NaCl Linux: create NaClSandbox class

components/nacl/loader/nacl_sandbox_linux.cc

Index: components/nacl/loader/nacl_sandbox_linux.cc
diff --git a/components/nacl/loader/nacl_sandbox_linux.cc b/components/nacl/loader/nacl_sandbox_linux.cc
deleted file mode 100644
index f1e4a49a4f71b1ab1efaaade862ea8a9d9f399b2..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/components/nacl/loader/nacl_sandbox_linux.cc
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
-// found in the LICENSE file.
-
-#include "components/nacl/loader/nacl_sandbox_linux.h"
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <sys/ptrace.h>
-
-#include "base/basictypes.h"
-#include "base/callback.h"
-#include "base/compiler_specific.h"
-#include "base/logging.h"
-#include "build/build_config.h"
-
-#if defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
-#include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
-#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h"
-#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf_policy.h"
-#include "sandbox/linux/services/linux_syscalls.h"
-
-using sandbox::ErrorCode;
-using sandbox::SandboxBPF;
-using sandbox::SandboxBPFPolicy;
-
-namespace {
-
-// On ARM and x86_64, System V shared memory calls have each their own system
-// call, while on i386 they are multiplexed.
-#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__)
-bool IsSystemVSharedMemory(int sysno) {
-  switch (sysno) {
-    case __NR_shmat:
-    case __NR_shmctl:
-    case __NR_shmdt:
-    case __NR_shmget:
-      return true;
-    default:
-      return false;
-  }
-}
-#endif
-
-#if defined(__i386__)
-// Big system V multiplexing system call.
-bool IsSystemVIpc(int sysno) {
-  switch (sysno) {
-    case __NR_ipc:
-      return true;
-    default:
-      return false;
-  }
-}
-#endif
-
-class NaClBPFSandboxPolicy : public SandboxBPFPolicy {
- public:
-  NaClBPFSandboxPolicy()
-      : baseline_policy_(content::GetBPFSandboxBaselinePolicy()) {}
-  virtual ~NaClBPFSandboxPolicy() {}
-
-  virtual ErrorCode EvaluateSyscall(SandboxBPF* sandbox_compiler,
-                                    int system_call_number) const OVERRIDE;
-
- private:
-  scoped_ptr<SandboxBPFPolicy> baseline_policy_;
-  DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(NaClBPFSandboxPolicy);
-};
-
-ErrorCode NaClBPFSandboxPolicy::EvaluateSyscall(
-    sandbox::SandboxBPF* sb, int sysno) const {
-  DCHECK(baseline_policy_);
-  switch (sysno) {
-    // TODO(jln): NaCl's GDB debug stub uses the following socket system calls,
-    // see if it can be restricted a bit.
-#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__)
-    // transport_common.cc needs this.
-    case __NR_accept:
-    case __NR_setsockopt:
-#elif defined(__i386__)
-    case __NR_socketcall:
-#endif
-    // trusted/service_runtime/linux/thread_suspension.c needs sigwait() and is
-    // used by NaCl's GDB debug stub.
-    case __NR_rt_sigtimedwait:
-#if defined(__i386__)
-    // Needed on i386 to set-up the custom segments.
-    case __NR_modify_ldt:
-#endif
-    // NaClAddrSpaceBeforeAlloc needs prlimit64.
-    case __NR_prlimit64:
-    // NaCl uses custom signal stacks.
-    case __NR_sigaltstack:
-    // Below is fairly similar to the policy for a Chromium renderer.
-    // TODO(jln): restrict clone(), ioctl() and prctl().
-    case __NR_ioctl:
-#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
-    case __NR_getrlimit:
-#endif
-#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__arm__)
-    case __NR_ugetrlimit:
-#endif
-    // NaCl runtime exposes clock_getres to untrusted code.
-    case __NR_clock_getres:
-    // NaCl runtime uses flock to simulate POSIX behavior for pwrite.
-    case __NR_flock:
-    case __NR_pread64:
-    case __NR_pwrite64:
-    case __NR_sched_get_priority_max:
-    case __NR_sched_get_priority_min:
-    case __NR_sched_getaffinity:
-    case __NR_sched_getparam:
-    case __NR_sched_getscheduler:
-    case __NR_sched_setscheduler:
-    case __NR_setpriority:
-    case __NR_sysinfo:
-    // __NR_times needed as clock() is called by CommandBufferHelper, which is
-    // used by NaCl applications that use Pepper's 3D interfaces.
-    // See crbug.com/264856 for details.
-    case __NR_times:
-    case __NR_uname:
-      return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
-    case __NR_ptrace:
-      return ErrorCode(EPERM);
-    default:
-      // TODO(jln): look into getting rid of System V shared memory:
-      // platform_qualify/linux/sysv_shm_and_mmap.c makes it a requirement, but
-      // it may not be needed in all cases. Chromium renderers don't need
-      // System V shared memory on Aura.
-#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__)
-      if (IsSystemVSharedMemory(sysno))
-        return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
-#elif defined(__i386__)
-      if (IsSystemVIpc(sysno))
-        return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
-#endif
-      return baseline_policy_->EvaluateSyscall(sb, sysno);
-  }
-  NOTREACHED();
-  // GCC wants this.
-  return ErrorCode(EPERM);
-}
-
-void RunSandboxSanityChecks() {
-  errno = 0;
-  // Make a ptrace request with an invalid PID.
-  long ptrace_ret = ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKUSER, -1 /* pid */, NULL, NULL);
-  CHECK_EQ(-1, ptrace_ret);
-  // Without the sandbox on, this ptrace call would ESRCH instead.
-  CHECK_EQ(EPERM, errno);
-}
-
-}  // namespace
-
-#else
-
-#if !defined(ARCH_CPU_MIPS_FAMILY)
-#error "Seccomp-bpf disabled on supported architecture!"
-#endif
-
-#endif  // defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
-
-bool InitializeBPFSandbox() {
-#if defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
-  bool sandbox_is_initialized = content::InitializeSandbox(
-      scoped_ptr<SandboxBPFPolicy>(new NaClBPFSandboxPolicy()));
-  if (sandbox_is_initialized) {
-    RunSandboxSanityChecks();
-    return true;
-  }
-#endif  // defined(USE_SECCOMP_BPF)
-  return false;
-}