Re-enable SecurityTest.CallocOverflow

base/security_unittest.cc

 // Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
@@ skipping 195 matching lines @@
 bool CallocReturnsNull(size_t nmemb, size_t size) {
   scoped_ptr<char, base::FreeDeleter> array_pointer(
       static_cast<char*>(calloc(nmemb, size)));
   // We need the call to HideValueFromCompiler(): we have seen LLVM
   // optimize away the call to calloc() entirely and assume
   // the pointer to not be NULL.
   return HideValueFromCompiler(array_pointer.get()) == NULL;
 }
 
 // Test if calloc() can overflow.
-// Fails on Mac under ASAN. http://crbug.com/304125
-#if defined(OS_MACOSX) && defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER)
-#define MAYBE_CallocOverflow DISABLED_CallocOverflow
-#else
-#define MAYBE_CallocOverflow CallocOverflow
-#endif
-TEST(SecurityTest, MAYBE_CallocOverflow) {
+TEST(SecurityTest, CallocOverflow) {
   const size_t kArraySize = 4096;
   const size_t kMaxSizeT = numeric_limits<size_t>::max();
   const size_t kArraySize2 = kMaxSizeT / kArraySize + 10;
   if (!CallocDiesOnOOM()) {
     EXPECT_TRUE(CallocReturnsNull(kArraySize, kArraySize2));
     EXPECT_TRUE(CallocReturnsNull(kArraySize2, kArraySize));
   } else {
     // It's also ok for calloc to just terminate the process.
 #if defined(GTEST_HAS_DEATH_TEST)
     EXPECT_DEATH(CallocReturnsNull(kArraySize, kArraySize2), "");
@@ skipping 67 matching lines @@
   // kRandomMask, so we use it as an additional detection mechanism.
   const uintptr_t kRandomMask = 0x3fffffffffffULL;
   bool impossible_random_address =
       reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(ptr.get()) & ~kRandomMask;
   EXPECT_FALSE(impossible_random_address);
 }
 
 #endif  // (defined(OS_LINUX) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)) && defined(__x86_64__)
 
 }  // namespace