Pull seccomp-sandbox in via DEPS rather than using an in-tree copy...

sandbox/linux/seccomp/open.cc

Index: sandbox/linux/seccomp/open.cc
===================================================================
--- sandbox/linux/seccomp/open.cc	(revision 57969)
+++ sandbox/linux/seccomp/open.cc	(working copy)
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
-// found in the LICENSE file.
-
-#include "debug.h"
-#include "sandbox_impl.h"
-
-namespace playground {
-
-long Sandbox::sandbox_open(const char *pathname, int flags, mode_t mode) {
-  long long tm;
-  Debug::syscall(&tm, __NR_open, "Executing handler");
-  size_t len                    = strlen(pathname);
-  struct Request {
-    int       sysnum;
-    long long cookie;
-    Open      open_req;
-    char      pathname[0];
-  } __attribute__((packed)) *request;
-  char data[sizeof(struct Request) + len];
-  request                       = reinterpret_cast<struct Request*>(data);
-  request->sysnum               = __NR_open;
-  request->cookie               = cookie();
-  request->open_req.path_length = len;
-  request->open_req.flags       = flags;
-  request->open_req.mode        = mode;
-  memcpy(request->pathname, pathname, len);
-
-  long rc;
-  SysCalls sys;
-  if (write(sys, processFdPub(), request, sizeof(data)) != (int)sizeof(data) ||
-      read(sys, threadFdPub(), &rc, sizeof(rc)) != sizeof(rc)) {
-    die("Failed to forward open() request [sandbox]");
-  }
-  Debug::elapsed(tm, __NR_open);
-  return rc;
-}
-
-bool Sandbox::process_open(int parentMapsFd, int sandboxFd, int threadFdPub,
-                           int threadFd, SecureMem::Args* mem) {
-  // Read request
-  SysCalls sys;
-  Open open_req;
-  if (read(sys, sandboxFd, &open_req, sizeof(open_req)) != sizeof(open_req)) {
- read_parm_failed:
-    die("Failed to read parameters for open() [process]");
-  }
-  int   rc                  = -ENAMETOOLONG;
-  if (open_req.path_length >= sizeof(mem->pathname)) {
-    char buf[32];
-    while (open_req.path_length > 0) {
-      size_t len            = open_req.path_length > sizeof(buf) ?
-                              sizeof(buf) : open_req.path_length;
-      ssize_t i             = read(sys, sandboxFd, buf, len);
-      if (i <= 0) {
-        goto read_parm_failed;
-      }
-      open_req.path_length -= i;
-    }
-    if (write(sys, threadFd, &rc, sizeof(rc)) != sizeof(rc)) {
-      die("Failed to return data from open() [process]");
-    }
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  if ((open_req.flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY ||
-      !g_policy.allow_file_namespace) {
-    // After locking the mutex, we can no longer abandon the system call. So,
-    // perform checks before clobbering the securely shared memory.
-    char tmp[open_req.path_length];
-    if (read(sys, sandboxFd, tmp, open_req.path_length) !=
-        (ssize_t)open_req.path_length) {
-      goto read_parm_failed;
-    }
-    Debug::message(("Denying access to \"" + std::string(tmp) + "\"").c_str());
-    SecureMem::abandonSystemCall(threadFd, -EACCES);
-    return false;
-  }
-
-  SecureMem::lockSystemCall(parentMapsFd, mem);
-  if (read(sys, sandboxFd, mem->pathname, open_req.path_length) !=
-      (ssize_t)open_req.path_length) {
-    goto read_parm_failed;
-  }
-  mem->pathname[open_req.path_length] = '\000';
-
-  // TODO(markus): Implement sandboxing policy. For now, we allow read
-  // access to everything. That's probably not correct.
-  Debug::message(("Allowing access to \"" + std::string(mem->pathname) +
-                  "\"").c_str());
-
-  // Tell trusted thread to open the file.
-  SecureMem::sendSystemCall(threadFdPub, true, parentMapsFd, mem, __NR_open,
-                            mem->pathname - (char*)mem + (char*)mem->self,
-                            open_req.flags, open_req.mode);
-  return true;
-}
-
-} // namespace