 Chromium Code Reviews
 Chromium Code Reviews Issue 299743002:
  Add domain-specific language for BPF policies  (Closed) 
  Base URL: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src
    
  
    Issue 299743002:
  Add domain-specific language for BPF policies  (Closed) 
  Base URL: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src| OLD | NEW | 
|---|---|
| (Empty) | |
| 1 // Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. | |
| 2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be | |
| 3 // found in the LICENSE file. | |
| 4 | |
| 5 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/bpf_dsl.h" | |
| 6 | |
| 7 #include <errno.h> | |
| 8 #include <netinet/in.h> | |
| 9 #include <sys/socket.h> | |
| 10 #include <sys/utsname.h> | |
| 11 | |
| 12 #include "base/macros.h" | |
| 13 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/bpf_tests.h" | |
| 14 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/errorcode.h" | |
| 15 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf_policy.h" | |
| 16 | |
| 17 using namespace sandbox::bpf_dsl; | |
| 18 | |
| 19 // Helper macro to assert that expression |expr| returns -1 and sets | |
| 20 // errno to |err|. | |
| 21 #define BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(err, expr) \ | |
| 22 do { \ | |
| 23 errno = 0; \ | |
| 24 BPF_ASSERT_EQ(-1, expr); \ | |
| 25 BPF_ASSERT_EQ(err, errno); \ | |
| 26 } while (0) | |
| 27 | |
| 28 namespace sandbox { | |
| 29 | |
| 30 namespace { | |
| 31 | |
| 32 class BasicPolicy : public SandboxBPFDSLPolicy { | |
| 33 public: | |
| 34 BasicPolicy() {} | |
| 35 virtual ~BasicPolicy() {} | |
| 36 virtual ResultExpr EvaluateSyscall(int sysno) const OVERRIDE { | |
| 37 if (sysno == __NR_getpgid) { | |
| 38 const Arg<pid_t> pid(0); | |
| 39 return If(pid == 0, Error(EPERM)).Else(Error(EINVAL)); | |
| 40 } | |
| 41 return Allow(); | |
| 42 } | |
| 43 | |
| 44 private: | |
| 45 DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(BasicPolicy); | |
| 46 }; | |
| 47 | |
| 48 BPF_TEST_C(BPFDSL, Basic, BasicPolicy) { | |
| 49 BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EPERM, getpgid(0)); | |
| 50 BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EINVAL, getpgid(1)); | |
| 51 } | |
| 52 | |
| 53 class BooleanLogicPolicy : public SandboxBPFDSLPolicy { | |
| 54 public: | |
| 55 BooleanLogicPolicy() {} | |
| 56 virtual ~BooleanLogicPolicy() {} | |
| 57 virtual ResultExpr EvaluateSyscall(int sysno) const OVERRIDE { | |
| 58 if (sysno == __NR_socketpair) { | |
| 
jln (very slow on Chromium)
2014/06/27 01:45:50
x86 32 bits is unhappy with this since it's multip
 
mdempsky
2014/06/28 00:36:42
Ah, right.
 | |
| 59 const Arg<int> domain(0), type(1), protocol(2); | |
| 60 return If(domain == AF_UNIX && | |
| 61 (type == SOCK_STREAM || type == SOCK_DGRAM) && | |
| 62 protocol == 0, | |
| 63 Error(EPERM)).Else(Error(EINVAL)); | |
| 64 } | |
| 65 return Allow(); | |
| 66 } | |
| 67 | |
| 68 private: | |
| 69 DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(BooleanLogicPolicy); | |
| 70 }; | |
| 71 | |
| 72 BPF_TEST_C(BPFDSL, BooleanLogic, BooleanLogicPolicy) { | |
| 73 int sv[2]; | |
| 74 | |
| 75 // Acceptable combinations that should return EPERM. | |
| 76 BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EPERM, socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sv)); | |
| 77 BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EPERM, socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, sv)); | |
| 78 | |
| 79 // Combinations that are invalid for only one reason; should return EINVAL. | |
| 80 BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EINVAL, socketpair(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sv)); | |
| 81 BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EINVAL, socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0, sv)); | |
| 82 BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EINVAL, socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP, sv)); | |
| 83 | |
| 84 // Completely unacceptable combination; should also return EINVAL. | |
| 85 BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EINVAL, | |
| 86 socketpair(AF_INET, SOCK_SEQPACKET, IPPROTO_UDP, sv)); | |
| 87 } | |
| 88 | |
| 89 static const uintptr_t kDeadBeefAddr = | |
| 90 static_cast<uintptr_t>(0xdeadbeefdeadbeefULL); | |
| 91 | |
| 92 class ArgSizePolicy : public SandboxBPFDSLPolicy { | |
| 93 public: | |
| 94 ArgSizePolicy() {} | |
| 95 virtual ~ArgSizePolicy() {} | |
| 96 virtual ResultExpr EvaluateSyscall(int sysno) const OVERRIDE { | |
| 97 if (sysno == __NR_uname) { | |
| 98 const Arg<uintptr_t> addr(0); | |
| 99 return If(addr == kDeadBeefAddr, Error(EPERM)).Else(Allow()); | |
| 100 } | |
| 101 return Allow(); | |
| 102 } | |
| 103 | |
| 104 private: | |
| 105 DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ArgSizePolicy); | |
| 106 }; | |
| 107 | |
| 108 BPF_TEST_C(BPFDSL, ArgSizeTest, ArgSizePolicy) { | |
| 109 struct utsname buf; | |
| 110 BPF_ASSERT_EQ(0, uname(&buf)); | |
| 111 | |
| 112 BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EPERM, | |
| 113 uname(reinterpret_cast<struct utsname*>(kDeadBeefAddr))); | |
| 114 } | |
| 115 | |
| 116 class TrappingPolicy : public SandboxBPFDSLPolicy { | |
| 117 public: | |
| 118 TrappingPolicy() {} | |
| 119 virtual ~TrappingPolicy() {} | |
| 120 virtual ResultExpr EvaluateSyscall(int sysno) const OVERRIDE { | |
| 121 if (sysno == __NR_uname) { | |
| 122 return Trap(UnameTrap, &count_); | |
| 123 } | |
| 124 return Allow(); | |
| 125 } | |
| 126 | |
| 127 private: | |
| 128 static intptr_t count_; | |
| 129 | |
| 130 static intptr_t UnameTrap(const struct arch_seccomp_data& data, void* aux) { | |
| 131 BPF_ASSERT_EQ(&count_, aux); | |
| 132 return ++count_; | |
| 133 } | |
| 134 | |
| 135 DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(TrappingPolicy); | |
| 136 }; | |
| 137 | |
| 138 intptr_t TrappingPolicy::count_; | |
| 139 | |
| 140 BPF_TEST_C(BPFDSL, TrapTest, TrappingPolicy) { | |
| 141 BPF_ASSERT_EQ(1, uname(NULL)); | |
| 142 BPF_ASSERT_EQ(2, uname(NULL)); | |
| 143 BPF_ASSERT_EQ(3, uname(NULL)); | |
| 144 } | |
| 145 | |
| 146 class MaskingPolicy : public SandboxBPFDSLPolicy { | |
| 147 public: | |
| 148 MaskingPolicy() {} | |
| 149 virtual ~MaskingPolicy() {} | |
| 150 virtual ResultExpr EvaluateSyscall(int sysno) const OVERRIDE { | |
| 151 if (sysno == __NR_setuid) { | |
| 152 const Arg<uid_t> uid(0); | |
| 153 return If((uid & 0xf) == 0, Error(EINVAL)).Else(Error(EACCES)); | |
| 154 } | |
| 155 if (sysno == __NR_setgid) { | |
| 156 const Arg<gid_t> gid(0); | |
| 157 return If((gid & 0xf0) == 0xf0, Error(EINVAL)).Else(Error(EACCES)); | |
| 158 } | |
| 159 return Allow(); | |
| 160 } | |
| 161 | |
| 162 private: | |
| 163 DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(MaskingPolicy); | |
| 164 }; | |
| 165 | |
| 166 BPF_TEST_C(BPFDSL, MaskTest, MaskingPolicy) { | |
| 167 for (uid_t uid = 0; uid < 0x100; ++uid) { | |
| 168 const int expect_errno = (uid & 0xf) == 0 ? EINVAL : EACCES; | |
| 169 BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(expect_errno, setuid(uid)); | |
| 170 } | |
| 171 | |
| 172 for (gid_t gid = 0; gid < 0x100; ++gid) { | |
| 173 const int expect_errno = (gid & 0xf0) == 0xf0 ? EINVAL : EACCES; | |
| 174 BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(expect_errno, setgid(gid)); | |
| 175 } | |
| 176 } | |
| 177 | |
| 178 class ElseIfPolicy : public SandboxBPFDSLPolicy { | |
| 179 public: | |
| 180 ElseIfPolicy() {} | |
| 181 virtual ~ElseIfPolicy() {} | |
| 182 virtual ResultExpr EvaluateSyscall(int sysno) const OVERRIDE { | |
| 183 if (sysno == __NR_setuid) { | |
| 184 const Arg<uid_t> uid(0); | |
| 185 return If((uid & 0xfff) == 0, Error(0)) | |
| 186 .ElseIf((uid & 0xff0) == 0, Error(EINVAL)) | |
| 187 .ElseIf((uid & 0xf00) == 0, Error(EEXIST)) | |
| 188 .Else(Error(EACCES)); | |
| 189 } | |
| 190 return Allow(); | |
| 191 } | |
| 192 | |
| 193 private: | |
| 194 DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(ElseIfPolicy); | |
| 195 }; | |
| 196 | |
| 197 BPF_TEST_C(BPFDSL, ElseIfTest, ElseIfPolicy) { | |
| 198 BPF_ASSERT_EQ(0, setuid(0)); | |
| 199 | |
| 200 BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EINVAL, setuid(0x0001)); | |
| 201 BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EINVAL, setuid(0x0002)); | |
| 202 | |
| 203 BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EEXIST, setuid(0x0011)); | |
| 204 BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EEXIST, setuid(0x0022)); | |
| 205 | |
| 206 BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EACCES, setuid(0x0111)); | |
| 207 BPF_ASSERT_ERROR(EACCES, setuid(0x0222)); | |
| 208 } | |
| 209 | |
| 210 } // namespace | |
| 211 | |
| 212 } // namespace sandbox | |
| OLD | NEW |