Index: net/socket/ssl_client_socket_openssl.cc |
diff --git a/net/socket/ssl_client_socket_openssl.cc b/net/socket/ssl_client_socket_openssl.cc |
index b417e13b86c3196c53f202b4c1f5dc9949ef5b3b..4e86c055932ed7517600625db0179d13ee720029 100644 |
--- a/net/socket/ssl_client_socket_openssl.cc |
+++ b/net/socket/ssl_client_socket_openssl.cc |
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ |
#include "crypto/openssl_util.h" |
#include "crypto/scoped_openssl_types.h" |
#include "net/base/net_errors.h" |
+#include "net/cert/cert_policy_enforcer.h" |
#include "net/cert/cert_verifier.h" |
#include "net/cert/ct_ev_whitelist.h" |
#include "net/cert/ct_verifier.h" |
@@ -380,6 +381,7 @@ SSLClientSocketOpenSSL::SSLClientSocketOpenSSL( |
handshake_succeeded_(false), |
marked_session_as_good_(false), |
transport_security_state_(context.transport_security_state), |
+ policy_enforcer_(context.cert_policy_enforcer), |
net_log_(transport_->socket()->NetLog()), |
weak_factory_(this) { |
} |
@@ -1144,21 +1146,6 @@ int SSLClientSocketOpenSSL::DoVerifyCertComplete(int result) { |
result = ERR_SSL_PINNED_KEY_NOT_IN_CERT_CHAIN; |
} |
- scoped_refptr<ct::EVCertsWhitelist> ev_whitelist = |
- SSLConfigService::GetEVCertsWhitelist(); |
- if (server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV) { |
- if (ev_whitelist.get() && ev_whitelist->IsValid()) { |
- const SHA256HashValue fingerprint( |
- X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint256( |
- server_cert_verify_result_.verified_cert->os_cert_handle())); |
- |
- UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN( |
- "Net.SSL_EVCertificateInWhitelist", |
- ev_whitelist->ContainsCertificateHash( |
- std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(fingerprint.data), 8))); |
- } |
- } |
- |
if (result == OK) { |
// Only check Certificate Transparency if there were no other errors with |
// the connection. |
@@ -1251,15 +1238,28 @@ void SSLClientSocketOpenSSL::VerifyCT() { |
// Note that this is a completely synchronous operation: The CT Log Verifier |
// gets all the data it needs for SCT verification and does not do any |
// external communication. |
- int result = cert_transparency_verifier_->Verify( |
- server_cert_verify_result_.verified_cert.get(), |
- ocsp_response, sct_list, &ct_verify_result_, net_log_); |
- |
- VLOG(1) << "CT Verification complete: result " << result |
- << " Invalid scts: " << ct_verify_result_.invalid_scts.size() |
- << " Verified scts: " << ct_verify_result_.verified_scts.size() |
- << " scts from unknown logs: " |
- << ct_verify_result_.unknown_logs_scts.size(); |
+ cert_transparency_verifier_->Verify( |
+ server_cert_verify_result_.verified_cert.get(), ocsp_response, sct_list, |
+ &ct_verify_result_, net_log_); |
+ |
+ if (!policy_enforcer_) { |
+ server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_IS_EV; |
+ } else { |
+ if (server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV) { |
+ scoped_refptr<ct::EVCertsWhitelist> ev_whitelist = |
+ SSLConfigService::GetEVCertsWhitelist(); |
+ if (!policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy( |
+ server_cert_verify_result_.verified_cert.get(), |
+ ev_whitelist.get(), ct_verify_result_)) { |
+ // TODO(eranm): Log via the BoundNetLog, see crbug.com/437766 |
+ VLOG(1) << "EV certificate for " |
+ << server_cert_verify_result_.verified_cert->subject() |
+ .GetDisplayName() |
+ << " does not conform to CT policy, removing EV status."; |
+ server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_IS_EV; |
+ } |
+ } |
+ } |
} |
void SSLClientSocketOpenSSL::OnHandshakeIOComplete(int result) { |