Index: extensions/browser/api/web_request/web_request_permissions.cc |
diff --git a/extensions/browser/api/web_request/web_request_permissions.cc b/extensions/browser/api/web_request/web_request_permissions.cc |
index 8b2f2f49742858767d6cbab0465b34f81dd181df..e9d19d90b9862065a0ff14938ba760efeee97271 100644 |
--- a/extensions/browser/api/web_request/web_request_permissions.cc |
+++ b/extensions/browser/api/web_request/web_request_permissions.cc |
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ |
#include "base/strings/string_util.h" |
#include "base/strings/stringprintf.h" |
#include "chromeos/login/login_state.h" |
+#include "content/public/browser/child_process_security_policy.h" |
#include "content/public/browser/resource_request_info.h" |
#include "extensions/browser/extension_navigation_ui_data.h" |
#include "extensions/browser/guest_view/web_view/web_view_renderer_state.h" |
@@ -42,11 +43,13 @@ bool g_allow_all_extension_locations_in_public_session = false; |
// Returns true if the URL is sensitive and requests to this URL must not be |
// modified/canceled by extensions, e.g. because it is targeted to the webstore |
// to check for updates, extension blacklisting, etc. |
-bool IsSensitiveURL(const GURL& url) { |
+bool IsSensitiveURL(const GURL& url, bool is_request_from_renderer) { |
// TODO(battre) Merge this, CanExtensionAccessURL and |
// PermissionsData::CanAccessPage into one function. |
bool sensitive_chrome_url = false; |
- const base::StringPiece& host = url.host_piece(); |
+ base::StringPiece host = url.host_piece(); |
+ while (host.ends_with(".")) |
+ host.remove_suffix(1u); |
const char kGoogleCom[] = "google.com"; |
const char kClient[] = "clients"; |
if (url.DomainIs(kGoogleCom)) { |
@@ -54,23 +57,32 @@ bool IsSensitiveURL(const GURL& url) { |
// This protects requests to several internal services such as sync, |
// extension update pings, captive portal detection, fraudulent certificate |
// reporting, autofill and others. |
- if (base::StartsWith(host, kClient, base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) { |
+ // |
+ // These URLs are only protected for requests from the browser, not |
+ // for requests from renderers, because clients*.google.com also used |
+ // by websites. |
+ base::StringPiece::size_type pos = host.rfind(kClient); |
Devlin
2017/05/04 15:33:29
Is this change to protect subdomains of clients*.g
Devlin
2017/05/04 15:33:29
nit: given the area of code this is called in and
battre
2017/05/04 15:53:46
Sure, will do this if Matt is ok with the general
battre
2017/05/04 15:53:46
Yes, this is to generalize the code. A couple of v
battre
2017/05/10 09:18:38
Done.
|
+ if (!is_request_from_renderer && pos != base::StringPiece::npos) { |
mmenke
2017/05/04 15:54:41
So we're only filtering out sensitive requests not
Devlin
2017/05/04 17:31:25
I'm not comfortable with that (yet). We have a *t
mmenke
2017/05/04 17:33:16
So what if those thumbnails are from a clients.goo
Devlin
2017/05/04 18:06:00
For want of a better solution, we'll protect them.
mmenke
2017/05/05 14:35:14
Could we instead have the initiators tag sensitive
Devlin
2017/05/05 16:16:03
Yes - that's what I was mentioning about relying o
mmenke
2017/05/05 16:18:03
Sorry, completely missed that.
battre
2017/05/10 09:18:37
Acknowledged.
|
bool match = true; |
- for (base::StringPiece::const_iterator |
- i = host.begin() + strlen(kClient), |
- end = host.end() - (strlen(kGoogleCom) + 1); |
- i != end; ++i) { |
- if (!isdigit(*i)) { |
- match = false; |
- break; |
+ if (pos > 0 && host[pos - 1] != '.') { |
+ match = false; |
+ } else { |
+ for (base::StringPiece::const_iterator |
Devlin
2017/05/04 15:33:29
I think this loop is right, but it's kind of a sha
battre
2017/05/10 09:18:37
Leaving this as is. I did not find anything better
|
+ i = host.begin() + pos + strlen(kClient), |
+ end = host.end() - (strlen(kGoogleCom) + 1); |
+ i != end; ++i) { |
+ if (!isdigit(*i)) { |
+ match = false; |
+ break; |
+ } |
} |
} |
sensitive_chrome_url = sensitive_chrome_url || match; |
} |
- // This protects requests to safe browsing, link doctor, and possibly |
- // others. |
+ |
+ // Safebrowsing and Chrome Webstore URLs are also protected for requests |
+ // from renderers. |
sensitive_chrome_url = sensitive_chrome_url || |
- url.DomainIs("clients.google.com") || |
url.DomainIs("sb-ssl.google.com") || |
(url.DomainIs("chrome.google.com") && |
base::StartsWith(url.path_piece(), "/webstore", |
@@ -85,7 +97,7 @@ bool WebRequestPermissions::HideRequest( |
const extensions::InfoMap* extension_info_map, |
const net::URLRequest* request, |
extensions::ExtensionNavigationUIData* navigation_ui_data) { |
- // Hide requests from the Chrome WebStore App or signin process. |
+ // Hide requests from the Chrome WebStore App, signin process and WebUI. |
const ResourceRequestInfo* info = ResourceRequestInfo::ForRequest(request); |
if (info) { |
int process_id = info->GetChildID(); |
@@ -100,10 +112,20 @@ bool WebRequestPermissions::HideRequest( |
process_id)) { |
return true; |
} |
+ |
+ // Always hide requests from WebUI. This is ok based on the assumption |
+ // that WebUI and regular sites never share the same renderer process |
+ // and the assumption that WebUI deserves protection from extensions. |
+ if (content::ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::GetInstance()->HasWebUIBindings( |
+ process_id)) { |
Devlin
2017/05/04 15:33:29
I'd actually prefer we only do this in the case of
battre
2017/05/04 15:53:46
Sure, will do this if Matt is ok with the general
mmenke
2017/05/04 15:56:33
I'm fine with that.
Devlin
2017/05/04 17:31:25
We could just pass a bool is_webui_process to IsSe
battre
2017/05/10 09:18:37
Done.
|
+ return true; |
+ } |
} |
const GURL& url = request->url(); |
- return IsSensitiveURL(url) || !HasWebRequestScheme(url); |
+ bool is_request_from_renderer = info != nullptr; |
+ return IsSensitiveURL(url, is_request_from_renderer) || |
+ !HasWebRequestScheme(url); |
} |
// static |