Certificate Transparency: Require SCTs for EV certificates.

net/cert/cert_policy_enforcer_unittest.cc

Index: net/cert/cert_policy_enforcer_unittest.cc
diff --git a/net/cert/cert_policy_enforcer_unittest.cc b/net/cert/cert_policy_enforcer_unittest.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..32be62caef28f5f2cc76a78baa2ab67833c74711
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/cert/cert_policy_enforcer_unittest.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+// Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include "net/cert/cert_policy_enforcer.h"
+
+#include <string>
+
+#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h"
+#include "net/cert/ct_ev_whitelist.h"
+#include "net/cert/ct_verify_result.h"
+#include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
+#include "net/test/cert_test_util.h"
+#include "net/test/ct_test_util.h"
+#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
+
+namespace net {
+
+namespace {
+
+class DummyEVCertsWhitelist : public ct::EVCertsWhitelist {
+ public:
+  explicit DummyEVCertsWhitelist(bool always_return)
+      : canned_response_(always_return) {}
+
+  bool IsValid() const override { return true; }
+
+  bool ContainsCertificateHash(
+      const std::string& certificate_hash) const override {
+    return canned_response_;
+  }
+
+ protected:
+  ~DummyEVCertsWhitelist() override {}
+
+ private:
+  bool canned_response_;
+};
+
+class CertPolicyEnforcerTest : public ::testing::Test {
+ public:
+  virtual void SetUp() override {
+    policy_enforcer_.reset(new CertPolicyEnforcer(5, true));
+
+    std::string der_test_cert(ct::GetDerEncodedX509Cert());
+    chain_ = X509Certificate::CreateFromBytes(der_test_cert.data(),
+                                              der_test_cert.length());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(chain_.get());
+    whitelist_ = new DummyEVCertsWhitelist(false);
+  }
+
+  void FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(
+      ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::Origin desired_origin,
+      int num_scts,
+      ct::CTVerifyResult* result) {
+    for (int i = 0; i < num_scts; ++i) {
+      scoped_refptr<ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp> sct(
+          new ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp());
+      sct->origin = desired_origin;
+      result->verified_scts.push_back(sct);
+    }
+  }
+
+ protected:
+  scoped_ptr<CertPolicyEnforcer> policy_enforcer_;
+  scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain_;
+  scoped_refptr<ct::EVCertsWhitelist> whitelist_;
+};
+
+TEST_F(CertPolicyEnforcerTest, ConformsToCTEVPolicyWithNonEmbeddedSCTs) {
+  ct::CTVerifyResult result;
+  FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(
+      ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_FROM_TLS_EXTENSION, 2, &result);
+
+  EXPECT_TRUE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+      chain_.get(), whitelist_.get(), result));
+}
+
+TEST_F(CertPolicyEnforcerTest, ConformsToCTEVPolicyWithEmbeddedSCTs) {
+  // This chain_ is valid for 10 years - over 121 months - so requires 5 SCTs.
+  ct::CTVerifyResult result;
+  FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 5,
+                             &result);
+
+  EXPECT_TRUE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+      chain_.get(), whitelist_.get(), result));
+}
+
+TEST_F(CertPolicyEnforcerTest, ConformsToCTEVPolicyMixedOriginSCTs) {
+  ct::CTVerifyResult result;
+  FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(
+      ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_FROM_TLS_EXTENSION, 2, &result);
+  result.verified_scts[1]->origin =
+      ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED;
+  EXPECT_TRUE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+      chain_.get(), whitelist_.get(), result));
+}
+
+TEST_F(CertPolicyEnforcerTest, DoesNotConformToCTEVPolicyNotEnoughSCTs) {
+  // This chain_ is valid for 10 years - over 121 months - so requires 5 SCTs.
+  // However, as there are only two logs, two SCTs will be required - supply one
+  // to guarantee the test fails.
+  ct::CTVerifyResult result;
+  FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 1,
+                             &result);
+
+  EXPECT_FALSE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+      chain_.get(), whitelist_.get(), result));
+}
+
+TEST_F(CertPolicyEnforcerTest, DoesNotEnforceCTPolicyIfNotRequired) {
+  scoped_ptr<CertPolicyEnforcer> enforcer(new CertPolicyEnforcer(3, false));
+
+  ct::CTVerifyResult result;
+  FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 1,
+                             &result);
+  // Expect true despite the chain not having enough SCTs as the policy
+  // is not enforced.
+  EXPECT_TRUE(enforcer->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(chain_.get(), whitelist_.get(),
+                                                result));
+}
+
+TEST_F(CertPolicyEnforcerTest, DoesNotConformToPolicyInvalidDates) {
+  scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> no_valid_dates_cert(new X509Certificate(
+      "subject", "issuer", base::Time(), base::Time::Now()));
+  ct::CTVerifyResult result;
+  FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 5,
+                             &result);
+  EXPECT_FALSE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+      no_valid_dates_cert.get(), NULL, result));
+}
+
+TEST_F(CertPolicyEnforcerTest,
+       ConformsToPolicyExactNumberOfSCTsForValidityPeriod) {
+  // Test multiple validity periods: Over 27 months, Over 15 months (but less
+  // than 27 months),
+  // Less than 15 months.
+  const size_t validity_period[] = {12, 19, 30, 50};
+  const size_t needed_scts[] = {2, 3, 4, 5};
+
+  for (int i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
+    size_t curr_validity = validity_period[i];
+    scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(new X509Certificate(
+        "subject", "issuer", base::Time::Now(),
+        base::Time::Now() + base::TimeDelta::FromDays(31 * curr_validity)));
+    size_t curr_required_scts = needed_scts[i];
+    ct::CTVerifyResult result;
+    for (size_t j = 0; j < curr_required_scts - 1; ++j) {
+      FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED,
+                                 1, &result);
+      EXPECT_FALSE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+          cert.get(), NULL, result))
+          << " for: " << curr_validity << " and " << curr_required_scts
+          << " scts=" << result.verified_scts.size() << " j=" << j;
+    }
+    FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 1,
+                               &result);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+        cert.get(), NULL, result));
+  }
+}
+
+TEST_F(CertPolicyEnforcerTest,
+       ConformsToPolicyButDoesNotRequireMoreThanNumLogs) {
+  scoped_ptr<CertPolicyEnforcer> enforcer(new CertPolicyEnforcer(2, true));
+
+  ct::CTVerifyResult result;
+  FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 2,
+                             &result);
+  // Expect true despite the chain not having enough SCTs according to the
+  // policy
+  // since we only have 2 logs.
+  EXPECT_TRUE(enforcer->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(chain_.get(), whitelist_.get(),
+                                                result));
+}
+
+TEST_F(CertPolicyEnforcerTest, ConformsToPolicyByEVWhitelistPresence) {
+  scoped_refptr<ct::EVCertsWhitelist> whitelist =
+      new DummyEVCertsWhitelist(true);
+
+  ct::CTVerifyResult result;
+  FillResultWithSCTsOfOrigin(ct::SignedCertificateTimestamp::SCT_EMBEDDED, 1,
+                             &result);
+  EXPECT_TRUE(policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+      chain_.get(), whitelist.get(), result));
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+}  // namespace net