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Issue 2419723002: Move services/shell to services/service_manager (Closed)
Patch Set: rebase Created 4 years, 2 months ago
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1 // Copyright 2015 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
3 // found in the LICENSE file.
4
5 #include "services/shell/runner/host/linux_sandbox.h"
6
7 #include <fcntl.h>
8 #include <sys/syscall.h>
9 #include <utility>
10
11 #include "base/bind.h"
12 #include "base/debug/leak_annotations.h"
13 #include "base/macros.h"
14 #include "base/posix/eintr_wrapper.h"
15 #include "base/rand_util.h"
16 #include "base/sys_info.h"
17 #include "sandbox/linux/bpf_dsl/policy.h"
18 #include "sandbox/linux/bpf_dsl/trap_registry.h"
19 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/baseline_policy.h"
20 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/sigsys_handlers.h"
21 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.h"
22 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.h"
23 #include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h"
24 #include "sandbox/linux/services/credentials.h"
25 #include "sandbox/linux/services/namespace_sandbox.h"
26 #include "sandbox/linux/services/proc_util.h"
27 #include "sandbox/linux/services/thread_helpers.h"
28
29 using sandbox::syscall_broker::BrokerFilePermission;
30
31 namespace shell {
32
33 namespace {
34
35 intptr_t SandboxSIGSYSHandler(const struct sandbox::arch_seccomp_data& args,
36 void* aux) {
37 RAW_CHECK(aux);
38 const sandbox::syscall_broker::BrokerProcess* broker_process =
39 static_cast<const sandbox::syscall_broker::BrokerProcess*>(aux);
40 switch (args.nr) {
41 #if !defined(__aarch64__)
42 case __NR_access:
43 return broker_process->Access(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(args.args[0]),
44 static_cast<int>(args.args[1]));
45 case __NR_open:
46 return broker_process->Open(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(args.args[0]),
47 static_cast<int>(args.args[1]));
48 #endif
49 case __NR_faccessat:
50 if (static_cast<int>(args.args[0]) == AT_FDCWD) {
51 return broker_process->Access(
52 reinterpret_cast<const char*>(args.args[1]),
53 static_cast<int>(args.args[2]));
54 } else {
55 return -EPERM;
56 }
57 case __NR_openat:
58 // Allow using openat() as open().
59 if (static_cast<int>(args.args[0]) == AT_FDCWD) {
60 return broker_process->Open(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(args.args[1]),
61 static_cast<int>(args.args[2]));
62 } else {
63 return -EPERM;
64 }
65 default:
66 RAW_CHECK(false);
67 return -ENOSYS;
68 }
69 }
70
71 class SandboxPolicy : public sandbox::BaselinePolicy {
72 public:
73 explicit SandboxPolicy(sandbox::syscall_broker::BrokerProcess* broker_process)
74 : broker_process_(broker_process) {}
75 ~SandboxPolicy() override {}
76
77 // Overridden from sandbox::bpf_dsl::Policy:
78 sandbox::bpf_dsl::ResultExpr EvaluateSyscall(int sysno) const override {
79 // This policy is only advisory/for noticing FS access for the moment.
80 switch (sysno) {
81 #if !defined(__aarch64__)
82 case __NR_access:
83 case __NR_open:
84 #endif
85 case __NR_faccessat:
86 case __NR_openat:
87 return sandbox::bpf_dsl::Trap(SandboxSIGSYSHandler, broker_process_);
88 case __NR_sched_getaffinity:
89 return sandbox::RestrictSchedTarget(policy_pid(), sysno);
90 case __NR_ftruncate:
91 #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__mips__) || \
92 defined(__aarch64__)
93 // Per #ifdefs in
94 // content/common/sandbox_linux/bpf_renderer_policy_linux.cc
95 case __NR_getrlimit:
96 #endif
97 #if defined(__i386__) || defined(__arm__)
98 case __NR_ugetrlimit:
99 #endif
100 case __NR_uname:
101 #if defined(__arm__) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__mips__)
102 case __NR_getsockopt:
103 case __NR_setsockopt:
104 #endif
105 return sandbox::bpf_dsl::Allow();
106 }
107
108 return BaselinePolicy::EvaluateSyscall(sysno);
109 }
110
111 private:
112 // Not owned.
113 const sandbox::syscall_broker::BrokerProcess* broker_process_;
114 DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(SandboxPolicy);
115 };
116
117 } // namespace
118
119 LinuxSandbox::LinuxSandbox(const std::vector<BrokerFilePermission>& permissions)
120 : broker_(new sandbox::syscall_broker::BrokerProcess(EPERM, permissions)) {
121 CHECK(broker_->Init(
122 base::Bind<bool (*)()>(&sandbox::Credentials::DropAllCapabilities)));
123 policy_.reset(new SandboxPolicy(broker_.get()));
124 }
125
126 LinuxSandbox::~LinuxSandbox() {}
127
128 void LinuxSandbox::Warmup() {
129 proc_fd_ = sandbox::ProcUtil::OpenProc();
130 warmed_up_ = true;
131
132 // Verify that we haven't started threads or grabbed directory file
133 // descriptors.
134 sandbox::ThreadHelpers::AssertSingleThreaded(proc_fd_.get());
135 CHECK(!sandbox::ProcUtil::HasOpenDirectory(proc_fd_.get()));
136 }
137
138 void LinuxSandbox::EngageNamespaceSandbox() {
139 CHECK(warmed_up_);
140 CHECK_EQ(1, getpid());
141 CHECK(sandbox::NamespaceSandbox::InNewPidNamespace());
142 CHECK(sandbox::Credentials::MoveToNewUserNS());
143 CHECK(sandbox::Credentials::DropFileSystemAccess(proc_fd_.get()));
144 CHECK(sandbox::Credentials::DropAllCapabilities(proc_fd_.get()));
145 }
146
147 void LinuxSandbox::EngageSeccompSandbox() {
148 CHECK(warmed_up_);
149 sandbox::SandboxBPF sandbox(policy_.release());
150 base::ScopedFD proc_fd(HANDLE_EINTR(
151 openat(proc_fd_.get(), ".", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC)));
152 CHECK(proc_fd.is_valid());
153 sandbox.SetProcFd(std::move(proc_fd));
154 CHECK(
155 sandbox.StartSandbox(sandbox::SandboxBPF::SeccompLevel::SINGLE_THREADED))
156 << "Starting the process with a sandbox failed. Missing kernel support.";
157
158 // The Broker is now bound to this process and should only be destroyed when
159 // the process exits or is killed.
160 sandbox::syscall_broker::BrokerProcess* leaked_broker = broker_.release();
161 ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(leaked_broker);
162 ANNOTATE_LEAKING_OBJECT_PTR(leaked_broker);
163 }
164
165 void LinuxSandbox::Seal() {
166 proc_fd_.reset();
167 }
168
169 } // namespace shell
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