Add a histogram for measuring the number of times we fall back to common name matching, when a cert…

net/cert/cert_verify_proc_android.cc

 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_android.h"
 
 #include <string>
 #include <vector>
 
 #include "base/logging.h"
@@ skipping 73 matching lines @@
   return false;
 }
 
 int CertVerifyProcAndroid::VerifyInternal(
     X509Certificate* cert,
     const std::string& hostname,
     int flags,
     CRLSet* crl_set,
     const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
     CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
-  if (!cert->VerifyNameMatch(hostname))
+  if (!cert->VerifyNameMatch(hostname,
+                             &verify_result->common_name_fallback_used)) {
     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID;
+  }
 
   std::vector<std::string> cert_bytes;
   if (!GetChainDEREncodedBytes(cert, &cert_bytes))
     return ERR_CERT_INVALID;
   if (!VerifyFromAndroidTrustManager(cert_bytes, verify_result)) {
     NOTREACHED();
     return ERR_FAILED;
   }
   if (IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status))
     return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status);
 
   // TODO(ppi): Implement missing functionality: yielding the constructed trust
   // chain, public key hashes of its certificates and |is_issued_by_known_root|
   // flag. All of the above require specific support from the platform, missing
   // in the Java APIs. See also: http://crbug.com/116838
 
   // Until the required support is available in the platform, we don't know if
   // the trust root at the end of the chain was standard or user-added, so we
   // mark all correctly verified certificates as issued by a known root.
   verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root = true;
 
   return OK;
 }
 
 }  // namespace net