Rewrite all BPF policies to use DSL API

sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h

 // Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 #ifndef SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_HELPERS_SYSCALL_PARAMETERS_RESTRICTIONS_H_
 #define SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_HELPERS_SYSCALL_PARAMETERS_RESTRICTIONS_H_
 
 #include <unistd.h>
 
 #include "build/build_config.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/bpf_dsl.h"
 #include "sandbox/sandbox_export.h"
 
 // These are helpers to build seccomp-bpf policies, i.e. policies for a
 // sandbox that reduces the Linux kernel's attack surface. They return an
 // SANDBOX_EXPORT ErrorCode suitable to restrict certain system call parameters.
 
 namespace sandbox {
 
-class ErrorCode;
-class SandboxBPF;
-
 // Allow clone(2) for threads.
 // Reject fork(2) attempts with EPERM.
 // Don't restrict on ASAN.
 // Crash if anything else is attempted.
-SANDBOX_EXPORT ErrorCode
-    RestrictCloneToThreadsAndEPERMFork(SandboxBPF* sandbox);
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictCloneToThreadsAndEPERMFork();
 
 // Allow PR_SET_NAME, PR_SET_DUMPABLE, PR_GET_DUMPABLE.
 // Crash if anything else is attempted.
-SANDBOX_EXPORT ErrorCode RestrictPrctl(SandboxBPF* sandbox);
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictPrctl();
 
 // Allow TCGETS and FIONREAD.
 // Crash if anything else is attempted.
-SANDBOX_EXPORT ErrorCode RestrictIoctl(SandboxBPF* sandbox);
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictIoctl();
 
 // Restrict the flags argument in mmap(2).
 // Only allow: MAP_SHARED | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS |
 // MAP_STACK | MAP_NORESERVE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_DENYWRITE.
 // Crash if any other flag is used.
-SANDBOX_EXPORT ErrorCode RestrictMmapFlags(SandboxBPF* sandbox);
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictMmapFlags();
 
 // Restrict the prot argument in mprotect(2).
 // Only allow: PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC.
-SANDBOX_EXPORT ErrorCode RestrictMprotectFlags(SandboxBPF* sandbox);
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictMprotectFlags();
 
 // Restrict fcntl(2) cmd argument to:
 // We allow F_GETFL, F_SETFL, F_GETFD, F_SETFD, F_DUPFD, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC,
 // F_SETLK, F_SETLKW and F_GETLK.
 // Also, in F_SETFL, restrict the allowed flags to: O_ACCMODE | O_APPEND |
 // O_NONBLOCK | O_SYNC | O_LARGEFILE | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOATIME.
-SANDBOX_EXPORT ErrorCode RestrictFcntlCommands(SandboxBPF* sandbox);
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictFcntlCommands();
 
 #if defined(__i386__)
 // Restrict socketcall(2) to only allow socketpair(2), send(2), recv(2),
 // sendto(2), recvfrom(2), shutdown(2), sendmsg(2) and recvmsg(2).
-SANDBOX_EXPORT ErrorCode RestrictSocketcallCommand(SandboxBPF* sandbox);
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictSocketcallCommand();
 #endif
 
 // Restrict |sysno| (which must be kill, tkill or tgkill) by allowing tgkill or
 // kill iff the first parameter is |target_pid|, crashing otherwise or if
 // |sysno| is tkill.
-ErrorCode RestrictKillTarget(pid_t target_pid, SandboxBPF* sandbox, int sysno);
+SANDBOX_EXPORT bpf_dsl::ResultExpr RestrictKillTarget(pid_t target_pid,
+                                                      int sysno);
 
 }  // namespace sandbox.
 
 #endif  // SANDBOX_LINUX_SECCOMP_BPF_HELPERS_SYSCALL_PARAMETERS_RESTRICTIONS_H_