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Issue 2706923002: Rework security checks to be based on Window rather than Frame. (Closed)
Patch Set: Address review comments. Created 3 years, 9 months ago
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1 /* 1 /*
2 * Copyright (C) 2009 Google Inc. All rights reserved. 2 * Copyright (C) 2009 Google Inc. All rights reserved.
3 * 3 *
4 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 4 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
5 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are 5 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are
6 * met: 6 * met:
7 * 7 *
8 * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 8 * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
9 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 9 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
10 * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above 10 * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
(...skipping 14 matching lines...) Expand all
25 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY 25 * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
26 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT 26 * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
27 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE 27 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
28 * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 28 * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
29 */ 29 */
30 30
31 #include "bindings/core/v8/BindingSecurity.h" 31 #include "bindings/core/v8/BindingSecurity.h"
32 32
33 #include "bindings/core/v8/ExceptionState.h" 33 #include "bindings/core/v8/ExceptionState.h"
34 #include "bindings/core/v8/V8Binding.h" 34 #include "bindings/core/v8/V8Binding.h"
35 #include "bindings/core/v8/V8Location.h"
36 #include "bindings/core/v8/V8Window.h"
35 #include "core/dom/Document.h" 37 #include "core/dom/Document.h"
38 #include "core/frame/DOMWindow.h"
36 #include "core/frame/LocalDOMWindow.h" 39 #include "core/frame/LocalDOMWindow.h"
37 #include "core/frame/LocalFrame.h" 40 #include "core/frame/LocalFrame.h"
38 #include "core/frame/Location.h" 41 #include "core/frame/Location.h"
39 #include "core/frame/Settings.h" 42 #include "core/frame/Settings.h"
40 #include "core/html/HTMLFrameElementBase.h" 43 #include "core/html/HTMLFrameElementBase.h"
41 #include "core/workers/MainThreadWorkletGlobalScope.h" 44 #include "core/workers/MainThreadWorkletGlobalScope.h"
42 #include "platform/weborigin/SecurityOrigin.h" 45 #include "platform/weborigin/SecurityOrigin.h"
43 46
44 namespace blink { 47 namespace blink {
45 48
46 namespace { 49 namespace {
47 50
48 bool canAccessFrameInternal(const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow, 51 bool canAccessWindowInternal(const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow,
49 const SecurityOrigin* targetFrameOrigin, 52 const DOMWindow* targetWindow) {
50 const DOMWindow* targetWindow) {
51 SECURITY_CHECK(!(targetWindow && targetWindow->frame()) || 53 SECURITY_CHECK(!(targetWindow && targetWindow->frame()) ||
52 targetWindow == targetWindow->frame()->domWindow()); 54 targetWindow == targetWindow->frame()->domWindow());
53 55
54 // It's important to check that targetWindow is a LocalDOMWindow: it's 56 // It's important to check that targetWindow is a LocalDOMWindow: it's
55 // possible for a remote frame and local frame to have the same security 57 // possible for a remote frame and local frame to have the same security
56 // origin, depending on the model being used to allocate Frames between 58 // origin, depending on the model being used to allocate Frames between
57 // processes. See https://crbug.com/601629. 59 // processes. See https://crbug.com/601629.
58 if (!(accessingWindow && targetWindow && targetWindow->isLocalDOMWindow())) 60 if (!(accessingWindow && targetWindow && targetWindow->isLocalDOMWindow()))
59 return false; 61 return false;
60 62
61 const SecurityOrigin* accessingOrigin = 63 const SecurityOrigin* accessingOrigin =
62 accessingWindow->document()->getSecurityOrigin(); 64 accessingWindow->document()->getSecurityOrigin();
63 if (!accessingOrigin->canAccessCheckSuborigins(targetFrameOrigin)) 65 const LocalDOMWindow* localTargetWindow = toLocalDOMWindow(targetWindow);
66 if (!accessingOrigin->canAccessCheckSuborigins(
67 localTargetWindow->document()->getSecurityOrigin())) {
64 return false; 68 return false;
69 }
65 70
66 // Notify the loader's client if the initial document has been accessed. 71 // Notify the loader's client if the initial document has been accessed.
67 LocalFrame* targetFrame = toLocalDOMWindow(targetWindow)->frame(); 72 LocalFrame* targetFrame = localTargetWindow->frame();
68 if (targetFrame && 73 if (targetFrame &&
69 targetFrame->loader().stateMachine()->isDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument()) 74 targetFrame->loader().stateMachine()->isDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument())
70 targetFrame->loader().didAccessInitialDocument(); 75 targetFrame->loader().didAccessInitialDocument();
71 76
72 return true; 77 return true;
73 } 78 }
74 79
75 bool canAccessFrame(const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow, 80 bool canAccessWindow(const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow,
76 const SecurityOrigin* targetFrameOrigin, 81 const DOMWindow* targetWindow,
77 const DOMWindow* targetWindow, 82 ExceptionState& exceptionState) {
78 ExceptionState& exceptionState) { 83 if (canAccessWindowInternal(accessingWindow, targetWindow))
79 if (canAccessFrameInternal(accessingWindow, targetFrameOrigin, targetWindow))
80 return true; 84 return true;
81 85
82 if (targetWindow) 86 if (targetWindow)
83 exceptionState.throwSecurityError( 87 exceptionState.throwSecurityError(
84 targetWindow->sanitizedCrossDomainAccessErrorMessage(accessingWindow), 88 targetWindow->sanitizedCrossDomainAccessErrorMessage(accessingWindow),
85 targetWindow->crossDomainAccessErrorMessage(accessingWindow)); 89 targetWindow->crossDomainAccessErrorMessage(accessingWindow));
86 return false; 90 return false;
87 } 91 }
88 92
89 bool canAccessFrame(const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow, 93 bool canAccessWindow(const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow,
90 SecurityOrigin* targetFrameOrigin, 94 const DOMWindow* targetWindow,
91 const DOMWindow* targetWindow, 95 BindingSecurity::ErrorReportOption reportingOption) {
92 BindingSecurity::ErrorReportOption reportingOption) { 96 if (canAccessWindowInternal(accessingWindow, targetWindow))
93 if (canAccessFrameInternal(accessingWindow, targetFrameOrigin, targetWindow))
94 return true; 97 return true;
95 98
96 if (accessingWindow && targetWindow && 99 if (accessingWindow && targetWindow &&
97 reportingOption == BindingSecurity::ErrorReportOption::Report) 100 reportingOption == BindingSecurity::ErrorReportOption::Report)
98 accessingWindow->printErrorMessage( 101 accessingWindow->printErrorMessage(
99 targetWindow->crossDomainAccessErrorMessage(accessingWindow)); 102 targetWindow->crossDomainAccessErrorMessage(accessingWindow));
100 return false; 103 return false;
101 } 104 }
102 105
106 DOMWindow* findWindow(v8::Isolate* isolate,
107 const WrapperTypeInfo* type,
108 v8::Local<v8::Object> host) {
109 if (V8Window::wrapperTypeInfo.equals(type))
haraken 2017/03/07 08:53:57 Previously we were using findInstanceInPrototypeCh
dcheng 2017/03/07 09:06:46 Originally, we didn't set the internal fields of t
110 return V8Window::toImpl(host);
111
112 if (V8Location::wrapperTypeInfo.equals(type))
113 return V8Location::toImpl(host)->domWindow();
114
115 // This function can handle only those types listed above.
116 NOTREACHED();
117 return nullptr;
118 }
119
103 } // namespace 120 } // namespace
104 121
105 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessTo(const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow, 122 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessTo(const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow,
106 const DOMWindow* target, 123 const DOMWindow* target,
107 ExceptionState& exceptionState) { 124 ExceptionState& exceptionState) {
108 DCHECK(target); 125 DCHECK(target);
109 const Frame* frame = target->frame(); 126 return canAccessWindow(accessingWindow, target, exceptionState);
110 if (!frame || !frame->securityContext())
111 return false;
112 return canAccessFrame(accessingWindow,
113 frame->securityContext()->getSecurityOrigin(), target,
114 exceptionState);
115 } 127 }
116 128
117 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessTo(const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow, 129 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessTo(const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow,
118 const DOMWindow* target, 130 const DOMWindow* target,
119 ErrorReportOption reportingOption) { 131 ErrorReportOption reportingOption) {
120 DCHECK(target); 132 DCHECK(target);
121 const Frame* frame = target->frame(); 133 return canAccessWindow(accessingWindow, target, reportingOption);
122 if (!frame || !frame->securityContext())
123 return false;
124 return canAccessFrame(accessingWindow,
125 frame->securityContext()->getSecurityOrigin(), target,
126 reportingOption);
127 }
128
129 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessTo(const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow,
130 const EventTarget* target,
131 ExceptionState& exceptionState) {
132 DCHECK(target);
133 const DOMWindow* window = target->toDOMWindow();
134 if (!window) {
135 // We only need to check the access to Window objects which are
136 // cross-origin accessible. If it's not a Window, the object's
137 // origin must always be the same origin (or it already leaked).
138 return true;
139 }
140 const Frame* frame = window->frame();
141 if (!frame || !frame->securityContext())
142 return false;
143 return canAccessFrame(accessingWindow,
144 frame->securityContext()->getSecurityOrigin(), window,
145 exceptionState);
146 } 134 }
147 135
148 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessTo(const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow, 136 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessTo(const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow,
149 const Location* target, 137 const Location* target,
150 ExceptionState& exceptionState) { 138 ExceptionState& exceptionState) {
151 DCHECK(target); 139 DCHECK(target);
152 const Frame* frame = target->frame(); 140 return canAccessWindow(accessingWindow, target->domWindow(), exceptionState);
153 if (!frame || !frame->securityContext())
154 return false;
155 return canAccessFrame(accessingWindow,
156 frame->securityContext()->getSecurityOrigin(),
157 frame->domWindow(), exceptionState);
158 } 141 }
159 142
160 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessTo(const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow, 143 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessTo(const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow,
161 const Location* target, 144 const Location* target,
162 ErrorReportOption reportingOption) { 145 ErrorReportOption reportingOption) {
163 DCHECK(target); 146 DCHECK(target);
164 const Frame* frame = target->frame(); 147 return canAccessWindow(accessingWindow, target->domWindow(), reportingOption);
165 if (!frame || !frame->securityContext())
166 return false;
167 return canAccessFrame(accessingWindow,
168 frame->securityContext()->getSecurityOrigin(),
169 frame->domWindow(), reportingOption);
170 } 148 }
171 149
172 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessTo(const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow, 150 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessTo(const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow,
173 const Node* target, 151 const Node* target,
174 ExceptionState& exceptionState) { 152 ExceptionState& exceptionState) {
175 if (!target) 153 if (!target)
176 return false; 154 return false;
177 return canAccessFrame(accessingWindow, target->document().getSecurityOrigin(), 155 return canAccessWindow(accessingWindow, target->document().domWindow(),
178 target->document().domWindow(), exceptionState); 156 exceptionState);
179 } 157 }
180 158
181 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessTo(const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow, 159 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessTo(const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow,
182 const Node* target, 160 const Node* target,
183 ErrorReportOption reportingOption) { 161 ErrorReportOption reportingOption) {
184 if (!target) 162 if (!target)
185 return false; 163 return false;
186 return canAccessFrame(accessingWindow, target->document().getSecurityOrigin(), 164 return canAccessWindow(accessingWindow, target->document().domWindow(),
187 target->document().domWindow(), reportingOption); 165 reportingOption);
188 } 166 }
189 167
190 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessToFrame( 168 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessToFrame(
191 const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow, 169 const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow,
192 const Frame* target, 170 const Frame* target,
193 ExceptionState& exceptionState) { 171 ExceptionState& exceptionState) {
194 if (!target || !target->securityContext()) 172 if (!target || !target->securityContext())
195 return false; 173 return false;
196 return canAccessFrame(accessingWindow, 174 return canAccessWindow(accessingWindow, target->domWindow(), exceptionState);
197 target->securityContext()->getSecurityOrigin(),
198 target->domWindow(), exceptionState);
199 } 175 }
200 176
201 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessToFrame( 177 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessToFrame(
202 const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow, 178 const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow,
203 const Frame* target, 179 const Frame* target,
204 ErrorReportOption reportingOption) { 180 ErrorReportOption reportingOption) {
205 if (!target || !target->securityContext()) 181 if (!target || !target->securityContext())
206 return false; 182 return false;
207 return canAccessFrame(accessingWindow, 183 return canAccessWindow(accessingWindow, target->domWindow(), reportingOption);
208 target->securityContext()->getSecurityOrigin(),
209 target->domWindow(), reportingOption);
210 }
211
212 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessToDetachedWindow(
213 const LocalDOMWindow* accessingWindow,
214 const DOMWindow* target,
215 ExceptionState& exceptionState) {
216 CHECK(target && !target->frame())
217 << "This version of shouldAllowAccessToFrame() must be used only for "
218 << "detached windows.";
219 if (!target->isLocalDOMWindow())
220 return false;
221 Document* document = toLocalDOMWindow(target)->document();
222 if (!document)
223 return false;
224 return canAccessFrame(accessingWindow, document->getSecurityOrigin(), target,
225 exceptionState);
226 } 184 }
227 185
228 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowNamedAccessTo(const DOMWindow* accessingWindow, 186 bool BindingSecurity::shouldAllowNamedAccessTo(const DOMWindow* accessingWindow,
229 const DOMWindow* targetWindow) { 187 const DOMWindow* targetWindow) {
230 const Frame* accessingFrame = accessingWindow->frame(); 188 const Frame* accessingFrame = accessingWindow->frame();
231 DCHECK(accessingFrame); 189 DCHECK(accessingFrame);
232 DCHECK(accessingFrame->securityContext()); 190 DCHECK(accessingFrame->securityContext());
233 const SecurityOrigin* accessingOrigin = 191 const SecurityOrigin* accessingOrigin =
234 accessingFrame->securityContext()->getSecurityOrigin(); 192 accessingFrame->securityContext()->getSecurityOrigin();
235 193
(...skipping 10 matching lines...) Expand all
246 204
247 // Note that there is no need to call back 205 // Note that there is no need to call back
248 // FrameLoader::didAccessInitialDocument() because |targetWindow| must be 206 // FrameLoader::didAccessInitialDocument() because |targetWindow| must be
249 // a child window inside iframe or frame and it doesn't have a URL bar, 207 // a child window inside iframe or frame and it doesn't have a URL bar,
250 // so there is no need to worry about URL spoofing. 208 // so there is no need to worry about URL spoofing.
251 209
252 return true; 210 return true;
253 } 211 }
254 212
255 void BindingSecurity::failedAccessCheckFor(v8::Isolate* isolate, 213 void BindingSecurity::failedAccessCheckFor(v8::Isolate* isolate,
256 const Frame* target) { 214 const WrapperTypeInfo* type,
257 // TODO(dcheng): See if this null check can be removed or hoisted to a 215 v8::Local<v8::Object> host) {
haraken 2017/03/07 08:53:57 host => holder
dcheng 2017/03/07 09:06:46 Done.
258 // different location. 216 DOMWindow* target = findWindow(isolate, type, host);
259 if (!target) 217 // Failing to find a target means something is wrong. Failing to throw an
260 return; 218 // exception could be a security issue, so just crash.
261 219 CHECK(target);
262 DOMWindow* targetWindow = target->domWindow();
263 220
264 // TODO(dcheng): Add ContextType, interface name, and property name as 221 // TODO(dcheng): Add ContextType, interface name, and property name as
265 // arguments, so the generated exception can be more descriptive. 222 // arguments, so the generated exception can be more descriptive.
266 ExceptionState exceptionState(isolate, ExceptionState::UnknownContext, 223 ExceptionState exceptionState(isolate, ExceptionState::UnknownContext,
267 nullptr, nullptr); 224 nullptr, nullptr);
268 exceptionState.throwSecurityError( 225 exceptionState.throwSecurityError(
269 targetWindow->sanitizedCrossDomainAccessErrorMessage( 226 target->sanitizedCrossDomainAccessErrorMessage(currentDOMWindow(isolate)),
270 currentDOMWindow(isolate)), 227 target->crossDomainAccessErrorMessage(currentDOMWindow(isolate)));
271 targetWindow->crossDomainAccessErrorMessage(currentDOMWindow(isolate)));
272 } 228 }
273 229
274 } // namespace blink 230 } // namespace blink
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