Add unit tests for NTLMv1 portable implementation

net/http/http_auth_handler_ntlm_portable_unittest.cc

+// Copyright 2017 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include <string>
+
+#include "base/base64.h"
+#include "base/memory/ptr_util.h"
+#include "base/strings/string_util.h"
+#include "base/strings/utf_string_conversions.h"
+#include "net/base/test_completion_callback.h"
+#include "net/dns/mock_host_resolver.h"
+#include "net/http/http_auth_challenge_tokenizer.h"
+#include "net/http/http_auth_handler_ntlm.h"
+#include "net/http/http_request_info.h"
+#include "net/http/mock_allow_http_auth_preferences.h"
+#include "net/log/net_log_with_source.h"
+#include "net/ntlm/ntlm.h"
+#include "net/ntlm/ntlm_buffer_reader.h"
+#include "net/ntlm/ntlm_buffer_writer.h"
+#include "net/ntlm/ntlm_test_data.h"
+#include "net/ssl/ssl_info.h"
+#include "net/test/gtest_util.h"
+#include "testing/gmock/include/gmock/gmock.h"
+#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
+#include "testing/platform_test.h"
+
+namespace net {
+
+class HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest : public PlatformTest {
+ public:
+  // Test input value defined in [MS-NLMP] Section 4.2.1.
+  HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest() {
+    http_auth_preferences_.reset(new MockAllowHttpAuthPreferences());
+    factory_.reset(new HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::Factory());
+    factory_->set_http_auth_preferences(http_auth_preferences_.get());
+    creds_ = AuthCredentials(
+        ntlm::test::kNtlmDomain + base::ASCIIToUTF16("\\") + ntlm::test::kUser,
+        ntlm::test::kPassword);
+  }
+
+  int CreateHandler() {
+    GURL gurl("https://foo.com");
+    SSLInfo null_ssl_info;
+
+    return factory_->CreateAuthHandlerFromString(
+        "NTLM", HttpAuth::AUTH_SERVER, null_ssl_info, gurl, NetLogWithSource(),
+        &auth_handler_);
+  }
+
+  std::string CreateNtlmAuthHeader(base::StringPiece message) {
+    std::string output;
+    base::Base64Encode(message, &output);
+
+    return "NTLM " + output;
+  }
+
+  HttpAuth::AuthorizationResult HandleAnotherChallenge(
+      const std::string& challenge) {
+    HttpAuthChallengeTokenizer tokenizer(challenge.begin(), challenge.end());
+    return GetAuthHandler()->HandleAnotherChallenge(&tokenizer);
+  }
+
+  bool DecodeChallenge(const std::string& challenge, std::string* decoded) {
+    HttpAuthChallengeTokenizer tokenizer(challenge.begin(), challenge.end());
+    return base::Base64Decode(tokenizer.base64_param(), decoded);
+  }
+
+  int GenerateAuthToken(std::string* token) {
+    TestCompletionCallback callback;
+    HttpRequestInfo request_info;
+    return callback.GetResult(GetAuthHandler()->GenerateAuthToken(
+        GetCreds(), &request_info, callback.callback(), token));
+  }
+
+  void ReadBytesPayload(ntlm::NtlmBufferReader* reader,
+                        uint8_t* buffer,
+                        size_t len) {
+    // First read the security buffer.
+    ntlm::SecurityBuffer sec_buf;
+    EXPECT_TRUE(reader->ReadSecurityBuffer(&sec_buf));
+    EXPECT_EQ(sec_buf.length, len);

[Ryan Sleevi, 2017/07/13 17:39:54]

ASSERT_EQ ?

If .length > len, this would be a crash bug, right?

[zentaro, 2017/07/13 18:20:31]

Done.

+    EXPECT_TRUE(reader->ReadBytesFrom(sec_buf, buffer));
+  }
+
+  // Reads bytes from a payload and assigns them to a string. This makes
+  // no assumptions about the underlying encoding.
+  void ReadStringPayload(ntlm::NtlmBufferReader* reader, std::string* str) {
+    ntlm::SecurityBuffer sec_buf;
+    EXPECT_TRUE(reader->ReadSecurityBuffer(&sec_buf));

[Ryan Sleevi, 2017/07/13 17:39:53]

ASSERT_TRUE ?

[zentaro, 2017/07/13 18:20:31]

Done.

+
+    uint8_t raw[sec_buf.length];

[Ryan Sleevi, 2017/07/13 17:39:53]

I don't believe this is legal C++, because it's a variable array (that is, the
compiler cannot reserve sufficient space on the stack, because .length will
vary)

VLAs are a GCC extension and, while part of C99, not part of C++11

scoped_ptr<uint8_t[]> raw(new uint8_t[sec_buf.length])

[zentaro, 2017/07/13 18:20:31]

Done.

+    EXPECT_TRUE(reader->ReadBytesFrom(sec_buf, raw));
+
+    str->assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(raw), sec_buf.length);
+  }
+
+  // Reads bytes from a payload and assigns them to a string16. This makes
+  // no assumptions about the underlying encoding. This will fail if there
+  // are an odd number of bytes in the payload.
+  void ReadString16Payload(ntlm::NtlmBufferReader* reader,
+                           base::string16* str) {
+    ntlm::SecurityBuffer sec_buf;
+    EXPECT_TRUE(reader->ReadSecurityBuffer(&sec_buf));
+    EXPECT_EQ(0, sec_buf.length % 2);
+
+    uint8_t raw[sec_buf.length];

[Ryan Sleevi, 2017/07/13 17:39:54]

Ditto re: VLAs

[zentaro, 2017/07/13 18:20:31]

Done.

+    EXPECT_TRUE(reader->ReadBytesFrom(sec_buf, raw));
+
+#if IS_BIG_ENDIAN

[Ryan Sleevi, 2017/07/13 17:39:53]

The code elsewhere (e.g. http_auth_handler_ntlm_portable) uses

#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN

rather than #if

[zentaro, 2017/07/13 18:20:31]

Done.

+    for (size_t i = 0; i < sec_buf.length; i += 2) {
+      std::swap(raw[i], raw[i + 1]);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    str->assign(reinterpret_cast<const base::char16*>(raw), sec_buf.length / 2);
+  }
+
+  int GetGenerateAuthTokenResult() {
+    std::string token;
+    return GenerateAuthToken(&token);
+  }
+
+  AuthCredentials* GetCreds() { return &creds_; }
+
+  HttpAuthHandlerNTLM* GetAuthHandler() {
+    return static_cast<HttpAuthHandlerNTLM*>(auth_handler_.get());
+  }
+
+  static void MockRandom(uint8_t* output, size_t n) {
+    // This is set to 0xaa because the client challenge for testing in
+    // [MS-NLMP] Section 4.2.1 is 8 bytes of 0xaa.
+    memset(output, 0xaa, n);
+  }
+
+  static std::string MockGetHostName() { return ntlm::test::kHostnameAscii; }
+
+ private:
+  AuthCredentials creds_;
+  std::unique_ptr<HttpAuthHandler> auth_handler_;
+  std::unique_ptr<MockAllowHttpAuthPreferences> http_auth_preferences_;
+  std::unique_ptr<HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::Factory> factory_;
+};
+
+TEST_F(HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest, SimpleConstruction) {
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, CreateHandler());
+  ASSERT_TRUE(GetAuthHandler() != nullptr);
+}
+
+TEST_F(HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest, DoNotAllowDefaultCreds) {
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, CreateHandler());
+  ASSERT_FALSE(GetAuthHandler()->AllowsDefaultCredentials());
+}
+
+TEST_F(HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest, AllowsExplicitCredentials) {
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, CreateHandler());
+  ASSERT_TRUE(GetAuthHandler()->AllowsExplicitCredentials());
+}
+
+TEST_F(HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest, VerifyType1Message) {
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, CreateHandler());
+
+  std::string token;
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GenerateAuthToken(&token));
+  // The type 1 message generated is always the same. The only variable
+  // part of the message is the flags and this implementation always offers
+  // the same set of flags.
+  ASSERT_EQ("NTLM TlRMTVNTUAABAAAAB4IIAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=", token);
+}
+
+TEST_F(HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest, EmptyTokenFails) {
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, CreateHandler());
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+
+  // The encoded token for a type 2 message can't be empty.
+  ASSERT_EQ(HttpAuth::AUTHORIZATION_RESULT_REJECT,
+            HandleAnotherChallenge("NTLM"));
+}
+
+TEST_F(HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest, InvalidBase64Encoding) {
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, CreateHandler());
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+
+  // Token isn't valid base64.
+  ASSERT_EQ(HttpAuth::AUTHORIZATION_RESULT_ACCEPT,
+            HandleAnotherChallenge("NTLM !!!!!!!!!!!!!"));
+  ASSERT_EQ(ERR_UNEXPECTED, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+}
+
+TEST_F(HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest, CantChangeSchemeMidway) {
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, CreateHandler());
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+
+  // Can't switch to a different auth scheme in the middle of the process.
+  ASSERT_EQ(HttpAuth::AUTHORIZATION_RESULT_INVALID,
+            HandleAnotherChallenge("Negotiate SSdtIG5vdCBhIHJlYWwgdG9rZW4h"));
+}
+
+TEST_F(HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest, MinimalStructurallyValidType2) {
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, CreateHandler());
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+  ASSERT_EQ(HttpAuth::AUTHORIZATION_RESULT_ACCEPT,
+            HandleAnotherChallenge(CreateNtlmAuthHeader(base::StringPiece(
+                reinterpret_cast<const char*>(ntlm::test::kMinChallengeMessage),
+                ntlm::kChallengeHeaderLen))));
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+}
+
+TEST_F(HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest, Type2MessageTooShort) {
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, CreateHandler());
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+
+  char raw[31];
+  memcpy(raw, ntlm::test::kMinChallengeMessage, 31);
+
+  // Fail because the minimum size valid message is 32 bytes.
+  ASSERT_EQ(HttpAuth::AUTHORIZATION_RESULT_ACCEPT,
+            HandleAnotherChallenge(
+                CreateNtlmAuthHeader(base::StringPiece(raw, sizeof(raw)))));
+  ASSERT_EQ(ERR_UNEXPECTED, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+}
+
+TEST_F(HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest, Type2MessageWrongSignature) {
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, CreateHandler());
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+
+  char raw[32];
+  memcpy(raw, ntlm::test::kMinChallengeMessage, 32);
+  // Modify the default valid message to overwrite the last byte of the
+  // signature.
+  raw[7] = 0xff;
+
+  // Fail because the first 8 bytes don't match "NTLMSSP\0"
+  ASSERT_EQ(HttpAuth::AUTHORIZATION_RESULT_ACCEPT,
+            HandleAnotherChallenge(
+                CreateNtlmAuthHeader(base::StringPiece(raw, sizeof(raw)))));
+  ASSERT_EQ(ERR_UNEXPECTED, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+}
+
+TEST_F(HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest, Type2WrongMessageType) {
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, CreateHandler());
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+
+  char raw[32];
+  memcpy(raw, ntlm::test::kMinChallengeMessage, 32);
+  // Modify the message type so it is not 0x00000002
+  raw[8] = 0x03;
+
+  // Fail because the message type should be MessageType::kChallenge
+  // (0x00000002)
+  ASSERT_EQ(HttpAuth::AUTHORIZATION_RESULT_ACCEPT,
+            HandleAnotherChallenge(CreateNtlmAuthHeader(raw)));
+  ASSERT_EQ(ERR_UNEXPECTED, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+}
+
+TEST_F(HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest, Type2MessageWithNoTargetName) {
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, CreateHandler());
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+
+  // The spec (2.2.1.2) states that the length SHOULD be 0 and the offset
+  // SHOULD be where the payload would be if it was present. This is the
+  // expected response from a compliant server when no target name is sent.
+  // In reality the offset should always be ignored if the length is zero.
+  // Also implementations often just write zeros.
+  char raw[32];
+  memcpy(raw, ntlm::test::kMinChallengeMessage, 32);
+  // Modify the default valid message to overwrite the offset to zero.
+  raw[16] = 0x00;
+
+  ASSERT_EQ(HttpAuth::AUTHORIZATION_RESULT_ACCEPT,
+            HandleAnotherChallenge(
+                CreateNtlmAuthHeader(base::StringPiece(raw, sizeof(raw)))));
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+}
+
+TEST_F(HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest, Type2MessageWithTargetName) {
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, CreateHandler());
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+
+  // One extra byte is provided for target name.
+  char raw[33];
+  memcpy(raw, ntlm::test::kMinChallengeMessage, 32);
+  // Modify the default valid message to indicate 1 byte is present in the
+  // target name payload.
+  raw[12] = 0x01;
+  raw[14] = 0x01;
+  // Put something in the target name.
+  raw[32] = 'Z';
+
+  ASSERT_EQ(HttpAuth::AUTHORIZATION_RESULT_ACCEPT,
+            HandleAnotherChallenge(
+                CreateNtlmAuthHeader(base::StringPiece(raw, sizeof(raw)))));
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+}
+
+TEST_F(HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest, NoTargetNameOverflowFromOffset) {
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, CreateHandler());
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+
+  char raw[32];
+  memcpy(raw, ntlm::test::kMinChallengeMessage, 32);
+  // Modify the default valid message to claim that the target name field is 1
+  // byte long overrunning the end of the message message.
+  raw[12] = 0x01;
+  raw[14] = 0x01;
+
+  // The above malformed message could cause an implementation to read outside
+  // the message buffer because the offset is past the end of the message.
+  // Verify it gets rejected.
+  ASSERT_EQ(HttpAuth::AUTHORIZATION_RESULT_ACCEPT,
+            HandleAnotherChallenge(
+                CreateNtlmAuthHeader(base::StringPiece(raw, sizeof(raw)))));
+  ASSERT_EQ(ERR_UNEXPECTED, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+}
+
+TEST_F(HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest, NoTargetNameOverflowFromLength) {
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, CreateHandler());
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+
+  // Message has 1 extra byte of space after the header for the target name.
+  // One extra byte is provided for target name.
+  char raw[33];
+  memcpy(raw, ntlm::test::kMinChallengeMessage, 32);
+  // Modify the default valid message to indicate 2 bytes are present in the
+  // target name payload (however there is only space for 1).
+  raw[12] = 0x02;
+  raw[14] = 0x02;
+  // Put something in the target name.
+  raw[32] = 'Z';
+
+  // The above malformed message could cause an implementation to read outside
+  // the message buffer because the length is longer than available space.
+  // Verify it gets rejected.
+  ASSERT_EQ(HttpAuth::AUTHORIZATION_RESULT_ACCEPT,
+            HandleAnotherChallenge(
+                CreateNtlmAuthHeader(base::StringPiece(raw, sizeof(raw)))));
+  ASSERT_EQ(ERR_UNEXPECTED, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+}
+
+TEST_F(HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest, Type3RespectsUnicode) {
+  HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::ScopedProcSetter proc_setter(MockRandom,
+                                                    MockGetHostName);
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, CreateHandler());
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+
+  // Generate the type 2 message from the server.
+  ntlm::NtlmBufferWriter writer(ntlm::kChallengeHeaderLen);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(writer.WriteMessageHeader(ntlm::MessageType::kChallenge));
+  // No target name. It is never used.
+  ASSERT_TRUE(writer.WriteSecurityBuffer(
+      ntlm::SecurityBuffer(ntlm::kChallengeHeaderLen, 0)));
+  // Set the unicode flag.
+  ASSERT_TRUE(writer.WriteFlags(ntlm::NegotiateFlags::kUnicode));
+
+  std::string token;
+  ASSERT_EQ(HttpAuth::AUTHORIZATION_RESULT_ACCEPT,
+            HandleAnotherChallenge(CreateNtlmAuthHeader(writer.GetBuffer())));
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GenerateAuthToken(&token));
+
+  // Validate the type 3 message
+  std::string decoded;
+  ASSERT_TRUE(DecodeChallenge(token, &decoded));
+  ntlm::NtlmBufferReader reader(decoded);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(reader.MatchMessageHeader(ntlm::MessageType::kAuthenticate));
+
+  // Skip the LM and NTLM Hash fields. This test isn't testing that.
+  ASSERT_TRUE(reader.SkipSecurityBufferWithValidation());
+  ASSERT_TRUE(reader.SkipSecurityBufferWithValidation());
+  base::string16 domain;
+  base::string16 username;
+  base::string16 hostname;
+  ReadString16Payload(&reader, &domain);
+  ASSERT_EQ(ntlm::test::kNtlmDomain, domain);
+  ReadString16Payload(&reader, &username);
+  ASSERT_EQ(ntlm::test::kUser, username);
+  ReadString16Payload(&reader, &hostname);
+  ASSERT_EQ(ntlm::test::kHostname, hostname);
+
+  // The session key is not used for the NTLM scheme in HTTP. Since
+  // NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH was not sent this is empty.
+  ASSERT_TRUE(reader.SkipSecurityBufferWithValidation());
+
+  // Verify the unicode flag is set.
+  ntlm::NegotiateFlags flags;
+  ASSERT_TRUE(reader.ReadFlags(&flags));
+  ASSERT_EQ(ntlm::NegotiateFlags::kUnicode,
+            flags & ntlm::NegotiateFlags::kUnicode);
+}
+
+TEST_F(HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest, Type3WithoutUnicode) {
+  HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::ScopedProcSetter proc_setter(MockRandom,
+                                                    MockGetHostName);
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, CreateHandler());
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+
+  // Generate the type 2 message from the server.
+  ntlm::NtlmBufferWriter writer(ntlm::kChallengeHeaderLen);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(writer.WriteMessageHeader(ntlm::MessageType::kChallenge));
+  // No target name. It is never used.
+  ASSERT_TRUE(writer.WriteSecurityBuffer(
+      ntlm::SecurityBuffer(ntlm::kChallengeHeaderLen, 0)));
+  // Set the OEM flag.
+  ASSERT_TRUE(writer.WriteFlags(ntlm::NegotiateFlags::kOem));
+
+  std::string token;
+  ASSERT_EQ(HttpAuth::AUTHORIZATION_RESULT_ACCEPT,
+            HandleAnotherChallenge(CreateNtlmAuthHeader(writer.GetBuffer())));
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GenerateAuthToken(&token));
+
+  // Validate the type 3 message
+  std::string decoded;
+  ASSERT_TRUE(DecodeChallenge(token, &decoded));
+  ntlm::NtlmBufferReader reader(decoded);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(reader.MatchMessageHeader(ntlm::MessageType::kAuthenticate));
+
+  // Skip the 2 hash fields. This test isn't testing that.
+  ASSERT_TRUE(reader.SkipSecurityBufferWithValidation());
+  ASSERT_TRUE(reader.SkipSecurityBufferWithValidation());
+  std::string domain;
+  std::string username;
+  std::string hostname;
+  ReadStringPayload(&reader, &domain);
+  ASSERT_EQ(ntlm::test::kNtlmDomainAscii, domain);
+  ReadStringPayload(&reader, &username);
+  ASSERT_EQ(ntlm::test::kUserAscii, username);
+  ReadStringPayload(&reader, &hostname);
+  ASSERT_EQ(ntlm::test::kHostnameAscii, hostname);
+
+  // The session key is not used for the NTLM scheme in HTTP. Since
+  // NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH was not sent this is empty.
+  ASSERT_TRUE(reader.SkipSecurityBufferWithValidation());
+
+  // Verify the unicode flag is not set and OEM flag is.
+  ntlm::NegotiateFlags flags;
+  ASSERT_TRUE(reader.ReadFlags(&flags));
+  ASSERT_EQ(ntlm::NegotiateFlags::kNone,
+            flags & ntlm::NegotiateFlags::kUnicode);
+  ASSERT_EQ(ntlm::NegotiateFlags::kOem, flags & ntlm::NegotiateFlags::kOem);
+}
+
+TEST_F(HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest, Type3UnicodeNoSessionSecurity) {
+  // Verify that the client won't be downgraded if the server clears
+  // the session security flag.
+  HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::ScopedProcSetter proc_setter(MockRandom,
+                                                    MockGetHostName);
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, CreateHandler());
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+
+  // Generate the type 2 message from the server.
+  ntlm::NtlmBufferWriter writer(ntlm::kChallengeHeaderLen);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(writer.WriteMessageHeader(ntlm::MessageType::kChallenge));
+  // No target name. It is never used.
+  ASSERT_TRUE(writer.WriteSecurityBuffer(
+      ntlm::SecurityBuffer(ntlm::kChallengeHeaderLen, 0)));
+  // Set the unicode but not the session security flag.
+  ASSERT_TRUE(writer.WriteFlags(ntlm::NegotiateFlags::kUnicode));
+
+  ASSERT_TRUE(
+      writer.WriteBytes(ntlm::test::kServerChallenge, ntlm::kChallengeLen));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(writer.IsEndOfBuffer());
+
+  std::string token;
+  ASSERT_EQ(HttpAuth::AUTHORIZATION_RESULT_ACCEPT,
+            HandleAnotherChallenge(CreateNtlmAuthHeader(writer.GetBuffer())));
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GenerateAuthToken(&token));
+
+  // Validate the type 3 message
+  std::string decoded;
+  ASSERT_TRUE(DecodeChallenge(token, &decoded));
+  ntlm::NtlmBufferReader reader(decoded);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(reader.MatchMessageHeader(ntlm::MessageType::kAuthenticate));
+
+  // Read the LM and NTLM Response Payloads.
+  uint8_t actual_lm_response[ntlm::kResponseLenV1];
+  uint8_t actual_ntlm_response[ntlm::kResponseLenV1];
+  ReadBytesPayload(&reader, actual_lm_response, ntlm::kResponseLenV1);
+  ReadBytesPayload(&reader, actual_ntlm_response, ntlm::kResponseLenV1);
+
+  // Verify that the client still generated a response that uses
+  // session security.
+  ASSERT_EQ(0, memcmp(ntlm::test::kExpectedLmResponseWithV1SS,
+                      actual_lm_response, ntlm::kResponseLenV1));
+  ASSERT_EQ(0, memcmp(ntlm::test::kExpectedNtlmResponseWithV1SS,
+                      actual_ntlm_response, ntlm::kResponseLenV1));
+
+  base::string16 domain;
+  base::string16 username;
+  base::string16 hostname;
+  ReadString16Payload(&reader, &domain);
+  ASSERT_EQ(ntlm::test::kNtlmDomain, domain);
+  ReadString16Payload(&reader, &username);
+  ASSERT_EQ(ntlm::test::kUser, username);
+  ReadString16Payload(&reader, &hostname);
+  ASSERT_EQ(ntlm::test::kHostname, hostname);
+
+  // The session key is not used for the NTLM scheme in HTTP. Since
+  // NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH was not sent this is empty.
+  ASSERT_TRUE(reader.SkipSecurityBufferWithValidation());
+
+  // Verify the unicode flag is set.
+  ntlm::NegotiateFlags flags;
+  ASSERT_TRUE(reader.ReadFlags(&flags));
+  ASSERT_EQ(ntlm::NegotiateFlags::kUnicode,
+            flags & ntlm::NegotiateFlags::kUnicode);
+}
+
+TEST_F(HttpAuthHandlerNtlmPortableTest, Type3UnicodeWithSessionSecurity) {
+  HttpAuthHandlerNTLM::ScopedProcSetter proc_setter(MockRandom,
+                                                    MockGetHostName);
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, CreateHandler());
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GetGenerateAuthTokenResult());
+
+  // Generate the type 2 message from the server.
+  ntlm::NtlmBufferWriter writer(ntlm::kChallengeHeaderLen);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(writer.WriteMessageHeader(ntlm::MessageType::kChallenge));
+  // No target name. It is never used.
+  ASSERT_TRUE(writer.WriteSecurityBuffer(
+      ntlm::SecurityBuffer(ntlm::kChallengeHeaderLen, 0)));
+  // Set the unicode and session security flag.
+  ASSERT_TRUE(
+      writer.WriteFlags((ntlm::NegotiateFlags::kUnicode |
+                         ntlm::NegotiateFlags::kExtendedSessionSecurity)));
+
+  ASSERT_TRUE(
+      writer.WriteBytes(ntlm::test::kServerChallenge, ntlm::kChallengeLen));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(writer.IsEndOfBuffer());
+
+  std::string token;
+  ASSERT_EQ(HttpAuth::AUTHORIZATION_RESULT_ACCEPT,
+            HandleAnotherChallenge(CreateNtlmAuthHeader(writer.GetBuffer())));
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, GenerateAuthToken(&token));
+
+  // Validate the type 3 message
+  std::string decoded;
+  ASSERT_TRUE(DecodeChallenge(token, &decoded));
+  ntlm::NtlmBufferReader reader(decoded);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(reader.MatchMessageHeader(ntlm::MessageType::kAuthenticate));
+
+  // Read the LM and NTLM Response Payloads.
+  uint8_t actual_lm_response[ntlm::kResponseLenV1];
+  uint8_t actual_ntlm_response[ntlm::kResponseLenV1];
+  ReadBytesPayload(&reader, actual_lm_response, ntlm::kResponseLenV1);
+  ReadBytesPayload(&reader, actual_ntlm_response, ntlm::kResponseLenV1);
+
+  ASSERT_EQ(0, memcmp(ntlm::test::kExpectedLmResponseWithV1SS,
+                      actual_lm_response, ntlm::kResponseLenV1));
+  ASSERT_EQ(0, memcmp(ntlm::test::kExpectedNtlmResponseWithV1SS,
+                      actual_ntlm_response, ntlm::kResponseLenV1));
+
+  base::string16 domain;
+  base::string16 username;
+  base::string16 hostname;
+  ReadString16Payload(&reader, &domain);
+  ASSERT_EQ(ntlm::test::kNtlmDomain, domain);
+  ReadString16Payload(&reader, &username);
+  ASSERT_EQ(ntlm::test::kUser, username);
+  ReadString16Payload(&reader, &hostname);
+  ASSERT_EQ(ntlm::test::kHostname, hostname);
+
+  // The session key is not used for the NTLM scheme in HTTP. Since
+  // NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_KEY_EXCH was not sent this is empty.
+  ASSERT_TRUE(reader.SkipSecurityBufferWithValidation());
+
+  // Verify the unicode flag is set.
+  ntlm::NegotiateFlags flags;
+  ASSERT_TRUE(reader.ReadFlags(&flags));
+  ASSERT_EQ(ntlm::NegotiateFlags::kUnicode,
+            flags & ntlm::NegotiateFlags::kUnicode);
+}
+
+}  // namespace net