Revert of Build services as standalone executables

services/service_manager/runner/host/linux_sandbox.cc

Index: services/service_manager/runner/host/linux_sandbox.cc
diff --git a/services/service_manager/runner/host/linux_sandbox.cc b/services/service_manager/runner/host/linux_sandbox.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..46fc62fa58246935a4cac5af85649a3024371a9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/service_manager/runner/host/linux_sandbox.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+// Copyright 2015 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include "services/service_manager/runner/host/linux_sandbox.h"
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <utility>
+
+#include "base/bind.h"
+#include "base/debug/leak_annotations.h"
+#include "base/macros.h"
+#include "base/posix/eintr_wrapper.h"
+#include "base/rand_util.h"
+#include "base/sys_info.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/bpf_dsl/policy.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/bpf_dsl/trap_registry.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/sigsys_handlers.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/services/credentials.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/services/namespace_sandbox.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/services/proc_util.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/services/thread_helpers.h"
+
+using sandbox::syscall_broker::BrokerFilePermission;
+
+namespace service_manager {
+
+namespace {
+
+intptr_t SandboxSIGSYSHandler(const struct sandbox::arch_seccomp_data& args,
+                              void* aux) {
+  RAW_CHECK(aux);
+  const sandbox::syscall_broker::BrokerProcess* broker_process =
+      static_cast<const sandbox::syscall_broker::BrokerProcess*>(aux);
+  switch (args.nr) {
+#if !defined(__aarch64__)
+    case __NR_access:
+      return broker_process->Access(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(args.args[0]),
+                                    static_cast<int>(args.args[1]));
+    case __NR_open:
+      return broker_process->Open(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(args.args[0]),
+                                  static_cast<int>(args.args[1]));
+#endif
+    case __NR_faccessat:
+      if (static_cast<int>(args.args[0]) == AT_FDCWD) {
+        return broker_process->Access(
+            reinterpret_cast<const char*>(args.args[1]),
+            static_cast<int>(args.args[2]));
+      } else {
+        return -EPERM;
+      }
+    case __NR_openat:
+      // Allow using openat() as open().
+      if (static_cast<int>(args.args[0]) == AT_FDCWD) {
+        return broker_process->Open(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(args.args[1]),
+                                    static_cast<int>(args.args[2]));
+      } else {
+        return -EPERM;
+      }
+    default:
+      RAW_CHECK(false);
+      return -ENOSYS;
+  }
+}
+
+class SandboxPolicy : public sandbox::BaselinePolicy {
+ public:
+  explicit SandboxPolicy(sandbox::syscall_broker::BrokerProcess* broker_process)
+      : broker_process_(broker_process) {}
+  ~SandboxPolicy() override {}
+
+  // Overridden from sandbox::bpf_dsl::Policy:
+  sandbox::bpf_dsl::ResultExpr EvaluateSyscall(int sysno) const override {
+    // This policy is only advisory/for noticing FS access for the moment.
+    switch (sysno) {
+#if !defined(__aarch64__)
+      case __NR_access:
+      case __NR_open:
+#endif
+      case __NR_faccessat:
+      case __NR_openat:
+        return sandbox::bpf_dsl::Trap(SandboxSIGSYSHandler, broker_process_);
+      case __NR_sched_getaffinity:
+        return sandbox::RestrictSchedTarget(policy_pid(), sysno);
+      case __NR_ftruncate:
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__mips__) || \
+    defined(__aarch64__)
+      // Per #ifdefs in
+      // content/common/sandbox_linux/bpf_renderer_policy_linux.cc
+      case __NR_getrlimit:
+#endif
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__arm__)
+      case __NR_ugetrlimit:
+#endif
+      case __NR_uname:
+#if defined(__arm__) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__mips__)
+      case __NR_getsockopt:
+      case __NR_setsockopt:
+#endif
+        return sandbox::bpf_dsl::Allow();
+    }
+
+    return BaselinePolicy::EvaluateSyscall(sysno);
+  }
+
+ private:
+  // Not owned.
+  const sandbox::syscall_broker::BrokerProcess* broker_process_;
+  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(SandboxPolicy);
+};
+
+}  // namespace
+
+LinuxSandbox::LinuxSandbox(const std::vector<BrokerFilePermission>& permissions)
+    : broker_(new sandbox::syscall_broker::BrokerProcess(EPERM, permissions)) {
+  CHECK(broker_->Init(
+      base::Bind<bool (*)()>(&sandbox::Credentials::DropAllCapabilities)));
+  policy_.reset(new SandboxPolicy(broker_.get()));
+}
+
+LinuxSandbox::~LinuxSandbox() {}
+
+void LinuxSandbox::Warmup() {
+  proc_fd_ = sandbox::ProcUtil::OpenProc();
+  warmed_up_ = true;
+
+  // Verify that we haven't started threads or grabbed directory file
+  // descriptors.
+  sandbox::ThreadHelpers::AssertSingleThreaded(proc_fd_.get());
+  CHECK(!sandbox::ProcUtil::HasOpenDirectory(proc_fd_.get()));
+}
+
+void LinuxSandbox::EngageNamespaceSandbox() {
+  CHECK(warmed_up_);
+  CHECK_EQ(1, getpid());
+  CHECK(sandbox::NamespaceSandbox::InNewPidNamespace());
+  CHECK(sandbox::Credentials::MoveToNewUserNS());
+  CHECK(sandbox::Credentials::DropFileSystemAccess(proc_fd_.get()));
+  CHECK(sandbox::Credentials::DropAllCapabilities(proc_fd_.get()));
+}
+
+void LinuxSandbox::EngageSeccompSandbox() {
+  CHECK(warmed_up_);
+  sandbox::SandboxBPF sandbox(policy_.release());
+  base::ScopedFD proc_fd(HANDLE_EINTR(
+      openat(proc_fd_.get(), ".", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC)));
+  CHECK(proc_fd.is_valid());
+  sandbox.SetProcFd(std::move(proc_fd));
+  CHECK(
+      sandbox.StartSandbox(sandbox::SandboxBPF::SeccompLevel::SINGLE_THREADED))
+      << "Starting the process with a sandbox failed. Missing kernel support.";
+
+  // The Broker is now bound to this process and should only be destroyed when
+  // the process exits or is killed.
+  sandbox::syscall_broker::BrokerProcess* leaked_broker = broker_.release();
+  ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(leaked_broker);
+  ANNOTATE_LEAKING_OBJECT_PTR(leaked_broker);
+}
+
+void LinuxSandbox::Seal() {
+  proc_fd_.reset();
+}
+
+}  // namespace service_manager