| Index: content/common/sandbox_linux.h
|
| diff --git a/content/common/sandbox_linux.h b/content/common/sandbox_linux.h
|
| index 412c04ab20bdf1915974443370025d853579ed9b..9533df57a956f7f870dd96d86e8cdc99fae18fd9 100644
|
| --- a/content/common/sandbox_linux.h
|
| +++ b/content/common/sandbox_linux.h
|
| @@ -80,6 +80,13 @@ class LinuxSandbox {
|
|
|
| // We must have been pre_initialized_ before using this.
|
| bool seccomp_bpf_supported() const;
|
| + // Returns true if it can be determined that the current process has open
|
| + // directories that are not managed by the LinuxSandbox class. This would
|
| + // be a vulnerability as it would allow to bypass the setuid sandbox.
|
| + bool HasOpenDirectories();
|
| + // Attempt to open /proc in debug builds if it's not already open. Returns
|
| + // true if proc_fd_ is valid afterwards.
|
| + bool OpenProc();
|
| // The last part of the initialization is to make sure any temporary "hole"
|
| // in the sandbox is closed. For now, this consists of closing proc_fd_.
|
| void SealSandbox();
|
| @@ -91,6 +98,7 @@ class LinuxSandbox {
|
| bool seccomp_bpf_started_;
|
| // Did PreinitializeSandbox() run?
|
| bool pre_initialized_;
|
| + bool sealed_;
|
| bool seccomp_bpf_supported_; // Accurate if pre_initialized_.
|
| scoped_ptr<sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient> setuid_sandbox_client_;
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|
|
|
|