Revert of [cast_channel] Move cast_channel related files from //extensions to //components

extensions/browser/api/cast_channel/cast_auth_util.cc

Index: extensions/browser/api/cast_channel/cast_auth_util.cc
diff --git a/extensions/browser/api/cast_channel/cast_auth_util.cc b/extensions/browser/api/cast_channel/cast_auth_util.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9406fde850cddb3f35b59cb565618beed129e60b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/extensions/browser/api/cast_channel/cast_auth_util.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,399 @@
+// Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include "extensions/browser/api/cast_channel/cast_auth_util.h"
+
+#include <vector>
+
+#include "base/feature_list.h"
+#include "base/logging.h"
+#include "base/macros.h"
+#include "base/memory/ptr_util.h"
+#include "base/memory/singleton.h"
+#include "base/metrics/histogram_macros.h"
+#include "base/strings/string_number_conversions.h"
+#include "base/strings/string_util.h"
+#include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
+#include "components/cast_certificate/cast_cert_validator.h"
+#include "components/cast_certificate/cast_crl.h"
+#include "crypto/random.h"
+#include "extensions/browser/api/cast_channel/cast_message_util.h"
+#include "extensions/common/api/cast_channel/cast_channel.pb.h"
+#include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
+#include "net/der/parse_values.h"
+
+namespace extensions {
+namespace api {
+namespace cast_channel {
+namespace {
+
+const char kParseErrorPrefix[] = "Failed to parse auth message: ";
+
+// The maximum number of days a cert can live for.
+const int kMaxSelfSignedCertLifetimeInDays = 4;
+
+// The size of the nonce challenge in bytes.
+const int kNonceSizeInBytes = 16;
+
+// The number of hours after which a nonce is regenerated.
+long kNonceExpirationTimeInHours = 24;
+
+// Enforce certificate revocation when enabled.
+// If disabled, any revocation failures are ignored.
+//
+// This flags only controls the enforcement. Revocation is checked regardless.
+//
+// This flag tracks the changes necessary to fully enforce revocation.
+const base::Feature kEnforceRevocationChecking{
+    "CastCertificateRevocation", base::FEATURE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT};
+
+// Enforce nonce checking when enabled.
+// If disabled, the nonce value returned from the device is not checked against
+// the one sent to the device. As a result, the nonce can be empty and omitted
+// from the signature. This allows backwards compatibility with legacy Cast
+// receivers.
+
+const base::Feature kEnforceNonceChecking{"CastNonceEnforced",
+                                          base::FEATURE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT};
+
+namespace cast_crypto = ::cast_certificate;
+
+// Extracts an embedded DeviceAuthMessage payload from an auth challenge reply
+// message.
+AuthResult ParseAuthMessage(const CastMessage& challenge_reply,
+                            DeviceAuthMessage* auth_message) {
+  if (challenge_reply.payload_type() != CastMessage_PayloadType_BINARY) {
+    return AuthResult::CreateWithParseError(
+        "Wrong payload type in challenge reply",
+        AuthResult::ERROR_WRONG_PAYLOAD_TYPE);
+  }
+  if (!challenge_reply.has_payload_binary()) {
+    return AuthResult::CreateWithParseError(
+        "Payload type is binary but payload_binary field not set",
+        AuthResult::ERROR_NO_PAYLOAD);
+  }
+  if (!auth_message->ParseFromString(challenge_reply.payload_binary())) {
+    return AuthResult::CreateWithParseError(
+        "Cannot parse binary payload into DeviceAuthMessage",
+        AuthResult::ERROR_PAYLOAD_PARSING_FAILED);
+  }
+
+  VLOG(1) << "Auth message: " << AuthMessageToString(*auth_message);
+
+  if (auth_message->has_error()) {
+    return AuthResult::CreateWithParseError(
+        "Auth message error: " +
+            base::IntToString(auth_message->error().error_type()),
+        AuthResult::ERROR_MESSAGE_ERROR);
+  }
+  if (!auth_message->has_response()) {
+    return AuthResult::CreateWithParseError(
+        "Auth message has no response field", AuthResult::ERROR_NO_RESPONSE);
+  }
+  return AuthResult();
+}
+
+class CastNonce {
+ public:
+  static CastNonce* GetInstance() {
+    return base::Singleton<CastNonce,
+                           base::LeakySingletonTraits<CastNonce>>::get();
+  }
+
+  static const std::string& Get() {
+    GetInstance()->EnsureNonceTimely();
+    return GetInstance()->nonce_;
+  }
+
+ private:
+  friend struct base::DefaultSingletonTraits<CastNonce>;
+
+  CastNonce() { GenerateNonce(); }
+  void GenerateNonce() {
+    // Create a cryptographically secure nonce.
+    crypto::RandBytes(base::WriteInto(&nonce_, kNonceSizeInBytes + 1),
+                      kNonceSizeInBytes);
+    nonce_generation_time_ = base::Time::Now();
+  }
+
+  void EnsureNonceTimely() {
+    if (base::Time::Now() >
+        (nonce_generation_time_ +
+         base::TimeDelta::FromHours(kNonceExpirationTimeInHours))) {
+      GenerateNonce();
+    }
+  }
+
+  // The nonce challenge to send to the Cast receiver.
+  // The nonce is updated daily.
+  std::string nonce_;
+  base::Time nonce_generation_time_;
+};
+
+// Must match with histogram enum CastCertificateStatus.
+// This should never be reordered.
+enum CertVerificationStatus {
+  CERT_STATUS_OK,
+  CERT_STATUS_INVALID_CRL,
+  CERT_STATUS_VERIFICATION_FAILED,
+  CERT_STATUS_REVOKED,
+  CERT_STATUS_COUNT,
+};
+
+// Must match with histogram enum CastNonce.
+// This should never be reordered.
+enum NonceVerificationStatus {
+  NONCE_MATCH,
+  NONCE_MISMATCH,
+  NONCE_MISSING,
+  NONCE_COUNT,
+};
+
+// Record certificate verification histogram events.
+void RecordCertificateEvent(CertVerificationStatus event) {
+  UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Cast.Channel.Certificate", event,
+                            CERT_STATUS_COUNT);
+}
+
+// Record nonce verification histogram events.
+void RecordNonceEvent(NonceVerificationStatus event) {
+  UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Cast.Channel.Nonce", event, NONCE_COUNT);
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+AuthResult::AuthResult()
+    : error_type(ERROR_NONE), channel_policies(POLICY_NONE) {}
+
+AuthResult::AuthResult(const std::string& error_message, ErrorType error_type)
+    : error_message(error_message), error_type(error_type) {}
+
+AuthResult::~AuthResult() {
+}
+
+// static
+AuthResult AuthResult::CreateWithParseError(const std::string& error_message,
+                                            ErrorType error_type) {
+  return AuthResult(kParseErrorPrefix + error_message, error_type);
+}
+
+// static
+AuthContext AuthContext::Create() {
+  return AuthContext(CastNonce::Get());
+}
+
+AuthContext::AuthContext(const std::string& nonce) : nonce_(nonce) {}
+
+AuthContext::~AuthContext() {}
+
+AuthResult AuthContext::VerifySenderNonce(
+    const std::string& nonce_response) const {
+  if (nonce_ != nonce_response) {
+    if (nonce_response.empty()) {
+      RecordNonceEvent(NONCE_MISSING);
+    } else {
+      RecordNonceEvent(NONCE_MISMATCH);
+    }
+    if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kEnforceNonceChecking)) {
+      return AuthResult("Sender nonce mismatched.",
+                        AuthResult::ERROR_SENDER_NONCE_MISMATCH);
+    }
+  } else {
+    RecordNonceEvent(NONCE_MATCH);
+  }
+  return AuthResult();
+}
+
+// Verifies the peer certificate and populates |peer_cert_der| with the DER
+// encoded certificate.
+AuthResult VerifyTLSCertificate(const net::X509Certificate& peer_cert,
+                                std::string* peer_cert_der,
+                                const base::Time& verification_time) {
+  // Get the DER-encoded form of the certificate.
+  if (!net::X509Certificate::GetDEREncoded(peer_cert.os_cert_handle(),
+                                           peer_cert_der) ||
+      peer_cert_der->empty()) {
+    return AuthResult::CreateWithParseError(
+        "Could not create DER-encoded peer cert.",
+        AuthResult::ERROR_CERT_PARSING_FAILED);
+  }
+
+  // Ensure the peer cert is valid and doesn't have an excessive remaining
+  // lifetime. Although it is not verified as an X.509 certificate, the entire
+  // structure is signed by the AuthResponse, so the validity field from X.509
+  // is repurposed as this signature's expiration.
+  base::Time expiry = peer_cert.valid_expiry();
+  base::Time lifetime_limit =
+      verification_time +
+      base::TimeDelta::FromDays(kMaxSelfSignedCertLifetimeInDays);
+  if (peer_cert.valid_start().is_null() ||
+      peer_cert.valid_start() > verification_time) {
+    return AuthResult::CreateWithParseError(
+        "Certificate's valid start date is in the future.",
+        AuthResult::ERROR_TLS_CERT_VALID_START_DATE_IN_FUTURE);
+  }
+  if (expiry.is_null() || peer_cert.valid_expiry() < verification_time) {
+    return AuthResult::CreateWithParseError("Certificate has expired.",
+                                            AuthResult::ERROR_TLS_CERT_EXPIRED);
+  }
+  if (expiry > lifetime_limit) {
+    return AuthResult::CreateWithParseError(
+        "Peer cert lifetime is too long.",
+        AuthResult::ERROR_TLS_CERT_VALIDITY_PERIOD_TOO_LONG);
+  }
+  return AuthResult();
+}
+
+AuthResult AuthenticateChallengeReply(const CastMessage& challenge_reply,
+                                      const net::X509Certificate& peer_cert,
+                                      const AuthContext& auth_context) {
+  DeviceAuthMessage auth_message;
+  AuthResult result = ParseAuthMessage(challenge_reply, &auth_message);
+  if (!result.success()) {
+    return result;
+  }
+
+  std::string peer_cert_der;
+  result = VerifyTLSCertificate(peer_cert, &peer_cert_der, base::Time::Now());
+  if (!result.success()) {
+    return result;
+  }
+
+  const AuthResponse& response = auth_message.response();
+  const std::string& nonce_response = response.sender_nonce();
+
+  result = auth_context.VerifySenderNonce(nonce_response);
+  if (!result.success()) {
+    return result;
+  }
+
+  return VerifyCredentials(response, nonce_response + peer_cert_der);
+}
+
+// This function does the following
+//
+// * Verifies that the certificate chain |response.client_auth_certificate| +
+//   |response.intermediate_certificate| is valid and chains to a trusted
+//   Cast root. The list of trusted Cast roots can be overrided by providing a
+//   non-nullptr |cast_trust_store|. The certificate is verified at
+//   |verification_time|.
+//
+// * Verifies that none of the certificates in the chain are revoked based on
+//   the CRL provided in the response |response.crl|. The CRL is verified to be
+//   valid and its issuer certificate chains to a trusted Cast CRL root. The
+//   list of trusted Cast CRL roots can be overrided by providing a non-nullptr
+//   |crl_trust_store|. If |crl_policy| is CRL_OPTIONAL then the result of
+//   revocation checking is ignored. The CRL is verified at
+//   |verification_time|.
+//
+// * Verifies that |response.signature| matches the signature
+//   of |signature_input| by |response.client_auth_certificate|'s public
+//   key.
+AuthResult VerifyCredentialsImpl(const AuthResponse& response,
+                                 const std::string& signature_input,
+                                 const cast_crypto::CRLPolicy& crl_policy,
+                                 net::TrustStore* cast_trust_store,
+                                 net::TrustStore* crl_trust_store,
+                                 const base::Time& verification_time) {
+  // Verify the certificate
+  std::unique_ptr<cast_crypto::CertVerificationContext> verification_context;
+
+  // Build a single vector containing the certificate chain.
+  std::vector<std::string> cert_chain;
+  cert_chain.push_back(response.client_auth_certificate());
+  cert_chain.insert(cert_chain.end(),
+                    response.intermediate_certificate().begin(),
+                    response.intermediate_certificate().end());
+
+  // Parse the CRL.
+  std::unique_ptr<cast_crypto::CastCRL> crl =
+      cast_crypto::ParseAndVerifyCRLUsingCustomTrustStore(
+          response.crl(), verification_time, crl_trust_store);
+  if (!crl) {
+    // CRL is invalid.
+    RecordCertificateEvent(CERT_STATUS_INVALID_CRL);
+    if (crl_policy == cast_crypto::CRLPolicy::CRL_REQUIRED) {
+      return AuthResult("Failed verifying Cast CRL.",
+                        AuthResult::ERROR_CRL_INVALID);
+    }
+  }
+
+  cast_crypto::CastDeviceCertPolicy device_policy;
+  bool verification_success =
+      cast_crypto::VerifyDeviceCertUsingCustomTrustStore(
+          cert_chain, verification_time, &verification_context, &device_policy,
+          crl.get(), crl_policy, cast_trust_store);
+  if (!verification_success) {
+    // TODO(ryanchung): Once this feature is completely rolled-out, remove the
+    // reverification step and use error reporting to get verification errors
+    // for metrics.
+    bool verification_no_crl_success =
+        cast_crypto::VerifyDeviceCertUsingCustomTrustStore(
+            cert_chain, verification_time, &verification_context,
+            &device_policy, nullptr, cast_crypto::CRLPolicy::CRL_OPTIONAL,
+            cast_trust_store);
+    if (!verification_no_crl_success) {
+      // TODO(eroman): The error information was lost; this error is ambiguous.
+      RecordCertificateEvent(CERT_STATUS_VERIFICATION_FAILED);
+      return AuthResult("Failed verifying cast device certificate",
+                        AuthResult::ERROR_CERT_NOT_SIGNED_BY_TRUSTED_CA);
+    }
+    if (crl) {
+      // If CRL was not present, it should've been recorded as such.
+      RecordCertificateEvent(CERT_STATUS_REVOKED);
+    }
+    if (crl_policy == cast_crypto::CRLPolicy::CRL_REQUIRED) {
+      // Device is revoked.
+      return AuthResult("Failed certificate revocation check.",
+                        AuthResult::ERROR_CERT_REVOKED);
+    }
+  }
+  // The certificate is verified at this point.
+  RecordCertificateEvent(CERT_STATUS_OK);
+  if (!verification_context->VerifySignatureOverData(response.signature(),
+                                                     signature_input)) {
+    return AuthResult("Failed verifying signature over data",
+                      AuthResult::ERROR_SIGNED_BLOBS_MISMATCH);
+  }
+
+  AuthResult success;
+
+  // Set the policy into the result.
+  switch (device_policy) {
+    case cast_crypto::CastDeviceCertPolicy::AUDIO_ONLY:
+      success.channel_policies = AuthResult::POLICY_AUDIO_ONLY;
+      break;
+    case cast_crypto::CastDeviceCertPolicy::NONE:
+      success.channel_policies = AuthResult::POLICY_NONE;
+      break;
+  }
+
+  return success;
+}
+
+AuthResult VerifyCredentials(const AuthResponse& response,
+                             const std::string& signature_input) {
+  base::Time now = base::Time::Now();
+  cast_crypto::CRLPolicy policy = cast_crypto::CRLPolicy::CRL_REQUIRED;
+  if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kEnforceRevocationChecking)) {
+    policy = cast_crypto::CRLPolicy::CRL_OPTIONAL;
+  }
+  return VerifyCredentialsImpl(response, signature_input, policy, nullptr,
+                               nullptr, now);
+}
+
+AuthResult VerifyCredentialsForTest(const AuthResponse& response,
+                                    const std::string& signature_input,
+                                    const cast_crypto::CRLPolicy& crl_policy,
+                                    net::TrustStore* cast_trust_store,
+                                    net::TrustStore* crl_trust_store,
+                                    const base::Time& verification_time) {
+  return VerifyCredentialsImpl(response, signature_input, crl_policy,
+                               cast_trust_store, crl_trust_store,
+                               verification_time);
+}
+
+}  // namespace cast_channel
+}  // namespace api
+}  // namespace extensions