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Unified Diff: net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslplatf.c

Issue 3455019: Support for using OS-native certificates for SSL client auth.... (Closed) Base URL: svn://chrome-svn/chrome/trunk/src/
Patch Set: Upload before checkin Created 10 years, 1 month ago
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Index: net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslplatf.c
===================================================================
--- net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslplatf.c (revision 0)
+++ net/third_party/nss/ssl/sslplatf.c (revision 0)
@@ -0,0 +1,561 @@
+/*
+ * Platform specific crypto wrappers
+ *
+ * ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK *****
+ * Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1
+ *
+ * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version
+ * 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
+ * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
+ *
+ * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License
+ * for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries.
+ *
+ * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is
+ * Netscape Communications Corporation.
+ * Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 1994-2000
+ * the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Contributor(s):
+ * Ryan Sleevi <ryan.sleevi@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of
+ * either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or
+ * the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"),
+ * in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead
+ * of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only
+ * under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to
+ * use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your
+ * decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice
+ * and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete
+ * the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under
+ * the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL.
+ *
+ * ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */
+/* $Id$ */
+#include "ssl.h"
+#include "certt.h"
+#include "keythi.h"
+#include "sslimpl.h"
+#include "cryptohi.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+
+#ifdef NSS_PLATFORM_CLIENT_AUTH
+CERTCertificateList*
+hack_NewCertificateListFromCertList(CERTCertList* list)
+{
+ CERTCertificateList * chain = NULL;
+ PRArenaPool * arena = NULL;
+ CERTCertListNode * node;
+ int len;
+
+ if (CERT_LIST_EMPTY(list))
+ goto loser;
+
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(4096);
+ if (arena == NULL)
+ goto loser;
+
+ for (len = 0, node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(list); !CERT_LIST_END(node, list);
+ len++, node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) {
+ }
+
+ chain = PORT_ArenaNew(arena, CERTCertificateList);
+ if (chain == NULL)
+ goto loser;
+
+ chain->certs = PORT_ArenaNewArray(arena, SECItem, len);
+ if (!chain->certs)
+ goto loser;
+ chain->len = len;
+
+ for (len = 0, node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(list); !CERT_LIST_END(node, list);
+ len++, node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) {
+ // Check to see if the last cert to be sent is a self-signed cert,
+ // and if so, omit it from the list of certificates. However, if
+ // there is only one cert (len == 0), include the cert, as it means
+ // the EE cert is self-signed.
+ if (len > 0 && (len == chain->len - 1) && node->cert->isRoot) {
+ chain->len = len;
+ break;
+ }
+ SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &chain->certs[len], &node->cert->derCert);
+ }
+
+ chain->arena = arena;
+ return chain;
+
+loser:
+ if (arena) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#if defined(XP_WIN32)
+void
+ssl_FreePlatformKey(PlatformKey key)
+{
+ CryptReleaseContext(key, 0);
+}
+
+void
+ssl_FreePlatformAuthInfo(PlatformAuthInfo* info)
+{
+ if (info->provider != NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(info->provider);
+ info->provider = NULL;
+ }
+ if (info->container != NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(info->container);
+ info->container = NULL;
+ }
+ info->provType = 0;
+}
+
+void
+ssl_InitPlatformAuthInfo(PlatformAuthInfo* info)
+{
+ info->provider = NULL;
+ info->container = NULL;
+ info->provType = 0;
+}
+
+PRBool
+ssl_PlatformAuthTokenPresent(PlatformAuthInfo *info)
+{
+ HCRYPTPROV prov = 0;
+
+ if (!info || !info->provider || !info->container)
+ return PR_FALSE;
+
+ if (!CryptAcquireContextA(&prov, info->container, info->provider,
+ info->provType, 0))
+ return PR_FALSE;
+
+ CryptReleaseContext(prov, 0);
+ return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+void
+ssl_GetPlatformAuthInfoForKey(PlatformKey key,
+ PlatformAuthInfo *info)
+{
+ DWORD bytesNeeded = 0;
+ ssl_InitPlatformAuthInfo(info);
+ bytesNeeded = sizeof(info->provType);
+ if (!CryptGetProvParam(key, PP_PROVTYPE, (BYTE*)&info->provType,
+ &bytesNeeded, 0))
+ goto error;
+
+ bytesNeeded = 0;
+ if (!CryptGetProvParam(key, PP_CONTAINER, NULL, &bytesNeeded, 0))
+ goto error;
+ info->container = (char*)PORT_Alloc(bytesNeeded);
+ if (info->container == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ if (!CryptGetProvParam(key, PP_CONTAINER, (BYTE*)info->container,
+ &bytesNeeded, 0))
+ goto error;
+
+ bytesNeeded = 0;
+ if (!CryptGetProvParam(key, PP_NAME, NULL, &bytesNeeded, 0))
+ goto error;
+ info->provider = (char*)PORT_Alloc(bytesNeeded);
+ if (info->provider == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ if (!CryptGetProvParam(key, PP_NAME, (BYTE*)info->provider,
+ &bytesNeeded, 0))
+ goto error;
+
+ goto done;
+error:
+ ssl_FreePlatformAuthInfo(info);
+
+done:
+ return;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_PlatformSignHashes(SSL3Hashes *hash, PlatformKey key, SECItem *buf,
+ PRBool isTLS)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ PRBool doDerEncode = PR_FALSE;
+ SECItem hashItem;
+ /* TODO(rsleevi): Should AT_SIGNATURE also be checked if doing client
+ * auth?
+ */
+ DWORD keySpec = AT_KEYEXCHANGE;
+ HCRYPTKEY hKey = 0;
+ DWORD argLen = 0;
+ ALG_ID keyAlg = 0;
+ DWORD signatureLen = 0;
+ ALG_ID hashAlg = 0;
+ HCRYPTHASH hHash = 0;
+ DWORD hashLen = 0;
+ unsigned int i = 0;
+
+ buf->data = NULL;
+ if (!CryptGetUserKey(key, keySpec, &hKey)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ argLen = sizeof(keyAlg);
+ if (!CryptGetKeyParam(hKey, KP_ALGID, (BYTE*)&keyAlg, &argLen, 0)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ switch (keyAlg) {
+ case CALG_RSA_KEYX:
+ case CALG_RSA_SIGN:
+ hashAlg = CALG_SSL3_SHAMD5;
+ hashItem.data = hash->md5;
+ hashItem.len = sizeof(SSL3Hashes);
+ break;
+ case CALG_DSS_SIGN:
+ /* TODO: Support CALG_ECDSA once tested */
+ case CALG_ECDSA:
+ if (keyAlg == CALG_ECDSA) {
+ doDerEncode = PR_TRUE;
+ } else {
+ doDerEncode = isTLS;
+ }
+ hashAlg = CALG_SHA1;
+ hashItem.data = hash->sha;
+ hashItem.len = sizeof(hash->sha);
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashItem.data, hashItem.len));
+
+ if (!CryptCreateHash(key, hashAlg, 0, 0, &hHash)) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ argLen = sizeof(hashLen);
+ if (!CryptGetHashParam(hHash, HP_HASHSIZE, (BYTE*)&hashLen, &argLen, 0)) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (hashLen != hashItem.len) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (!CryptSetHashParam(hHash, HP_HASHVAL, (BYTE*)hashItem.data, 0)) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (!CryptSignHash(hHash, keySpec, NULL, CRYPT_NOHASHOID,
+ NULL, &signatureLen) || signatureLen == 0) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ buf->len = signatureLen;
+ buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen);
+ if (!buf->data)
+ goto done; /* error code was set. */
+
+ if (!CryptSignHash(hHash, keySpec, NULL, CRYPT_NOHASHOID,
+ (BYTE*)buf->data, &signatureLen)) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* CryptoAPI signs in little-endian, so reverse */
+ for (i = 0; i < buf->len / 2; ++i) {
+ unsigned char tmp = buf->data[i];
+ buf->data[i] = buf->data[buf->len - 1 - i];
+ buf->data[buf->len - 1 - i] = tmp;
+ }
+ if (doDerEncode) {
+ SECItem derSig = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
+
+ /* This also works for an ECDSA signature */
+ rv = DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen(&derSig, buf, buf->len);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_Free(buf->data); /* discard unencoded signature. */
+ *buf = derSig; /* give caller encoded signature. */
+ } else if (derSig.data) {
+ PORT_Free(derSig.data);
+ }
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "signed hashes", buf->data, buf->len));
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+done:
+ if (hHash)
+ CryptDestroyHash(hHash);
+ if (hKey)
+ CryptDestroyKey(hKey);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess && buf->data) {
+ PORT_Free(buf->data);
+ buf->data = NULL;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+#elif defined(XP_MACOSX)
+#include <Security/cssm.h>
+
+/*
+ * In Mac OS X 10.5, these two functions are private but implemented, and
+ * in Mac OS X 10.6, these are exposed publicly. To compile with the 10.5
+ * SDK, we declare them here.
+ */
+OSStatus SecKeychainItemCreatePersistentReference(SecKeychainItemRef itemRef, CFDataRef *persistentItemRef);
+OSStatus SecKeychainItemCopyFromPersistentReference(CFDataRef persistentItemRef, SecKeychainItemRef *itemRef);
+
+void
+ssl_FreePlatformKey(PlatformKey key)
+{
+ CFRelease(key);
+}
+
+void
+ssl_FreePlatformAuthInfo(PlatformAuthInfo* info)
+{
+ if (info->keychain != NULL) {
+ CFRelease(info->keychain);
+ info->keychain = NULL;
+ }
+ if (info->persistentKey != NULL) {
+ CFRelease(info->persistentKey);
+ info->persistentKey = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+ssl_InitPlatformAuthInfo(PlatformAuthInfo* info)
+{
+ info->keychain = NULL;
+ info->persistentKey = NULL;
+}
+
+PRBool
+ssl_PlatformAuthTokenPresent(PlatformAuthInfo* info)
+{
+ if (!info || !info->keychain || !info->persistentKey)
+ return PR_FALSE;
+
+ // Not actually interested in the status, but it can be used to make sure
+ // that the keychain still exists (as smart card ejection will remove
+ // the keychain)
+ SecKeychainStatus keychainStatus;
+ OSStatus rv = SecKeychainGetStatus(info->keychain, &keychainStatus);
+ if (rv != noErr)
+ return PR_FALSE;
+
+ // Make sure the individual key still exists within the keychain, if
+ // the keychain is present
+ SecKeychainItemRef keychainItem;
+ rv = SecKeychainItemCopyFromPersistentReference(info->persistentKey,
+ &keychainItem);
+ if (rv != noErr)
+ return PR_FALSE;
+
+ CFRelease(keychainItem);
+ return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+void
+ssl_GetPlatformAuthInfoForKey(PlatformKey key,
+ PlatformAuthInfo *info)
+{
+ SecKeychainItemRef keychainItem = (SecKeychainItemRef)key;
+ OSStatus rv = SecKeychainItemCopyKeychain(keychainItem, &info->keychain);
+ if (rv == noErr) {
+ rv = SecKeychainItemCreatePersistentReference(keychainItem,
+ &info->persistentKey);
+ }
+ if (rv != noErr) {
+ ssl_FreePlatformAuthInfo(info);
+ }
+ return;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_PlatformSignHashes(SSL3Hashes *hash, PlatformKey key, SECItem *buf,
+ PRBool isTLS)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+ PRBool doDerEncode = PR_FALSE;
+ unsigned int signatureLen;
+ OSStatus status = noErr;
+ CSSM_CSP_HANDLE cspHandle = 0;
+ const CSSM_KEY *cssmKey = NULL;
+ CSSM_ALGORITHMS sigAlg;
+ const CSSM_ACCESS_CREDENTIALS * cssmCreds = NULL;
+ CSSM_RETURN cssmRv;
+ CSSM_DATA hashData;
+ CSSM_DATA signatureData;
+ CSSM_CC_HANDLE cssmSignature = 0;
+
+ buf->data = NULL;
+
+ status = SecKeyGetCSPHandle(key, &cspHandle);
+ if (status != noErr) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ status = SecKeyGetCSSMKey(key, &cssmKey);
+ if (status != noErr || !cssmKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* SecKeyGetBlockSize wasn't addeded until OS X 10.6 - but the
+ * needed information is readily available on the key itself.
+ */
+ signatureLen = (cssmKey->KeyHeader.LogicalKeySizeInBits + 7) / 8;
+
+ if (signatureLen == 0) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ buf->len = signatureLen;
+ buf->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(signatureLen);
+ if (!buf->data)
+ goto done; /* error code was set. */
+
+ sigAlg = cssmKey->KeyHeader.AlgorithmId;
+ switch (sigAlg) {
+ case CSSM_ALGID_RSA:
+ hashData.Data = hash->md5;
+ hashData.Length = sizeof(SSL3Hashes);
+ break;
+ case CSSM_ALGID_ECDSA:
+ case CSSM_ALGID_DSA:
+ if (sigAlg == CSSM_ALGID_ECDSA) {
+ doDerEncode = PR_TRUE;
+ } else {
+ doDerEncode = isTLS;
+ }
+ hashData.Data = hash->sha;
+ hashData.Length = sizeof(hash->sha);
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "hash(es) to be signed", hashData.Data, hashData.Length));
+
+ /* TODO(rsleevi): Should it be kSecCredentialTypeNoUI? In Win32, at least,
+ * you can prevent the UI by setting the provider handle on the
+ * certificate to be opened with CRYPT_SILENT, but is there an equivalent?
+ */
+ status = SecKeyGetCredentials(key, CSSM_ACL_AUTHORIZATION_SIGN,
+ kSecCredentialTypeDefault, &cssmCreds);
+ if (status != noErr) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ signatureData.Length = buf->len;
+ signatureData.Data = (uint8*)buf->data;
+
+ cssmRv = CSSM_CSP_CreateSignatureContext(cspHandle, sigAlg, cssmCreds,
+ cssmKey, &cssmSignature);
+ if (cssmRv) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* See "Apple Cryptographic Service Provider Functional Specification" */
+ if (cssmKey->KeyHeader.AlgorithmId == CSSM_ALGID_RSA) {
+ /* To set RSA blinding for RSA keys */
+ CSSM_CONTEXT_ATTRIBUTE blindingAttr;
+ blindingAttr.AttributeType = CSSM_ATTRIBUTE_RSA_BLINDING;
+ blindingAttr.AttributeLength = sizeof(uint32);
+ blindingAttr.Attribute.Uint32 = 1;
+ cssmRv = CSSM_UpdateContextAttributes(cssmSignature, 1, &blindingAttr);
+ if (cssmRv) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ cssmRv = CSSM_SignData(cssmSignature, &hashData, 1, CSSM_ALGID_NONE,
+ &signatureData);
+ if (cssmRv) {
+ ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SIGN_HASHES_FAILURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (doDerEncode) {
+ SECItem derSig = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
+
+ /* This also works for an ECDSA signature */
+ rv = DSAU_EncodeDerSigWithLen(&derSig, buf, buf->len);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_Free(buf->data); /* discard unencoded signature. */
+ *buf = derSig; /* give caller encoded signature. */
+ } else if (derSig.data) {
+ PORT_Free(derSig.data);
+ }
+ }
+
+ PRINT_BUF(60, (NULL, "signed hashes", buf->data, buf->len));
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+done:
+ /* cspHandle, cssmKey, and cssmCreds are owned by the SecKeyRef and
+ * should not be freed. When the PlatformKey is freed, they will be
+ * released.
+ */
+ if (cssmSignature)
+ CSSM_DeleteContext(cssmSignature);
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess && buf->data) {
+ PORT_Free(buf->data);
+ buf->data = NULL;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+#else
+void
+ssl_FreePlatformKey(PlatformKey key)
+{
+}
+
+void
+ssl_FreePlatformAuthInfo(PlatformAuthInfo *info)
+{
+}
+
+void
+ssl_InitPlatformAuthInfo(PlatformAuthInfo *info)
+{
+}
+
+PRBool
+ssl_PlatformAuthTokenPresent(PlatformAuthInfo *info)
+{
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+void
+ssl_GetPlatformAuthInfoForKey(PlatformKey key, PlatformAuthInfo *info)
+{
+}
+
+SECStatus
+ssl3_PlatformSignHashes(SSL3Hashes *hash, PlatformKey key, SECItem *buf,
+ PRBool isTLS)
+{
+ PORT_SetError(PR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_ERROR);
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* NSS_PLATFORM_CLIENT_AUTH */
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