Added net_log logging statments for CertVerifyResult

net/base/net_log_event_type_list.h

Index: net/base/net_log_event_type_list.h
diff --git a/net/base/net_log_event_type_list.h b/net/base/net_log_event_type_list.h
index 10d9c593b2f6b1376e5f7e13eb0c44fa044ba52f..ec44e73d78ff58237f05789d76dfa9373a40a6b7 100644
--- a/net/base/net_log_event_type_list.h
+++ b/net/base/net_log_event_type_list.h
@@ -1881,12 +1881,51 @@ EVENT_TYPE(CHROME_POLICY_ABORTED_REQUEST)
 EVENT_TYPE(CERT_VERIFIER_REQUEST)
 
 // This event is created when we start a CertVerifier job.
+// The BEGIN phase event parameters are:
+// {
+//   "certificates": <A list of PEM encoded certificates, the first one
+//                    being the certificate to verify and the remaining
+//                    being intermediate certificates to assist path
+//                    building. Only present when byte logging is enabled.>
+// }
+//
 // The END phase event parameters are:
 //   {
-//     "certificates": <A list of PEM encoded certificates, the first one
-//                      being the certificate to verify and the remaining
-//                      being intermediate certificates to assist path
-//                      building. Only present when byte logging is enabled.>
+//     "cert_status": <Bitmask of CERT_STATUS_*
+//                     from net/base/cert_status_flags.h>
+//     "common_name_fallback_used": <True if a fallback to the common name
+//                                   was used when matching the host
+//                                   name, rather than using the
+//                                   subjectAltName.>
+//     "has_md2": <True if a certificate in the certificate chain is signed with
+//                 a MD2 signature.>
+//     "has_md4": <True if a certificate in the certificate chain is signed with
+//                 a MD4 signature.>
+//     "has_md5": <True if a certificate in the certificate chain is signed with
+//                 a MD5 signature.>
+//     "is_issued_by_additional_trust_anchor": <True if the root CA used for
+//                                              this verification came from the
+//                                              list of additional trust
+//                                              anchors.>
+//     "is_issued_by_known_root": <True if we recognise the root CA as a
+//                                 standard root.  If it isn't then it's
+//                                 probably the case that this certificate
+//                                 was generated by a MITM proxy whose root
+//                                 has been installed locally. This is
+//                                 meaningless if the certificate was not
+//                                 trusted.>
+//     "public_key_hashes": <If the certificate was successfully verified then
+//                           this contains the hashes, in several hash
+//                           algorithms, of the SubjectPublicKeyInfos of the
+//                           chain.>
+//     "verified_cert": <The certificate chain that was constructed
+//                       during verification. Note that though the verified
+//                       certificate will match the originally supplied
+//                       certificate, the intermediate certificates stored
+//                       within may be substantially different. In the event
+//                       of a verification failure, this will contain the
+//                       chain as supplied by the server. This may be NULL
+//                       if running within the sandbox.>
 //   }
 EVENT_TYPE(CERT_VERIFIER_JOB)