Revert of Add seccomp sandbox for non-SFI NaCl

components/nacl/loader/nonsfi/nonsfi_sandbox.cc

Index: components/nacl/loader/nonsfi/nonsfi_sandbox.cc
diff --git a/components/nacl/loader/nonsfi/nonsfi_sandbox.cc b/components/nacl/loader/nonsfi/nonsfi_sandbox.cc
deleted file mode 100644
index a58ba840b73991c29485556968f9845b3045d82f..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/components/nacl/loader/nonsfi/nonsfi_sandbox.cc
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,315 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2014 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
-// found in the LICENSE file.
-
-#include "components/nacl/loader/nonsfi/nonsfi_sandbox.h"
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <linux/net.h>
-#include <sys/prctl.h>
-#include <sys/ptrace.h>
-#include <sys/mman.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <sys/syscall.h>
-
-#include "base/basictypes.h"
-#include "base/logging.h"
-#include "build/build_config.h"
-#include "content/public/common/sandbox_init.h"
-#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/sigsys_handlers.h"
-#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.h"
-#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf_policy.h"
-#include "sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/trap.h"
-#include "sandbox/linux/services/linux_syscalls.h"
-
-#if defined(__arm__) && !defined(MAP_STACK)
-// Chrome OS Daisy (ARM) build environment has old headers.
-#define MAP_STACK 0x20000
-#endif
-
-using sandbox::ErrorCode;
-using sandbox::SandboxBPF;
-
-namespace nacl {
-namespace nonsfi {
-namespace {
-
-ErrorCode RestrictFcntlCommands(SandboxBPF* sb) {
-  ErrorCode::ArgType mask_long_type;
-  if (sizeof(long) == 8) {
-    mask_long_type = ErrorCode::TP_64BIT;
-  } else if (sizeof(long) == 4) {
-    mask_long_type = ErrorCode::TP_32BIT;
-  } else {
-    NOTREACHED();
-  }
-  // We allow following cases:
-  // 1. F_SETFD + FD_CLOEXEC: libevent's epoll_init uses this.
-  // 2. F_GETFL: Used by SetNonBlocking in
-  // message_pump_libevent.cc and Channel::ChannelImpl::CreatePipe
-  // in ipc_channel_posix.cc. Note that the latter does not work
-  // with EPERM.
-  // 3. F_SETFL: Used by evutil_make_socket_nonblocking in
-  // libevent and SetNonBlocking. As the latter mix O_NONBLOCK to
-  // the return value of F_GETFL, so we need to allow O_ACCMODE in
-  // addition to O_NONBLOCK.
-  const unsigned long denied_mask = ~(O_ACCMODE | O_NONBLOCK);
-  return sb->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT,
-                  ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_SETFD,
-                  sb->Cond(2, mask_long_type,
-                           ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, FD_CLOEXEC,
-                           ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
-                  sb->Trap(sandbox::CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL)),
-         sb->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT,
-                  ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_GETFL,
-                  ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
-         sb->Cond(1, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT,
-                  ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, F_SETFL,
-                  sb->Cond(2, mask_long_type,
-                           ErrorCode::OP_HAS_ANY_BITS, denied_mask,
-                           sb->Trap(sandbox::CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL),
-                           ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED)),
-         sb->Trap(sandbox::CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL))));
-}
-
-ErrorCode RestrictClone(SandboxBPF* sb) {
-  // We allow clone only for new thread creation.
-  return sb->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
-                  CLONE_VM | CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES | CLONE_SIGHAND |
-                  CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SYSVSEM | CLONE_SETTLS |
-                  CLONE_PARENT_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID,
-                  ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
-         sb->Trap(sandbox::SIGSYSCloneFailure, NULL));
-}
-
-ErrorCode RestrictPrctl(SandboxBPF* sb) {
-  // base::PlatformThread::SetName() uses PR_SET_NAME so we return
-  // EPERM for it. Otherwise, we will raise SIGSYS.
-  return sb->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
-                  PR_SET_NAME, ErrorCode(EPERM),
-         sb->Trap(sandbox::SIGSYSPrctlFailure, NULL));
-}
-
-#if defined(__i386__)
-ErrorCode RestrictSocketcall(SandboxBPF* sb) {
-  // We only allow socketpair, sendmsg, and recvmsg.
-  return sb->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
-                  SYS_SOCKETPAIR,
-                  ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
-         sb->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
-                  SYS_SENDMSG,
-                  ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
-         sb->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
-                  SYS_RECVMSG,
-                  ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
-         sb->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT, ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL,
-                  SYS_SHUTDOWN,
-                  ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
-                  sb->Trap(sandbox::CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL)))));
-}
-#endif
-
-ErrorCode RestrictMemoryProtection(SandboxBPF* sb, int argno) {
-  // TODO(jln, keescook, drewry): Limit the use of mmap/mprotect by
-  // adding some features to linux kernel.
-  const uint32_t denied_mask = ~(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC);
-  return sb->Cond(argno, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT,
-                  ErrorCode::OP_HAS_ANY_BITS,
-                  denied_mask,
-         sb->Trap(sandbox::CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL),
-                  ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED));
-}
-
-ErrorCode RestrictMmap(SandboxBPF* sb) {
-  const uint32_t denied_flag_mask = ~(MAP_SHARED | MAP_PRIVATE |
-                                      MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_STACK | MAP_FIXED);
-  // TODO(hamaji): Disallow RWX mmap.
-  return sb->Cond(3, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT,
-                  ErrorCode::OP_HAS_ANY_BITS,
-                  denied_flag_mask,
-         sb->Trap(sandbox::CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL),
-                  RestrictMemoryProtection(sb, 2));
-}
-
-ErrorCode RestrictSocketpair(SandboxBPF* sb) {
-  // Only allow AF_UNIX, PF_UNIX. Crash if anything else is seen.
-  COMPILE_ASSERT(AF_UNIX == PF_UNIX, af_unix_pf_unix_different);
-  return sb->Cond(0, ErrorCode::TP_32BIT,
-                  ErrorCode::OP_EQUAL, AF_UNIX,
-                  ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED),
-         sb->Trap(sandbox::CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL));
-}
-
-bool IsGracefullyDenied(int sysno) {
-  switch (sysno) {
-    // third_party/libevent uses them, but we can just return -1 from
-    // them as it is just checking getuid() != geteuid() and
-    // getgid() != getegid()
-#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__arm__)
-    case __NR_getegid32:
-    case __NR_geteuid32:
-    case __NR_getgid32:
-    case __NR_getuid32:
-#elif defined(__x86_64__)
-    case __NR_getegid:
-    case __NR_geteuid:
-    case __NR_getgid:
-    case __NR_getuid:
-#endif
-    // tcmalloc calls madvise in TCMalloc_SystemRelease.
-    case __NR_madvise:
-    // EPERM instead of SIGSYS as glibc tries to open files in /proc.
-    // TODO(hamaji): Remove this when we switch to newlib.
-    case __NR_open:
-    // For RunSandboxSanityChecks().
-    case __NR_ptrace:
-    // glibc uses this for its pthread implementation. If we return
-    // EPERM for this, glibc will stop using this.
-    // TODO(hamaji): newlib does not use this. Make this SIGTRAP once
-    // we have switched to newlib.
-    case __NR_set_robust_list:
-    // This is obsolete in ARM EABI, but x86 glibc indirectly calls
-    // this in sysconf.
-#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
-    case __NR_time:
-#endif
-      return true;
-
-    default:
-      return false;
-  }
-}
-
-void RunSandboxSanityChecks() {
-  errno = 0;
-  // Make a ptrace request with an invalid PID.
-  long ptrace_ret = ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKUSER, -1 /* pid */, NULL, NULL);
-  CHECK_EQ(-1, ptrace_ret);
-  // Without the sandbox on, this ptrace call would ESRCH instead.
-  CHECK_EQ(EPERM, errno);
-}
-
-}  // namespace
-
-ErrorCode NaClNonSfiBPFSandboxPolicy::EvaluateSyscall(
-    SandboxBPF* sb, int sysno) const {
-  return EvaluateSyscallImpl(sb, sysno, NULL);
-}
-
-ErrorCode NaClNonSfiBPFSandboxPolicy::EvaluateSyscallImpl(
-    SandboxBPF* sb, int sysno, void*) {
-  switch (sysno) {
-    // Allowed syscalls.
-#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__arm__)
-    case __NR__llseek:
-#elif defined(__x86_64__)
-    case __NR_lseek:
-#endif
-    // NaCl runtime exposes clock_gettime and clock_getres to untrusted code.
-    case __NR_clock_getres:
-    case __NR_clock_gettime:
-    case __NR_close:
-    case __NR_dup:
-    case __NR_dup2:
-    case __NR_epoll_create:
-    case __NR_epoll_ctl:
-    case __NR_epoll_wait:
-    case __NR_exit:
-    case __NR_exit_group:
-#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__arm__)
-    case __NR_fstat64:
-#elif defined(__x86_64__)
-    case __NR_fstat:
-#endif
-    // TODO(hamaji): Allow only FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG.
-    case __NR_futex:
-    // TODO(hamaji): Remove the need of gettid. Currently, this is
-    // called from PlatformThread::CurrentId().
-    case __NR_gettid:
-    case __NR_gettimeofday:
-    case __NR_munmap:
-    case __NR_nanosleep:
-    // TODO(hamaji): Remove the need of pipe. Currently, this is
-    // called from base::MessagePumpLibevent::Init().
-    case __NR_pipe:
-    case __NR_pread64:
-    case __NR_pwrite64:
-    case __NR_read:
-    case __NR_restart_syscall:
-    case __NR_sched_yield:
-    // __NR_times needed as clock() is called by CommandBufferHelper, which is
-    // used by NaCl applications that use Pepper's 3D interfaces.
-    // See crbug.com/264856 for details.
-    case __NR_times:
-    case __NR_write:
-#if defined(__arm__)
-    case __ARM_NR_cacheflush:
-#endif
-      return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
-
-    case __NR_clone:
-      return RestrictClone(sb);
-
-#if defined(__x86_64__)
-    case __NR_fcntl:
-#endif
-#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__arm__)
-    case __NR_fcntl64:
-#endif
-      return RestrictFcntlCommands(sb);
-
-#if defined(__x86_64__)
-    case __NR_mmap:
-#endif
-#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__arm__)
-    case __NR_mmap2:
-#endif
-      return RestrictMmap(sb);
-    case __NR_mprotect:
-      return RestrictMemoryProtection(sb, 2);
-
-    case __NR_prctl:
-      return RestrictPrctl(sb);
-
-#if defined(__i386__)
-    case __NR_socketcall:
-      return RestrictSocketcall(sb);
-#endif
-#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__)
-    case __NR_recvmsg:
-    case __NR_sendmsg:
-    case __NR_shutdown:
-      return ErrorCode(ErrorCode::ERR_ALLOWED);
-    case __NR_socketpair:
-      return RestrictSocketpair(sb);
-#endif
-
-    case __NR_brk:
-      // The behavior of brk on Linux is different from other system
-      // calls. It does not return errno but the current break on
-      // failure. glibc thinks brk failed if the return value of brk
-      // is less than the requested address (i.e., brk(addr) < addr).
-      // So, glibc thinks brk succeeded if we return -EPERM and we
-      // need to return zero instead.
-      return ErrorCode(0);
-
-    default:
-      if (IsGracefullyDenied(sysno))
-        return ErrorCode(EPERM);
-      return sb->Trap(sandbox::CrashSIGSYS_Handler, NULL);
-  }
-}
-
-bool InitializeBPFSandbox() {
-  bool sandbox_is_initialized = content::InitializeSandbox(
-      scoped_ptr<sandbox::SandboxBPFPolicy>(
-          new nacl::nonsfi::NaClNonSfiBPFSandboxPolicy()));
-  if (!sandbox_is_initialized)
-    return false;
-  RunSandboxSanityChecks();
-  return true;
-}
-
-}  // namespace nonsfi
-}  // namespace nacl