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Unified Diff: sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall_unittest.cc

Issue 330723003: Clean-up the SandboxSyscall interface (Closed) Base URL: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src
Patch Set: Address comments. Created 6 years, 6 months ago
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Index: sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall_unittest.cc
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall_unittest.cc b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall_unittest.cc
index bdeee4fe2da77cf87cbda1d980787e52f3ee93b7..80b5079bae08fe35e02d2b57dcb0f0dc77b33795 100644
--- a/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall_unittest.cc
+++ b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall_unittest.cc
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include "base/basictypes.h"
#include "base/posix/eintr_wrapper.h"
+#include "build/build_config.h"
#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/bpf_tests.h"
#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h"
#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/syscall.h"
@@ -31,24 +32,25 @@ const int kMMapNr = __NR_mmap;
#endif
TEST(Syscall, WellKnownEntryPoint) {
-// Test that SandboxSyscall(-1) is handled specially. Don't do this on ARM,
+// Test that Syscall::Call(-1) is handled specially. Don't do this on ARM,
// where syscall(-1) crashes with SIGILL. Not running the test is fine, as we
// are still testing ARM code in the next set of tests.
#if !defined(__arm__)
- EXPECT_NE(SandboxSyscall(-1), syscall(-1));
+ EXPECT_NE(Syscall::Call(-1), syscall(-1));
#endif
-// If possible, test that SandboxSyscall(-1) returns the address right after
+// If possible, test that Syscall::Call(-1) returns the address right
+// after
// a kernel entry point.
#if defined(__i386__)
- EXPECT_EQ(0x80CDu, ((uint16_t*)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // INT 0x80
+ EXPECT_EQ(0x80CDu, ((uint16_t*)Syscall::Call(-1))[-1]); // INT 0x80
#elif defined(__x86_64__)
- EXPECT_EQ(0x050Fu, ((uint16_t*)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // SYSCALL
+ EXPECT_EQ(0x050Fu, ((uint16_t*)Syscall::Call(-1))[-1]); // SYSCALL
#elif defined(__arm__)
#if defined(__thumb__)
- EXPECT_EQ(0xDF00u, ((uint16_t*)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // SWI 0
+ EXPECT_EQ(0xDF00u, ((uint16_t*)Syscall::Call(-1))[-1]); // SWI 0
#else
- EXPECT_EQ(0xEF000000u, ((uint32_t*)SandboxSyscall(-1))[-1]); // SVC 0
+ EXPECT_EQ(0xEF000000u, ((uint32_t*)Syscall::Call(-1))[-1]); // SVC 0
#endif
#else
#warning Incomplete test case; need port for target platform
@@ -57,17 +59,25 @@ TEST(Syscall, WellKnownEntryPoint) {
TEST(Syscall, TrivialSyscallNoArgs) {
// Test that we can do basic system calls
- EXPECT_EQ(SandboxSyscall(__NR_getpid), syscall(__NR_getpid));
+ EXPECT_EQ(Syscall::Call(__NR_getpid), syscall(__NR_getpid));
}
TEST(Syscall, TrivialSyscallOneArg) {
int new_fd;
// Duplicate standard error and close it.
- ASSERT_GE(new_fd = SandboxSyscall(__NR_dup, 2), 0);
- int close_return_value = IGNORE_EINTR(SandboxSyscall(__NR_close, new_fd));
+ ASSERT_GE(new_fd = Syscall::Call(__NR_dup, 2), 0);
+ int close_return_value = IGNORE_EINTR(Syscall::Call(__NR_close, new_fd));
ASSERT_EQ(close_return_value, 0);
}
+TEST(Syscall, TrivialFailingSyscall) {
+ errno = -42;
+ int ret = Syscall::Call(__NR_dup, -1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(-EBADF, ret);
+ // Verify that Syscall::Call does not touch errno.
+ ASSERT_EQ(-42, errno);
+}
+
// SIGSYS trap handler that will be called on __NR_uname.
intptr_t CopySyscallArgsToAux(const struct arch_seccomp_data& args, void* aux) {
// |aux| is our BPF_AUX pointer.
@@ -91,7 +101,8 @@ ErrorCode CopyAllArgsOnUnamePolicy(SandboxBPF* sandbox,
}
}
-// We are testing SandboxSyscall() by making use of a BPF filter that allows us
+// We are testing Syscall::Call() by making use of a BPF filter that
+// allows us
// to inspect the system call arguments that the kernel saw.
BPF_TEST(Syscall,
SyntheticSixArgs,
@@ -109,13 +120,13 @@ BPF_TEST(Syscall,
// We could use pretty much any system call we don't need here. uname() is
// nice because it doesn't have any dangerous side effects.
- BPF_ASSERT(SandboxSyscall(__NR_uname,
- syscall_args[0],
- syscall_args[1],
- syscall_args[2],
- syscall_args[3],
- syscall_args[4],
- syscall_args[5]) == -ENOMEM);
+ BPF_ASSERT(Syscall::Call(__NR_uname,
+ syscall_args[0],
+ syscall_args[1],
+ syscall_args[2],
+ syscall_args[3],
+ syscall_args[4],
+ syscall_args[5]) == -ENOMEM);
// We expect the trap handler to have copied the 6 arguments.
BPF_ASSERT(BPF_AUX->size() == 6);
@@ -133,69 +144,69 @@ BPF_TEST(Syscall,
TEST(Syscall, ComplexSyscallSixArgs) {
int fd;
- ASSERT_LE(0, fd = SandboxSyscall(__NR_open, "/dev/null", O_RDWR, 0L));
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd = Syscall::Call(__NR_open, "/dev/null", O_RDWR, 0L));
// Use mmap() to allocate some read-only memory
char* addr0;
- ASSERT_NE((char*)NULL,
- addr0 = reinterpret_cast<char*>(
- SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr,
- (void*)NULL,
- 4096,
- PROT_READ,
- MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS,
- fd,
- 0L)));
+ ASSERT_NE(
+ (char*)NULL,
+ addr0 = reinterpret_cast<char*>(Syscall::Call(kMMapNr,
+ (void*)NULL,
+ 4096,
+ PROT_READ,
+ MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS,
+ fd,
+ 0L)));
// Try to replace the existing mapping with a read-write mapping
char* addr1;
ASSERT_EQ(addr0,
addr1 = reinterpret_cast<char*>(
- SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr,
- addr0,
- 4096L,
- PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
- MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED,
- fd,
- 0L)));
+ Syscall::Call(kMMapNr,
+ addr0,
+ 4096L,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED,
+ fd,
+ 0L)));
++*addr1; // This should not seg fault
// Clean up
- EXPECT_EQ(0, SandboxSyscall(__NR_munmap, addr1, 4096L));
- EXPECT_EQ(0, IGNORE_EINTR(SandboxSyscall(__NR_close, fd)));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, Syscall::Call(__NR_munmap, addr1, 4096L));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, IGNORE_EINTR(Syscall::Call(__NR_close, fd)));
// Check that the offset argument (i.e. the sixth argument) is processed
// correctly.
- ASSERT_GE(fd = SandboxSyscall(__NR_open, "/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY, 0L), 0);
+ ASSERT_GE(fd = Syscall::Call(__NR_open, "/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY, 0L), 0);
char* addr2, *addr3;
ASSERT_NE((char*)NULL,
- addr2 = reinterpret_cast<char*>(SandboxSyscall(
+ addr2 = reinterpret_cast<char*>(Syscall::Call(
kMMapNr, (void*)NULL, 8192L, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0L)));
ASSERT_NE((char*)NULL,
- addr3 = reinterpret_cast<char*>(SandboxSyscall(kMMapNr,
- (void*)NULL,
- 4096L,
- PROT_READ,
- MAP_PRIVATE,
- fd,
+ addr3 = reinterpret_cast<char*>(Syscall::Call(kMMapNr,
+ (void*)NULL,
+ 4096L,
+ PROT_READ,
+ MAP_PRIVATE,
+ fd,
#if defined(__NR_mmap2)
- 1L
+ 1L
#else
- 4096L
+ 4096L
#endif
- )));
+ )));
EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(addr2 + 4096, addr3, 4096));
// Just to be absolutely on the safe side, also verify that the file
// contents matches what we are getting from a read() operation.
char buf[8192];
- EXPECT_EQ(8192, SandboxSyscall(__NR_read, fd, buf, 8192L));
+ EXPECT_EQ(8192, Syscall::Call(__NR_read, fd, buf, 8192L));
EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(addr2, buf, 8192));
// Clean up
- EXPECT_EQ(0, SandboxSyscall(__NR_munmap, addr2, 8192L));
- EXPECT_EQ(0, SandboxSyscall(__NR_munmap, addr3, 4096L));
- EXPECT_EQ(0, IGNORE_EINTR(SandboxSyscall(__NR_close, fd)));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, Syscall::Call(__NR_munmap, addr2, 8192L));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, Syscall::Call(__NR_munmap, addr3, 4096L));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, IGNORE_EINTR(Syscall::Call(__NR_close, fd)));
}
} // namespace
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