Remove unused files, and tidy the directory structure of the remaining ones.

README

 This directory contains a reference implementation for Chrome OS
 verified boot in firmware.
 
 ---------- 
 Directory Structure 
 ----------
 
 The source is organized into distinct modules -
 
-vboot_firmware/ - Contains ONLY the code required by the BIOS to validate
-the secure boot components. There shouldn't be any code in here that signs
-or generates images. BIOS should require ONLY this directory to implement
-secure boot. Refer to vboot_firmware/README for futher details.
+firmware/ - Contains ONLY the code required by the BIOS to validate
+the secure boot components. There shouldn't be any code in here that
+signs or generates images. BIOS should require ONLY this directory to
+implement secure boot. Refer to firmware/README for futher details.
 
-cgptlib/ - Work in progress for handling GPT headers. Parts of this will no
-doubt be migrated into vboot_firmware/
+cgpt/ - Utility to read/write/modify GPT partitions.  Much like the
+gpt tool, but with support for Chrome OS extensiosn.
 
-misclibs/ - Miscellaneous functions used by userland utilities.
+host/ - Miscellaneous functions used by userland utilities.
 
 utility/ - Utilities for generating and verifying signed
 firmware and kernel images, as well as arbitrary blobs.
 
-vfirmware/ and vkernel/ - Functions for generating, verifying, and
-manipulating signed firmware and kernel images.
-
 tests/ - User-land tests and benchmarks that test the reference
 implementation. Please have a look at these if you'd like to
 understand how to use the reference implementation.
 
 build/ - a directory where the generated files go to.
 
 --------------------
 Building and testing
 --------------------
 
@@ skipping 18 matching lines @@
 in the top level directory or
 
 cd tests
 BUILD=../build make runtests
 
 
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 Some useful utilities: 
 ----------
 
-firmware_utility.c To generate verified boot firmware images.
+vbutil_key              Convert a public key into .vbpubk format
+vbutil_keyblock         Wrap a public key inside a signature and checksum
+vbutil_firmware         Create a .vblock with signature info for a
+                        firmware image
+vbutil_kernel           Pack a kernel image, bootloader, and config into
+                        a signed binary
 
-kernel_utility.c To generate verified boot kernel images.
-
-dumpRSAPublicKey.c Dump RSA Public key (from a DER-encoded X509
-                   certificate) in a format suitable for
-                   use by RSAVerify* functions in
-                   crypto/.
+dumpRSAPublicKey        Dump RSA Public key (from a DER-encoded X509
+                        certificate) in a format suitable for
+                        use by RSAVerify* functions in
+                        crypto/.
 
 verify_data.c Verify a given signature on a given file.
                                  
 
  
 ---------- 
 Generating a signed firmware image: 
 ----------
 
 * Step 1: Generate RSA root and signing keys.
@@ skipping 10 matching lines @@
 
 * Step 2: Generate pre-processed public versions of the above keys using
         utility/dumpRSAPublicKey
 
 # dumpRSAPublicKey expects an x509 certificate as input.
 $ openssl req -batch -new -x509 -key root_key.pem -out root_key.crt
 $ openssl req -batch -new -x509 -key signing_key.pem -out signing_key.crt
 $ utility/dumpRSAPublicKey root_key.crt > root_key.keyb
 $ utility/dumpRSAPublicKey signing_key.crt > signing_key.keyb
 
+************** TODO: STUFF PAST HERE IS OUT OF DATE ***************
+
 At this point we have all the requisite keys needed to generate a signed
 firmware image.
 
 .pem   RSA Public/Private Key Pair
 .crt   X509 Key Certificate
 .keyb  Pre-processed RSA Public Key
 
 
 * Step 3: Use utility/firmware_utility to generate a signed firmare blob.
 
@@ skipping 32 matching lines @@
 
 ---------- 
 Generating a signed kernel image: 
 ----------
 
 The steps for generating a signed kernel image are similar to that of
 a firmware image. Since verification is chained - RO firmware verifies
 RW firmware which verifies the kernel, only the keys change. An additional
 kernel signing key must be generated. The firmware signing generated above
 is the root key equivalent for signed kernel images.