NaCl Linux: create NaClSandbox class

components/nacl/loader/sandbox_linux/nacl_sandbox_linux.cc

Index: components/nacl/loader/sandbox_linux/nacl_sandbox_linux.cc
diff --git a/components/nacl/loader/sandbox_linux/nacl_sandbox_linux.cc b/components/nacl/loader/sandbox_linux/nacl_sandbox_linux.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..76572de90d151e2c2e480e7a8cbaf343dca06ff7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/components/nacl/loader/sandbox_linux/nacl_sandbox_linux.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+// Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
+// found in the LICENSE file.
+
+#include "components/nacl/loader/sandbox_linux/nacl_sandbox_linux.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "base/basictypes.h"
+#include "base/callback.h"
+#include "base/command_line.h"
+#include "base/compiler_specific.h"
+#include "base/logging.h"
+#include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h"
+#include "base/posix/eintr_wrapper.h"
+#include "build/build_config.h"
+#include "components/nacl/common/nacl_switches.h"
+#include "components/nacl/loader/nonsfi/nonsfi_sandbox.h"
+#include "components/nacl/loader/sandbox_linux/nacl_bpf_sandbox_linux.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/services/credentials.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/services/thread_helpers.h"
+#include "sandbox/linux/suid/client/setuid_sandbox_client.h"
+
+namespace nacl {
+
+namespace {
+
+// This is a poor man's check on whether we are sandboxed.
+bool IsSandboxed() {
+  int proc_fd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY);
+  if (proc_fd >= 0) {
+    PCHECK(0 == IGNORE_EINTR(close(proc_fd)));
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+NaClSandbox::NaClSandbox()
+    : layer_one_enabled_(false),
+      layer_one_sealed_(false),
+      layer_two_enabled_(false),
+      layer_two_is_non_sfi_(false),
+      proc_fd_(-1) {
+  proc_fd_.reset(
+      HANDLE_EINTR(open("/proc", O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC)));
+  PCHECK(proc_fd_.is_valid());
+}
+
+NaClSandbox::~NaClSandbox() {
+}
+
+bool NaClSandbox::IsSingleThreaded() {
+  CHECK(proc_fd_.is_valid());
+  base::ScopedFD proc_self_task(HANDLE_EINTR(openat(
+      proc_fd_.get(), "self/task/", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC)));
+  PCHECK(proc_self_task.is_valid());
+  return sandbox::ThreadHelpers::IsSingleThreaded(proc_self_task.get());
+}
+
+bool NaClSandbox::HasOpenDirectory() {
+  CHECK(proc_fd_.is_valid());
+  sandbox::Credentials credentials;
+  return credentials.HasOpenDirectory(proc_fd_.get());
+}
+
+void NaClSandbox::InitializeLayerOneSandbox() {
+  // Check that IsSandboxed() works. We should not be sandboxed at this point.
+  CHECK(!IsSandboxed()) << "Unexpectedly sandboxed!";
+  scoped_ptr<sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient> setuid_sandbox_client(
+      sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient::Create());
+  // Close the file descriptor that is an artefact of how the setuid sandbox
+  // works.
+  PCHECK(0 == IGNORE_EINTR(close(
+                  setuid_sandbox_client->GetUniqueToChildFileDescriptor())));
+  const bool suid_sandbox_child = setuid_sandbox_client->IsSuidSandboxChild();
+
+  if (suid_sandbox_child) {
+    // Make sure that no directory file descriptor is open, as it would bypass
+    // the setuid sandbox model.
+    CHECK(!HasOpenDirectory());
+
+    // Get sandboxed.
+    CHECK(setuid_sandbox_client->ChrootMe());
+    CHECK(IsSandboxed());
+    layer_one_enabled_ = true;
+  }
+}
+
+void NaClSandbox::InitializeLayerTwoSandbox(bool uses_nonsfi_mode) {
+  // seccomp-bpf only applies to the current thread, so it's critical to only
+  // have a single thread running here.
+  DCHECK(!layer_one_sealed_);
+  CHECK(IsSingleThreaded());
+  if (uses_nonsfi_mode) {
+    layer_two_enabled_ = nacl::nonsfi::InitializeBPFSandbox();
+    layer_two_is_non_sfi_ = true;
+  } else {
+    layer_two_enabled_ = nacl::InitializeBPFSandbox();
+  }
+}
+
+void NaClSandbox::SealLayerOneSandbox() {
+  if (!layer_two_enabled_) {
+    // If nothing prevents us, check that there is no superfluous directory
+    // open.
+    CHECK(!HasOpenDirectory());
+  }
+  proc_fd_.reset();
+  layer_one_sealed_ = true;
+}
+
+void NaClSandbox::CheckSandboxingStateWithPolicy() {
+  static const char kItIsDangerousMsg[] = " it is dangerous.";

[Mark Seaborn, 2014/04/29 00:28:22]

How about "this is dangerous", otherwise it seems like it's saying the sandbox
is dangerous.

[jln (very slow on Chromium), 2014/04/29 01:28:32]

Done.

+  static const char kItIsNotAllowedMsg[] =
+      " this is not allowed in this configuration.";
+
+  const bool no_sandbox_for_non_sfi_ok =
+      CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
+          switches::kNaClDangerousNoSandboxNonSfi);
+  const bool can_be_no_sandbox =
+      !layer_two_is_non_sfi_ || no_sandbox_for_non_sfi_ok;
+
+  if (!layer_one_enabled_ || !layer_one_sealed_) {
+    static const char kNoSuidMsg[] = "The SUID sandbox is not engaged,";

[Mark Seaborn, 2014/04/29 00:28:22]

Nit: comma splice, use ":" or ";" instead of ",". :-)

Can you mention NaCl in these messages?  The old message did.  e.g. "not engaged
for NaCl".

[jln (very slow on Chromium), 2014/04/29 01:28:32]

Done.

+    if (can_be_no_sandbox)
+      LOG(ERROR) << kNoSuidMsg << kItIsDangerousMsg;
+    else
+      LOG(FATAL) << kNoSuidMsg << kItIsNotAllowedMsg;
+  }
+
+  if (!layer_two_enabled_) {
+    static const char kNoBpfMsg[] = "The seccomp-bpf sandbox is not engaged,";
+    if (can_be_no_sandbox)
+      LOG(ERROR) << kNoBpfMsg << kItIsDangerousMsg;
+    else
+      LOG(FATAL) << kNoBpfMsg << kItIsNotAllowedMsg;
+  }
+}
+
+}  // namespace nacl