Reland of nable SecurityTest.NewOverflow on Windows, with clang fix

base/security_unittest.cc

 // Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <stddef.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
@@ skipping 69 matching lines @@
     printf("Platform has overflow: %s\n",
            !overflow_detected ? "yes." : "no.");
 #else
     // Otherwise, fail the test. (Note: EXPECT are ok in subfunctions, ASSERT
     // aren't).
     EXPECT_TRUE(overflow_detected);
 #endif
   }
 }
 
-#if defined(OS_IOS) || defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_LINUX)
+#if defined(OS_IOS) || defined(OS_LINUX) || defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER)
 #define MAYBE_NewOverflow DISABLED_NewOverflow
 #else
 #define MAYBE_NewOverflow NewOverflow
 #endif
 // Test array[TooBig][X] and array[X][TooBig] allocations for int overflows.
 // IOS doesn't honor nothrow, so disable the test there.
-// Crashes on Windows Dbg builds, disable there as well.
 // Disabled on Linux because failing Linux Valgrind bot, and Valgrind exclusions
 // are not currently read. See http://crbug.com/582398
+// Disabled under ASan because asan aborts when new returns nullptr,
+// https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=690271#c15
 TEST(SecurityTest, MAYBE_NewOverflow) {
   const size_t kArraySize = 4096;
   // We want something "dynamic" here, so that the compiler doesn't
   // immediately reject crazy arrays.
   const size_t kDynamicArraySize = HideValueFromCompiler(kArraySize);
-  // numeric_limits are still not constexpr until we switch to C++11, so we
-  // use an ugly cast.
-  const size_t kMaxSizeT = ~static_cast<size_t>(0);
-  ASSERT_EQ(numeric_limits<size_t>::max(), kMaxSizeT);
+  const size_t kMaxSizeT = std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max();
   const size_t kArraySize2 = kMaxSizeT / kArraySize + 10;
   const size_t kDynamicArraySize2 = HideValueFromCompiler(kArraySize2);
   {
     std::unique_ptr<char[][kArraySize]> array_pointer(
         new (nothrow) char[kDynamicArraySize2][kArraySize]);
-    OverflowTestsSoftExpectTrue(!array_pointer);
+    // Prevent clang from optimizing away the whole test.
+    char* volatile p = reinterpret_cast<char*>(array_pointer.get());
+    OverflowTestsSoftExpectTrue(!p);
   }
   // On windows, the compiler prevents static array sizes of more than
   // 0x7fffffff (error C2148).
 #if defined(OS_WIN) && defined(ARCH_CPU_64_BITS)
   ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(kDynamicArraySize);
 #else
   {
     std::unique_ptr<char[][kArraySize2]> array_pointer(
         new (nothrow) char[kDynamicArraySize][kArraySize2]);
-    OverflowTestsSoftExpectTrue(!array_pointer);
+    // Prevent clang from optimizing away the whole test.
+    char* volatile p = reinterpret_cast<char*>(array_pointer.get());
+    OverflowTestsSoftExpectTrue(!p);
   }
 #endif  // !defined(OS_WIN) || !defined(ARCH_CPU_64_BITS)
 }
 
 #if defined(OS_LINUX) && defined(__x86_64__)
 // Check if ptr1 and ptr2 are separated by less than size chars.
 bool ArePointersToSameArea(void* ptr1, void* ptr2, size_t size) {
   ptrdiff_t ptr_diff = reinterpret_cast<char*>(std::max(ptr1, ptr2)) -
                        reinterpret_cast<char*>(std::min(ptr1, ptr2));
   return static_cast<size_t>(ptr_diff) <= size;
@@ skipping 43 matching lines @@
   // kRandomMask, so we use it as an additional detection mechanism.
   const uintptr_t kRandomMask = 0x3fffffffffffULL;
   bool impossible_random_address =
       reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(ptr.get()) & ~kRandomMask;
   EXPECT_FALSE(impossible_random_address);
 }
 
 #endif  // defined(OS_LINUX) && defined(__x86_64__)
 
 }  // namespace