Disable SecurityTest.NewOverflow under msan.

base/security_unittest.cc

 // Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <stddef.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
@@ skipping 69 matching lines @@
     printf("Platform has overflow: %s\n",
            !overflow_detected ? "yes." : "no.");
 #else
     // Otherwise, fail the test. (Note: EXPECT are ok in subfunctions, ASSERT
     // aren't).
     EXPECT_TRUE(overflow_detected);
 #endif
   }
 }
 
-#if defined(OS_IOS) || defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER) || defined(THREAD_SANITIZER)
+#if defined(OS_IOS) || defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER) || \
+    defined(THREAD_SANITIZER) || defined(MEMORY_SANITIZER)
 #define MAYBE_NewOverflow DISABLED_NewOverflow
 #else
 #define MAYBE_NewOverflow NewOverflow
 #endif
 // Test array[TooBig][X] and array[X][TooBig] allocations for int overflows.
 // IOS doesn't honor nothrow, so disable the test there.
 // Disabled under XSan because asan aborts when new returns nullptr,
 // https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=690271#c15
 TEST(SecurityTest, MAYBE_NewOverflow) {
   const size_t kArraySize = 4096;
@@ skipping 77 matching lines @@
   // kRandomMask, so we use it as an additional detection mechanism.
   const uintptr_t kRandomMask = 0x3fffffffffffULL;
   bool impossible_random_address =
       reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(ptr.get()) & ~kRandomMask;
   EXPECT_FALSE(impossible_random_address);
 }
 
 #endif  // defined(OS_LINUX) && defined(__x86_64__)
 
 }  // namespace