Removing CSPSourceList level up to SourceListDirective.

third_party/WebKit/Source/core/frame/csp/SourceListDirective.cpp

Index: third_party/WebKit/Source/core/frame/csp/SourceListDirective.cpp
diff --git a/third_party/WebKit/Source/core/frame/csp/SourceListDirective.cpp b/third_party/WebKit/Source/core/frame/csp/SourceListDirective.cpp
index 4d2cd4a8b7b26f4217594f9cc663c5dd2c914826..089c93804adc460dfe6f6d0413e881ac2f9acfa6 100644
--- a/third_party/WebKit/Source/core/frame/csp/SourceListDirective.cpp
+++ b/third_party/WebKit/Source/core/frame/csp/SourceListDirective.cpp
@@ -4,10 +4,15 @@
 
 #include "core/frame/csp/SourceListDirective.h"
 
-#include "core/frame/csp/CSPSourceList.h"
+#include "core/frame/csp/CSPSource.h"
 #include "core/frame/csp/ContentSecurityPolicy.h"
 #include "platform/network/ContentSecurityPolicyParsers.h"
 #include "platform/weborigin/KURL.h"
+#include "platform/weborigin/SecurityOrigin.h"
+#include "wtf/HashSet.h"
+#include "wtf/text/Base64.h"
+#include "wtf/text/ParsingUtilities.h"
+#include "wtf/text/StringToNumber.h"
 #include "wtf/text/WTFString.h"
 
 namespace blink {
@@ -15,53 +20,558 @@ namespace blink {
 SourceListDirective::SourceListDirective(const String& name,
                                          const String& value,
                                          ContentSecurityPolicy* policy)
-    : CSPDirective(name, value, policy), m_sourceList(policy, name) {
+    : CSPDirective(name, value, policy),
+      m_policy(policy),
+      m_directiveName(name),
+      m_allowSelf(false),
+      m_allowStar(false),
+      m_allowInline(false),
+      m_allowEval(false),
+      m_allowDynamic(false),
+      m_allowHashedAttributes(false),
+      m_hashAlgorithmsUsed(0) {
   Vector<UChar> characters;
   value.appendTo(characters);
+  parse(characters.data(), characters.data() + characters.size());
+}
+
+static bool isSourceListNone(const UChar* begin, const UChar* end) {
+  skipWhile<UChar, isASCIISpace>(begin, end);
+
+  const UChar* position = begin;
+  skipWhile<UChar, isSourceCharacter>(position, end);
+  if (!equalIgnoringCase("'none'", StringView(begin, position - begin)))
+    return false;
+
+  skipWhile<UChar, isASCIISpace>(position, end);
+  if (position != end)
+    return false;
 
-  m_sourceList.parse(characters.data(), characters.data() + characters.size());
+  return true;
 }
 
 bool SourceListDirective::allows(
     const KURL& url,
     ResourceRequest::RedirectStatus redirectStatus) const {
-  return m_sourceList.matches(url, redirectStatus);
+  // Wildcards match network schemes ('http', 'https', 'ftp', 'ws', 'wss'), and
+  // the scheme of the protected resource:
+  // https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-csp/#match-url-to-source-expression. Other
+  // schemes, including custom schemes, must be explicitly listed in a source
+  // list.
+  if (m_allowStar) {
+    if (url.protocolIsInHTTPFamily() || url.protocolIs("ftp") ||
+        url.protocolIs("ws") || url.protocolIs("wss") ||
+        m_policy->protocolMatchesSelf(url))
+      return true;
+
+    return hasSourceMatchInList(url, redirectStatus);
+  }
+
+  KURL effectiveURL =
+      m_policy->selfMatchesInnerURL() && SecurityOrigin::shouldUseInnerURL(url)
+          ? SecurityOrigin::extractInnerURL(url)
+          : url;
+
+  if (m_allowSelf && m_policy->urlMatchesSelf(effectiveURL))
+    return true;
+
+  return hasSourceMatchInList(effectiveURL, redirectStatus);
 }
 
 bool SourceListDirective::allowInline() const {
-  return m_sourceList.allowInline();
+  return m_allowInline;
 }
 
 bool SourceListDirective::allowEval() const {
-  return m_sourceList.allowEval();
+  return m_allowEval;
 }
 
 bool SourceListDirective::allowDynamic() const {
-  return m_sourceList.allowDynamic();
+  return m_allowDynamic;
 }
 
 bool SourceListDirective::allowNonce(const String& nonce) const {
-  return m_sourceList.allowNonce(nonce.stripWhiteSpace());
+  String nonceStripped = nonce.stripWhiteSpace();

[amalika, 2016/10/27 12:34:19]

Changed this to strip white space inside!

+  return !nonceStripped.isNull() && m_nonces.contains(nonceStripped);
 }
 
 bool SourceListDirective::allowHash(const CSPHashValue& hashValue) const {
-  return m_sourceList.allowHash(hashValue);
+  return m_hashes.contains(hashValue);
 }
 
 bool SourceListDirective::allowHashedAttributes() const {
-  return m_sourceList.allowHashedAttributes();
+  return m_allowHashedAttributes;
+}
+
+uint8_t SourceListDirective::hashAlgorithmsUsed() const {
+  return m_hashAlgorithmsUsed;
 }
 
 bool SourceListDirective::isHashOrNoncePresent() const {
-  return m_sourceList.isHashOrNoncePresent();
+  return !m_nonces.isEmpty() ||
+         m_hashAlgorithmsUsed != ContentSecurityPolicyHashAlgorithmNone;
 }
 
-uint8_t SourceListDirective::hashAlgorithmsUsed() const {
-  return m_sourceList.hashAlgorithmsUsed();
+// source-list       = *WSP [ source *( 1*WSP source ) *WSP ]
+//                   / *WSP "'none'" *WSP
+//
+void SourceListDirective::parse(const UChar* begin, const UChar* end) {
+  // We represent 'none' as an empty m_list.
+  if (isSourceListNone(begin, end))
+    return;
+
+  const UChar* position = begin;
+  while (position < end) {
+    skipWhile<UChar, isASCIISpace>(position, end);
+    if (position == end)
+      return;
+
+    const UChar* beginSource = position;
+    skipWhile<UChar, isSourceCharacter>(position, end);
+
+    String scheme, host, path;
+    int port = 0;
+    CSPSource::WildcardDisposition hostWildcard = CSPSource::NoWildcard;
+    CSPSource::WildcardDisposition portWildcard = CSPSource::NoWildcard;
+
+    if (parseSource(beginSource, position, scheme, host, port, path,
+                    hostWildcard, portWildcard)) {
+      // Wildcard hosts and keyword sources ('self', 'unsafe-inline',
+      // etc.) aren't stored in m_list, but as attributes on the source
+      // list itself.
+      if (scheme.isEmpty() && host.isEmpty())
+        continue;
+      if (m_policy->isDirectiveName(host))
+        m_policy->reportDirectiveAsSourceExpression(m_directiveName, host);
+      m_list.append(new CSPSource(m_policy, scheme, host, port, path,
+                                  hostWildcard, portWildcard));
+    } else {
+      m_policy->reportInvalidSourceExpression(
+          m_directiveName, String(beginSource, position - beginSource));
+    }
+
+    DCHECK(position == end || isASCIISpace(*position));
+  }
+}
+
+// source            = scheme ":"
+//                   / ( [ scheme "://" ] host [ port ] [ path ] )
+//                   / "'self'"
+bool SourceListDirective::parseSource(
+    const UChar* begin,
+    const UChar* end,
+    String& scheme,
+    String& host,
+    int& port,
+    String& path,
+    CSPSource::WildcardDisposition& hostWildcard,
+    CSPSource::WildcardDisposition& portWildcard) {
+  if (begin == end)
+    return false;
+
+  StringView token(begin, end - begin);
+
+  if (equalIgnoringCase("'none'", token))
+    return false;
+
+  if (end - begin == 1 && *begin == '*') {
+    addSourceStar();
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (equalIgnoringCase("'self'", token)) {
+    addSourceSelf();
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (equalIgnoringCase("'unsafe-inline'", token)) {
+    addSourceUnsafeInline();
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (equalIgnoringCase("'unsafe-eval'", token)) {
+    addSourceUnsafeEval();
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (equalIgnoringCase("'strict-dynamic'", token)) {
+    addSourceStrictDynamic();
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (equalIgnoringCase("'unsafe-hashed-attributes'", token)) {
+    addSourceUnsafeHashedAttributes();
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  String nonce;
+  if (!parseNonce(begin, end, nonce))
+    return false;
+
+  if (!nonce.isNull()) {
+    addSourceNonce(nonce);
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  DigestValue hash;
+  ContentSecurityPolicyHashAlgorithm algorithm =
+      ContentSecurityPolicyHashAlgorithmNone;
+  if (!parseHash(begin, end, hash, algorithm))
+    return false;
+
+  if (hash.size() > 0) {
+    addSourceHash(algorithm, hash);
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  const UChar* position = begin;
+  const UChar* beginHost = begin;
+  const UChar* beginPath = end;
+  const UChar* beginPort = 0;
+
+  skipWhile<UChar, isNotColonOrSlash>(position, end);
+
+  if (position == end) {
+    // host
+    //     ^
+    return parseHost(beginHost, position, host, hostWildcard);
+  }
+
+  if (position < end && *position == '/') {
+    // host/path || host/ || /
+    //     ^            ^    ^
+    return parseHost(beginHost, position, host, hostWildcard) &&
+           parsePath(position, end, path);
+  }
+
+  if (position < end && *position == ':') {
+    if (end - position == 1) {
+      // scheme:
+      //       ^
+      return parseScheme(begin, position, scheme);
+    }
+
+    if (position[1] == '/') {
+      // scheme://host || scheme://
+      //       ^                ^
+      if (!parseScheme(begin, position, scheme) ||
+          !skipExactly<UChar>(position, end, ':') ||
+          !skipExactly<UChar>(position, end, '/') ||
+          !skipExactly<UChar>(position, end, '/'))
+        return false;
+      if (position == end)
+        return false;
+      beginHost = position;
+      skipWhile<UChar, isNotColonOrSlash>(position, end);
+    }
+
+    if (position < end && *position == ':') {
+      // host:port || scheme://host:port
+      //     ^                     ^
+      beginPort = position;
+      skipUntil<UChar>(position, end, '/');
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (position < end && *position == '/') {
+    // scheme://host/path || scheme://host:port/path
+    //              ^                          ^
+    if (position == beginHost)
+      return false;
+    beginPath = position;
+  }
+
+  if (!parseHost(beginHost, beginPort ? beginPort : beginPath, host,
+                 hostWildcard))
+    return false;
+
+  if (beginPort) {
+    if (!parsePort(beginPort, beginPath, port, portWildcard))
+      return false;
+  } else {
+    port = 0;
+  }
+
+  if (beginPath != end) {
+    if (!parsePath(beginPath, end, path))
+      return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+// nonce-source      = "'nonce-" nonce-value "'"
+// nonce-value        = 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "/" / "=" )
+//
+bool SourceListDirective::parseNonce(const UChar* begin,
+                                     const UChar* end,
+                                     String& nonce) {
+  size_t nonceLength = end - begin;
+  StringView prefix("'nonce-");
+
+  // TODO(esprehn): Should be StringView(begin, nonceLength).startsWith(prefix).
+  if (nonceLength <= prefix.length() ||
+      !equalIgnoringCase(prefix, StringView(begin, prefix.length())))
+    return true;
+
+  const UChar* position = begin + prefix.length();
+  const UChar* nonceBegin = position;
+
+  DCHECK(position < end);
+  skipWhile<UChar, isNonceCharacter>(position, end);
+  DCHECK(nonceBegin <= position);
+
+  if (position + 1 != end || *position != '\'' || position == nonceBegin)
+    return false;
+
+  nonce = String(nonceBegin, position - nonceBegin);
+  return true;
+}
+
+// hash-source       = "'" hash-algorithm "-" hash-value "'"
+// hash-algorithm    = "sha1" / "sha256" / "sha384" / "sha512"
+// hash-value        = 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "/" / "=" )
+//
+bool SourceListDirective::parseHash(
+    const UChar* begin,
+    const UChar* end,
+    DigestValue& hash,
+    ContentSecurityPolicyHashAlgorithm& hashAlgorithm) {
+  // Any additions or subtractions from this struct should also modify the
+  // respective entries in the kAlgorithmMap array in checkDigest().
+  static const struct {
+    const char* prefix;
+    ContentSecurityPolicyHashAlgorithm type;
+  } kSupportedPrefixes[] = {
+      // FIXME: Drop support for SHA-1. It's not in the spec.
+      {"'sha1-", ContentSecurityPolicyHashAlgorithmSha1},
+      {"'sha256-", ContentSecurityPolicyHashAlgorithmSha256},
+      {"'sha384-", ContentSecurityPolicyHashAlgorithmSha384},
+      {"'sha512-", ContentSecurityPolicyHashAlgorithmSha512},
+      {"'sha-256-", ContentSecurityPolicyHashAlgorithmSha256},
+      {"'sha-384-", ContentSecurityPolicyHashAlgorithmSha384},
+      {"'sha-512-", ContentSecurityPolicyHashAlgorithmSha512}};
+
+  StringView prefix;
+  hashAlgorithm = ContentSecurityPolicyHashAlgorithmNone;
+  size_t hashLength = end - begin;
+
+  for (const auto& algorithm : kSupportedPrefixes) {
+    prefix = algorithm.prefix;
+    // TODO(esprehn): Should be StringView(begin, end -
+    // begin).startsWith(prefix).
+    if (hashLength > prefix.length() &&
+        equalIgnoringCase(prefix, StringView(begin, prefix.length()))) {
+      hashAlgorithm = algorithm.type;
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (hashAlgorithm == ContentSecurityPolicyHashAlgorithmNone)
+    return true;
+
+  const UChar* position = begin + prefix.length();
+  const UChar* hashBegin = position;
+
+  DCHECK(position < end);
+  skipWhile<UChar, isBase64EncodedCharacter>(position, end);
+  DCHECK(hashBegin <= position);
+
+  // Base64 encodings may end with exactly one or two '=' characters
+  if (position < end)
+    skipExactly<UChar>(position, position + 1, '=');
+  if (position < end)
+    skipExactly<UChar>(position, position + 1, '=');
+
+  if (position + 1 != end || *position != '\'' || position == hashBegin)
+    return false;
+
+  Vector<char> hashVector;
+  // We accept base64url-encoded data here by normalizing it to base64.
+  base64Decode(normalizeToBase64(String(hashBegin, position - hashBegin)),
+               hashVector);
+  if (hashVector.size() > kMaxDigestSize)
+    return false;
+  hash.append(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(hashVector.data()), hashVector.size());
+  return true;
+}
+
+//                     ; <scheme> production from RFC 3986
+// scheme      = ALPHA *( ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "-" / "." )
+//
+bool SourceListDirective::parseScheme(const UChar* begin,
+                                      const UChar* end,
+                                      String& scheme) {
+  DCHECK(begin <= end);
+  DCHECK(scheme.isEmpty());
+
+  if (begin == end)
+    return false;
+
+  const UChar* position = begin;
+
+  if (!skipExactly<UChar, isASCIIAlpha>(position, end))
+    return false;
+
+  skipWhile<UChar, isSchemeContinuationCharacter>(position, end);
+
+  if (position != end)
+    return false;
+
+  scheme = String(begin, end - begin);
+  return true;
+}
+
+// host              = [ "*." ] 1*host-char *( "." 1*host-char )
+//                   / "*"
+// host-char         = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-"
+//
+bool SourceListDirective::parseHost(
+    const UChar* begin,
+    const UChar* end,
+    String& host,
+    CSPSource::WildcardDisposition& hostWildcard) {
+  DCHECK(begin <= end);
+  DCHECK(host.isEmpty());
+  DCHECK(hostWildcard == CSPSource::NoWildcard);
+
+  if (begin == end)
+    return false;
+
+  const UChar* position = begin;
+
+  if (skipExactly<UChar>(position, end, '*')) {
+    hostWildcard = CSPSource::HasWildcard;
+
+    if (position == end)
+      return true;
+
+    if (!skipExactly<UChar>(position, end, '.'))
+      return false;
+  }
+
+  const UChar* hostBegin = position;
+
+  while (position < end) {
+    if (!skipExactly<UChar, isHostCharacter>(position, end))
+      return false;
+
+    skipWhile<UChar, isHostCharacter>(position, end);
+
+    if (position < end && !skipExactly<UChar>(position, end, '.'))
+      return false;
+  }
+
+  DCHECK(position == end);
+  host = String(hostBegin, end - hostBegin);
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool SourceListDirective::parsePath(const UChar* begin,
+                                    const UChar* end,
+                                    String& path) {
+  DCHECK(begin <= end);
+  DCHECK(path.isEmpty());
+
+  const UChar* position = begin;
+  skipWhile<UChar, isPathComponentCharacter>(position, end);
+  // path/to/file.js?query=string || path/to/file.js#anchor
+  //                ^                               ^
+  if (position < end) {
+    m_policy->reportInvalidPathCharacter(m_directiveName,
+                                         String(begin, end - begin), *position);
+  }
+
+  path = decodeURLEscapeSequences(String(begin, position - begin));
+
+  DCHECK(position <= end);
+  DCHECK(position == end || (*position == '#' || *position == '?'));
+  return true;
+}
+
+// port              = ":" ( 1*DIGIT / "*" )
+//
+bool SourceListDirective::parsePort(
+    const UChar* begin,
+    const UChar* end,
+    int& port,
+    CSPSource::WildcardDisposition& portWildcard) {
+  DCHECK(begin <= end);
+  DCHECK(!port);
+  DCHECK(portWildcard == CSPSource::NoWildcard);
+
+  if (!skipExactly<UChar>(begin, end, ':'))
+    NOTREACHED();
+
+  if (begin == end)
+    return false;
+
+  if (end - begin == 1 && *begin == '*') {
+    port = 0;
+    portWildcard = CSPSource::HasWildcard;
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  const UChar* position = begin;
+  skipWhile<UChar, isASCIIDigit>(position, end);
+
+  if (position != end)
+    return false;
+
+  bool ok;
+  port = charactersToIntStrict(begin, end - begin, &ok);
+  return ok;
+}
+
+void SourceListDirective::addSourceSelf() {
+  m_allowSelf = true;
+}
+
+void SourceListDirective::addSourceStar() {
+  m_allowStar = true;
+}
+
+void SourceListDirective::addSourceUnsafeInline() {
+  m_allowInline = true;
+}
+
+void SourceListDirective::addSourceUnsafeEval() {
+  m_allowEval = true;
+}
+
+void SourceListDirective::addSourceStrictDynamic() {
+  m_allowDynamic = true;
+}
+
+void SourceListDirective::addSourceUnsafeHashedAttributes() {
+  m_allowHashedAttributes = true;
+}
+
+void SourceListDirective::addSourceNonce(const String& nonce) {
+  m_nonces.add(nonce);
+}
+
+void SourceListDirective::addSourceHash(
+    const ContentSecurityPolicyHashAlgorithm& algorithm,
+    const DigestValue& hash) {
+  m_hashes.add(CSPHashValue(algorithm, hash));
+  m_hashAlgorithmsUsed |= algorithm;
+}
+
+bool SourceListDirective::hasSourceMatchInList(
+    const KURL& url,
+    ResourceRequest::RedirectStatus redirectStatus) const {
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < m_list.size(); ++i) {
+    if (m_list[i]->matches(url, redirectStatus))
+      return true;
+  }
+
+  return false;
 }
 
 DEFINE_TRACE(SourceListDirective) {
-  visitor->trace(m_sourceList);
+  visitor->trace(m_policy);
+  visitor->trace(m_list);
   CSPDirective::trace(visitor);
 }