| Index: content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
|
| diff --git a/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc b/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
|
| index 68f4e81fbef0c73f41b93147023c8a7bb8841c6c..3f8e21611f472071e90c51c4d5b21a0f3762dbd0 100644
|
| --- a/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
|
| +++ b/content/browser/child_process_security_policy_impl.cc
|
| @@ -580,14 +580,13 @@ void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::RevokeReadRawCookies(int child_id) {
|
| state->second->RevokeReadRawCookies();
|
| }
|
|
|
| -bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanLoadPage(
|
| - int child_id,
|
| - const GURL& url,
|
| - ResourceType::Type resource_type) {
|
| +bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanLoadPage(int child_id,
|
| + const GURL& url,
|
| + ResourceType resource_type) {
|
| // If --site-per-process flag is passed, we should enforce
|
| // stronger security restrictions on page navigation.
|
| if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kSitePerProcess) &&
|
| - ResourceType::IsFrame(resource_type)) {
|
| + IsResourceTypeFrame(resource_type)) {
|
| // TODO(nasko): Do the proper check for site-per-process, once
|
| // out-of-process iframes is ready to go.
|
| return true;
|
|
|