| Index: ui/events/ozone/evdev/scoped_input_device.cc
|
| diff --git a/ui/events/ozone/evdev/scoped_input_device.cc b/ui/events/ozone/evdev/scoped_input_device.cc
|
| new file mode 100644
|
| index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3f8f62bd89c985000554d8ffbb4454bcb3d1bd6f
|
| --- /dev/null
|
| +++ b/ui/events/ozone/evdev/scoped_input_device.cc
|
| @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
|
| +// Copyright 2017 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
|
| +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
|
| +// found in the LICENSE file.
|
| +
|
| +#include "ui/events/ozone/evdev/scoped_input_device.h"
|
| +
|
| +#include <errno.h>
|
| +#include <unistd.h>
|
| +
|
| +#include "base/debug/alias.h"
|
| +#include "base/logging.h"
|
| +#include "base/posix/eintr_wrapper.h"
|
| +
|
| +namespace ui {
|
| +namespace internal {
|
| +
|
| +// static
|
| +void ScopedInputDeviceCloseTraits::Free(int fd) {
|
| + // It's important to crash here.
|
| + // There are security implications to not closing a file descriptor
|
| + // properly. As file descriptors are "capabilities", keeping them open
|
| + // would make the current process keep access to a resource. Much of
|
| + // Chrome relies on being able to "drop" such access.
|
| + // It's especially problematic on Linux with the setuid sandbox, where
|
| + // a single open directory would bypass the entire security model.
|
| + int ret = IGNORE_EINTR(close(fd));
|
| + PCHECK(0 == ret || errno != EBADF);
|
| +}
|
| +
|
| +} // namespace internal
|
| +} // namespace ui
|
|
|