add a LinuxSandbox::HasOpenDirectories() sanity check

content/common/sandbox_linux.h

 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 #ifndef CONTENT_COMMON_SANDBOX_LINUX_H_
 #define CONTENT_COMMON_SANDBOX_LINUX_H_
 
 #include <string>
 
 #include "base/basictypes.h"
@@ skipping 62 matching lines @@
 
   // Limit the address space of the current process (and its children).
   // to make some vulnerabilities harder to exploit.
   bool LimitAddressSpace(const std::string& process_type);
 
  private:
   friend struct DefaultSingletonTraits<LinuxSandbox>;
 
   // We must have been pre_initialized_ before using this.
   bool seccomp_bpf_supported() const;
+  // Returns true if it can be determined that the current process has open
+  // directories that are not managed by the LinuxSandbox class. This would
+  // be a vulnerability as it would allow to bypass the setuid sandbox.
+  bool HasOpenDirectories() const;
   // The last part of the initialization is to make sure any temporary "hole"
   // in the sandbox is closed. For now, this consists of closing proc_fd_.
   void SealSandbox();
 
   // A file descriptor to /proc. It's dangerous to have it around as it could
   // allow for sandbox bypasses. It needs to be closed before we consider
   // ourselves sandboxed.
   int proc_fd_;
   bool seccomp_bpf_started_;
   // Did PreinitializeSandbox() run?
   bool pre_initialized_;
   bool seccomp_bpf_supported_;  // Accurate if pre_initialized_.
   scoped_ptr<sandbox::SetuidSandboxClient> setuid_sandbox_client_;
 
   ~LinuxSandbox();
   DISALLOW_IMPLICIT_CONSTRUCTORS(LinuxSandbox);
 };
 
 }  // namespace content
 
 #endif  // CONTENT_COMMON_SANDBOX_LINUX_H_