Added net_log logging statments for CertVerifyResult

net/base/net_log_event_type_list.h

Index: net/base/net_log_event_type_list.h
diff --git a/net/base/net_log_event_type_list.h b/net/base/net_log_event_type_list.h
index 10d9c593b2f6b1376e5f7e13eb0c44fa044ba52f..c548b0c45f3ca6a15622382a119ffbafba9dcaef 100644
--- a/net/base/net_log_event_type_list.h
+++ b/net/base/net_log_event_type_list.h
@@ -1883,6 +1883,40 @@ EVENT_TYPE(CERT_VERIFIER_REQUEST)
 // This event is created when we start a CertVerifier job.
 // The END phase event parameters are:
 //   {
+//     "cert_status": <Bitmask of CERT_STATUS_*
+//                     from net/base/cert_status_flags.h>
+//     "common_name_fallback_used": <True if a fallback to the common name
+//                                   was used when matching the host
+//                                   name, rather than using the
+//                                   subjectAltName.>
+//     "has_md2": <Property of the certificate chain.>
+//     "has_md4": <Property of the certificate chain.>
+//     "has_md5": <Property of the certificate chain.>

[wtc, 2014/05/31 02:48:03]

The description of these three booleans should be more informative.
For example:

  "has_md2": <True if a certificate in the certificate chain is signed with a
MD2 signature.>

[mshelley, 2014/06/02 20:40:06]

Done.

+//     "is_issued_by_additional_trust_anchor": <True if the root CA used for
+//     this

[Ryan Sleevi, 2014/05/31 02:41:11]

Still unaligned (it should match up with "True" on 1895)

[mshelley, 2014/06/02 20:40:06]

Done.

+//                                              verification came from the list
+//                                              of additional trust anchors.>
+//     "is_issued_by_known_root": <True if we recognise the root CA as a
+//     standard

[Ryan Sleevi, 2014/05/31 02:41:11]

Ditto here.

[mshelley, 2014/06/02 20:40:06]

Done.

+//                                 root.  If it isn't then it's probably the
+//                                 case that this certificate was generated by
+//                                 a MITM proxy whose root has been installed
+//                                 locally. This is meaningless if the
+//                                 certificate
+//                                 was not trusted.>

[Ryan Sleevi, 2014/05/31 02:41:11]

You should be able to fold this onto 1905

[mshelley, 2014/06/02 20:40:06]

Done.

+//     "public_key_hashes": <If the certificate was successfully verified then
+//                           this contains the hashes, in several hash
+//                           algorithms,
+//                           of the SubjectPublicKeyInfos of the chain.>

[Ryan Sleevi, 2014/05/31 02:41:11]

You should be able to fold this with 1909

[mshelley, 2014/06/02 20:40:06]

Done.

+//     "verified_cert": <The certificate and chain that was constructed

[wtc, 2014/05/31 02:48:03]

Remove "and" from "certificate and chain".

[mshelley, 2014/06/02 20:40:06]

Done.

+//                       during verification. Note that the though the verified

[wtc, 2014/05/31 02:48:03]

In "the though the", I think the first "the" should be deleted.

[mshelley, 2014/06/02 20:40:06]

Done.

+//                       certificate will match the originally supplied
+//                       certificate,
+//                       the intermediate certificates stored within may be

[Ryan Sleevi, 2014/05/31 02:41:11]

You should be able to fold this onto 1914 (and adjust the lines below)

[mshelley, 2014/06/02 20:40:06]

Done.

+//                       substantially different. In the event of a verification
+//                       failure, this will contain the chain as supplied by the
+//                       server. This may be NULL if running within the
+//                       sandbox.>
 //     "certificates": <A list of PEM encoded certificates, the first one
 //                      being the certificate to verify and the remaining
 //                      being intermediate certificates to assist path