Index: net/android/keystore_openssl.cc |
diff --git a/net/android/keystore_openssl.cc b/net/android/keystore_openssl.cc |
index 91c5b78fbe6abab07a2bd513694e45cc2a2a25bf..dbb3b1c73f2394bbb697e3f2ba79d1fe54cf88cf 100644 |
--- a/net/android/keystore_openssl.cc |
+++ b/net/android/keystore_openssl.cc |
@@ -6,10 +6,16 @@ |
#include <jni.h> |
#include <openssl/bn.h> |
+// This include is required to get the ECDSA_METHOD structure definition |
+// which isn't currently part of the OpenSSL official ABI. This should |
+// not be a concern for Chromium which always links against its own |
+// version of the library on Android. |
+#include <openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_locl.h> |
+// And this one is needed for the EC_GROUP definition. |
+#include <openssl/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h> |
#include <openssl/dsa.h> |
#include <openssl/ec.h> |
#include <openssl/engine.h> |
-#include <openssl/err.h> |
#include <openssl/evp.h> |
#include <openssl/rsa.h> |
@@ -54,10 +60,41 @@ |
// fields point to static methods used to implement the corresponding |
// RSA operation using platform Android APIs. |
// |
-// However, the platform APIs require a jobject JNI reference to work. It must |
-// be stored in the RSA instance, or made accessible when the custom RSA |
-// methods are called. This is done by storing it in a |KeyExData| structure |
-// that's referenced by the key using |EX_DATA|. |
+// However, the platform APIs require a jobject JNI reference to work. |
+// It must be stored in the RSA instance, or made accessible when the |
+// custom RSA methods are called. This is done by using RSA_set_app_data() |
+// and RSA_get_app_data(). |
+// |
+// One can thus _directly_ create a new EVP_PKEY that uses a custom RSA |
+// object with the following: |
+// |
+// RSA* rsa = RSA_new() |
+// RSA_set_method(&custom_rsa_method); |
+// RSA_set_app_data(rsa, jni_private_key); |
+// |
+// EVP_PKEY* pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); |
+// EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa); |
+// |
+// Note that because EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA() is used, instead of |
+// EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(), the new EVP_PKEY now owns the RSA object, and |
+// will destroy it when it is itself destroyed. |
+// |
+// Unfortunately, such objects cannot be used with RSA_size(), which |
+// totally ignores the RSA_METHOD pointers. Instead, it is necessary |
+// to manually setup the modulus field (n) in the RSA object, with a |
+// value that matches the wrapped PrivateKey object. See GetRsaPkeyWrapper |
+// for full details. |
+// |
+// Similarly, custom DSA_METHOD and ECDSA_METHOD are defined by this source |
+// file, and appropriate field setups are performed to ensure that |
+// DSA_size() and ECDSA_size() work properly with the wrapper EVP_PKEY. |
+// |
+// Note that there is no need to define an OpenSSL ENGINE here. These |
+// are objects that can be used to expose custom methods (i.e. either |
+// RSA_METHOD, DSA_METHOD, ECDSA_METHOD, and a large number of other ones |
+// for types not related to this source file), and make them used by |
+// default for a lot of operations. Very fortunately, this is not needed |
+// here, which saves a lot of complexity. |
using base::android::ScopedJavaGlobalRef; |
using base::android::ScopedJavaLocalRef; |
@@ -67,127 +104,45 @@ namespace android { |
namespace { |
-extern const RSA_METHOD android_rsa_method; |
-extern const ECDSA_METHOD android_ecdsa_method; |
+typedef crypto::ScopedOpenSSL<EC_GROUP, EC_GROUP_free>::Type ScopedEC_GROUP; |
+ |
+// Custom RSA_METHOD that uses the platform APIs. |
+// Note that for now, only signing through RSA_sign() is really supported. |
+// all other method pointers are either stubs returning errors, or no-ops. |
+// See <openssl/rsa.h> for exact declaration of RSA_METHOD. |
-// KeyExData contains the data that is contained in the EX_DATA of the RSA, DSA |
-// and ECDSA objects that are created to wrap Android system keys. |
-struct KeyExData { |
- // private_key contains a reference to a Java, private-key object. |
+struct RsaAppData { |
jobject private_key; |
- // legacy_rsa, if not NULL, points to an RSA* in the system's OpenSSL (which |
- // might not be ABI compatible with Chromium). |
AndroidRSA* legacy_rsa; |
- // cached_size contains the "size" of the key. This is the size of the |
- // modulus (in bytes) for RSA, or the group order size for (EC)DSA. This |
- // avoids calling into Java to calculate the size. |
- size_t cached_size; |
-}; |
- |
-// ExDataDup is called when one of the RSA, DSA or EC_KEY objects is |
-// duplicated. We don't support this and it should never happen. |
-int ExDataDup(CRYPTO_EX_DATA* to, |
- const CRYPTO_EX_DATA* from, |
- void** from_d, |
- int index, |
- long argl, |
- void* argp) { |
- CHECK(false); |
- return 0; |
-} |
- |
-// ExDataFree is called when one of the RSA, DSA or EC_KEY object is freed. |
-void ExDataFree(void* parent, |
- void* ptr, |
- CRYPTO_EX_DATA* ad, |
- int index, |
- long argl, |
- void* argp) { |
- // Ensure the global JNI reference created with this wrapper is |
- // properly destroyed with it. |
- KeyExData *ex_data = reinterpret_cast<KeyExData*>(ptr); |
- if (ex_data != NULL) { |
- ReleaseKey(ex_data->private_key); |
- delete ex_data; |
- } |
-} |
- |
-// BoringSSLEngine is a BoringSSL ENGINE that implements RSA, DSA and ECDSA by |
-// forwarding the requested operations to the Java libraries. |
-class BoringSSLEngine { |
- public: |
- BoringSSLEngine() |
- : rsa_index_(RSA_get_ex_new_index(0 /* argl */, |
- NULL /* argp */, |
- NULL /* new_func */, |
- ExDataDup, |
- ExDataFree)), |
- ec_key_index_(EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index(0 /* argl */, |
- NULL /* argp */, |
- NULL /* new_func */, |
- ExDataDup, |
- ExDataFree)), |
- engine_(ENGINE_new()) { |
- ENGINE_set_RSA_method( |
- engine_, &android_rsa_method, sizeof(android_rsa_method)); |
- ENGINE_set_ECDSA_method( |
- engine_, &android_ecdsa_method, sizeof(android_ecdsa_method)); |
- } |
- |
- int rsa_ex_index() const { return rsa_index_; } |
- int ec_key_ex_index() const { return ec_key_index_; } |
- |
- const ENGINE* engine() const { return engine_; } |
- |
- private: |
- const int rsa_index_; |
- const int ec_key_index_; |
- ENGINE* const engine_; |
}; |
-base::LazyInstance<BoringSSLEngine>::Leaky global_boringssl_engine = |
- LAZY_INSTANCE_INITIALIZER; |
- |
- |
-// VectorBignumSize returns the number of bytes needed to represent the bignum |
-// given in |v|, i.e. the length of |v| less any leading zero bytes. |
-size_t VectorBignumSize(const std::vector<uint8>& v) { |
- size_t size = v.size(); |
- // Ignore any leading zero bytes. |
- for (size_t i = 0; i < v.size() && v[i] == 0; i++) { |
- size--; |
- } |
- return size; |
-} |
- |
-KeyExData* RsaGetExData(const RSA* rsa) { |
- return reinterpret_cast<KeyExData*>( |
- RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, global_boringssl_engine.Get().rsa_ex_index())); |
-} |
- |
-size_t RsaMethodSize(const RSA *rsa) { |
- const KeyExData *ex_data = RsaGetExData(rsa); |
- return ex_data->cached_size; |
+int RsaMethodPubEnc(int flen, |
+ const unsigned char* from, |
+ unsigned char* to, |
+ RSA* rsa, |
+ int padding) { |
+ NOTIMPLEMENTED(); |
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
+ return -1; |
} |
-int RsaMethodEncrypt(RSA* rsa, |
- size_t* out_len, |
- uint8_t* out, |
- size_t max_out, |
- const uint8_t* in, |
- size_t in_len, |
- int padding) { |
+int RsaMethodPubDec(int flen, |
+ const unsigned char* from, |
+ unsigned char* to, |
+ RSA* rsa, |
+ int padding) { |
NOTIMPLEMENTED(); |
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, encrypt, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); |
- return 1; |
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
+ return -1; |
} |
-int RsaMethodSignRaw(RSA* rsa, |
- size_t* out_len, |
- uint8_t* out, |
- size_t max_out, |
- const uint8_t* in, |
- size_t in_len, |
+// See RSA_eay_private_encrypt in |
+// third_party/openssl/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c for the default |
+// implementation of this function. |
+int RsaMethodPrivEnc(int flen, |
+ const unsigned char *from, |
+ unsigned char *to, |
+ RSA *rsa, |
int padding) { |
DCHECK_EQ(RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, padding); |
if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { |
@@ -198,22 +153,22 @@ int RsaMethodSignRaw(RSA* rsa, |
// the same Android version as the "NONEwithRSA" |
// java.security.Signature algorithm, so the same version checks |
// for GetRsaLegacyKey should work. |
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, sign_raw, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); |
- return 0; |
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); |
+ return -1; |
} |
// Retrieve private key JNI reference. |
- const KeyExData *ex_data = RsaGetExData(rsa); |
- if (!ex_data || !ex_data->private_key) { |
+ RsaAppData* app_data = static_cast<RsaAppData*>(RSA_get_app_data(rsa)); |
+ if (!app_data || !app_data->private_key) { |
LOG(WARNING) << "Null JNI reference passed to RsaMethodPrivEnc!"; |
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, sign_raw, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- return 0; |
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
+ return -1; |
} |
// Pre-4.2 legacy codepath. |
- if (ex_data->legacy_rsa) { |
- int ret = ex_data->legacy_rsa->meth->rsa_priv_enc( |
- in_len, in, out, ex_data->legacy_rsa, ANDROID_RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); |
+ if (app_data->legacy_rsa) { |
+ int ret = app_data->legacy_rsa->meth->rsa_priv_enc( |
+ flen, from, to, app_data->legacy_rsa, ANDROID_RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); |
if (ret < 0) { |
LOG(WARNING) << "Could not sign message in RsaMethodPrivEnc!"; |
// System OpenSSL will use a separate error queue, so it is still |
@@ -223,92 +178,126 @@ int RsaMethodSignRaw(RSA* rsa, |
// if there were some way to convince Java to do it. (Without going |
// through Java, it's difficult to get a handle on a system OpenSSL |
// function; dlopen loads a second copy.) |
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, sign_raw, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- return 0; |
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
+ return -1; |
} |
- *out_len = ret; |
- return 1; |
+ return ret; |
} |
- base::StringPiece from_piece(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(in), in_len); |
+ base::StringPiece from_piece(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(from), flen); |
std::vector<uint8> result; |
// For RSA keys, this function behaves as RSA_private_encrypt with |
// PKCS#1 padding. |
- if (!RawSignDigestWithPrivateKey(ex_data->private_key, from_piece, &result)) { |
+ if (!RawSignDigestWithPrivateKey(app_data->private_key, |
+ from_piece, &result)) { |
LOG(WARNING) << "Could not sign message in RsaMethodPrivEnc!"; |
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, sign_raw, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- return 0; |
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
+ return -1; |
} |
size_t expected_size = static_cast<size_t>(RSA_size(rsa)); |
if (result.size() > expected_size) { |
LOG(ERROR) << "RSA Signature size mismatch, actual: " |
<< result.size() << ", expected <= " << expected_size; |
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, sign_raw, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
- if (max_out < expected_size) { |
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, sign_raw, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); |
- return 0; |
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
+ return -1; |
} |
// Copy result to OpenSSL-provided buffer. RawSignDigestWithPrivateKey |
// should pad with leading 0s, but if it doesn't, pad the result. |
size_t zero_pad = expected_size - result.size(); |
- memset(out, 0, zero_pad); |
- memcpy(out + zero_pad, &result[0], result.size()); |
- *out_len = expected_size; |
+ memset(to, 0, zero_pad); |
+ memcpy(to + zero_pad, &result[0], result.size()); |
- return 1; |
+ return expected_size; |
} |
-int RsaMethodDecrypt(RSA* rsa, |
- size_t* out_len, |
- uint8_t* out, |
- size_t max_out, |
- const uint8_t* in, |
- size_t in_len, |
+int RsaMethodPrivDec(int flen, |
+ const unsigned char* from, |
+ unsigned char* to, |
+ RSA* rsa, |
int padding) { |
NOTIMPLEMENTED(); |
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, decrypt, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); |
- return 1; |
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED); |
+ return -1; |
} |
-int RsaMethodVerifyRaw(RSA* rsa, |
- size_t* out_len, |
- uint8_t* out, |
- size_t max_out, |
- const uint8_t* in, |
- size_t in_len, |
- int padding) { |
- NOTIMPLEMENTED(); |
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(RSA, verify_raw, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); |
- return 1; |
+int RsaMethodInit(RSA* rsa) { |
+ return 0; |
+} |
+ |
+int RsaMethodFinish(RSA* rsa) { |
+ // Ensure the global JNI reference created with this wrapper is |
+ // properly destroyed with it. |
+ RsaAppData* app_data = static_cast<RsaAppData*>(RSA_get_app_data(rsa)); |
+ if (app_data != NULL) { |
+ RSA_set_app_data(rsa, NULL); |
+ ReleaseKey(app_data->private_key); |
+ delete app_data; |
+ } |
+ // Actual return value is ignored by OpenSSL. There are no docs |
+ // explaining what this is supposed to be. |
+ return 0; |
} |
const RSA_METHOD android_rsa_method = { |
- { |
- 0 /* references */, |
- 1 /* is_static */ |
- } /* common */, |
- NULL /* app_data */, |
- |
- NULL /* init */, |
- NULL /* finish */, |
- RsaMethodSize, |
- NULL /* sign */, |
- NULL /* verify */, |
- RsaMethodEncrypt, |
- RsaMethodSignRaw, |
- RsaMethodDecrypt, |
- RsaMethodVerifyRaw, |
- NULL /* mod_exp */, |
- NULL /* bn_mod_exp */, |
- 0 /* flags */, |
- NULL /* keygen */, |
+ /* .name = */ "Android signing-only RSA method", |
+ /* .rsa_pub_enc = */ RsaMethodPubEnc, |
+ /* .rsa_pub_dec = */ RsaMethodPubDec, |
+ /* .rsa_priv_enc = */ RsaMethodPrivEnc, |
+ /* .rsa_priv_dec = */ RsaMethodPrivDec, |
+ /* .rsa_mod_exp = */ NULL, |
+ /* .bn_mod_exp = */ NULL, |
+ /* .init = */ RsaMethodInit, |
+ /* .finish = */ RsaMethodFinish, |
+ // This flag is necessary to tell OpenSSL to avoid checking the content |
+ // (i.e. internal fields) of the private key. Otherwise, it will complain |
+ // it's not valid for the certificate. |
+ /* .flags = */ RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK, |
+ /* .app_data = */ NULL, |
+ /* .rsa_sign = */ NULL, |
+ /* .rsa_verify = */ NULL, |
+ /* .rsa_keygen = */ NULL, |
}; |
+// Copy the contents of an encoded big integer into an existing BIGNUM. |
+// This function modifies |*num| in-place. |
+// |new_bytes| is the byte encoding of the new value. |
+// |num| points to the BIGNUM which will be assigned with the new value. |
+// Returns true on success, false otherwise. On failure, |*num| is |
+// not modified. |
+bool CopyBigNumFromBytes(const std::vector<uint8>& new_bytes, |
+ BIGNUM* num) { |
+ BIGNUM* ret = BN_bin2bn( |
+ reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(&new_bytes[0]), |
+ static_cast<int>(new_bytes.size()), |
+ num); |
+ return (ret != NULL); |
+} |
+ |
+// Decode the contents of an encoded big integer and either create a new |
+// BIGNUM object (if |*num_ptr| is NULL on input) or copy it (if |
+// |*num_ptr| is not NULL). |
+// |new_bytes| is the byte encoding of the new value. |
+// |num_ptr| is the address of a BIGNUM pointer. |*num_ptr| can be NULL. |
+// Returns true on success, false otherwise. On failure, |*num_ptr| is |
+// not modified. On success, |*num_ptr| will always be non-NULL and |
+// point to a valid BIGNUM object. |
+bool SwapBigNumPtrFromBytes(const std::vector<uint8>& new_bytes, |
+ BIGNUM** num_ptr) { |
+ BIGNUM* old_num = *num_ptr; |
+ BIGNUM* new_num = BN_bin2bn( |
+ reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(&new_bytes[0]), |
+ static_cast<int>(new_bytes.size()), |
+ old_num); |
+ if (new_num == NULL) |
+ return false; |
+ |
+ if (old_num == NULL) |
+ *num_ptr = new_num; |
+ return true; |
+} |
+ |
// Setup an EVP_PKEY to wrap an existing platform RSA PrivateKey object. |
// |private_key| is the JNI reference (local or global) to the object. |
// |legacy_rsa|, if non-NULL, is a pointer to the system OpenSSL RSA object |
@@ -322,8 +311,24 @@ const RSA_METHOD android_rsa_method = { |
bool GetRsaPkeyWrapper(jobject private_key, |
AndroidRSA* legacy_rsa, |
EVP_PKEY* pkey) { |
- crypto::ScopedRSA rsa( |
- RSA_new_method(global_boringssl_engine.Get().engine())); |
+ crypto::ScopedRSA rsa(RSA_new()); |
+ RSA_set_method(rsa.get(), &android_rsa_method); |
+ |
+ // HACK: RSA_size() doesn't work with custom RSA_METHODs. To ensure that |
+ // it will return the right value, set the 'n' field of the RSA object |
+ // to match the private key's modulus. |
+ // |
+ // TODO(davidben): After switching to BoringSSL, consider making RSA_size call |
+ // into an RSA_METHOD hook. |
+ std::vector<uint8> modulus; |
+ if (!GetRSAKeyModulus(private_key, &modulus)) { |
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get private key modulus"; |
+ return false; |
+ } |
+ if (!SwapBigNumPtrFromBytes(modulus, &rsa.get()->n)) { |
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to decode private key modulus"; |
+ return false; |
+ } |
ScopedJavaGlobalRef<jobject> global_key; |
global_key.Reset(NULL, private_key); |
@@ -331,19 +336,10 @@ bool GetRsaPkeyWrapper(jobject private_key, |
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not create global JNI reference"; |
return false; |
} |
- |
- std::vector<uint8> modulus; |
- if (!GetRSAKeyModulus(private_key, &modulus)) { |
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get private key modulus"; |
- return false; |
- } |
- |
- KeyExData* ex_data = new KeyExData; |
- ex_data->private_key = global_key.Release(); |
- ex_data->legacy_rsa = legacy_rsa; |
- ex_data->cached_size = VectorBignumSize(modulus); |
- RSA_set_ex_data( |
- rsa.get(), global_boringssl_engine.Get().rsa_ex_index(), ex_data); |
+ RsaAppData* app_data = new RsaAppData(); |
+ app_data->private_key = global_key.Release(); |
+ app_data->legacy_rsa = legacy_rsa; |
+ RSA_set_app_data(rsa.get(), app_data); |
EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa.release()); |
return true; |
} |
@@ -402,7 +398,7 @@ EVP_PKEY* GetRsaLegacyKey(jobject private_key) { |
if (sys_rsa->engine) { |
// |private_key| may not have an engine if the PrivateKey did not come |
// from the key store, such as in unit tests. |
- if (strcmp(sys_rsa->engine->id, "keystore") == 0) { |
+ if (!strcmp(sys_rsa->engine->id, "keystore")) { |
LeakEngine(private_key); |
} else { |
NOTREACHED(); |
@@ -435,67 +431,266 @@ EVP_PKEY* GetRsaLegacyKey(jobject private_key) { |
return pkey; |
} |
+// Custom DSA_METHOD that uses the platform APIs. |
+// Note that for now, only signing through DSA_sign() is really supported. |
+// all other method pointers are either stubs returning errors, or no-ops. |
+// See <openssl/dsa.h> for exact declaration of DSA_METHOD. |
+// |
+// Note: There is no DSA_set_app_data() and DSA_get_app_data() functions, |
+// but RSA_set_app_data() is defined as a simple macro that calls |
+// RSA_set_ex_data() with a hard-coded index of 0, so this code |
+// does the same thing here. |
+ |
+DSA_SIG* DsaMethodDoSign(const unsigned char* dgst, |
+ int dlen, |
+ DSA* dsa) { |
+ // Extract the JNI reference to the PrivateKey object. |
+ jobject private_key = reinterpret_cast<jobject>(DSA_get_ex_data(dsa, 0)); |
+ if (private_key == NULL) |
+ return NULL; |
+ |
+ // Sign the message with it, calling platform APIs. |
+ std::vector<uint8> signature; |
+ if (!RawSignDigestWithPrivateKey( |
+ private_key, |
+ base::StringPiece( |
+ reinterpret_cast<const char*>(dgst), |
+ static_cast<size_t>(dlen)), |
+ &signature)) { |
+ return NULL; |
+ } |
+ |
+ // Note: With DSA, the actual signature might be smaller than DSA_size(). |
+ size_t max_expected_size = static_cast<size_t>(DSA_size(dsa)); |
+ if (signature.size() > max_expected_size) { |
+ LOG(ERROR) << "DSA Signature size mismatch, actual: " |
+ << signature.size() << ", expected <= " |
+ << max_expected_size; |
+ return NULL; |
+ } |
+ |
+ // Convert the signature into a DSA_SIG object. |
+ const unsigned char* sigbuf = |
+ reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(&signature[0]); |
+ int siglen = static_cast<size_t>(signature.size()); |
+ DSA_SIG* dsa_sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &sigbuf, siglen); |
+ return dsa_sig; |
+} |
+ |
+int DsaMethodSignSetup(DSA* dsa, |
+ BN_CTX* ctx_in, |
+ BIGNUM** kinvp, |
+ BIGNUM** rp) { |
+ NOTIMPLEMENTED(); |
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE); |
+ return -1; |
+} |
+ |
+int DsaMethodDoVerify(const unsigned char* dgst, |
+ int dgst_len, |
+ DSA_SIG* sig, |
+ DSA* dsa) { |
+ NOTIMPLEMENTED(); |
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE); |
+ return -1; |
+} |
+ |
+int DsaMethodFinish(DSA* dsa) { |
+ // Free the global JNI reference that was created with this |
+ // wrapper key. |
+ jobject key = reinterpret_cast<jobject>(DSA_get_ex_data(dsa,0)); |
+ if (key != NULL) { |
+ DSA_set_ex_data(dsa, 0, NULL); |
+ ReleaseKey(key); |
+ } |
+ // Actual return value is ignored by OpenSSL. There are no docs |
+ // explaining what this is supposed to be. |
+ return 0; |
+} |
+ |
+const DSA_METHOD android_dsa_method = { |
+ /* .name = */ "Android signing-only DSA method", |
+ /* .dsa_do_sign = */ DsaMethodDoSign, |
+ /* .dsa_sign_setup = */ DsaMethodSignSetup, |
+ /* .dsa_do_verify = */ DsaMethodDoVerify, |
+ /* .dsa_mod_exp = */ NULL, |
+ /* .bn_mod_exp = */ NULL, |
+ /* .init = */ NULL, // nothing to do here. |
+ /* .finish = */ DsaMethodFinish, |
+ /* .flags = */ 0, |
+ /* .app_data = */ NULL, |
+ /* .dsa_paramgem = */ NULL, |
+ /* .dsa_keygen = */ NULL |
+}; |
+ |
+// Setup an EVP_PKEY to wrap an existing DSA platform PrivateKey object. |
+// |private_key| is a JNI reference (local or global) to the object. |
+// |pkey| is the EVP_PKEY to setup as a wrapper. |
+// Returns true on success, false otherwise. |
+// On success, this creates a global JNI reference to the same object |
+// that will be owned by and destroyed with the EVP_PKEY. |
+bool GetDsaPkeyWrapper(jobject private_key, EVP_PKEY* pkey) { |
+ crypto::ScopedDSA dsa(DSA_new()); |
+ DSA_set_method(dsa.get(), &android_dsa_method); |
+ |
+ // DSA_size() doesn't work with custom DSA_METHODs. To ensure it |
+ // returns the right value, set the 'q' field in the DSA object to |
+ // match the parameter from the platform key. |
+ std::vector<uint8> q; |
+ if (!GetDSAKeyParamQ(private_key, &q)) { |
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Can't extract Q parameter from DSA private key"; |
+ return false; |
+ } |
+ if (!SwapBigNumPtrFromBytes(q, &dsa.get()->q)) { |
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Can't decode Q parameter from DSA private key"; |
+ return false; |
+ } |
+ |
+ ScopedJavaGlobalRef<jobject> global_key; |
+ global_key.Reset(NULL, private_key); |
+ if (global_key.is_null()) { |
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Could not create global JNI reference"; |
+ return false; |
+ } |
+ DSA_set_ex_data(dsa.get(), 0, global_key.Release()); |
+ EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa.release()); |
+ return true; |
+} |
+ |
// Custom ECDSA_METHOD that uses the platform APIs. |
// Note that for now, only signing through ECDSA_sign() is really supported. |
// all other method pointers are either stubs returning errors, or no-ops. |
+// |
+// Note: The ECDSA_METHOD structure doesn't have init/finish |
+// methods. As such, the only way to to ensure the global |
+// JNI reference is properly released when the EVP_PKEY is |
+// destroyed is to use a custom EX_DATA type. |
+ |
+// Used to ensure that the global JNI reference associated with a custom |
+// EC_KEY + ECDSA_METHOD wrapper is released when its EX_DATA is destroyed |
+// (this function is called when EVP_PKEY_free() is called on the wrapper). |
+void ExDataFree(void* parent, |
+ void* ptr, |
+ CRYPTO_EX_DATA* ad, |
+ int idx, |
+ long argl, |
+ void* argp) { |
+ jobject private_key = reinterpret_cast<jobject>(ptr); |
+ if (private_key == NULL) |
+ return; |
-jobject EcKeyGetKey(const EC_KEY* ec_key) { |
- KeyExData* ex_data = reinterpret_cast<KeyExData*>(EC_KEY_get_ex_data( |
- ec_key, global_boringssl_engine.Get().ec_key_ex_index())); |
- return ex_data->private_key; |
+ CRYPTO_set_ex_data(ad, idx, NULL); |
+ ReleaseKey(private_key); |
+} |
+ |
+int ExDataDup(CRYPTO_EX_DATA* to, |
+ CRYPTO_EX_DATA* from, |
+ void* from_d, |
+ int idx, |
+ long argl, |
+ void* argp) { |
+ // This callback shall never be called with the current OpenSSL |
+ // implementation (the library only ever duplicates EX_DATA items |
+ // for SSL and BIO objects). But provide this to catch regressions |
+ // in the future. |
+ CHECK(false) << "ExDataDup was called for ECDSA custom key !?"; |
+ // Return value is currently ignored by OpenSSL. |
+ return 0; |
} |
-size_t EcdsaMethodGroupOrderSize(const EC_KEY* key) { |
- KeyExData* ex_data = reinterpret_cast<KeyExData*>(EC_KEY_get_ex_data( |
- key, global_boringssl_engine.Get().ec_key_ex_index())); |
- return ex_data->cached_size; |
+class EcdsaExDataIndex { |
+public: |
+ int ex_data_index() { return ex_data_index_; } |
+ |
+ EcdsaExDataIndex() { |
+ ex_data_index_ = ECDSA_get_ex_new_index(0, // argl |
+ NULL, // argp |
+ NULL, // new_func |
+ ExDataDup, // dup_func |
+ ExDataFree); // free_func |
+ } |
+ |
+private: |
+ int ex_data_index_; |
+}; |
+ |
+// Returns the index of the custom EX_DATA used to store the JNI reference. |
+int EcdsaGetExDataIndex(void) { |
+ // Use a LazyInstance to perform thread-safe lazy initialization. |
+ // Use a leaky one, since OpenSSL doesn't provide a way to release |
+ // allocated EX_DATA indices. |
+ static base::LazyInstance<EcdsaExDataIndex>::Leaky s_instance = |
+ LAZY_INSTANCE_INITIALIZER; |
+ return s_instance.Get().ex_data_index(); |
} |
-int EcdsaMethodSign(const uint8_t* digest, |
- size_t digest_len, |
- uint8_t* sig, |
- unsigned int* sig_len, |
- EC_KEY* eckey) { |
+ECDSA_SIG* EcdsaMethodDoSign(const unsigned char* dgst, |
+ int dgst_len, |
+ const BIGNUM* inv, |
+ const BIGNUM* rp, |
+ EC_KEY* eckey) { |
// Retrieve private key JNI reference. |
- jobject private_key = EcKeyGetKey(eckey); |
+ jobject private_key = reinterpret_cast<jobject>( |
+ ECDSA_get_ex_data(eckey, EcdsaGetExDataIndex())); |
if (!private_key) { |
- LOG(WARNING) << "Null JNI reference passed to EcdsaMethodSign!"; |
- return 0; |
+ LOG(WARNING) << "Null JNI reference passed to EcdsaMethodDoSign!"; |
+ return NULL; |
} |
// Sign message with it through JNI. |
std::vector<uint8> signature; |
- base::StringPiece digest_sp(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(digest), |
- digest_len); |
- if (!RawSignDigestWithPrivateKey(private_key, digest_sp, &signature)) { |
- LOG(WARNING) << "Could not sign message in EcdsaMethodSign!"; |
- return 0; |
+ base::StringPiece digest( |
+ reinterpret_cast<const char*>(dgst), |
+ static_cast<size_t>(dgst_len)); |
+ if (!RawSignDigestWithPrivateKey( |
+ private_key, digest, &signature)) { |
+ LOG(WARNING) << "Could not sign message in EcdsaMethodDoSign!"; |
+ return NULL; |
} |
// Note: With ECDSA, the actual signature may be smaller than |
// ECDSA_size(). |
- size_t max_expected_size = ECDSA_size(eckey); |
+ size_t max_expected_size = static_cast<size_t>(ECDSA_size(eckey)); |
if (signature.size() > max_expected_size) { |
LOG(ERROR) << "ECDSA Signature size mismatch, actual: " |
<< signature.size() << ", expected <= " |
<< max_expected_size; |
- return 0; |
+ return NULL; |
} |
- memcpy(sig, &signature[0], signature.size()); |
- *sig_len = signature.size(); |
- return 1; |
+ // Convert signature to ECDSA_SIG object |
+ const unsigned char* sigbuf = |
+ reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(&signature[0]); |
+ long siglen = static_cast<long>(signature.size()); |
+ return d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &sigbuf, siglen); |
} |
-int EcdsaMethodVerify(const uint8_t* digest, |
- size_t digest_len, |
- const uint8_t* sig, |
- size_t sig_len, |
- EC_KEY* eckey) { |
+int EcdsaMethodSignSetup(EC_KEY* eckey, |
+ BN_CTX* ctx, |
+ BIGNUM** kinv, |
+ BIGNUM** r) { |
NOTIMPLEMENTED(); |
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ECDSA, ECDSA_do_verify, ECDSA_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); |
- return 0; |
+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_SIGN_SETUP, ECDSA_R_ERR_EC_LIB); |
+ return -1; |
+} |
+ |
+int EcdsaMethodDoVerify(const unsigned char* dgst, |
+ int dgst_len, |
+ const ECDSA_SIG* sig, |
+ EC_KEY* eckey) { |
+ NOTIMPLEMENTED(); |
+ ECDSAerr(ECDSA_F_ECDSA_DO_VERIFY, ECDSA_R_ERR_EC_LIB); |
+ return -1; |
} |
+const ECDSA_METHOD android_ecdsa_method = { |
+ /* .name = */ "Android signing-only ECDSA method", |
+ /* .ecdsa_do_sign = */ EcdsaMethodDoSign, |
+ /* .ecdsa_sign_setup = */ EcdsaMethodSignSetup, |
+ /* .ecdsa_do_verify = */ EcdsaMethodDoVerify, |
+ /* .flags = */ 0, |
+ /* .app_data = */ NULL, |
+}; |
+ |
// Setup an EVP_PKEY to wrap an existing platform PrivateKey object. |
// |private_key| is the JNI reference (local or global) to the object. |
// |pkey| is the EVP_PKEY to setup as a wrapper. |
@@ -504,48 +699,41 @@ int EcdsaMethodVerify(const uint8_t* digest, |
// is owned by and destroyed with the EVP_PKEY. I.e. the caller shall |
// always free |private_key| after the call. |
bool GetEcdsaPkeyWrapper(jobject private_key, EVP_PKEY* pkey) { |
- crypto::ScopedEC_KEY eckey( |
- EC_KEY_new_method(global_boringssl_engine.Get().engine())); |
- |
- ScopedJavaGlobalRef<jobject> global_key; |
- global_key.Reset(NULL, private_key); |
- if (global_key.is_null()) { |
- LOG(ERROR) << "Can't create global JNI reference"; |
- return false; |
- } |
+ crypto::ScopedEC_KEY eckey(EC_KEY_new()); |
+ ECDSA_set_method(eckey.get(), &android_ecdsa_method); |
+ // To ensure that ECDSA_size() works properly, craft a custom EC_GROUP |
+ // that has the same order than the private key. |
std::vector<uint8> order; |
if (!GetECKeyOrder(private_key, &order)) { |
LOG(ERROR) << "Can't extract order parameter from EC private key"; |
return false; |
} |
+ ScopedEC_GROUP group(EC_GROUP_new(EC_GFp_nist_method())); |
+ if (!group.get()) { |
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Can't create new EC_GROUP"; |
+ return false; |
+ } |
+ if (!CopyBigNumFromBytes(order, &group.get()->order)) { |
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Can't decode order from PrivateKey"; |
+ return false; |
+ } |
+ EC_KEY_set_group(eckey.get(), group.release()); |
- KeyExData* ex_data = new KeyExData; |
- ex_data->private_key = global_key.Release(); |
- ex_data->legacy_rsa = NULL; |
- ex_data->cached_size = VectorBignumSize(order); |
- |
- EC_KEY_set_ex_data( |
- eckey.get(), global_boringssl_engine.Get().ec_key_ex_index(), ex_data); |
+ ScopedJavaGlobalRef<jobject> global_key; |
+ global_key.Reset(NULL, private_key); |
+ if (global_key.is_null()) { |
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Can't create global JNI reference"; |
+ return false; |
+ } |
+ ECDSA_set_ex_data(eckey.get(), |
+ EcdsaGetExDataIndex(), |
+ global_key.Release()); |
EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, eckey.release()); |
return true; |
} |
-const ECDSA_METHOD android_ecdsa_method = { |
- { |
- 0 /* references */, |
- 1 /* is_static */ |
- } /* common */, |
- NULL /* app_data */, |
- |
- NULL /* init */, |
- NULL /* finish */, |
- EcdsaMethodGroupOrderSize, |
- EcdsaMethodSign, |
- EcdsaMethodVerify, |
-}; |
- |
} // namespace |
EVP_PKEY* GetOpenSSLPrivateKeyWrapper(jobject private_key) { |
@@ -577,6 +765,10 @@ EVP_PKEY* GetOpenSSLPrivateKeyWrapper(jobject private_key) { |
} |
} |
break; |
+ case PRIVATE_KEY_TYPE_DSA: |
+ if (!GetDsaPkeyWrapper(private_key, pkey.get())) |
+ return NULL; |
+ break; |
case PRIVATE_KEY_TYPE_ECDSA: |
if (!GetEcdsaPkeyWrapper(private_key, pkey.get())) |
return NULL; |