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| 1 /* | |
| 2 * srtp.c | |
| 3 * | |
| 4 * the secure real-time transport protocol | |
| 5 * | |
| 6 * David A. McGrew | |
| 7 * Cisco Systems, Inc. | |
| 8 */ | |
| 9 /* | |
| 10 * | |
| 11 * Copyright (c) 2001-2006, Cisco Systems, Inc. | |
| 12 * All rights reserved. | |
| 13 * | |
| 14 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| 15 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| 16 * are met: | |
| 17 * | |
| 18 * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
| 19 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| 20 * | |
| 21 * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above | |
| 22 * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following | |
| 23 * disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided | |
| 24 * with the distribution. | |
| 25 * | |
| 26 * Neither the name of the Cisco Systems, Inc. nor the names of its | |
| 27 * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived | |
| 28 * from this software without specific prior written permission. | |
| 29 * | |
| 30 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS | |
| 31 * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT | |
| 32 * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS | |
| 33 * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE | |
| 34 * COPYRIGHT HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, | |
| 35 * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES | |
| 36 * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR | |
| 37 * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| 38 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
| 39 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
| 40 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
| 41 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| 42 * | |
| 43 */ | |
| 44 | |
| 45 | |
| 46 #include "srtp_priv.h" | |
| 47 #include "ekt.h" /* for SRTP Encrypted Key Transport */ | |
| 48 #include "alloc.h" /* for crypto_alloc() */ | |
| 49 #ifdef OPENSSL | |
| 50 #include "aes_gcm_ossl.h" /* for AES GCM mode */ | |
| 51 #endif | |
| 52 | |
| 53 #ifndef SRTP_KERNEL | |
| 54 # include <limits.h> | |
| 55 # ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H | |
| 56 # include <netinet/in.h> | |
| 57 # elif defined(HAVE_WINSOCK2_H) | |
| 58 # include <winsock2.h> | |
| 59 # endif | |
| 60 #endif /* ! SRTP_KERNEL */ | |
| 61 | |
| 62 | |
| 63 /* the debug module for srtp */ | |
| 64 | |
| 65 debug_module_t mod_srtp = { | |
| 66 0, /* debugging is off by default */ | |
| 67 "srtp" /* printable name for module */ | |
| 68 }; | |
| 69 | |
| 70 #define octets_in_rtp_header 12 | |
| 71 #define uint32s_in_rtp_header 3 | |
| 72 #define octets_in_rtcp_header 8 | |
| 73 #define uint32s_in_rtcp_header 2 | |
| 74 #define octets_in_rtp_extn_hdr 4 | |
| 75 | |
| 76 static err_status_t | |
| 77 srtp_validate_rtp_header(void *rtp_hdr, int *pkt_octet_len) { | |
| 78 if (*pkt_octet_len < octets_in_rtp_header) | |
| 79 return err_status_bad_param; | |
| 80 | |
| 81 srtp_hdr_t *hdr = (srtp_hdr_t *)rtp_hdr; | |
| 82 | |
| 83 /* Check RTP header length */ | |
| 84 int rtp_header_len = octets_in_rtp_header + 4 * hdr->cc; | |
| 85 if (hdr->x == 1) | |
| 86 rtp_header_len += octets_in_rtp_extn_hdr; | |
| 87 | |
| 88 if (*pkt_octet_len < rtp_header_len) | |
| 89 return err_status_bad_param; | |
| 90 | |
| 91 /* Verifing profile length. */ | |
| 92 if (hdr->x == 1) { | |
| 93 srtp_hdr_xtnd_t *xtn_hdr = | |
| 94 (srtp_hdr_xtnd_t *)((uint32_t *)hdr + uint32s_in_rtp_header + hdr->cc); | |
| 95 int profile_len = ntohs(xtn_hdr->length); | |
| 96 rtp_header_len += profile_len * 4; | |
| 97 /* profile length counts the number of 32-bit words */ | |
| 98 if (*pkt_octet_len < rtp_header_len) | |
| 99 return err_status_bad_param; | |
| 100 } | |
| 101 return err_status_ok; | |
| 102 } | |
| 103 | |
| 104 const char *srtp_get_version_string () | |
| 105 { | |
| 106 /* | |
| 107 * Simply return the autotools generated string | |
| 108 */ | |
| 109 return SRTP_VER_STRING; | |
| 110 } | |
| 111 | |
| 112 unsigned int srtp_get_version () | |
| 113 { | |
| 114 unsigned int major = 0, minor = 0, micro = 0; | |
| 115 unsigned int rv = 0; | |
| 116 int parse_rv; | |
| 117 | |
| 118 /* | |
| 119 * Parse the autotools generated version | |
| 120 */ | |
| 121 parse_rv = sscanf(SRTP_VERSION, "%u.%u.%u", &major, &minor, µ); | |
| 122 if (parse_rv != 3) { | |
| 123 /* | |
| 124 * We're expected to parse all 3 version levels. | |
| 125 * If not, then this must not be an official release. | |
| 126 * Return all zeros on the version | |
| 127 */ | |
| 128 return (0); | |
| 129 } | |
| 130 | |
| 131 /* | |
| 132 * We allow 8 bits for the major and minor, while | |
| 133 * allowing 16 bits for the micro. 16 bits for the micro | |
| 134 * may be beneficial for a continuous delivery model | |
| 135 * in the future. | |
| 136 */ | |
| 137 rv |= (major & 0xFF) << 24; | |
| 138 rv |= (minor & 0xFF) << 16; | |
| 139 rv |= micro & 0xFF; | |
| 140 return rv; | |
| 141 } | |
| 142 | |
| 143 err_status_t | |
| 144 srtp_stream_alloc(srtp_stream_ctx_t **str_ptr, | |
| 145 const srtp_policy_t *p) { | |
| 146 srtp_stream_ctx_t *str; | |
| 147 err_status_t stat; | |
| 148 | |
| 149 /* | |
| 150 * This function allocates the stream context, rtp and rtcp ciphers | |
| 151 * and auth functions, and key limit structure. If there is a | |
| 152 * failure during allocation, we free all previously allocated | |
| 153 * memory and return a failure code. The code could probably | |
| 154 * be improved, but it works and should be clear. | |
| 155 */ | |
| 156 | |
| 157 /* allocate srtp stream and set str_ptr */ | |
| 158 str = (srtp_stream_ctx_t *) crypto_alloc(sizeof(srtp_stream_ctx_t)); | |
| 159 if (str == NULL) | |
| 160 return err_status_alloc_fail; | |
| 161 *str_ptr = str; | |
| 162 | |
| 163 /* allocate cipher */ | |
| 164 stat = crypto_kernel_alloc_cipher(p->rtp.cipher_type, | |
| 165 &str->rtp_cipher, | |
| 166 p->rtp.cipher_key_len, | |
| 167 p->rtp.auth_tag_len); | |
| 168 if (stat) { | |
| 169 crypto_free(str); | |
| 170 return stat; | |
| 171 } | |
| 172 | |
| 173 /* allocate auth function */ | |
| 174 stat = crypto_kernel_alloc_auth(p->rtp.auth_type, | |
| 175 &str->rtp_auth, | |
| 176 p->rtp.auth_key_len, | |
| 177 p->rtp.auth_tag_len); | |
| 178 if (stat) { | |
| 179 cipher_dealloc(str->rtp_cipher); | |
| 180 crypto_free(str); | |
| 181 return stat; | |
| 182 } | |
| 183 | |
| 184 /* allocate key limit structure */ | |
| 185 str->limit = (key_limit_ctx_t*) crypto_alloc(sizeof(key_limit_ctx_t)); | |
| 186 if (str->limit == NULL) { | |
| 187 auth_dealloc(str->rtp_auth); | |
| 188 cipher_dealloc(str->rtp_cipher); | |
| 189 crypto_free(str); | |
| 190 return err_status_alloc_fail; | |
| 191 } | |
| 192 | |
| 193 /* | |
| 194 * ...and now the RTCP-specific initialization - first, allocate | |
| 195 * the cipher | |
| 196 */ | |
| 197 stat = crypto_kernel_alloc_cipher(p->rtcp.cipher_type, | |
| 198 &str->rtcp_cipher, | |
| 199 p->rtcp.cipher_key_len, | |
| 200 p->rtcp.auth_tag_len); | |
| 201 if (stat) { | |
| 202 auth_dealloc(str->rtp_auth); | |
| 203 cipher_dealloc(str->rtp_cipher); | |
| 204 crypto_free(str->limit); | |
| 205 crypto_free(str); | |
| 206 return stat; | |
| 207 } | |
| 208 | |
| 209 /* allocate auth function */ | |
| 210 stat = crypto_kernel_alloc_auth(p->rtcp.auth_type, | |
| 211 &str->rtcp_auth, | |
| 212 p->rtcp.auth_key_len, | |
| 213 p->rtcp.auth_tag_len); | |
| 214 if (stat) { | |
| 215 cipher_dealloc(str->rtcp_cipher); | |
| 216 auth_dealloc(str->rtp_auth); | |
| 217 cipher_dealloc(str->rtp_cipher); | |
| 218 crypto_free(str->limit); | |
| 219 crypto_free(str); | |
| 220 return stat; | |
| 221 } | |
| 222 | |
| 223 /* allocate ekt data associated with stream */ | |
| 224 stat = ekt_alloc(&str->ekt, p->ekt); | |
| 225 if (stat) { | |
| 226 auth_dealloc(str->rtcp_auth); | |
| 227 cipher_dealloc(str->rtcp_cipher); | |
| 228 auth_dealloc(str->rtp_auth); | |
| 229 cipher_dealloc(str->rtp_cipher); | |
| 230 crypto_free(str->limit); | |
| 231 crypto_free(str); | |
| 232 return stat; | |
| 233 } | |
| 234 | |
| 235 if (p->enc_xtn_hdr && p->enc_xtn_hdr_count > 0) { | |
| 236 cipher_type_id_t enc_xtn_hdr_cipher_type; | |
| 237 int enc_xtn_hdr_cipher_key_len; | |
| 238 | |
| 239 str->enc_xtn_hdr = (int*) crypto_alloc(p->enc_xtn_hdr_count * sizeof(p->enc_
xtn_hdr[0])); | |
| 240 if (!str->enc_xtn_hdr) { | |
| 241 auth_dealloc(str->rtcp_auth); | |
| 242 cipher_dealloc(str->rtcp_cipher); | |
| 243 auth_dealloc(str->rtp_auth); | |
| 244 cipher_dealloc(str->rtp_cipher); | |
| 245 crypto_free(str->limit); | |
| 246 crypto_free(str); | |
| 247 return err_status_alloc_fail; | |
| 248 } | |
| 249 memcpy(str->enc_xtn_hdr, p->enc_xtn_hdr, p->enc_xtn_hdr_count * sizeof(p->en
c_xtn_hdr[0])); | |
| 250 str->enc_xtn_hdr_count = p->enc_xtn_hdr_count; | |
| 251 | |
| 252 /* For GCM ciphers, the corresponding ICM cipher is used for header extensio
ns encryption. */ | |
| 253 switch (p->rtp.cipher_type) { | |
| 254 case AES_128_GCM: | |
| 255 enc_xtn_hdr_cipher_type = AES_128_ICM; | |
| 256 enc_xtn_hdr_cipher_key_len = 30; | |
| 257 break; | |
| 258 case AES_256_GCM: | |
| 259 enc_xtn_hdr_cipher_type = AES_256_ICM; | |
| 260 enc_xtn_hdr_cipher_key_len = 46; | |
| 261 break; | |
| 262 default: | |
| 263 enc_xtn_hdr_cipher_type = p->rtp.cipher_type; | |
| 264 enc_xtn_hdr_cipher_key_len = p->rtp.cipher_key_len; | |
| 265 break; | |
| 266 } | |
| 267 | |
| 268 /* allocate cipher for extensions header encryption */ | |
| 269 stat = crypto_kernel_alloc_cipher(enc_xtn_hdr_cipher_type, | |
| 270 &str->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher, | |
| 271 enc_xtn_hdr_cipher_key_len, | |
| 272 0); | |
| 273 | |
| 274 if (stat) { | |
| 275 crypto_free(str->enc_xtn_hdr); | |
| 276 auth_dealloc(str->rtcp_auth); | |
| 277 cipher_dealloc(str->rtcp_cipher); | |
| 278 auth_dealloc(str->rtp_auth); | |
| 279 cipher_dealloc(str->rtp_cipher); | |
| 280 crypto_free(str->limit); | |
| 281 crypto_free(str); | |
| 282 return stat; | |
| 283 } | |
| 284 } else { | |
| 285 str->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher = NULL; | |
| 286 str->enc_xtn_hdr = NULL; | |
| 287 str->enc_xtn_hdr_count = 0; | |
| 288 } | |
| 289 | |
| 290 return err_status_ok; | |
| 291 } | |
| 292 | |
| 293 err_status_t | |
| 294 srtp_stream_dealloc(srtp_t session, srtp_stream_ctx_t *stream) { | |
| 295 err_status_t status; | |
| 296 | |
| 297 /* | |
| 298 * we use a conservative deallocation strategy - if any deallocation | |
| 299 * fails, then we report that fact without trying to deallocate | |
| 300 * anything else | |
| 301 */ | |
| 302 | |
| 303 /* deallocate cipher, if it is not the same as that in template */ | |
| 304 if (session->stream_template | |
| 305 && stream->rtp_cipher == session->stream_template->rtp_cipher) { | |
| 306 /* do nothing */ | |
| 307 } else { | |
| 308 status = cipher_dealloc(stream->rtp_cipher); | |
| 309 if (status) | |
| 310 return status; | |
| 311 } | |
| 312 | |
| 313 /* deallocate auth function, if it is not the same as that in template */ | |
| 314 if (session->stream_template | |
| 315 && stream->rtp_auth == session->stream_template->rtp_auth) { | |
| 316 /* do nothing */ | |
| 317 } else { | |
| 318 status = auth_dealloc(stream->rtp_auth); | |
| 319 if (status) | |
| 320 return status; | |
| 321 } | |
| 322 | |
| 323 /* deallocate key usage limit, if it is not the same as that in template */ | |
| 324 if (session->stream_template | |
| 325 && stream->limit == session->stream_template->limit) { | |
| 326 /* do nothing */ | |
| 327 } else { | |
| 328 crypto_free(stream->limit); | |
| 329 } | |
| 330 | |
| 331 if (session->stream_template | |
| 332 && stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher == session->stream_template->rtp_xtn_hdr_cip
her) { | |
| 333 /* do nothing */ | |
| 334 } else if (stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher) { | |
| 335 status = cipher_dealloc(stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher); | |
| 336 if (status) | |
| 337 return status; | |
| 338 } | |
| 339 | |
| 340 /* | |
| 341 * deallocate rtcp cipher, if it is not the same as that in | |
| 342 * template | |
| 343 */ | |
| 344 if (session->stream_template | |
| 345 && stream->rtcp_cipher == session->stream_template->rtcp_cipher) { | |
| 346 /* do nothing */ | |
| 347 } else { | |
| 348 status = cipher_dealloc(stream->rtcp_cipher); | |
| 349 if (status) | |
| 350 return status; | |
| 351 } | |
| 352 | |
| 353 /* | |
| 354 * deallocate rtcp auth function, if it is not the same as that in | |
| 355 * template | |
| 356 */ | |
| 357 if (session->stream_template | |
| 358 && stream->rtcp_auth == session->stream_template->rtcp_auth) { | |
| 359 /* do nothing */ | |
| 360 } else { | |
| 361 status = auth_dealloc(stream->rtcp_auth); | |
| 362 if (status) | |
| 363 return status; | |
| 364 } | |
| 365 | |
| 366 status = rdbx_dealloc(&stream->rtp_rdbx); | |
| 367 if (status) | |
| 368 return status; | |
| 369 | |
| 370 /* DAM - need to deallocate EKT here */ | |
| 371 | |
| 372 if (session->stream_template | |
| 373 && stream->enc_xtn_hdr == session->stream_template->enc_xtn_hdr) { | |
| 374 /* do nothing */ | |
| 375 } else if (stream->enc_xtn_hdr) { | |
| 376 crypto_free(stream->enc_xtn_hdr); | |
| 377 } | |
| 378 | |
| 379 /* | |
| 380 * zeroize the salt value | |
| 381 */ | |
| 382 memset(stream->salt, 0, SRTP_AEAD_SALT_LEN); | |
| 383 memset(stream->c_salt, 0, SRTP_AEAD_SALT_LEN); | |
| 384 | |
| 385 | |
| 386 /* deallocate srtp stream context */ | |
| 387 crypto_free(stream); | |
| 388 | |
| 389 return err_status_ok; | |
| 390 } | |
| 391 | |
| 392 | |
| 393 /* | |
| 394 * srtp_stream_clone(stream_template, new) allocates a new stream and | |
| 395 * initializes it using the cipher and auth of the stream_template | |
| 396 * | |
| 397 * the only unique data in a cloned stream is the replay database and | |
| 398 * the SSRC | |
| 399 */ | |
| 400 | |
| 401 err_status_t | |
| 402 srtp_stream_clone(const srtp_stream_ctx_t *stream_template, | |
| 403 uint32_t ssrc, | |
| 404 srtp_stream_ctx_t **str_ptr) { | |
| 405 err_status_t status; | |
| 406 srtp_stream_ctx_t *str; | |
| 407 | |
| 408 debug_print(mod_srtp, "cloning stream (SSRC: 0x%08x)", ssrc); | |
| 409 | |
| 410 /* allocate srtp stream and set str_ptr */ | |
| 411 str = (srtp_stream_ctx_t *) crypto_alloc(sizeof(srtp_stream_ctx_t)); | |
| 412 if (str == NULL) | |
| 413 return err_status_alloc_fail; | |
| 414 *str_ptr = str; | |
| 415 | |
| 416 /* set cipher and auth pointers to those of the template */ | |
| 417 str->rtp_cipher = stream_template->rtp_cipher; | |
| 418 str->rtp_auth = stream_template->rtp_auth; | |
| 419 str->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher = stream_template->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher; | |
| 420 str->rtcp_cipher = stream_template->rtcp_cipher; | |
| 421 str->rtcp_auth = stream_template->rtcp_auth; | |
| 422 | |
| 423 /* set key limit to point to that of the template */ | |
| 424 status = key_limit_clone(stream_template->limit, &str->limit); | |
| 425 if (status) { | |
| 426 crypto_free(*str_ptr); | |
| 427 *str_ptr = NULL; | |
| 428 return status; | |
| 429 } | |
| 430 | |
| 431 /* initialize replay databases */ | |
| 432 status = rdbx_init(&str->rtp_rdbx, | |
| 433 rdbx_get_window_size(&stream_template->rtp_rdbx)); | |
| 434 if (status) { | |
| 435 crypto_free(*str_ptr); | |
| 436 *str_ptr = NULL; | |
| 437 return status; | |
| 438 } | |
| 439 rdb_init(&str->rtcp_rdb); | |
| 440 str->allow_repeat_tx = stream_template->allow_repeat_tx; | |
| 441 | |
| 442 /* set ssrc to that provided */ | |
| 443 str->ssrc = ssrc; | |
| 444 | |
| 445 /* set direction and security services */ | |
| 446 str->direction = stream_template->direction; | |
| 447 str->rtp_services = stream_template->rtp_services; | |
| 448 str->rtcp_services = stream_template->rtcp_services; | |
| 449 | |
| 450 /* set pointer to EKT data associated with stream */ | |
| 451 str->ekt = stream_template->ekt; | |
| 452 | |
| 453 /* copy information about extensions header encryption */ | |
| 454 str->enc_xtn_hdr = stream_template->enc_xtn_hdr; | |
| 455 str->enc_xtn_hdr_count = stream_template->enc_xtn_hdr_count; | |
| 456 | |
| 457 /* Copy the salt values */ | |
| 458 memcpy(str->salt, stream_template->salt, SRTP_AEAD_SALT_LEN); | |
| 459 memcpy(str->c_salt, stream_template->c_salt, SRTP_AEAD_SALT_LEN); | |
| 460 | |
| 461 /* defensive coding */ | |
| 462 str->next = NULL; | |
| 463 | |
| 464 return err_status_ok; | |
| 465 } | |
| 466 | |
| 467 | |
| 468 /* | |
| 469 * key derivation functions, internal to libSRTP | |
| 470 * | |
| 471 * srtp_kdf_t is a key derivation context | |
| 472 * | |
| 473 * srtp_kdf_init(&kdf, cipher_id, k, keylen) initializes kdf to use cipher | |
| 474 * described by cipher_id, with the master key k with length in octets keylen. | |
| 475 * | |
| 476 * srtp_kdf_generate(&kdf, l, kl, keylen) derives the key | |
| 477 * corresponding to label l and puts it into kl; the length | |
| 478 * of the key in octets is provided as keylen. this function | |
| 479 * should be called once for each subkey that is derived. | |
| 480 * | |
| 481 * srtp_kdf_clear(&kdf) zeroizes and deallocates the kdf state | |
| 482 */ | |
| 483 | |
| 484 typedef enum { | |
| 485 label_rtp_encryption = 0x00, | |
| 486 label_rtp_msg_auth = 0x01, | |
| 487 label_rtp_salt = 0x02, | |
| 488 label_rtcp_encryption = 0x03, | |
| 489 label_rtcp_msg_auth = 0x04, | |
| 490 label_rtcp_salt = 0x05, | |
| 491 label_rtp_header_encryption = 0x06, | |
| 492 label_rtp_header_salt = 0x07 | |
| 493 } srtp_prf_label; | |
| 494 | |
| 495 | |
| 496 /* | |
| 497 * srtp_kdf_t represents a key derivation function. The SRTP | |
| 498 * default KDF is the only one implemented at present. | |
| 499 */ | |
| 500 | |
| 501 typedef struct { | |
| 502 cipher_t *cipher; /* cipher used for key derivation */ | |
| 503 } srtp_kdf_t; | |
| 504 | |
| 505 err_status_t | |
| 506 srtp_kdf_init(srtp_kdf_t *kdf, cipher_type_id_t cipher_id, const uint8_t *key, i
nt length) { | |
| 507 | |
| 508 err_status_t stat; | |
| 509 stat = crypto_kernel_alloc_cipher(cipher_id, &kdf->cipher, length, 0); | |
| 510 if (stat) | |
| 511 return stat; | |
| 512 | |
| 513 stat = cipher_init(kdf->cipher, key); | |
| 514 if (stat) { | |
| 515 cipher_dealloc(kdf->cipher); | |
| 516 return stat; | |
| 517 } | |
| 518 | |
| 519 return err_status_ok; | |
| 520 } | |
| 521 | |
| 522 err_status_t | |
| 523 srtp_kdf_generate(srtp_kdf_t *kdf, srtp_prf_label label, | |
| 524 uint8_t *key, unsigned int length) { | |
| 525 | |
| 526 v128_t nonce; | |
| 527 err_status_t status; | |
| 528 | |
| 529 /* set eigth octet of nonce to <label>, set the rest of it to zero */ | |
| 530 v128_set_to_zero(&nonce); | |
| 531 nonce.v8[7] = label; | |
| 532 | |
| 533 status = cipher_set_iv(kdf->cipher, &nonce, direction_encrypt); | |
| 534 if (status) | |
| 535 return status; | |
| 536 | |
| 537 /* generate keystream output */ | |
| 538 octet_string_set_to_zero(key, length); | |
| 539 status = cipher_encrypt(kdf->cipher, key, &length); | |
| 540 if (status) | |
| 541 return status; | |
| 542 | |
| 543 return err_status_ok; | |
| 544 } | |
| 545 | |
| 546 err_status_t | |
| 547 srtp_kdf_clear(srtp_kdf_t *kdf) { | |
| 548 err_status_t status; | |
| 549 status = cipher_dealloc(kdf->cipher); | |
| 550 if (status) | |
| 551 return status; | |
| 552 kdf->cipher = NULL; | |
| 553 | |
| 554 return err_status_ok; | |
| 555 } | |
| 556 | |
| 557 /* | |
| 558 * end of key derivation functions | |
| 559 */ | |
| 560 | |
| 561 #define MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN 256 | |
| 562 | |
| 563 | |
| 564 /* Get the base key length corresponding to a given combined key+salt | |
| 565 * length for the given cipher. | |
| 566 * Assumption is that for AES-ICM a key length < 30 is Ismacryp using | |
| 567 * AES-128 and short salts; everything else uses a salt length of 14. | |
| 568 * TODO: key and salt lengths should be separate fields in the policy. */ | |
| 569 static inline int base_key_length(const cipher_type_t *cipher, int key_length) | |
| 570 { | |
| 571 switch (cipher->id) { | |
| 572 case AES_128_ICM: | |
| 573 case AES_192_ICM: | |
| 574 case AES_256_ICM: | |
| 575 /* The legacy modes are derived from | |
| 576 * the configured key length on the policy */ | |
| 577 return key_length - 14; | |
| 578 break; | |
| 579 case AES_128_GCM: | |
| 580 return 16; | |
| 581 break; | |
| 582 case AES_256_GCM: | |
| 583 return 32; | |
| 584 break; | |
| 585 default: | |
| 586 return key_length; | |
| 587 break; | |
| 588 } | |
| 589 } | |
| 590 | |
| 591 err_status_t | |
| 592 srtp_stream_init_keys(srtp_stream_ctx_t *srtp, const void *key) { | |
| 593 err_status_t stat; | |
| 594 srtp_kdf_t kdf; | |
| 595 uint8_t tmp_key[MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN]; | |
| 596 int kdf_keylen = 30, rtp_keylen, rtcp_keylen; | |
| 597 int rtp_base_key_len, rtp_salt_len; | |
| 598 int rtcp_base_key_len, rtcp_salt_len; | |
| 599 | |
| 600 /* If RTP or RTCP have a key length > AES-128, assume matching kdf. */ | |
| 601 /* TODO: kdf algorithm, master key length, and master salt length should | |
| 602 * be part of srtp_policy_t. */ | |
| 603 rtp_keylen = cipher_get_key_length(srtp->rtp_cipher); | |
| 604 rtcp_keylen = cipher_get_key_length(srtp->rtcp_cipher); | |
| 605 rtp_base_key_len = base_key_length(srtp->rtp_cipher->type, rtp_keylen); | |
| 606 rtp_salt_len = rtp_keylen - rtp_base_key_len; | |
| 607 | |
| 608 if (rtp_keylen > kdf_keylen) { | |
| 609 kdf_keylen = 46; /* AES-CTR mode is always used for KDF */ | |
| 610 } | |
| 611 | |
| 612 if (rtcp_keylen > kdf_keylen) { | |
| 613 kdf_keylen = 46; /* AES-CTR mode is always used for KDF */ | |
| 614 } | |
| 615 | |
| 616 debug_print(mod_srtp, "srtp key len: %d", rtp_keylen); | |
| 617 debug_print(mod_srtp, "srtcp key len: %d", rtcp_keylen); | |
| 618 debug_print(mod_srtp, "base key len: %d", rtp_base_key_len); | |
| 619 debug_print(mod_srtp, "kdf key len: %d", kdf_keylen); | |
| 620 debug_print(mod_srtp, "rtp salt len: %d", rtp_salt_len); | |
| 621 | |
| 622 /* | |
| 623 * Make sure the key given to us is 'zero' appended. GCM | |
| 624 * mode uses a shorter master SALT (96 bits), but still relies on | |
| 625 * the legacy CTR mode KDF, which uses a 112 bit master SALT. | |
| 626 */ | |
| 627 memset(tmp_key, 0x0, MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN); | |
| 628 memcpy(tmp_key, key, (rtp_base_key_len + rtp_salt_len)); | |
| 629 | |
| 630 /* initialize KDF state */ | |
| 631 stat = srtp_kdf_init(&kdf, AES_ICM, (const uint8_t *)tmp_key, kdf_keylen); | |
| 632 if (stat) { | |
| 633 return err_status_init_fail; | |
| 634 } | |
| 635 | |
| 636 /* generate encryption key */ | |
| 637 stat = srtp_kdf_generate(&kdf, label_rtp_encryption, | |
| 638 tmp_key, rtp_base_key_len); | |
| 639 if (stat) { | |
| 640 /* zeroize temp buffer */ | |
| 641 octet_string_set_to_zero(tmp_key, MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN); | |
| 642 return err_status_init_fail; | |
| 643 } | |
| 644 debug_print(mod_srtp, "cipher key: %s", | |
| 645 octet_string_hex_string(tmp_key, rtp_base_key_len)); | |
| 646 | |
| 647 /* | |
| 648 * if the cipher in the srtp context uses a salt, then we need | |
| 649 * to generate the salt value | |
| 650 */ | |
| 651 if (rtp_salt_len > 0) { | |
| 652 debug_print(mod_srtp, "found rtp_salt_len > 0, generating salt", NULL); | |
| 653 | |
| 654 /* generate encryption salt, put after encryption key */ | |
| 655 stat = srtp_kdf_generate(&kdf, label_rtp_salt, | |
| 656 tmp_key + rtp_base_key_len, rtp_salt_len); | |
| 657 if (stat) { | |
| 658 /* zeroize temp buffer */ | |
| 659 octet_string_set_to_zero(tmp_key, MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN); | |
| 660 return err_status_init_fail; | |
| 661 } | |
| 662 memcpy(srtp->salt, tmp_key + rtp_base_key_len, SRTP_AEAD_SALT_LEN); | |
| 663 } | |
| 664 if (rtp_salt_len > 0) { | |
| 665 debug_print(mod_srtp, "cipher salt: %s", | |
| 666 octet_string_hex_string(tmp_key + rtp_base_key_len, rtp_salt_len
)); | |
| 667 } | |
| 668 | |
| 669 /* initialize cipher */ | |
| 670 stat = cipher_init(srtp->rtp_cipher, tmp_key); | |
| 671 if (stat) { | |
| 672 /* zeroize temp buffer */ | |
| 673 octet_string_set_to_zero(tmp_key, MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN); | |
| 674 return err_status_init_fail; | |
| 675 } | |
| 676 | |
| 677 if (srtp->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher) { | |
| 678 /* generate extensions header encryption key */ | |
| 679 int rtp_xtn_hdr_keylen; | |
| 680 int rtp_xtn_hdr_base_key_len; | |
| 681 int rtp_xtn_hdr_salt_len; | |
| 682 srtp_kdf_t tmp_kdf; | |
| 683 srtp_kdf_t *xtn_hdr_kdf; | |
| 684 | |
| 685 if (srtp->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher->type != srtp->rtp_cipher->type) { | |
| 686 /* With GCM ciphers, the header extensions are still encrypted using the c
orresponding ICM cipher. */ | |
| 687 /* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-aes-gcm-17#sect
ion-8.3 */ | |
| 688 uint8_t tmp_xtn_hdr_key[MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN]; | |
| 689 rtp_xtn_hdr_keylen = cipher_get_key_length(srtp->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher); | |
| 690 rtp_xtn_hdr_base_key_len = base_key_length(srtp->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher->type,
rtp_xtn_hdr_keylen); | |
| 691 rtp_xtn_hdr_salt_len = rtp_xtn_hdr_keylen - rtp_xtn_hdr_base_key_len; | |
| 692 memset(tmp_xtn_hdr_key, 0x0, MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN); | |
| 693 memcpy(tmp_xtn_hdr_key, key, (rtp_xtn_hdr_base_key_len + rtp_xtn_hdr_salt_
len)); | |
| 694 xtn_hdr_kdf = &tmp_kdf; | |
| 695 | |
| 696 /* initialize KDF state */ | |
| 697 stat = srtp_kdf_init(xtn_hdr_kdf, AES_ICM, (const uint8_t *)tmp_xtn_hdr_ke
y, kdf_keylen); | |
| 698 octet_string_set_to_zero(tmp_xtn_hdr_key, MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN); | |
| 699 if (stat) { | |
| 700 return err_status_init_fail; | |
| 701 } | |
| 702 } else { | |
| 703 /* Reuse main KDF. */ | |
| 704 rtp_xtn_hdr_keylen = rtp_keylen; | |
| 705 rtp_xtn_hdr_base_key_len = rtp_base_key_len; | |
| 706 rtp_xtn_hdr_salt_len = rtp_salt_len; | |
| 707 xtn_hdr_kdf = &kdf; | |
| 708 } | |
| 709 | |
| 710 stat = srtp_kdf_generate(xtn_hdr_kdf, label_rtp_header_encryption, | |
| 711 tmp_key, rtp_xtn_hdr_base_key_len); | |
| 712 if (stat) { | |
| 713 /* zeroize temp buffer */ | |
| 714 octet_string_set_to_zero(tmp_key, MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN); | |
| 715 return err_status_init_fail; | |
| 716 } | |
| 717 debug_print(mod_srtp, "extensions cipher key: %s", | |
| 718 octet_string_hex_string(tmp_key, rtp_xtn_hdr_base_key_len)); | |
| 719 | |
| 720 /* | |
| 721 * if the cipher in the srtp context uses a salt, then we need | |
| 722 * to generate the salt value | |
| 723 */ | |
| 724 if (rtp_xtn_hdr_salt_len > 0) { | |
| 725 debug_print(mod_srtp, "found rtp_xtn_hdr_salt_len > 0, generating salt", N
ULL); | |
| 726 | |
| 727 /* generate encryption salt, put after encryption key */ | |
| 728 stat = srtp_kdf_generate(xtn_hdr_kdf, label_rtp_header_salt, | |
| 729 tmp_key + rtp_xtn_hdr_base_key_len, rtp_xtn_hdr_salt_len); | |
| 730 if (stat) { | |
| 731 /* zeroize temp buffer */ | |
| 732 octet_string_set_to_zero(tmp_key, MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN); | |
| 733 return err_status_init_fail; | |
| 734 } | |
| 735 } | |
| 736 if (rtp_xtn_hdr_salt_len > 0) { | |
| 737 debug_print(mod_srtp, "extensions cipher salt: %s", | |
| 738 octet_string_hex_string(tmp_key + rtp_xtn_hdr_base_key_len, rtp_xtn_hdr_sa
lt_len)); | |
| 739 } | |
| 740 | |
| 741 /* initialize extensions header cipher */ | |
| 742 stat = cipher_init(srtp->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher, tmp_key); | |
| 743 if (stat) { | |
| 744 /* zeroize temp buffer */ | |
| 745 octet_string_set_to_zero(tmp_key, MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN); | |
| 746 return err_status_init_fail; | |
| 747 } | |
| 748 | |
| 749 if (xtn_hdr_kdf != &kdf) { | |
| 750 /* release memory for custom header extension encryption kdf */ | |
| 751 stat = srtp_kdf_clear(xtn_hdr_kdf); | |
| 752 if (stat) { | |
| 753 octet_string_set_to_zero(tmp_key, MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN); | |
| 754 return err_status_init_fail; | |
| 755 } | |
| 756 } | |
| 757 } | |
| 758 | |
| 759 /* generate authentication key */ | |
| 760 stat = srtp_kdf_generate(&kdf, label_rtp_msg_auth, | |
| 761 tmp_key, auth_get_key_length(srtp->rtp_auth)); | |
| 762 if (stat) { | |
| 763 /* zeroize temp buffer */ | |
| 764 octet_string_set_to_zero(tmp_key, MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN); | |
| 765 return err_status_init_fail; | |
| 766 } | |
| 767 debug_print(mod_srtp, "auth key: %s", | |
| 768 octet_string_hex_string(tmp_key, | |
| 769 auth_get_key_length(srtp->rtp_auth))); | |
| 770 | |
| 771 /* initialize auth function */ | |
| 772 stat = auth_init(srtp->rtp_auth, tmp_key); | |
| 773 if (stat) { | |
| 774 /* zeroize temp buffer */ | |
| 775 octet_string_set_to_zero(tmp_key, MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN); | |
| 776 return err_status_init_fail; | |
| 777 } | |
| 778 | |
| 779 /* | |
| 780 * ...now initialize SRTCP keys | |
| 781 */ | |
| 782 | |
| 783 rtcp_base_key_len = base_key_length(srtp->rtcp_cipher->type, rtcp_keylen); | |
| 784 rtcp_salt_len = rtcp_keylen - rtcp_base_key_len; | |
| 785 debug_print(mod_srtp, "rtcp salt len: %d", rtcp_salt_len); | |
| 786 | |
| 787 /* generate encryption key */ | |
| 788 stat = srtp_kdf_generate(&kdf, label_rtcp_encryption, | |
| 789 tmp_key, rtcp_base_key_len); | |
| 790 if (stat) { | |
| 791 /* zeroize temp buffer */ | |
| 792 octet_string_set_to_zero(tmp_key, MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN); | |
| 793 return err_status_init_fail; | |
| 794 } | |
| 795 | |
| 796 /* | |
| 797 * if the cipher in the srtp context uses a salt, then we need | |
| 798 * to generate the salt value | |
| 799 */ | |
| 800 if (rtcp_salt_len > 0) { | |
| 801 debug_print(mod_srtp, "found rtcp_salt_len > 0, generating rtcp salt", | |
| 802 NULL); | |
| 803 | |
| 804 /* generate encryption salt, put after encryption key */ | |
| 805 stat = srtp_kdf_generate(&kdf, label_rtcp_salt, | |
| 806 tmp_key + rtcp_base_key_len, rtcp_salt_len); | |
| 807 if (stat) { | |
| 808 /* zeroize temp buffer */ | |
| 809 octet_string_set_to_zero(tmp_key, MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN); | |
| 810 return err_status_init_fail; | |
| 811 } | |
| 812 memcpy(srtp->c_salt, tmp_key + rtcp_base_key_len, SRTP_AEAD_SALT_LEN); | |
| 813 } | |
| 814 debug_print(mod_srtp, "rtcp cipher key: %s", | |
| 815 octet_string_hex_string(tmp_key, rtcp_base_key_len)); | |
| 816 if (rtcp_salt_len > 0) { | |
| 817 debug_print(mod_srtp, "rtcp cipher salt: %s", | |
| 818 octet_string_hex_string(tmp_key + rtcp_base_key_len, rtcp_salt_l
en)); | |
| 819 } | |
| 820 | |
| 821 /* initialize cipher */ | |
| 822 stat = cipher_init(srtp->rtcp_cipher, tmp_key); | |
| 823 if (stat) { | |
| 824 /* zeroize temp buffer */ | |
| 825 octet_string_set_to_zero(tmp_key, MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN); | |
| 826 return err_status_init_fail; | |
| 827 } | |
| 828 | |
| 829 /* generate authentication key */ | |
| 830 stat = srtp_kdf_generate(&kdf, label_rtcp_msg_auth, | |
| 831 tmp_key, auth_get_key_length(srtp->rtcp_auth)); | |
| 832 if (stat) { | |
| 833 /* zeroize temp buffer */ | |
| 834 octet_string_set_to_zero(tmp_key, MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN); | |
| 835 return err_status_init_fail; | |
| 836 } | |
| 837 | |
| 838 debug_print(mod_srtp, "rtcp auth key: %s", | |
| 839 octet_string_hex_string(tmp_key, | |
| 840 auth_get_key_length(srtp->rtcp_auth))); | |
| 841 | |
| 842 /* initialize auth function */ | |
| 843 stat = auth_init(srtp->rtcp_auth, tmp_key); | |
| 844 if (stat) { | |
| 845 /* zeroize temp buffer */ | |
| 846 octet_string_set_to_zero(tmp_key, MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN); | |
| 847 return err_status_init_fail; | |
| 848 } | |
| 849 | |
| 850 /* clear memory then return */ | |
| 851 stat = srtp_kdf_clear(&kdf); | |
| 852 octet_string_set_to_zero(tmp_key, MAX_SRTP_KEY_LEN); | |
| 853 if (stat) | |
| 854 return err_status_init_fail; | |
| 855 | |
| 856 return err_status_ok; | |
| 857 } | |
| 858 | |
| 859 err_status_t | |
| 860 srtp_stream_init(srtp_stream_ctx_t *srtp, | |
| 861 const srtp_policy_t *p) { | |
| 862 err_status_t err; | |
| 863 | |
| 864 debug_print(mod_srtp, "initializing stream (SSRC: 0x%08x)", | |
| 865 p->ssrc.value); | |
| 866 | |
| 867 /* initialize replay database */ | |
| 868 /* window size MUST be at least 64. MAY be larger. Values more than | |
| 869 * 2^15 aren't meaningful due to how extended sequence numbers are | |
| 870 * calculated. Let a window size of 0 imply the default value. */ | |
| 871 | |
| 872 if (p->window_size != 0 && (p->window_size < 64 || p->window_size >= 0x8000)) | |
| 873 return err_status_bad_param; | |
| 874 | |
| 875 if (p->window_size != 0) | |
| 876 err = rdbx_init(&srtp->rtp_rdbx, p->window_size); | |
| 877 else | |
| 878 err = rdbx_init(&srtp->rtp_rdbx, 128); | |
| 879 if (err) return err; | |
| 880 | |
| 881 /* initialize key limit to maximum value */ | |
| 882 #ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH | |
| 883 { | |
| 884 uint64_t temp; | |
| 885 temp = make64(UINT_MAX,UINT_MAX); | |
| 886 key_limit_set(srtp->limit, temp); | |
| 887 } | |
| 888 #else | |
| 889 key_limit_set(srtp->limit, 0xffffffffffffLL); | |
| 890 #endif | |
| 891 | |
| 892 /* set the SSRC value */ | |
| 893 srtp->ssrc = htonl(p->ssrc.value); | |
| 894 | |
| 895 /* set the security service flags */ | |
| 896 srtp->rtp_services = p->rtp.sec_serv; | |
| 897 srtp->rtcp_services = p->rtcp.sec_serv; | |
| 898 | |
| 899 /* | |
| 900 * set direction to unknown - this flag gets checked in srtp_protect(), | |
| 901 * srtp_unprotect(), srtp_protect_rtcp(), and srtp_unprotect_rtcp(), and | |
| 902 * gets set appropriately if it is set to unknown. | |
| 903 */ | |
| 904 srtp->direction = dir_unknown; | |
| 905 | |
| 906 /* initialize SRTCP replay database */ | |
| 907 rdb_init(&srtp->rtcp_rdb); | |
| 908 | |
| 909 /* initialize allow_repeat_tx */ | |
| 910 /* guard against uninitialized memory: allow only 0 or 1 here */ | |
| 911 if (p->allow_repeat_tx != 0 && p->allow_repeat_tx != 1) { | |
| 912 rdbx_dealloc(&srtp->rtp_rdbx); | |
| 913 return err_status_bad_param; | |
| 914 } | |
| 915 srtp->allow_repeat_tx = p->allow_repeat_tx; | |
| 916 | |
| 917 /* DAM - no RTCP key limit at present */ | |
| 918 | |
| 919 /* initialize keys */ | |
| 920 err = srtp_stream_init_keys(srtp, p->key); | |
| 921 if (err) { | |
| 922 rdbx_dealloc(&srtp->rtp_rdbx); | |
| 923 return err; | |
| 924 } | |
| 925 | |
| 926 /* | |
| 927 * if EKT is in use, then initialize the EKT data associated with | |
| 928 * the stream | |
| 929 */ | |
| 930 err = ekt_stream_init_from_policy(srtp->ekt, p->ekt); | |
| 931 if (err) { | |
| 932 rdbx_dealloc(&srtp->rtp_rdbx); | |
| 933 return err; | |
| 934 } | |
| 935 | |
| 936 return err_status_ok; | |
| 937 } | |
| 938 | |
| 939 | |
| 940 /* | |
| 941 * srtp_event_reporter is an event handler function that merely | |
| 942 * reports the events that are reported by the callbacks | |
| 943 */ | |
| 944 | |
| 945 void | |
| 946 srtp_event_reporter(srtp_event_data_t *data) { | |
| 947 | |
| 948 err_report(err_level_warning, "srtp: in stream 0x%x: ", | |
| 949 data->stream->ssrc); | |
| 950 | |
| 951 switch(data->event) { | |
| 952 case event_ssrc_collision: | |
| 953 err_report(err_level_warning, "\tSSRC collision\n"); | |
| 954 break; | |
| 955 case event_key_soft_limit: | |
| 956 err_report(err_level_warning, "\tkey usage soft limit reached\n"); | |
| 957 break; | |
| 958 case event_key_hard_limit: | |
| 959 err_report(err_level_warning, "\tkey usage hard limit reached\n"); | |
| 960 break; | |
| 961 case event_packet_index_limit: | |
| 962 err_report(err_level_warning, "\tpacket index limit reached\n"); | |
| 963 break; | |
| 964 default: | |
| 965 err_report(err_level_warning, "\tunknown event reported to handler\n"); | |
| 966 } | |
| 967 } | |
| 968 | |
| 969 /* | |
| 970 * srtp_event_handler is a global variable holding a pointer to the | |
| 971 * event handler function; this function is called for any unexpected | |
| 972 * event that needs to be handled out of the SRTP data path. see | |
| 973 * srtp_event_t in srtp.h for more info | |
| 974 * | |
| 975 * it is okay to set srtp_event_handler to NULL, but we set | |
| 976 * it to the srtp_event_reporter. | |
| 977 */ | |
| 978 | |
| 979 static srtp_event_handler_func_t *srtp_event_handler = srtp_event_reporter; | |
| 980 | |
| 981 err_status_t | |
| 982 srtp_install_event_handler(srtp_event_handler_func_t func) { | |
| 983 | |
| 984 /* | |
| 985 * note that we accept NULL arguments intentionally - calling this | |
| 986 * function with a NULL arguments removes an event handler that's | |
| 987 * been previously installed | |
| 988 */ | |
| 989 | |
| 990 /* set global event handling function */ | |
| 991 srtp_event_handler = func; | |
| 992 return err_status_ok; | |
| 993 } | |
| 994 | |
| 995 | |
| 996 /* | |
| 997 * Check if the given extension header id is / should be encrypted. | |
| 998 * Returns 1 if yes, otherwise 0. | |
| 999 */ | |
| 1000 static int | |
| 1001 srtp_protect_extension_header(srtp_stream_ctx_t *stream, int id) { | |
| 1002 int* enc_xtn_hdr = stream->enc_xtn_hdr; | |
| 1003 int count = stream->enc_xtn_hdr_count; | |
| 1004 | |
| 1005 if (!enc_xtn_hdr || count <= 0) { | |
| 1006 return 0; | |
| 1007 } | |
| 1008 | |
| 1009 while (count > 0) { | |
| 1010 if (*enc_xtn_hdr == id) { | |
| 1011 return 1; | |
| 1012 } | |
| 1013 | |
| 1014 enc_xtn_hdr++; | |
| 1015 count--; | |
| 1016 } | |
| 1017 return 0; | |
| 1018 } | |
| 1019 | |
| 1020 | |
| 1021 /* | |
| 1022 + * extensions header encryption RFC 6904 | |
| 1023 */ | |
| 1024 static err_status_t | |
| 1025 srtp_process_header_encryption(srtp_stream_ctx_t *stream, srtp_hdr_xtnd_t *xtn_h
dr) { | |
| 1026 err_status_t status; | |
| 1027 uint8_t keystream[257]; /* Maximum 2 bytes header + 255 bytes data. */ | |
| 1028 int keystream_pos; | |
| 1029 uint8_t* xtn_hdr_data = ((uint8_t *)xtn_hdr) + octets_in_rtp_extn_hdr; | |
| 1030 uint8_t* xtn_hdr_end = xtn_hdr_data + (ntohs(xtn_hdr->length) * sizeof(uint32_
t)); | |
| 1031 | |
| 1032 if (ntohs(xtn_hdr->profile_specific) == 0xbede) { | |
| 1033 /* RFC 5285, section 4.2. One-Byte Header */ | |
| 1034 while (xtn_hdr_data < xtn_hdr_end) { | |
| 1035 uint8_t xid = (*xtn_hdr_data & 0xf0) >> 4; | |
| 1036 unsigned int xlen = (*xtn_hdr_data & 0x0f) + 1; | |
| 1037 uint32_t xlen_with_header = 1+xlen; | |
| 1038 xtn_hdr_data++; | |
| 1039 | |
| 1040 if (xtn_hdr_data + xlen > xtn_hdr_end) | |
| 1041 return err_status_parse_err; | |
| 1042 | |
| 1043 if (xid == 15) { | |
| 1044 /* found header 15, stop further processing. */ | |
| 1045 break; | |
| 1046 } | |
| 1047 | |
| 1048 status = cipher_output(stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher, keystream, xlen_with_he
ader); | |
| 1049 if (status) | |
| 1050 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 1051 | |
| 1052 if (srtp_protect_extension_header(stream, xid)) { | |
| 1053 keystream_pos = 1; | |
| 1054 while (xlen > 0) { | |
| 1055 *xtn_hdr_data ^= keystream[keystream_pos++]; | |
| 1056 xtn_hdr_data++; | |
| 1057 xlen--; | |
| 1058 } | |
| 1059 } else { | |
| 1060 xtn_hdr_data += xlen; | |
| 1061 } | |
| 1062 | |
| 1063 /* skip padding bytes. */ | |
| 1064 while (xtn_hdr_data < xtn_hdr_end && *xtn_hdr_data == 0) { | |
| 1065 xtn_hdr_data++; | |
| 1066 } | |
| 1067 } | |
| 1068 } else if ((ntohs(xtn_hdr->profile_specific) & 0x1fff) == 0x100) { | |
| 1069 /* RFC 5285, section 4.3. Two-Byte Header */ | |
| 1070 while (xtn_hdr_data + 1 < xtn_hdr_end) { | |
| 1071 uint8_t xid = *xtn_hdr_data; | |
| 1072 unsigned int xlen = *(xtn_hdr_data+1); | |
| 1073 uint32_t xlen_with_header = 2+xlen; | |
| 1074 xtn_hdr_data += 2; | |
| 1075 | |
| 1076 if (xtn_hdr_data + xlen > xtn_hdr_end) | |
| 1077 return err_status_parse_err; | |
| 1078 | |
| 1079 status = cipher_output(stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher, keystream, xlen_with_he
ader); | |
| 1080 if (status) | |
| 1081 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 1082 | |
| 1083 if (xlen > 0 && srtp_protect_extension_header(stream, xid)) { | |
| 1084 keystream_pos = 2; | |
| 1085 while (xlen > 0) { | |
| 1086 *xtn_hdr_data ^= keystream[keystream_pos++]; | |
| 1087 xtn_hdr_data++; | |
| 1088 xlen--; | |
| 1089 } | |
| 1090 } else { | |
| 1091 xtn_hdr_data += xlen; | |
| 1092 } | |
| 1093 | |
| 1094 /* skip padding bytes. */ | |
| 1095 while (xtn_hdr_data < xtn_hdr_end && *xtn_hdr_data == 0) { | |
| 1096 xtn_hdr_data++; | |
| 1097 } | |
| 1098 } | |
| 1099 } else { | |
| 1100 /* unsupported extension header format. */ | |
| 1101 return err_status_parse_err; | |
| 1102 } | |
| 1103 | |
| 1104 return err_status_ok; | |
| 1105 } | |
| 1106 | |
| 1107 | |
| 1108 /* | |
| 1109 * AEAD uses a new IV formation method. This function implements | |
| 1110 * section 9.1 from draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-aes-gcm-07.txt. The | |
| 1111 * calculation is defined as, where (+) is the xor operation: | |
| 1112 * | |
| 1113 * | |
| 1114 * 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 | |
| 1115 * 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 | |
| 1116 * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ | |
| 1117 * |00|00| SSRC | ROC | SEQ |---+ | |
| 1118 * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ | | |
| 1119 * | | |
| 1120 * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ | | |
| 1121 * | Encryption Salt |->(+) | |
| 1122 * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ | | |
| 1123 * | | |
| 1124 * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ | | |
| 1125 * | Initialization Vector |<--+ | |
| 1126 * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+* | |
| 1127 * | |
| 1128 * Input: *stream - pointer to SRTP stream context, used to retrieve | |
| 1129 * the SALT | |
| 1130 * *iv - Pointer to receive the calculated IV | |
| 1131 * *seq - The ROC and SEQ value to use for the | |
| 1132 * IV calculation. | |
| 1133 * *hdr - The RTP header, used to get the SSRC value | |
| 1134 * | |
| 1135 */ | |
| 1136 static void srtp_calc_aead_iv(srtp_stream_ctx_t *stream, v128_t *iv, | |
| 1137 xtd_seq_num_t *seq, srtp_hdr_t *hdr) | |
| 1138 { | |
| 1139 v128_t in; | |
| 1140 v128_t salt; | |
| 1141 | |
| 1142 #ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH | |
| 1143 uint32_t local_roc = ((high32(*seq) << 16) | | |
| 1144 (low32(*seq) >> 16)); | |
| 1145 uint16_t local_seq = (uint16_t) (low32(*seq)); | |
| 1146 #else | |
| 1147 uint32_t local_roc = (uint32_t)(*seq >> 16); | |
| 1148 uint16_t local_seq = (uint16_t) *seq; | |
| 1149 #endif | |
| 1150 | |
| 1151 memset(&in, 0, sizeof(v128_t)); | |
| 1152 memset(&salt, 0, sizeof(v128_t)); | |
| 1153 | |
| 1154 in.v16[5] = htons(local_seq); | |
| 1155 local_roc = htonl(local_roc); | |
| 1156 memcpy(&in.v16[3], &local_roc, sizeof(local_roc)); | |
| 1157 | |
| 1158 /* | |
| 1159 * Copy in the RTP SSRC value | |
| 1160 */ | |
| 1161 memcpy(&in.v8[2], &hdr->ssrc, 4); | |
| 1162 debug_print(mod_srtp, "Pre-salted RTP IV = %s\n", v128_hex_string(&in)); | |
| 1163 | |
| 1164 /* | |
| 1165 * Get the SALT value from the context | |
| 1166 */ | |
| 1167 memcpy(salt.v8, stream->salt, SRTP_AEAD_SALT_LEN); | |
| 1168 debug_print(mod_srtp, "RTP SALT = %s\n", v128_hex_string(&salt)); | |
| 1169 | |
| 1170 /* | |
| 1171 * Finally, apply tyhe SALT to the input | |
| 1172 */ | |
| 1173 v128_xor(iv, &in, &salt); | |
| 1174 } | |
| 1175 | |
| 1176 | |
| 1177 /* | |
| 1178 * This function handles outgoing SRTP packets while in AEAD mode, | |
| 1179 * which currently supports AES-GCM encryption. All packets are | |
| 1180 * encrypted and authenticated. | |
| 1181 */ | |
| 1182 static err_status_t | |
| 1183 srtp_protect_aead (srtp_ctx_t *ctx, srtp_stream_ctx_t *stream, | |
| 1184 void *rtp_hdr, unsigned int *pkt_octet_len) | |
| 1185 { | |
| 1186 srtp_hdr_t *hdr = (srtp_hdr_t*)rtp_hdr; | |
| 1187 uint32_t *enc_start; /* pointer to start of encrypted portion */ | |
| 1188 unsigned int enc_octet_len = 0; /* number of octets in encrypted portion */ | |
| 1189 xtd_seq_num_t est; /* estimated xtd_seq_num_t of *hdr */ | |
| 1190 int delta; /* delta of local pkt idx and that in hdr */ | |
| 1191 err_status_t status; | |
| 1192 int tag_len; | |
| 1193 v128_t iv; | |
| 1194 unsigned int aad_len; | |
| 1195 srtp_hdr_xtnd_t *xtn_hdr = NULL; | |
| 1196 | |
| 1197 debug_print(mod_srtp, "function srtp_protect_aead", NULL); | |
| 1198 | |
| 1199 /* | |
| 1200 * update the key usage limit, and check it to make sure that we | |
| 1201 * didn't just hit either the soft limit or the hard limit, and call | |
| 1202 * the event handler if we hit either. | |
| 1203 */ | |
| 1204 switch (key_limit_update(stream->limit)) { | |
| 1205 case key_event_normal: | |
| 1206 break; | |
| 1207 case key_event_hard_limit: | |
| 1208 srtp_handle_event(ctx, stream, event_key_hard_limit); | |
| 1209 return err_status_key_expired; | |
| 1210 case key_event_soft_limit: | |
| 1211 default: | |
| 1212 srtp_handle_event(ctx, stream, event_key_soft_limit); | |
| 1213 break; | |
| 1214 } | |
| 1215 | |
| 1216 /* get tag length from stream */ | |
| 1217 tag_len = auth_get_tag_length(stream->rtp_auth); | |
| 1218 | |
| 1219 /* | |
| 1220 * find starting point for encryption and length of data to be | |
| 1221 * encrypted - the encrypted portion starts after the rtp header | |
| 1222 * extension, if present; otherwise, it starts after the last csrc, | |
| 1223 * if any are present | |
| 1224 */ | |
| 1225 enc_start = (uint32_t*)hdr + uint32s_in_rtp_header + hdr->cc; | |
| 1226 if (hdr->x == 1) { | |
| 1227 xtn_hdr = (srtp_hdr_xtnd_t*)enc_start; | |
| 1228 enc_start += (ntohs(xtn_hdr->length) + 1); | |
| 1229 } | |
| 1230 if (!((uint8_t*)enc_start <= (uint8_t*)hdr + *pkt_octet_len)) | |
| 1231 return err_status_parse_err; | |
| 1232 enc_octet_len = (unsigned int)(*pkt_octet_len - | |
| 1233 ((uint8_t*)enc_start - (uint8_t*)hdr)); | |
| 1234 | |
| 1235 /* | |
| 1236 * estimate the packet index using the start of the replay window | |
| 1237 * and the sequence number from the header | |
| 1238 */ | |
| 1239 delta = rdbx_estimate_index(&stream->rtp_rdbx, &est, ntohs(hdr->seq)); | |
| 1240 status = rdbx_check(&stream->rtp_rdbx, delta); | |
| 1241 if (status) { | |
| 1242 if (status != err_status_replay_fail || !stream->allow_repeat_tx) { | |
| 1243 return status; /* we've been asked to reuse an index */ | |
| 1244 } | |
| 1245 } else { | |
| 1246 rdbx_add_index(&stream->rtp_rdbx, delta); | |
| 1247 } | |
| 1248 | |
| 1249 #ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH | |
| 1250 debug_print2(mod_srtp, "estimated packet index: %08x%08x", | |
| 1251 high32(est), low32(est)); | |
| 1252 #else | |
| 1253 debug_print(mod_srtp, "estimated packet index: %016llx", est); | |
| 1254 #endif | |
| 1255 | |
| 1256 /* | |
| 1257 * AEAD uses a new IV formation method | |
| 1258 */ | |
| 1259 srtp_calc_aead_iv(stream, &iv, &est, hdr); | |
| 1260 | |
| 1261 /* shift est, put into network byte order */ | |
| 1262 #ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH | |
| 1263 est = be64_to_cpu(make64((high32(est) << 16) | | |
| 1264 (low32(est) >> 16), | |
| 1265 low32(est) << 16)); | |
| 1266 #else | |
| 1267 est = be64_to_cpu(est << 16); | |
| 1268 #endif | |
| 1269 | |
| 1270 status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtp_cipher, &iv, direction_encrypt); | |
| 1271 if (!status && stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher) { | |
| 1272 iv.v32[0] = 0; | |
| 1273 iv.v32[1] = hdr->ssrc; | |
| 1274 iv.v64[1] = est; | |
| 1275 status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher, (uint8_t*)&iv, directio
n_encrypt); | |
| 1276 } | |
| 1277 if (status) { | |
| 1278 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 1279 } | |
| 1280 | |
| 1281 if (xtn_hdr && stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher) { | |
| 1282 /* | |
| 1283 * extensions header encryption RFC 6904 | |
| 1284 */ | |
| 1285 status = srtp_process_header_encryption(stream, xtn_hdr); | |
| 1286 if (status) { | |
| 1287 return status; | |
| 1288 } | |
| 1289 } | |
| 1290 | |
| 1291 /* | |
| 1292 * Set the AAD over the RTP header | |
| 1293 */ | |
| 1294 aad_len = (uint8_t *)enc_start - (uint8_t *)hdr; | |
| 1295 status = cipher_set_aad(stream->rtp_cipher, (uint8_t*)hdr, aad_len); | |
| 1296 if (status) { | |
| 1297 return ( err_status_cipher_fail); | |
| 1298 } | |
| 1299 | |
| 1300 /* Encrypt the payload */ | |
| 1301 status = cipher_encrypt(stream->rtp_cipher, | |
| 1302 (uint8_t*)enc_start, &enc_octet_len); | |
| 1303 if (status) { | |
| 1304 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 1305 } | |
| 1306 /* | |
| 1307 * If we're doing GCM, we need to get the tag | |
| 1308 * and append that to the output | |
| 1309 */ | |
| 1310 status = cipher_get_tag(stream->rtp_cipher, | |
| 1311 (uint8_t*)enc_start+enc_octet_len, &tag_len); | |
| 1312 if (status) { | |
| 1313 return ( err_status_cipher_fail); | |
| 1314 } | |
| 1315 enc_octet_len += tag_len; | |
| 1316 | |
| 1317 /* increase the packet length by the length of the auth tag */ | |
| 1318 *pkt_octet_len += tag_len; | |
| 1319 | |
| 1320 return err_status_ok; | |
| 1321 } | |
| 1322 | |
| 1323 | |
| 1324 /* | |
| 1325 * This function handles incoming SRTP packets while in AEAD mode, | |
| 1326 * which currently supports AES-GCM encryption. All packets are | |
| 1327 * encrypted and authenticated. Note, the auth tag is at the end | |
| 1328 * of the packet stream and is automatically checked by GCM | |
| 1329 * when decrypting the payload. | |
| 1330 */ | |
| 1331 static err_status_t | |
| 1332 srtp_unprotect_aead (srtp_ctx_t *ctx, srtp_stream_ctx_t *stream, int delta, | |
| 1333 xtd_seq_num_t est, void *srtp_hdr, unsigned int *pkt_octet_
len) | |
| 1334 { | |
| 1335 srtp_hdr_t *hdr = (srtp_hdr_t*)srtp_hdr; | |
| 1336 uint32_t *enc_start; /* pointer to start of encrypted portion */ | |
| 1337 unsigned int enc_octet_len = 0; /* number of octets in encrypted portion */ | |
| 1338 v128_t iv; | |
| 1339 err_status_t status; | |
| 1340 int tag_len; | |
| 1341 unsigned int aad_len; | |
| 1342 srtp_hdr_xtnd_t *xtn_hdr = NULL; | |
| 1343 | |
| 1344 debug_print(mod_srtp, "function srtp_unprotect_aead", NULL); | |
| 1345 | |
| 1346 #ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH | |
| 1347 debug_print2(mod_srtp, "estimated u_packet index: %08x%08x", high32(est), lo
w32(est)); | |
| 1348 #else | |
| 1349 debug_print(mod_srtp, "estimated u_packet index: %016llx", est); | |
| 1350 #endif | |
| 1351 | |
| 1352 /* get tag length from stream */ | |
| 1353 tag_len = auth_get_tag_length(stream->rtp_auth); | |
| 1354 | |
| 1355 /* | |
| 1356 * AEAD uses a new IV formation method | |
| 1357 */ | |
| 1358 srtp_calc_aead_iv(stream, &iv, &est, hdr); | |
| 1359 status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtp_cipher, &iv, direction_decrypt); | |
| 1360 if (status) { | |
| 1361 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 1362 } | |
| 1363 | |
| 1364 /* | |
| 1365 * find starting point for decryption and length of data to be | |
| 1366 * decrypted - the encrypted portion starts after the rtp header | |
| 1367 * extension, if present; otherwise, it starts after the last csrc, | |
| 1368 * if any are present | |
| 1369 */ | |
| 1370 enc_start = (uint32_t*)hdr + uint32s_in_rtp_header + hdr->cc; | |
| 1371 if (hdr->x == 1) { | |
| 1372 xtn_hdr = (srtp_hdr_xtnd_t*)enc_start; | |
| 1373 enc_start += (ntohs(xtn_hdr->length) + 1); | |
| 1374 } | |
| 1375 if (!((uint8_t*)enc_start <= (uint8_t*)hdr + (*pkt_octet_len - tag_len))) | |
| 1376 return err_status_parse_err; | |
| 1377 /* | |
| 1378 * We pass the tag down to the cipher when doing GCM mode | |
| 1379 */ | |
| 1380 enc_octet_len = (unsigned int)(*pkt_octet_len - | |
| 1381 ((uint8_t*)enc_start - (uint8_t*)hdr)); | |
| 1382 | |
| 1383 /* | |
| 1384 * Sanity check the encrypted payload length against | |
| 1385 * the tag size. It must always be at least as large | |
| 1386 * as the tag length. | |
| 1387 */ | |
| 1388 if (enc_octet_len < (unsigned int) tag_len) { | |
| 1389 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 1390 } | |
| 1391 | |
| 1392 /* | |
| 1393 * update the key usage limit, and check it to make sure that we | |
| 1394 * didn't just hit either the soft limit or the hard limit, and call | |
| 1395 * the event handler if we hit either. | |
| 1396 */ | |
| 1397 switch (key_limit_update(stream->limit)) { | |
| 1398 case key_event_normal: | |
| 1399 break; | |
| 1400 case key_event_soft_limit: | |
| 1401 srtp_handle_event(ctx, stream, event_key_soft_limit); | |
| 1402 break; | |
| 1403 case key_event_hard_limit: | |
| 1404 srtp_handle_event(ctx, stream, event_key_hard_limit); | |
| 1405 return err_status_key_expired; | |
| 1406 default: | |
| 1407 break; | |
| 1408 } | |
| 1409 | |
| 1410 /* | |
| 1411 * Set the AAD for AES-GCM, which is the RTP header | |
| 1412 */ | |
| 1413 aad_len = (uint8_t *)enc_start - (uint8_t *)hdr; | |
| 1414 status = cipher_set_aad(stream->rtp_cipher, (uint8_t*)hdr, aad_len); | |
| 1415 if (!status && stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher) { | |
| 1416 iv.v32[0] = 0; | |
| 1417 iv.v32[1] = hdr->ssrc; | |
| 1418 #ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH | |
| 1419 iv.v64[1] = be64_to_cpu(make64((high32(est) << 16) | (low32(est) >> 16), | |
| 1420 low32(est) << 16)); | |
| 1421 #else | |
| 1422 iv.v64[1] = be64_to_cpu(est << 16); | |
| 1423 #endif | |
| 1424 status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher, (uint8_t*)&iv, directio
n_encrypt); | |
| 1425 } | |
| 1426 if (status) { | |
| 1427 return ( err_status_cipher_fail); | |
| 1428 } | |
| 1429 | |
| 1430 /* Decrypt the ciphertext. This also checks the auth tag based | |
| 1431 * on the AAD we just specified above */ | |
| 1432 status = cipher_decrypt(stream->rtp_cipher, | |
| 1433 (uint8_t*)enc_start, &enc_octet_len); | |
| 1434 if (status) { | |
| 1435 return status; | |
| 1436 } | |
| 1437 | |
| 1438 if (xtn_hdr && stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher) { | |
| 1439 /* | |
| 1440 * extensions header encryption RFC 6904 | |
| 1441 */ | |
| 1442 status = srtp_process_header_encryption(stream, xtn_hdr); | |
| 1443 if (status) { | |
| 1444 return status; | |
| 1445 } | |
| 1446 } | |
| 1447 | |
| 1448 /* | |
| 1449 * verify that stream is for received traffic - this check will | |
| 1450 * detect SSRC collisions, since a stream that appears in both | |
| 1451 * srtp_protect() and srtp_unprotect() will fail this test in one of | |
| 1452 * those functions. | |
| 1453 * | |
| 1454 * we do this check *after* the authentication check, so that the | |
| 1455 * latter check will catch any attempts to fool us into thinking | |
| 1456 * that we've got a collision | |
| 1457 */ | |
| 1458 if (stream->direction != dir_srtp_receiver) { | |
| 1459 if (stream->direction == dir_unknown) { | |
| 1460 stream->direction = dir_srtp_receiver; | |
| 1461 } else { | |
| 1462 srtp_handle_event(ctx, stream, event_ssrc_collision); | |
| 1463 } | |
| 1464 } | |
| 1465 | |
| 1466 /* | |
| 1467 * if the stream is a 'provisional' one, in which the template context | |
| 1468 * is used, then we need to allocate a new stream at this point, since | |
| 1469 * the authentication passed | |
| 1470 */ | |
| 1471 if (stream == ctx->stream_template) { | |
| 1472 srtp_stream_ctx_t *new_stream; | |
| 1473 | |
| 1474 /* | |
| 1475 * allocate and initialize a new stream | |
| 1476 * | |
| 1477 * note that we indicate failure if we can't allocate the new | |
| 1478 * stream, and some implementations will want to not return | |
| 1479 * failure here | |
| 1480 */ | |
| 1481 status = srtp_stream_clone(ctx->stream_template, hdr->ssrc, &new_stream)
; | |
| 1482 if (status) { | |
| 1483 return status; | |
| 1484 } | |
| 1485 | |
| 1486 /* add new stream to the head of the stream_list */ | |
| 1487 new_stream->next = ctx->stream_list; | |
| 1488 ctx->stream_list = new_stream; | |
| 1489 | |
| 1490 /* set stream (the pointer used in this function) */ | |
| 1491 stream = new_stream; | |
| 1492 } | |
| 1493 | |
| 1494 /* | |
| 1495 * the message authentication function passed, so add the packet | |
| 1496 * index into the replay database | |
| 1497 */ | |
| 1498 rdbx_add_index(&stream->rtp_rdbx, delta); | |
| 1499 | |
| 1500 /* decrease the packet length by the length of the auth tag */ | |
| 1501 *pkt_octet_len -= tag_len; | |
| 1502 | |
| 1503 return err_status_ok; | |
| 1504 } | |
| 1505 | |
| 1506 | |
| 1507 | |
| 1508 | |
| 1509 err_status_t | |
| 1510 srtp_protect(srtp_ctx_t *ctx, void *rtp_hdr, int *pkt_octet_len) { | |
| 1511 srtp_hdr_t *hdr = (srtp_hdr_t *)rtp_hdr; | |
| 1512 uint32_t *enc_start; /* pointer to start of encrypted portion */ | |
| 1513 uint32_t *auth_start; /* pointer to start of auth. portion */ | |
| 1514 unsigned int enc_octet_len = 0; /* number of octets in encrypted portion */ | |
| 1515 xtd_seq_num_t est; /* estimated xtd_seq_num_t of *hdr */ | |
| 1516 int delta; /* delta of local pkt idx and that in hdr */ | |
| 1517 uint8_t *auth_tag = NULL; /* location of auth_tag within packet */ | |
| 1518 err_status_t status; | |
| 1519 int tag_len; | |
| 1520 srtp_stream_ctx_t *stream; | |
| 1521 int prefix_len; | |
| 1522 srtp_hdr_xtnd_t *xtn_hdr = NULL; | |
| 1523 | |
| 1524 debug_print(mod_srtp, "function srtp_protect", NULL); | |
| 1525 | |
| 1526 /* we assume the hdr is 32-bit aligned to start */ | |
| 1527 | |
| 1528 /* Verify RTP header */ | |
| 1529 status = srtp_validate_rtp_header(rtp_hdr, pkt_octet_len); | |
| 1530 if (status) | |
| 1531 return status; | |
| 1532 | |
| 1533 /* check the packet length - it must at least contain a full header */ | |
| 1534 if (*pkt_octet_len < octets_in_rtp_header) | |
| 1535 return err_status_bad_param; | |
| 1536 | |
| 1537 /* | |
| 1538 * look up ssrc in srtp_stream list, and process the packet with | |
| 1539 * the appropriate stream. if we haven't seen this stream before, | |
| 1540 * there's a template key for this srtp_session, and the cipher | |
| 1541 * supports key-sharing, then we assume that a new stream using | |
| 1542 * that key has just started up | |
| 1543 */ | |
| 1544 stream = srtp_get_stream(ctx, hdr->ssrc); | |
| 1545 if (stream == NULL) { | |
| 1546 if (ctx->stream_template != NULL) { | |
| 1547 srtp_stream_ctx_t *new_stream; | |
| 1548 | |
| 1549 /* allocate and initialize a new stream */ | |
| 1550 status = srtp_stream_clone(ctx->stream_template, | |
| 1551 hdr->ssrc, &new_stream); | |
| 1552 if (status) | |
| 1553 return status; | |
| 1554 | |
| 1555 /* add new stream to the head of the stream_list */ | |
| 1556 new_stream->next = ctx->stream_list; | |
| 1557 ctx->stream_list = new_stream; | |
| 1558 | |
| 1559 /* set direction to outbound */ | |
| 1560 new_stream->direction = dir_srtp_sender; | |
| 1561 | |
| 1562 /* set stream (the pointer used in this function) */ | |
| 1563 stream = new_stream; | |
| 1564 } else { | |
| 1565 /* no template stream, so we return an error */ | |
| 1566 return err_status_no_ctx; | |
| 1567 } | |
| 1568 } | |
| 1569 | |
| 1570 /* | |
| 1571 * verify that stream is for sending traffic - this check will | |
| 1572 * detect SSRC collisions, since a stream that appears in both | |
| 1573 * srtp_protect() and srtp_unprotect() will fail this test in one of | |
| 1574 * those functions. | |
| 1575 */ | |
| 1576 if (stream->direction != dir_srtp_sender) { | |
| 1577 if (stream->direction == dir_unknown) { | |
| 1578 stream->direction = dir_srtp_sender; | |
| 1579 } else { | |
| 1580 srtp_handle_event(ctx, stream, event_ssrc_collision); | |
| 1581 } | |
| 1582 } | |
| 1583 | |
| 1584 /* | |
| 1585 * Check if this is an AEAD stream (GCM mode). If so, then dispatch | |
| 1586 * the request to our AEAD handler. | |
| 1587 */ | |
| 1588 if (stream->rtp_cipher->algorithm == AES_128_GCM || | |
| 1589 stream->rtp_cipher->algorithm == AES_256_GCM) { | |
| 1590 return srtp_protect_aead(ctx, stream, rtp_hdr, (unsigned int*)pkt_octet_le
n); | |
| 1591 } | |
| 1592 | |
| 1593 /* | |
| 1594 * update the key usage limit, and check it to make sure that we | |
| 1595 * didn't just hit either the soft limit or the hard limit, and call | |
| 1596 * the event handler if we hit either. | |
| 1597 */ | |
| 1598 switch(key_limit_update(stream->limit)) { | |
| 1599 case key_event_normal: | |
| 1600 break; | |
| 1601 case key_event_soft_limit: | |
| 1602 srtp_handle_event(ctx, stream, event_key_soft_limit); | |
| 1603 break; | |
| 1604 case key_event_hard_limit: | |
| 1605 srtp_handle_event(ctx, stream, event_key_hard_limit); | |
| 1606 return err_status_key_expired; | |
| 1607 default: | |
| 1608 break; | |
| 1609 } | |
| 1610 | |
| 1611 /* get tag length from stream */ | |
| 1612 tag_len = auth_get_tag_length(stream->rtp_auth); | |
| 1613 | |
| 1614 /* | |
| 1615 * find starting point for encryption and length of data to be | |
| 1616 * encrypted - the encrypted portion starts after the rtp header | |
| 1617 * extension, if present; otherwise, it starts after the last csrc, | |
| 1618 * if any are present | |
| 1619 * | |
| 1620 * if we're not providing confidentiality, set enc_start to NULL | |
| 1621 */ | |
| 1622 if (stream->rtp_services & sec_serv_conf) { | |
| 1623 enc_start = (uint32_t *)hdr + uint32s_in_rtp_header + hdr->cc; | |
| 1624 if (hdr->x == 1) { | |
| 1625 xtn_hdr = (srtp_hdr_xtnd_t *)enc_start; | |
| 1626 enc_start += (ntohs(xtn_hdr->length) + 1); | |
| 1627 } | |
| 1628 if (!((uint8_t*)enc_start <= (uint8_t*)hdr + *pkt_octet_len)) | |
| 1629 return err_status_parse_err; | |
| 1630 enc_octet_len = (unsigned int)(*pkt_octet_len - | |
| 1631 ((uint8_t*)enc_start - (uint8_t*)hdr)); | |
| 1632 } else { | |
| 1633 enc_start = NULL; | |
| 1634 } | |
| 1635 | |
| 1636 /* | |
| 1637 * if we're providing authentication, set the auth_start and auth_tag | |
| 1638 * pointers to the proper locations; otherwise, set auth_start to NULL | |
| 1639 * to indicate that no authentication is needed | |
| 1640 */ | |
| 1641 if (stream->rtp_services & sec_serv_auth) { | |
| 1642 auth_start = (uint32_t *)hdr; | |
| 1643 auth_tag = (uint8_t *)hdr + *pkt_octet_len; | |
| 1644 } else { | |
| 1645 auth_start = NULL; | |
| 1646 auth_tag = NULL; | |
| 1647 } | |
| 1648 | |
| 1649 /* | |
| 1650 * estimate the packet index using the start of the replay window | |
| 1651 * and the sequence number from the header | |
| 1652 */ | |
| 1653 delta = rdbx_estimate_index(&stream->rtp_rdbx, &est, ntohs(hdr->seq)); | |
| 1654 status = rdbx_check(&stream->rtp_rdbx, delta); | |
| 1655 if (status) { | |
| 1656 if (status != err_status_replay_fail || !stream->allow_repeat_tx) | |
| 1657 return status; /* we've been asked to reuse an index */ | |
| 1658 } | |
| 1659 else | |
| 1660 rdbx_add_index(&stream->rtp_rdbx, delta); | |
| 1661 | |
| 1662 #ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH | |
| 1663 debug_print2(mod_srtp, "estimated packet index: %08x%08x", | |
| 1664 high32(est),low32(est)); | |
| 1665 #else | |
| 1666 debug_print(mod_srtp, "estimated packet index: %016llx", est); | |
| 1667 #endif | |
| 1668 | |
| 1669 /* | |
| 1670 * if we're using rindael counter mode, set nonce and seq | |
| 1671 */ | |
| 1672 if (stream->rtp_cipher->type->id == AES_ICM || | |
| 1673 stream->rtp_cipher->type->id == AES_256_ICM) { | |
| 1674 v128_t iv; | |
| 1675 | |
| 1676 iv.v32[0] = 0; | |
| 1677 iv.v32[1] = hdr->ssrc; | |
| 1678 #ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH | |
| 1679 iv.v64[1] = be64_to_cpu(make64((high32(est) << 16) | (low32(est) >> 16), | |
| 1680 low32(est) << 1
6)); | |
| 1681 #else | |
| 1682 iv.v64[1] = be64_to_cpu(est << 16); | |
| 1683 #endif | |
| 1684 status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtp_cipher, &iv, direction_encrypt); | |
| 1685 if (!status && stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher) { | |
| 1686 status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher, (uint8_t*)&iv, directi
on_encrypt); | |
| 1687 } | |
| 1688 } else { | |
| 1689 v128_t iv; | |
| 1690 | |
| 1691 /* otherwise, set the index to est */ | |
| 1692 #ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH | |
| 1693 iv.v32[0] = 0; | |
| 1694 iv.v32[1] = 0; | |
| 1695 #else | |
| 1696 iv.v64[0] = 0; | |
| 1697 #endif | |
| 1698 iv.v64[1] = be64_to_cpu(est); | |
| 1699 status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtp_cipher, &iv, direction_encrypt); | |
| 1700 if (!status && stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher) { | |
| 1701 status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher, (uint8_t*)&iv, directi
on_encrypt); | |
| 1702 } | |
| 1703 } | |
| 1704 if (status) | |
| 1705 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 1706 | |
| 1707 /* shift est, put into network byte order */ | |
| 1708 #ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH | |
| 1709 est = be64_to_cpu(make64((high32(est) << 16) | | |
| 1710 (low32(est) >> 16), | |
| 1711 low32(est) << 16)); | |
| 1712 #else | |
| 1713 est = be64_to_cpu(est << 16); | |
| 1714 #endif | |
| 1715 | |
| 1716 /* | |
| 1717 * if we're authenticating using a universal hash, put the keystream | |
| 1718 * prefix into the authentication tag | |
| 1719 */ | |
| 1720 if (auth_start) { | |
| 1721 | |
| 1722 prefix_len = auth_get_prefix_length(stream->rtp_auth); | |
| 1723 if (prefix_len) { | |
| 1724 status = cipher_output(stream->rtp_cipher, auth_tag, prefix_len); | |
| 1725 if (status) | |
| 1726 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 1727 debug_print(mod_srtp, "keystream prefix: %s", | |
| 1728 octet_string_hex_string(auth_tag, prefix_len)); | |
| 1729 } | |
| 1730 } | |
| 1731 | |
| 1732 if (xtn_hdr && stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher) { | |
| 1733 /* | |
| 1734 * extensions header encryption RFC 6904 | |
| 1735 */ | |
| 1736 status = srtp_process_header_encryption(stream, xtn_hdr); | |
| 1737 if (status) { | |
| 1738 return status; | |
| 1739 } | |
| 1740 } | |
| 1741 | |
| 1742 /* if we're encrypting, exor keystream into the message */ | |
| 1743 if (enc_start) { | |
| 1744 status = cipher_encrypt(stream->rtp_cipher, | |
| 1745 (uint8_t *)enc_start, &enc_octet_len); | |
| 1746 if (status) | |
| 1747 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 1748 } | |
| 1749 | |
| 1750 /* | |
| 1751 * if we're authenticating, run authentication function and put result | |
| 1752 * into the auth_tag | |
| 1753 */ | |
| 1754 if (auth_start) { | |
| 1755 | |
| 1756 /* initialize auth func context */ | |
| 1757 status = auth_start(stream->rtp_auth); | |
| 1758 if (status) return status; | |
| 1759 | |
| 1760 /* run auth func over packet */ | |
| 1761 status = auth_update(stream->rtp_auth, | |
| 1762 (uint8_t *)auth_start, *pkt_octet_len); | |
| 1763 if (status) return status; | |
| 1764 | |
| 1765 /* run auth func over ROC, put result into auth_tag */ | |
| 1766 debug_print(mod_srtp, "estimated packet index: %016llx", est); | |
| 1767 status = auth_compute(stream->rtp_auth, (uint8_t *)&est, 4, auth_tag); | |
| 1768 debug_print(mod_srtp, "srtp auth tag: %s", | |
| 1769 octet_string_hex_string(auth_tag, tag_len)); | |
| 1770 if (status) | |
| 1771 return err_status_auth_fail; | |
| 1772 | |
| 1773 } | |
| 1774 | |
| 1775 if (auth_tag) { | |
| 1776 | |
| 1777 /* increase the packet length by the length of the auth tag */ | |
| 1778 *pkt_octet_len += tag_len; | |
| 1779 } | |
| 1780 | |
| 1781 return err_status_ok; | |
| 1782 } | |
| 1783 | |
| 1784 | |
| 1785 err_status_t | |
| 1786 srtp_unprotect(srtp_ctx_t *ctx, void *srtp_hdr, int *pkt_octet_len) { | |
| 1787 srtp_hdr_t *hdr = (srtp_hdr_t *)srtp_hdr; | |
| 1788 uint32_t *enc_start; /* pointer to start of encrypted portion */ | |
| 1789 uint32_t *auth_start; /* pointer to start of auth. portion */ | |
| 1790 unsigned int enc_octet_len = 0;/* number of octets in encrypted portion */ | |
| 1791 uint8_t *auth_tag = NULL; /* location of auth_tag within packet */ | |
| 1792 xtd_seq_num_t est; /* estimated xtd_seq_num_t of *hdr */ | |
| 1793 int delta; /* delta of local pkt idx and that in hdr */ | |
| 1794 v128_t iv; | |
| 1795 err_status_t status; | |
| 1796 srtp_stream_ctx_t *stream; | |
| 1797 uint8_t tmp_tag[SRTP_MAX_TAG_LEN]; | |
| 1798 int tag_len, prefix_len; | |
| 1799 srtp_hdr_xtnd_t *xtn_hdr = NULL; | |
| 1800 | |
| 1801 debug_print(mod_srtp, "function srtp_unprotect", NULL); | |
| 1802 | |
| 1803 /* we assume the hdr is 32-bit aligned to start */ | |
| 1804 | |
| 1805 /* Verify RTP header */ | |
| 1806 status = srtp_validate_rtp_header(srtp_hdr, pkt_octet_len); | |
| 1807 if (status) | |
| 1808 return status; | |
| 1809 | |
| 1810 /* check the packet length - it must at least contain a full header */ | |
| 1811 if (*pkt_octet_len < octets_in_rtp_header) | |
| 1812 return err_status_bad_param; | |
| 1813 | |
| 1814 /* | |
| 1815 * look up ssrc in srtp_stream list, and process the packet with | |
| 1816 * the appropriate stream. if we haven't seen this stream before, | |
| 1817 * there's only one key for this srtp_session, and the cipher | |
| 1818 * supports key-sharing, then we assume that a new stream using | |
| 1819 * that key has just started up | |
| 1820 */ | |
| 1821 stream = srtp_get_stream(ctx, hdr->ssrc); | |
| 1822 if (stream == NULL) { | |
| 1823 if (ctx->stream_template != NULL) { | |
| 1824 stream = ctx->stream_template; | |
| 1825 debug_print(mod_srtp, "using provisional stream (SSRC: 0x%08x)", | |
| 1826 hdr->ssrc); | |
| 1827 | |
| 1828 /* | |
| 1829 * set estimated packet index to sequence number from header, | |
| 1830 * and set delta equal to the same value | |
| 1831 */ | |
| 1832 #ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH | |
| 1833 est = (xtd_seq_num_t) make64(0,ntohs(hdr->seq)); | |
| 1834 delta = low32(est); | |
| 1835 #else | |
| 1836 est = (xtd_seq_num_t) ntohs(hdr->seq); | |
| 1837 delta = (int)est; | |
| 1838 #endif | |
| 1839 } else { | |
| 1840 | |
| 1841 /* | |
| 1842 * no stream corresponding to SSRC found, and we don't do | |
| 1843 * key-sharing, so return an error | |
| 1844 */ | |
| 1845 return err_status_no_ctx; | |
| 1846 } | |
| 1847 } else { | |
| 1848 | |
| 1849 /* estimate packet index from seq. num. in header */ | |
| 1850 delta = rdbx_estimate_index(&stream->rtp_rdbx, &est, ntohs(hdr->seq)); | |
| 1851 | |
| 1852 /* check replay database */ | |
| 1853 status = rdbx_check(&stream->rtp_rdbx, delta); | |
| 1854 if (status) | |
| 1855 return status; | |
| 1856 } | |
| 1857 | |
| 1858 #ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH | |
| 1859 debug_print2(mod_srtp, "estimated u_packet index: %08x%08x", high32(est),low32
(est)); | |
| 1860 #else | |
| 1861 debug_print(mod_srtp, "estimated u_packet index: %016llx", est); | |
| 1862 #endif | |
| 1863 | |
| 1864 /* | |
| 1865 * Check if this is an AEAD stream (GCM mode). If so, then dispatch | |
| 1866 * the request to our AEAD handler. | |
| 1867 */ | |
| 1868 if (stream->rtp_cipher->algorithm == AES_128_GCM || | |
| 1869 stream->rtp_cipher->algorithm == AES_256_GCM) { | |
| 1870 return srtp_unprotect_aead(ctx, stream, delta, est, srtp_hdr, (unsigned in
t*)pkt_octet_len); | |
| 1871 } | |
| 1872 | |
| 1873 /* get tag length from stream */ | |
| 1874 tag_len = auth_get_tag_length(stream->rtp_auth); | |
| 1875 | |
| 1876 /* | |
| 1877 * set the cipher's IV properly, depending on whatever cipher we | |
| 1878 * happen to be using | |
| 1879 */ | |
| 1880 if (stream->rtp_cipher->type->id == AES_ICM || | |
| 1881 stream->rtp_cipher->type->id == AES_256_ICM) { | |
| 1882 | |
| 1883 /* aes counter mode */ | |
| 1884 iv.v32[0] = 0; | |
| 1885 iv.v32[1] = hdr->ssrc; /* still in network order */ | |
| 1886 #ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH | |
| 1887 iv.v64[1] = be64_to_cpu(make64((high32(est) << 16) | (low32(est) >> 16), | |
| 1888 low32(est) << 16)); | |
| 1889 #else | |
| 1890 iv.v64[1] = be64_to_cpu(est << 16); | |
| 1891 #endif | |
| 1892 status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtp_cipher, &iv, direction_decrypt); | |
| 1893 if (!status && stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher) { | |
| 1894 status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher, (uint8_t*)&iv, directio
n_decrypt); | |
| 1895 } | |
| 1896 } else { | |
| 1897 | |
| 1898 /* no particular format - set the iv to the pakcet index */ | |
| 1899 #ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH | |
| 1900 iv.v32[0] = 0; | |
| 1901 iv.v32[1] = 0; | |
| 1902 #else | |
| 1903 iv.v64[0] = 0; | |
| 1904 #endif | |
| 1905 iv.v64[1] = be64_to_cpu(est); | |
| 1906 status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtp_cipher, &iv, direction_decrypt); | |
| 1907 if (!status && stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher) { | |
| 1908 status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher, (uint8_t*)&iv, directio
n_decrypt); | |
| 1909 } | |
| 1910 } | |
| 1911 if (status) | |
| 1912 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 1913 | |
| 1914 /* shift est, put into network byte order */ | |
| 1915 #ifdef NO_64BIT_MATH | |
| 1916 est = be64_to_cpu(make64((high32(est) << 16) | | |
| 1917 (low32(est) >> 16), | |
| 1918 low32(est) << 16)); | |
| 1919 #else | |
| 1920 est = be64_to_cpu(est << 16); | |
| 1921 #endif | |
| 1922 | |
| 1923 /* | |
| 1924 * find starting point for decryption and length of data to be | |
| 1925 * decrypted - the encrypted portion starts after the rtp header | |
| 1926 * extension, if present; otherwise, it starts after the last csrc, | |
| 1927 * if any are present | |
| 1928 * | |
| 1929 * if we're not providing confidentiality, set enc_start to NULL | |
| 1930 */ | |
| 1931 if (stream->rtp_services & sec_serv_conf) { | |
| 1932 enc_start = (uint32_t *)hdr + uint32s_in_rtp_header + hdr->cc; | |
| 1933 if (hdr->x == 1) { | |
| 1934 xtn_hdr = (srtp_hdr_xtnd_t *)enc_start; | |
| 1935 enc_start += (ntohs(xtn_hdr->length) + 1); | |
| 1936 } | |
| 1937 if (!((uint8_t*)enc_start <= (uint8_t*)hdr + (*pkt_octet_len - tag_len))) | |
| 1938 return err_status_parse_err; | |
| 1939 enc_octet_len = (uint32_t)(*pkt_octet_len - tag_len - | |
| 1940 ((uint8_t*)enc_start - (uint8_t*)hdr)); | |
| 1941 } else { | |
| 1942 enc_start = NULL; | |
| 1943 } | |
| 1944 | |
| 1945 /* | |
| 1946 * if we're providing authentication, set the auth_start and auth_tag | |
| 1947 * pointers to the proper locations; otherwise, set auth_start to NULL | |
| 1948 * to indicate that no authentication is needed | |
| 1949 */ | |
| 1950 if (stream->rtp_services & sec_serv_auth) { | |
| 1951 auth_start = (uint32_t *)hdr; | |
| 1952 auth_tag = (uint8_t *)hdr + *pkt_octet_len - tag_len; | |
| 1953 } else { | |
| 1954 auth_start = NULL; | |
| 1955 auth_tag = NULL; | |
| 1956 } | |
| 1957 | |
| 1958 /* | |
| 1959 * if we expect message authentication, run the authentication | |
| 1960 * function and compare the result with the value of the auth_tag | |
| 1961 */ | |
| 1962 if (auth_start) { | |
| 1963 | |
| 1964 /* | |
| 1965 * if we're using a universal hash, then we need to compute the | |
| 1966 * keystream prefix for encrypting the universal hash output | |
| 1967 * | |
| 1968 * if the keystream prefix length is zero, then we know that | |
| 1969 * the authenticator isn't using a universal hash function | |
| 1970 */ | |
| 1971 if (stream->rtp_auth->prefix_len != 0) { | |
| 1972 | |
| 1973 prefix_len = auth_get_prefix_length(stream->rtp_auth); | |
| 1974 status = cipher_output(stream->rtp_cipher, tmp_tag, prefix_len); | |
| 1975 debug_print(mod_srtp, "keystream prefix: %s", | |
| 1976 octet_string_hex_string(tmp_tag, prefix_len)); | |
| 1977 if (status) | |
| 1978 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 1979 } | |
| 1980 | |
| 1981 /* initialize auth func context */ | |
| 1982 status = auth_start(stream->rtp_auth); | |
| 1983 if (status) return status; | |
| 1984 | |
| 1985 /* now compute auth function over packet */ | |
| 1986 status = auth_update(stream->rtp_auth, (uint8_t *)auth_start, | |
| 1987 *pkt_octet_len - tag_len); | |
| 1988 | |
| 1989 /* run auth func over ROC, then write tmp tag */ | |
| 1990 status = auth_compute(stream->rtp_auth, (uint8_t *)&est, 4, tmp_tag); | |
| 1991 | |
| 1992 debug_print(mod_srtp, "computed auth tag: %s", | |
| 1993 octet_string_hex_string(tmp_tag, tag_len)); | |
| 1994 debug_print(mod_srtp, "packet auth tag: %s", | |
| 1995 octet_string_hex_string(auth_tag, tag_len)); | |
| 1996 if (status) | |
| 1997 return err_status_auth_fail; | |
| 1998 | |
| 1999 if (octet_string_is_eq(tmp_tag, auth_tag, tag_len)) | |
| 2000 return err_status_auth_fail; | |
| 2001 } | |
| 2002 | |
| 2003 /* | |
| 2004 * update the key usage limit, and check it to make sure that we | |
| 2005 * didn't just hit either the soft limit or the hard limit, and call | |
| 2006 * the event handler if we hit either. | |
| 2007 */ | |
| 2008 switch(key_limit_update(stream->limit)) { | |
| 2009 case key_event_normal: | |
| 2010 break; | |
| 2011 case key_event_soft_limit: | |
| 2012 srtp_handle_event(ctx, stream, event_key_soft_limit); | |
| 2013 break; | |
| 2014 case key_event_hard_limit: | |
| 2015 srtp_handle_event(ctx, stream, event_key_hard_limit); | |
| 2016 return err_status_key_expired; | |
| 2017 default: | |
| 2018 break; | |
| 2019 } | |
| 2020 | |
| 2021 if (xtn_hdr && stream->rtp_xtn_hdr_cipher) { | |
| 2022 /* | |
| 2023 * extensions header encryption RFC 6904 | |
| 2024 */ | |
| 2025 status = srtp_process_header_encryption(stream, xtn_hdr); | |
| 2026 if (status) { | |
| 2027 return status; | |
| 2028 } | |
| 2029 } | |
| 2030 | |
| 2031 /* if we're decrypting, add keystream into ciphertext */ | |
| 2032 if (enc_start) { | |
| 2033 status = cipher_decrypt(stream->rtp_cipher, | |
| 2034 (uint8_t *)enc_start, &enc_octet_len); | |
| 2035 if (status) | |
| 2036 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 2037 } | |
| 2038 | |
| 2039 /* | |
| 2040 * verify that stream is for received traffic - this check will | |
| 2041 * detect SSRC collisions, since a stream that appears in both | |
| 2042 * srtp_protect() and srtp_unprotect() will fail this test in one of | |
| 2043 * those functions. | |
| 2044 * | |
| 2045 * we do this check *after* the authentication check, so that the | |
| 2046 * latter check will catch any attempts to fool us into thinking | |
| 2047 * that we've got a collision | |
| 2048 */ | |
| 2049 if (stream->direction != dir_srtp_receiver) { | |
| 2050 if (stream->direction == dir_unknown) { | |
| 2051 stream->direction = dir_srtp_receiver; | |
| 2052 } else { | |
| 2053 srtp_handle_event(ctx, stream, event_ssrc_collision); | |
| 2054 } | |
| 2055 } | |
| 2056 | |
| 2057 /* | |
| 2058 * if the stream is a 'provisional' one, in which the template context | |
| 2059 * is used, then we need to allocate a new stream at this point, since | |
| 2060 * the authentication passed | |
| 2061 */ | |
| 2062 if (stream == ctx->stream_template) { | |
| 2063 srtp_stream_ctx_t *new_stream; | |
| 2064 | |
| 2065 /* | |
| 2066 * allocate and initialize a new stream | |
| 2067 * | |
| 2068 * note that we indicate failure if we can't allocate the new | |
| 2069 * stream, and some implementations will want to not return | |
| 2070 * failure here | |
| 2071 */ | |
| 2072 status = srtp_stream_clone(ctx->stream_template, hdr->ssrc, &new_stream); | |
| 2073 if (status) | |
| 2074 return status; | |
| 2075 | |
| 2076 /* add new stream to the head of the stream_list */ | |
| 2077 new_stream->next = ctx->stream_list; | |
| 2078 ctx->stream_list = new_stream; | |
| 2079 | |
| 2080 /* set stream (the pointer used in this function) */ | |
| 2081 stream = new_stream; | |
| 2082 } | |
| 2083 | |
| 2084 /* | |
| 2085 * the message authentication function passed, so add the packet | |
| 2086 * index into the replay database | |
| 2087 */ | |
| 2088 rdbx_add_index(&stream->rtp_rdbx, delta); | |
| 2089 | |
| 2090 /* decrease the packet length by the length of the auth tag */ | |
| 2091 *pkt_octet_len -= tag_len; | |
| 2092 | |
| 2093 return err_status_ok; | |
| 2094 } | |
| 2095 | |
| 2096 err_status_t | |
| 2097 srtp_init() { | |
| 2098 err_status_t status; | |
| 2099 | |
| 2100 /* initialize crypto kernel */ | |
| 2101 status = crypto_kernel_init(); | |
| 2102 if (status) | |
| 2103 return status; | |
| 2104 | |
| 2105 /* load srtp debug module into the kernel */ | |
| 2106 status = crypto_kernel_load_debug_module(&mod_srtp); | |
| 2107 if (status) | |
| 2108 return status; | |
| 2109 | |
| 2110 return err_status_ok; | |
| 2111 } | |
| 2112 | |
| 2113 err_status_t | |
| 2114 srtp_shutdown() { | |
| 2115 err_status_t status; | |
| 2116 | |
| 2117 /* shut down crypto kernel */ | |
| 2118 status = crypto_kernel_shutdown(); | |
| 2119 if (status) | |
| 2120 return status; | |
| 2121 | |
| 2122 /* shutting down crypto kernel frees the srtp debug module as well */ | |
| 2123 | |
| 2124 return err_status_ok; | |
| 2125 } | |
| 2126 | |
| 2127 | |
| 2128 /* | |
| 2129 * The following code is under consideration for removal. See | |
| 2130 * SRTP_MAX_TRAILER_LEN | |
| 2131 */ | |
| 2132 #if 0 | |
| 2133 | |
| 2134 /* | |
| 2135 * srtp_get_trailer_length(&a) returns the number of octets that will | |
| 2136 * be added to an RTP packet by the SRTP processing. This value | |
| 2137 * is constant for a given srtp_stream_t (i.e. between initializations). | |
| 2138 */ | |
| 2139 | |
| 2140 int | |
| 2141 srtp_get_trailer_length(const srtp_stream_t s) { | |
| 2142 return auth_get_tag_length(s->rtp_auth); | |
| 2143 } | |
| 2144 | |
| 2145 #endif | |
| 2146 | |
| 2147 /* | |
| 2148 * srtp_get_stream(ssrc) returns a pointer to the stream corresponding | |
| 2149 * to ssrc, or NULL if no stream exists for that ssrc | |
| 2150 * | |
| 2151 * this is an internal function | |
| 2152 */ | |
| 2153 | |
| 2154 srtp_stream_ctx_t * | |
| 2155 srtp_get_stream(srtp_t srtp, uint32_t ssrc) { | |
| 2156 srtp_stream_ctx_t *stream; | |
| 2157 | |
| 2158 /* walk down list until ssrc is found */ | |
| 2159 stream = srtp->stream_list; | |
| 2160 while (stream != NULL) { | |
| 2161 if (stream->ssrc == ssrc) | |
| 2162 return stream; | |
| 2163 stream = stream->next; | |
| 2164 } | |
| 2165 | |
| 2166 /* we haven't found our ssrc, so return a null */ | |
| 2167 return NULL; | |
| 2168 } | |
| 2169 | |
| 2170 err_status_t | |
| 2171 srtp_dealloc(srtp_t session) { | |
| 2172 srtp_stream_ctx_t *stream; | |
| 2173 err_status_t status; | |
| 2174 | |
| 2175 /* | |
| 2176 * we take a conservative deallocation strategy - if we encounter an | |
| 2177 * error deallocating a stream, then we stop trying to deallocate | |
| 2178 * memory and just return an error | |
| 2179 */ | |
| 2180 | |
| 2181 /* walk list of streams, deallocating as we go */ | |
| 2182 stream = session->stream_list; | |
| 2183 while (stream != NULL) { | |
| 2184 srtp_stream_t next = stream->next; | |
| 2185 status = srtp_stream_dealloc(session, stream); | |
| 2186 if (status) | |
| 2187 return status; | |
| 2188 stream = next; | |
| 2189 } | |
| 2190 | |
| 2191 /* deallocate stream template, if there is one */ | |
| 2192 if (session->stream_template != NULL) { | |
| 2193 status = auth_dealloc(session->stream_template->rtcp_auth); | |
| 2194 if (status) | |
| 2195 return status; | |
| 2196 status = cipher_dealloc(session->stream_template->rtcp_cipher); | |
| 2197 if (status) | |
| 2198 return status; | |
| 2199 crypto_free(session->stream_template->limit); | |
| 2200 status = cipher_dealloc(session->stream_template->rtp_cipher); | |
| 2201 if (status) | |
| 2202 return status; | |
| 2203 status = auth_dealloc(session->stream_template->rtp_auth); | |
| 2204 if (status) | |
| 2205 return status; | |
| 2206 status = rdbx_dealloc(&session->stream_template->rtp_rdbx); | |
| 2207 if (status) | |
| 2208 return status; | |
| 2209 crypto_free(session->stream_template); | |
| 2210 } | |
| 2211 | |
| 2212 /* deallocate session context */ | |
| 2213 crypto_free(session); | |
| 2214 | |
| 2215 return err_status_ok; | |
| 2216 } | |
| 2217 | |
| 2218 | |
| 2219 err_status_t | |
| 2220 srtp_add_stream(srtp_t session, | |
| 2221 const srtp_policy_t *policy) { | |
| 2222 err_status_t status; | |
| 2223 srtp_stream_t tmp; | |
| 2224 | |
| 2225 /* sanity check arguments */ | |
| 2226 if ((session == NULL) || (policy == NULL) || (policy->key == NULL)) | |
| 2227 return err_status_bad_param; | |
| 2228 | |
| 2229 /* allocate stream */ | |
| 2230 status = srtp_stream_alloc(&tmp, policy); | |
| 2231 if (status) { | |
| 2232 return status; | |
| 2233 } | |
| 2234 | |
| 2235 /* initialize stream */ | |
| 2236 status = srtp_stream_init(tmp, policy); | |
| 2237 if (status) { | |
| 2238 crypto_free(tmp); | |
| 2239 return status; | |
| 2240 } | |
| 2241 | |
| 2242 /* | |
| 2243 * set the head of the stream list or the template to point to the | |
| 2244 * stream that we've just alloced and init'ed, depending on whether | |
| 2245 * or not it has a wildcard SSRC value or not | |
| 2246 * | |
| 2247 * if the template stream has already been set, then the policy is | |
| 2248 * inconsistent, so we return a bad_param error code | |
| 2249 */ | |
| 2250 switch (policy->ssrc.type) { | |
| 2251 case (ssrc_any_outbound): | |
| 2252 if (session->stream_template) { | |
| 2253 return err_status_bad_param; | |
| 2254 } | |
| 2255 session->stream_template = tmp; | |
| 2256 session->stream_template->direction = dir_srtp_sender; | |
| 2257 break; | |
| 2258 case (ssrc_any_inbound): | |
| 2259 if (session->stream_template) { | |
| 2260 return err_status_bad_param; | |
| 2261 } | |
| 2262 session->stream_template = tmp; | |
| 2263 session->stream_template->direction = dir_srtp_receiver; | |
| 2264 break; | |
| 2265 case (ssrc_specific): | |
| 2266 tmp->next = session->stream_list; | |
| 2267 session->stream_list = tmp; | |
| 2268 break; | |
| 2269 case (ssrc_undefined): | |
| 2270 default: | |
| 2271 crypto_free(tmp); | |
| 2272 return err_status_bad_param; | |
| 2273 } | |
| 2274 | |
| 2275 return err_status_ok; | |
| 2276 } | |
| 2277 | |
| 2278 | |
| 2279 err_status_t | |
| 2280 srtp_create(srtp_t *session, /* handle for session */ | |
| 2281 const srtp_policy_t *policy) { /* SRTP policy (list) */ | |
| 2282 err_status_t stat; | |
| 2283 srtp_ctx_t *ctx; | |
| 2284 | |
| 2285 /* sanity check arguments */ | |
| 2286 if (session == NULL) | |
| 2287 return err_status_bad_param; | |
| 2288 | |
| 2289 /* allocate srtp context and set ctx_ptr */ | |
| 2290 ctx = (srtp_ctx_t *) crypto_alloc(sizeof(srtp_ctx_t)); | |
| 2291 if (ctx == NULL) | |
| 2292 return err_status_alloc_fail; | |
| 2293 *session = ctx; | |
| 2294 | |
| 2295 /* | |
| 2296 * loop over elements in the policy list, allocating and | |
| 2297 * initializing a stream for each element | |
| 2298 */ | |
| 2299 ctx->stream_template = NULL; | |
| 2300 ctx->stream_list = NULL; | |
| 2301 ctx->user_data = NULL; | |
| 2302 while (policy != NULL) { | |
| 2303 | |
| 2304 stat = srtp_add_stream(ctx, policy); | |
| 2305 if (stat) { | |
| 2306 /* clean up everything */ | |
| 2307 srtp_dealloc(*session); | |
| 2308 return stat; | |
| 2309 } | |
| 2310 | |
| 2311 /* set policy to next item in list */ | |
| 2312 policy = policy->next; | |
| 2313 } | |
| 2314 | |
| 2315 return err_status_ok; | |
| 2316 } | |
| 2317 | |
| 2318 | |
| 2319 err_status_t | |
| 2320 srtp_remove_stream(srtp_t session, uint32_t ssrc) { | |
| 2321 srtp_stream_ctx_t *stream, *last_stream; | |
| 2322 err_status_t status; | |
| 2323 | |
| 2324 /* sanity check arguments */ | |
| 2325 if (session == NULL) | |
| 2326 return err_status_bad_param; | |
| 2327 | |
| 2328 /* find stream in list; complain if not found */ | |
| 2329 last_stream = stream = session->stream_list; | |
| 2330 while ((stream != NULL) && (ssrc != stream->ssrc)) { | |
| 2331 last_stream = stream; | |
| 2332 stream = stream->next; | |
| 2333 } | |
| 2334 if (stream == NULL) | |
| 2335 return err_status_no_ctx; | |
| 2336 | |
| 2337 /* remove stream from the list */ | |
| 2338 if (last_stream == stream) | |
| 2339 /* stream was first in list */ | |
| 2340 session->stream_list = stream->next; | |
| 2341 else | |
| 2342 last_stream->next = stream->next; | |
| 2343 | |
| 2344 /* deallocate the stream */ | |
| 2345 status = srtp_stream_dealloc(session, stream); | |
| 2346 if (status) | |
| 2347 return status; | |
| 2348 | |
| 2349 return err_status_ok; | |
| 2350 } | |
| 2351 | |
| 2352 | |
| 2353 /* | |
| 2354 * the default policy - provides a convenient way for callers to use | |
| 2355 * the default security policy | |
| 2356 * | |
| 2357 * this policy is that defined in the current SRTP internet draft. | |
| 2358 * | |
| 2359 */ | |
| 2360 | |
| 2361 /* | |
| 2362 * NOTE: cipher_key_len is really key len (128 bits) plus salt len | |
| 2363 * (112 bits) | |
| 2364 */ | |
| 2365 /* There are hard-coded 16's for base_key_len in the key generation code */ | |
| 2366 | |
| 2367 void | |
| 2368 crypto_policy_set_rtp_default(crypto_policy_t *p) { | |
| 2369 | |
| 2370 p->cipher_type = AES_ICM; | |
| 2371 p->cipher_key_len = 30; /* default 128 bits per RFC 3711 */ | |
| 2372 p->auth_type = HMAC_SHA1; | |
| 2373 p->auth_key_len = 20; /* default 160 bits per RFC 3711 */ | |
| 2374 p->auth_tag_len = 10; /* default 80 bits per RFC 3711 */ | |
| 2375 p->sec_serv = sec_serv_conf_and_auth; | |
| 2376 | |
| 2377 } | |
| 2378 | |
| 2379 void | |
| 2380 crypto_policy_set_rtcp_default(crypto_policy_t *p) { | |
| 2381 | |
| 2382 p->cipher_type = AES_ICM; | |
| 2383 p->cipher_key_len = 30; /* default 128 bits per RFC 3711 */ | |
| 2384 p->auth_type = HMAC_SHA1; | |
| 2385 p->auth_key_len = 20; /* default 160 bits per RFC 3711 */ | |
| 2386 p->auth_tag_len = 10; /* default 80 bits per RFC 3711 */ | |
| 2387 p->sec_serv = sec_serv_conf_and_auth; | |
| 2388 | |
| 2389 } | |
| 2390 | |
| 2391 void | |
| 2392 crypto_policy_set_aes_cm_128_hmac_sha1_32(crypto_policy_t *p) { | |
| 2393 | |
| 2394 /* | |
| 2395 * corresponds to RFC 4568 | |
| 2396 * | |
| 2397 * note that this crypto policy is intended for SRTP, but not SRTCP | |
| 2398 */ | |
| 2399 | |
| 2400 p->cipher_type = AES_ICM; | |
| 2401 p->cipher_key_len = 30; /* 128 bit key, 112 bit salt */ | |
| 2402 p->auth_type = HMAC_SHA1; | |
| 2403 p->auth_key_len = 20; /* 160 bit key */ | |
| 2404 p->auth_tag_len = 4; /* 32 bit tag */ | |
| 2405 p->sec_serv = sec_serv_conf_and_auth; | |
| 2406 | |
| 2407 } | |
| 2408 | |
| 2409 | |
| 2410 void | |
| 2411 crypto_policy_set_aes_cm_128_null_auth(crypto_policy_t *p) { | |
| 2412 | |
| 2413 /* | |
| 2414 * corresponds to RFC 4568 | |
| 2415 * | |
| 2416 * note that this crypto policy is intended for SRTP, but not SRTCP | |
| 2417 */ | |
| 2418 | |
| 2419 p->cipher_type = AES_ICM; | |
| 2420 p->cipher_key_len = 30; /* 128 bit key, 112 bit salt */ | |
| 2421 p->auth_type = NULL_AUTH; | |
| 2422 p->auth_key_len = 0; | |
| 2423 p->auth_tag_len = 0; | |
| 2424 p->sec_serv = sec_serv_conf; | |
| 2425 | |
| 2426 } | |
| 2427 | |
| 2428 | |
| 2429 void | |
| 2430 crypto_policy_set_null_cipher_hmac_sha1_80(crypto_policy_t *p) { | |
| 2431 | |
| 2432 /* | |
| 2433 * corresponds to RFC 4568 | |
| 2434 */ | |
| 2435 | |
| 2436 p->cipher_type = NULL_CIPHER; | |
| 2437 p->cipher_key_len = 0; | |
| 2438 p->auth_type = HMAC_SHA1; | |
| 2439 p->auth_key_len = 20; | |
| 2440 p->auth_tag_len = 10; | |
| 2441 p->sec_serv = sec_serv_auth; | |
| 2442 | |
| 2443 } | |
| 2444 | |
| 2445 | |
| 2446 void | |
| 2447 crypto_policy_set_aes_cm_256_hmac_sha1_80(crypto_policy_t *p) { | |
| 2448 | |
| 2449 /* | |
| 2450 * corresponds to draft-ietf-avt-big-aes-03.txt | |
| 2451 */ | |
| 2452 | |
| 2453 p->cipher_type = AES_ICM; | |
| 2454 p->cipher_key_len = 46; | |
| 2455 p->auth_type = HMAC_SHA1; | |
| 2456 p->auth_key_len = 20; /* default 160 bits per RFC 3711 */ | |
| 2457 p->auth_tag_len = 10; /* default 80 bits per RFC 3711 */ | |
| 2458 p->sec_serv = sec_serv_conf_and_auth; | |
| 2459 } | |
| 2460 | |
| 2461 | |
| 2462 void | |
| 2463 crypto_policy_set_aes_cm_256_hmac_sha1_32(crypto_policy_t *p) { | |
| 2464 | |
| 2465 /* | |
| 2466 * corresponds to draft-ietf-avt-big-aes-03.txt | |
| 2467 * | |
| 2468 * note that this crypto policy is intended for SRTP, but not SRTCP | |
| 2469 */ | |
| 2470 | |
| 2471 p->cipher_type = AES_ICM; | |
| 2472 p->cipher_key_len = 46; | |
| 2473 p->auth_type = HMAC_SHA1; | |
| 2474 p->auth_key_len = 20; /* default 160 bits per RFC 3711 */ | |
| 2475 p->auth_tag_len = 4; /* default 80 bits per RFC 3711 */ | |
| 2476 p->sec_serv = sec_serv_conf_and_auth; | |
| 2477 } | |
| 2478 | |
| 2479 /* | |
| 2480 * AES-256 with no authentication. | |
| 2481 */ | |
| 2482 void | |
| 2483 crypto_policy_set_aes_cm_256_null_auth (crypto_policy_t *p) | |
| 2484 { | |
| 2485 p->cipher_type = AES_ICM; | |
| 2486 p->cipher_key_len = 46; | |
| 2487 p->auth_type = NULL_AUTH; | |
| 2488 p->auth_key_len = 0; | |
| 2489 p->auth_tag_len = 0; | |
| 2490 p->sec_serv = sec_serv_conf; | |
| 2491 } | |
| 2492 | |
| 2493 #ifdef OPENSSL | |
| 2494 /* | |
| 2495 * AES-128 GCM mode with 8 octet auth tag. | |
| 2496 */ | |
| 2497 void | |
| 2498 crypto_policy_set_aes_gcm_128_8_auth(crypto_policy_t *p) { | |
| 2499 p->cipher_type = AES_128_GCM; | |
| 2500 p->cipher_key_len = AES_128_GCM_KEYSIZE_WSALT; | |
| 2501 p->auth_type = NULL_AUTH; /* GCM handles the auth for us */ | |
| 2502 p->auth_key_len = 0; | |
| 2503 p->auth_tag_len = 8; /* 8 octet tag length */ | |
| 2504 p->sec_serv = sec_serv_conf_and_auth; | |
| 2505 } | |
| 2506 | |
| 2507 /* | |
| 2508 * AES-256 GCM mode with 8 octet auth tag. | |
| 2509 */ | |
| 2510 void | |
| 2511 crypto_policy_set_aes_gcm_256_8_auth(crypto_policy_t *p) { | |
| 2512 p->cipher_type = AES_256_GCM; | |
| 2513 p->cipher_key_len = AES_256_GCM_KEYSIZE_WSALT; | |
| 2514 p->auth_type = NULL_AUTH; /* GCM handles the auth for us */ | |
| 2515 p->auth_key_len = 0; | |
| 2516 p->auth_tag_len = 8; /* 8 octet tag length */ | |
| 2517 p->sec_serv = sec_serv_conf_and_auth; | |
| 2518 } | |
| 2519 | |
| 2520 /* | |
| 2521 * AES-128 GCM mode with 8 octet auth tag, no RTCP encryption. | |
| 2522 */ | |
| 2523 void | |
| 2524 crypto_policy_set_aes_gcm_128_8_only_auth(crypto_policy_t *p) { | |
| 2525 p->cipher_type = AES_128_GCM; | |
| 2526 p->cipher_key_len = AES_128_GCM_KEYSIZE_WSALT; | |
| 2527 p->auth_type = NULL_AUTH; /* GCM handles the auth for us */ | |
| 2528 p->auth_key_len = 0; | |
| 2529 p->auth_tag_len = 8; /* 8 octet tag length */ | |
| 2530 p->sec_serv = sec_serv_auth; /* This only applies to RTCP */ | |
| 2531 } | |
| 2532 | |
| 2533 /* | |
| 2534 * AES-256 GCM mode with 8 octet auth tag, no RTCP encryption. | |
| 2535 */ | |
| 2536 void | |
| 2537 crypto_policy_set_aes_gcm_256_8_only_auth(crypto_policy_t *p) { | |
| 2538 p->cipher_type = AES_256_GCM; | |
| 2539 p->cipher_key_len = AES_256_GCM_KEYSIZE_WSALT; | |
| 2540 p->auth_type = NULL_AUTH; /* GCM handles the auth for us */ | |
| 2541 p->auth_key_len = 0; | |
| 2542 p->auth_tag_len = 8; /* 8 octet tag length */ | |
| 2543 p->sec_serv = sec_serv_auth; /* This only applies to RTCP */ | |
| 2544 } | |
| 2545 | |
| 2546 /* | |
| 2547 * AES-128 GCM mode with 16 octet auth tag. | |
| 2548 */ | |
| 2549 void | |
| 2550 crypto_policy_set_aes_gcm_128_16_auth(crypto_policy_t *p) { | |
| 2551 p->cipher_type = AES_128_GCM; | |
| 2552 p->cipher_key_len = AES_128_GCM_KEYSIZE_WSALT; | |
| 2553 p->auth_type = NULL_AUTH; /* GCM handles the auth for us */ | |
| 2554 p->auth_key_len = 0; | |
| 2555 p->auth_tag_len = 16; /* 16 octet tag length */ | |
| 2556 p->sec_serv = sec_serv_conf_and_auth; | |
| 2557 } | |
| 2558 | |
| 2559 /* | |
| 2560 * AES-256 GCM mode with 16 octet auth tag. | |
| 2561 */ | |
| 2562 void | |
| 2563 crypto_policy_set_aes_gcm_256_16_auth(crypto_policy_t *p) { | |
| 2564 p->cipher_type = AES_256_GCM; | |
| 2565 p->cipher_key_len = AES_256_GCM_KEYSIZE_WSALT; | |
| 2566 p->auth_type = NULL_AUTH; /* GCM handles the auth for us */ | |
| 2567 p->auth_key_len = 0; | |
| 2568 p->auth_tag_len = 16; /* 16 octet tag length */ | |
| 2569 p->sec_serv = sec_serv_conf_and_auth; | |
| 2570 } | |
| 2571 | |
| 2572 #endif | |
| 2573 | |
| 2574 /* | |
| 2575 * secure rtcp functions | |
| 2576 */ | |
| 2577 | |
| 2578 /* | |
| 2579 * AEAD uses a new IV formation method. This function implements | |
| 2580 * section 10.1 from draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-aes-gcm-07.txt. The | |
| 2581 * calculation is defined as, where (+) is the xor operation: | |
| 2582 * | |
| 2583 * 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 | |
| 2584 * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ | |
| 2585 * |00|00| SSRC |00|00|0+SRTCP Idx|---+ | |
| 2586 * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ | | |
| 2587 * | | |
| 2588 * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ | | |
| 2589 * | Encryption Salt |->(+) | |
| 2590 * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ | | |
| 2591 * | | |
| 2592 * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ | | |
| 2593 * | Initialization Vector |<--+ | |
| 2594 * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+* | |
| 2595 * | |
| 2596 * Input: *stream - pointer to SRTP stream context, used to retrieve | |
| 2597 * the SALT | |
| 2598 * *iv - Pointer to recieve the calculated IV | |
| 2599 * seq_num - The SEQ value to use for the IV calculation. | |
| 2600 * *hdr - The RTP header, used to get the SSRC value | |
| 2601 * | |
| 2602 */ | |
| 2603 static void srtp_calc_aead_iv_srtcp(srtp_stream_ctx_t *stream, v128_t *iv, | |
| 2604 uint32_t seq_num, srtcp_hdr_t *hdr) | |
| 2605 { | |
| 2606 v128_t in; | |
| 2607 v128_t salt; | |
| 2608 | |
| 2609 memset(&in, 0, sizeof(v128_t)); | |
| 2610 memset(&salt, 0, sizeof(v128_t)); | |
| 2611 | |
| 2612 in.v16[0] = 0; | |
| 2613 memcpy(&in.v16[1], &hdr->ssrc, 4); /* still in network order! */ | |
| 2614 in.v16[3] = 0; | |
| 2615 in.v32[2] = 0x7FFFFFFF & htonl(seq_num); /* bit 32 is suppose to be zero */ | |
| 2616 | |
| 2617 debug_print(mod_srtp, "Pre-salted RTCP IV = %s\n", v128_hex_string(&in)); | |
| 2618 | |
| 2619 /* | |
| 2620 * Get the SALT value from the context | |
| 2621 */ | |
| 2622 memcpy(salt.v8, stream->c_salt, 12); | |
| 2623 debug_print(mod_srtp, "RTCP SALT = %s\n", v128_hex_string(&salt)); | |
| 2624 | |
| 2625 /* | |
| 2626 * Finally, apply the SALT to the input | |
| 2627 */ | |
| 2628 v128_xor(iv, &in, &salt); | |
| 2629 } | |
| 2630 | |
| 2631 /* | |
| 2632 * This code handles AEAD ciphers for outgoing RTCP. We currently support | |
| 2633 * AES-GCM mode with 128 or 256 bit keys. | |
| 2634 */ | |
| 2635 static err_status_t | |
| 2636 srtp_protect_rtcp_aead (srtp_t ctx, srtp_stream_ctx_t *stream, | |
| 2637 void *rtcp_hdr, unsigned int *pkt_octet_len) | |
| 2638 { | |
| 2639 srtcp_hdr_t *hdr = (srtcp_hdr_t*)rtcp_hdr; | |
| 2640 uint32_t *enc_start; /* pointer to start of encrypted portion */ | |
| 2641 uint32_t *trailer; /* pointer to start of trailer */ | |
| 2642 unsigned int enc_octet_len = 0; /* number of octets in encrypted portion */ | |
| 2643 uint8_t *auth_tag = NULL; /* location of auth_tag within packet */ | |
| 2644 err_status_t status; | |
| 2645 int tag_len; | |
| 2646 uint32_t seq_num; | |
| 2647 v128_t iv; | |
| 2648 uint32_t tseq; | |
| 2649 | |
| 2650 /* get tag length from stream context */ | |
| 2651 tag_len = auth_get_tag_length(stream->rtcp_auth); | |
| 2652 | |
| 2653 /* | |
| 2654 * set encryption start and encryption length - if we're not | |
| 2655 * providing confidentiality, set enc_start to NULL | |
| 2656 */ | |
| 2657 enc_start = (uint32_t*)hdr + uint32s_in_rtcp_header; | |
| 2658 enc_octet_len = *pkt_octet_len - octets_in_rtcp_header; | |
| 2659 | |
| 2660 /* NOTE: hdr->length is not usable - it refers to only the first | |
| 2661 RTCP report in the compound packet! */ | |
| 2662 /* NOTE: trailer is 32-bit aligned because RTCP 'packets' are always | |
| 2663 multiples of 32-bits (RFC 3550 6.1) */ | |
| 2664 trailer = (uint32_t*)((char*)enc_start + enc_octet_len + tag_len); | |
| 2665 | |
| 2666 if (stream->rtcp_services & sec_serv_conf) { | |
| 2667 *trailer = htonl(SRTCP_E_BIT); /* set encrypt bit */ | |
| 2668 } else { | |
| 2669 enc_start = NULL; | |
| 2670 enc_octet_len = 0; | |
| 2671 /* 0 is network-order independant */ | |
| 2672 *trailer = 0x00000000; /* set encrypt bit */ | |
| 2673 } | |
| 2674 | |
| 2675 /* | |
| 2676 * set the auth_tag pointer to the proper location, which is after | |
| 2677 * the payload, but before the trailer | |
| 2678 * (note that srtpc *always* provides authentication, unlike srtp) | |
| 2679 */ | |
| 2680 /* Note: This would need to change for optional mikey data */ | |
| 2681 auth_tag = (uint8_t*)hdr + *pkt_octet_len; | |
| 2682 | |
| 2683 /* | |
| 2684 * check sequence number for overruns, and copy it into the packet | |
| 2685 * if its value isn't too big | |
| 2686 */ | |
| 2687 status = rdb_increment(&stream->rtcp_rdb); | |
| 2688 if (status) { | |
| 2689 return status; | |
| 2690 } | |
| 2691 seq_num = rdb_get_value(&stream->rtcp_rdb); | |
| 2692 *trailer |= htonl(seq_num); | |
| 2693 debug_print(mod_srtp, "srtcp index: %x", seq_num); | |
| 2694 | |
| 2695 /* | |
| 2696 * Calculating the IV and pass it down to the cipher | |
| 2697 */ | |
| 2698 srtp_calc_aead_iv_srtcp(stream, &iv, seq_num, hdr); | |
| 2699 status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtcp_cipher, &iv, direction_encrypt); | |
| 2700 if (status) { | |
| 2701 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 2702 } | |
| 2703 | |
| 2704 /* | |
| 2705 * Set the AAD for GCM mode | |
| 2706 */ | |
| 2707 if (enc_start) { | |
| 2708 /* | |
| 2709 * If payload encryption is enabled, then the AAD consist of | |
| 2710 * the RTCP header and the seq# at the end of the packet | |
| 2711 */ | |
| 2712 status = cipher_set_aad(stream->rtcp_cipher, (uint8_t*)hdr, | |
| 2713 octets_in_rtcp_header); | |
| 2714 if (status) { | |
| 2715 return ( err_status_cipher_fail); | |
| 2716 } | |
| 2717 } else { | |
| 2718 /* | |
| 2719 * Since payload encryption is not enabled, we must authenticate | |
| 2720 * the entire packet as described in section 10.3 in revision 07 | |
| 2721 * of the draft. | |
| 2722 */ | |
| 2723 status = cipher_set_aad(stream->rtcp_cipher, (uint8_t*)hdr, | |
| 2724 *pkt_octet_len); | |
| 2725 if (status) { | |
| 2726 return ( err_status_cipher_fail); | |
| 2727 } | |
| 2728 } | |
| 2729 /* | |
| 2730 * Process the sequence# as AAD | |
| 2731 */ | |
| 2732 tseq = *trailer; | |
| 2733 status = cipher_set_aad(stream->rtcp_cipher, (uint8_t*)&tseq, | |
| 2734 sizeof(srtcp_trailer_t)); | |
| 2735 if (status) { | |
| 2736 return ( err_status_cipher_fail); | |
| 2737 } | |
| 2738 | |
| 2739 /* if we're encrypting, exor keystream into the message */ | |
| 2740 if (enc_start) { | |
| 2741 status = cipher_encrypt(stream->rtcp_cipher, | |
| 2742 (uint8_t*)enc_start, &enc_octet_len); | |
| 2743 if (status) { | |
| 2744 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 2745 } | |
| 2746 /* | |
| 2747 * Get the tag and append that to the output | |
| 2748 */ | |
| 2749 status = cipher_get_tag(stream->rtcp_cipher, (uint8_t*)auth_tag, | |
| 2750 &tag_len); | |
| 2751 if (status) { | |
| 2752 return ( err_status_cipher_fail); | |
| 2753 } | |
| 2754 enc_octet_len += tag_len; | |
| 2755 } else { | |
| 2756 /* | |
| 2757 * Even though we're not encrypting the payload, we need | |
| 2758 * to run the cipher to get the auth tag. | |
| 2759 */ | |
| 2760 unsigned int nolen = 0; | |
| 2761 status = cipher_encrypt(stream->rtcp_cipher, NULL, &nolen); | |
| 2762 if (status) { | |
| 2763 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 2764 } | |
| 2765 /* | |
| 2766 * Get the tag and append that to the output | |
| 2767 */ | |
| 2768 status = cipher_get_tag(stream->rtcp_cipher, (uint8_t*)auth_tag, | |
| 2769 &tag_len); | |
| 2770 if (status) { | |
| 2771 return ( err_status_cipher_fail); | |
| 2772 } | |
| 2773 enc_octet_len += tag_len; | |
| 2774 } | |
| 2775 | |
| 2776 /* increase the packet length by the length of the auth tag and seq_num*/ | |
| 2777 *pkt_octet_len += (tag_len + sizeof(srtcp_trailer_t)); | |
| 2778 | |
| 2779 return err_status_ok; | |
| 2780 } | |
| 2781 | |
| 2782 /* | |
| 2783 * This function handles incoming SRTCP packets while in AEAD mode, | |
| 2784 * which currently supports AES-GCM encryption. Note, the auth tag is | |
| 2785 * at the end of the packet stream and is automatically checked by GCM | |
| 2786 * when decrypting the payload. | |
| 2787 */ | |
| 2788 static err_status_t | |
| 2789 srtp_unprotect_rtcp_aead (srtp_t ctx, srtp_stream_ctx_t *stream, | |
| 2790 void *srtcp_hdr, unsigned int *pkt_octet_len) | |
| 2791 { | |
| 2792 srtcp_hdr_t *hdr = (srtcp_hdr_t*)srtcp_hdr; | |
| 2793 uint32_t *enc_start; /* pointer to start of encrypted portion */ | |
| 2794 uint32_t *trailer; /* pointer to start of trailer */ | |
| 2795 unsigned int enc_octet_len = 0; /* number of octets in encrypted portion */ | |
| 2796 uint8_t *auth_tag = NULL; /* location of auth_tag within packet */ | |
| 2797 err_status_t status; | |
| 2798 int tag_len; | |
| 2799 unsigned int tmp_len; | |
| 2800 uint32_t seq_num; | |
| 2801 v128_t iv; | |
| 2802 uint32_t tseq; | |
| 2803 | |
| 2804 /* get tag length from stream context */ | |
| 2805 tag_len = auth_get_tag_length(stream->rtcp_auth); | |
| 2806 | |
| 2807 /* | |
| 2808 * set encryption start, encryption length, and trailer | |
| 2809 */ | |
| 2810 /* index & E (encryption) bit follow normal data. hdr->len | |
| 2811 is the number of words (32-bit) in the normal packet minus 1 */ | |
| 2812 /* This should point trailer to the word past the end of the | |
| 2813 normal data. */ | |
| 2814 /* This would need to be modified for optional mikey data */ | |
| 2815 /* | |
| 2816 * NOTE: trailer is 32-bit aligned because RTCP 'packets' are always | |
| 2817 * multiples of 32-bits (RFC 3550 6.1) | |
| 2818 */ | |
| 2819 trailer = (uint32_t*)((char*)hdr + *pkt_octet_len - sizeof(srtcp_trailer_t))
; | |
| 2820 /* | |
| 2821 * We pass the tag down to the cipher when doing GCM mode | |
| 2822 */ | |
| 2823 enc_octet_len = *pkt_octet_len - (octets_in_rtcp_header + | |
| 2824 sizeof(srtcp_trailer_t)); | |
| 2825 auth_tag = (uint8_t*)hdr + *pkt_octet_len - tag_len - sizeof(srtcp_trailer_t
); | |
| 2826 | |
| 2827 if (*((unsigned char*)trailer) & SRTCP_E_BYTE_BIT) { | |
| 2828 enc_start = (uint32_t*)hdr + uint32s_in_rtcp_header; | |
| 2829 } else { | |
| 2830 enc_octet_len = 0; | |
| 2831 enc_start = NULL; /* this indicates that there's no encryption */ | |
| 2832 } | |
| 2833 | |
| 2834 /* | |
| 2835 * check the sequence number for replays | |
| 2836 */ | |
| 2837 /* this is easier than dealing with bitfield access */ | |
| 2838 seq_num = ntohl(*trailer) & SRTCP_INDEX_MASK; | |
| 2839 debug_print(mod_srtp, "srtcp index: %x", seq_num); | |
| 2840 status = rdb_check(&stream->rtcp_rdb, seq_num); | |
| 2841 if (status) { | |
| 2842 return status; | |
| 2843 } | |
| 2844 | |
| 2845 /* | |
| 2846 * Calculate and set the IV | |
| 2847 */ | |
| 2848 srtp_calc_aead_iv_srtcp(stream, &iv, seq_num, hdr); | |
| 2849 status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtcp_cipher, &iv, direction_decrypt); | |
| 2850 if (status) { | |
| 2851 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 2852 } | |
| 2853 | |
| 2854 /* | |
| 2855 * Set the AAD for GCM mode | |
| 2856 */ | |
| 2857 if (enc_start) { | |
| 2858 /* | |
| 2859 * If payload encryption is enabled, then the AAD consist of | |
| 2860 * the RTCP header and the seq# at the end of the packet | |
| 2861 */ | |
| 2862 status = cipher_set_aad(stream->rtcp_cipher, (uint8_t*)hdr, | |
| 2863 octets_in_rtcp_header); | |
| 2864 if (status) { | |
| 2865 return ( err_status_cipher_fail); | |
| 2866 } | |
| 2867 } else { | |
| 2868 /* | |
| 2869 * Since payload encryption is not enabled, we must authenticate | |
| 2870 * the entire packet as described in section 10.3 in revision 07 | |
| 2871 * of the draft. | |
| 2872 */ | |
| 2873 status = cipher_set_aad(stream->rtcp_cipher, (uint8_t*)hdr, | |
| 2874 (*pkt_octet_len - tag_len - sizeof(srtcp_trailer_
t))); | |
| 2875 if (status) { | |
| 2876 return ( err_status_cipher_fail); | |
| 2877 } | |
| 2878 } | |
| 2879 | |
| 2880 /* | |
| 2881 * Process the sequence# as AAD | |
| 2882 */ | |
| 2883 tseq = *trailer; | |
| 2884 status = cipher_set_aad(stream->rtcp_cipher, (uint8_t*)&tseq, | |
| 2885 sizeof(srtcp_trailer_t)); | |
| 2886 if (status) { | |
| 2887 return ( err_status_cipher_fail); | |
| 2888 } | |
| 2889 | |
| 2890 /* if we're decrypting, exor keystream into the message */ | |
| 2891 if (enc_start) { | |
| 2892 status = cipher_decrypt(stream->rtcp_cipher, | |
| 2893 (uint8_t*)enc_start, &enc_octet_len); | |
| 2894 if (status) { | |
| 2895 return status; | |
| 2896 } | |
| 2897 } else { | |
| 2898 /* | |
| 2899 * Still need to run the cipher to check the tag | |
| 2900 */ | |
| 2901 tmp_len = tag_len; | |
| 2902 status = cipher_decrypt(stream->rtcp_cipher, (uint8_t*)auth_tag, | |
| 2903 &tmp_len); | |
| 2904 if (status) { | |
| 2905 return status; | |
| 2906 } | |
| 2907 } | |
| 2908 | |
| 2909 /* decrease the packet length by the length of the auth tag and seq_num*/ | |
| 2910 *pkt_octet_len -= (tag_len + sizeof(srtcp_trailer_t)); | |
| 2911 | |
| 2912 /* | |
| 2913 * verify that stream is for received traffic - this check will | |
| 2914 * detect SSRC collisions, since a stream that appears in both | |
| 2915 * srtp_protect() and srtp_unprotect() will fail this test in one of | |
| 2916 * those functions. | |
| 2917 * | |
| 2918 * we do this check *after* the authentication check, so that the | |
| 2919 * latter check will catch any attempts to fool us into thinking | |
| 2920 * that we've got a collision | |
| 2921 */ | |
| 2922 if (stream->direction != dir_srtp_receiver) { | |
| 2923 if (stream->direction == dir_unknown) { | |
| 2924 stream->direction = dir_srtp_receiver; | |
| 2925 } else { | |
| 2926 srtp_handle_event(ctx, stream, event_ssrc_collision); | |
| 2927 } | |
| 2928 } | |
| 2929 | |
| 2930 /* | |
| 2931 * if the stream is a 'provisional' one, in which the template context | |
| 2932 * is used, then we need to allocate a new stream at this point, since | |
| 2933 * the authentication passed | |
| 2934 */ | |
| 2935 if (stream == ctx->stream_template) { | |
| 2936 srtp_stream_ctx_t *new_stream; | |
| 2937 | |
| 2938 /* | |
| 2939 * allocate and initialize a new stream | |
| 2940 * | |
| 2941 * note that we indicate failure if we can't allocate the new | |
| 2942 * stream, and some implementations will want to not return | |
| 2943 * failure here | |
| 2944 */ | |
| 2945 status = srtp_stream_clone(ctx->stream_template, hdr->ssrc, &new_stream)
; | |
| 2946 if (status) { | |
| 2947 return status; | |
| 2948 } | |
| 2949 | |
| 2950 /* add new stream to the head of the stream_list */ | |
| 2951 new_stream->next = ctx->stream_list; | |
| 2952 ctx->stream_list = new_stream; | |
| 2953 | |
| 2954 /* set stream (the pointer used in this function) */ | |
| 2955 stream = new_stream; | |
| 2956 } | |
| 2957 | |
| 2958 /* we've passed the authentication check, so add seq_num to the rdb */ | |
| 2959 rdb_add_index(&stream->rtcp_rdb, seq_num); | |
| 2960 | |
| 2961 return err_status_ok; | |
| 2962 } | |
| 2963 | |
| 2964 err_status_t | |
| 2965 srtp_protect_rtcp(srtp_t ctx, void *rtcp_hdr, int *pkt_octet_len) { | |
| 2966 srtcp_hdr_t *hdr = (srtcp_hdr_t *)rtcp_hdr; | |
| 2967 uint32_t *enc_start; /* pointer to start of encrypted portion */ | |
| 2968 uint32_t *auth_start; /* pointer to start of auth. portion */ | |
| 2969 uint32_t *trailer; /* pointer to start of trailer */ | |
| 2970 unsigned int enc_octet_len = 0;/* number of octets in encrypted portion */ | |
| 2971 uint8_t *auth_tag = NULL; /* location of auth_tag within packet */ | |
| 2972 err_status_t status; | |
| 2973 int tag_len; | |
| 2974 srtp_stream_ctx_t *stream; | |
| 2975 int prefix_len; | |
| 2976 uint32_t seq_num; | |
| 2977 | |
| 2978 /* we assume the hdr is 32-bit aligned to start */ | |
| 2979 | |
| 2980 /* check the packet length - it must at least contain a full header */ | |
| 2981 if (*pkt_octet_len < octets_in_rtcp_header) | |
| 2982 return err_status_bad_param; | |
| 2983 | |
| 2984 /* | |
| 2985 * look up ssrc in srtp_stream list, and process the packet with | |
| 2986 * the appropriate stream. if we haven't seen this stream before, | |
| 2987 * there's only one key for this srtp_session, and the cipher | |
| 2988 * supports key-sharing, then we assume that a new stream using | |
| 2989 * that key has just started up | |
| 2990 */ | |
| 2991 stream = srtp_get_stream(ctx, hdr->ssrc); | |
| 2992 if (stream == NULL) { | |
| 2993 if (ctx->stream_template != NULL) { | |
| 2994 srtp_stream_ctx_t *new_stream; | |
| 2995 | |
| 2996 /* allocate and initialize a new stream */ | |
| 2997 status = srtp_stream_clone(ctx->stream_template, | |
| 2998 hdr->ssrc, &new_stream); | |
| 2999 if (status) | |
| 3000 return status; | |
| 3001 | |
| 3002 /* add new stream to the head of the stream_list */ | |
| 3003 new_stream->next = ctx->stream_list; | |
| 3004 ctx->stream_list = new_stream; | |
| 3005 | |
| 3006 /* set stream (the pointer used in this function) */ | |
| 3007 stream = new_stream; | |
| 3008 } else { | |
| 3009 /* no template stream, so we return an error */ | |
| 3010 return err_status_no_ctx; | |
| 3011 } | |
| 3012 } | |
| 3013 | |
| 3014 /* | |
| 3015 * verify that stream is for sending traffic - this check will | |
| 3016 * detect SSRC collisions, since a stream that appears in both | |
| 3017 * srtp_protect() and srtp_unprotect() will fail this test in one of | |
| 3018 * those functions. | |
| 3019 */ | |
| 3020 if (stream->direction != dir_srtp_sender) { | |
| 3021 if (stream->direction == dir_unknown) { | |
| 3022 stream->direction = dir_srtp_sender; | |
| 3023 } else { | |
| 3024 srtp_handle_event(ctx, stream, event_ssrc_collision); | |
| 3025 } | |
| 3026 } | |
| 3027 | |
| 3028 /* | |
| 3029 * Check if this is an AEAD stream (GCM mode). If so, then dispatch | |
| 3030 * the request to our AEAD handler. | |
| 3031 */ | |
| 3032 if (stream->rtp_cipher->algorithm == AES_128_GCM || | |
| 3033 stream->rtp_cipher->algorithm == AES_256_GCM) { | |
| 3034 return srtp_protect_rtcp_aead(ctx, stream, rtcp_hdr, (unsigned int*)pkt_oc
tet_len); | |
| 3035 } | |
| 3036 | |
| 3037 /* get tag length from stream context */ | |
| 3038 tag_len = auth_get_tag_length(stream->rtcp_auth); | |
| 3039 | |
| 3040 /* | |
| 3041 * set encryption start and encryption length - if we're not | |
| 3042 * providing confidentiality, set enc_start to NULL | |
| 3043 */ | |
| 3044 enc_start = (uint32_t *)hdr + uint32s_in_rtcp_header; | |
| 3045 enc_octet_len = *pkt_octet_len - octets_in_rtcp_header; | |
| 3046 | |
| 3047 /* all of the packet, except the header, gets encrypted */ | |
| 3048 /* NOTE: hdr->length is not usable - it refers to only the first | |
| 3049 RTCP report in the compound packet! */ | |
| 3050 /* NOTE: trailer is 32-bit aligned because RTCP 'packets' are always | |
| 3051 multiples of 32-bits (RFC 3550 6.1) */ | |
| 3052 trailer = (uint32_t *) ((char *)enc_start + enc_octet_len); | |
| 3053 | |
| 3054 if (stream->rtcp_services & sec_serv_conf) { | |
| 3055 *trailer = htonl(SRTCP_E_BIT); /* set encrypt bit */ | |
| 3056 } else { | |
| 3057 enc_start = NULL; | |
| 3058 enc_octet_len = 0; | |
| 3059 /* 0 is network-order independant */ | |
| 3060 *trailer = 0x00000000; /* set encrypt bit */ | |
| 3061 } | |
| 3062 | |
| 3063 /* | |
| 3064 * set the auth_start and auth_tag pointers to the proper locations | |
| 3065 * (note that srtpc *always* provides authentication, unlike srtp) | |
| 3066 */ | |
| 3067 /* Note: This would need to change for optional mikey data */ | |
| 3068 auth_start = (uint32_t *)hdr; | |
| 3069 auth_tag = (uint8_t *)hdr + *pkt_octet_len + sizeof(srtcp_trailer_t); | |
| 3070 | |
| 3071 /* perform EKT processing if needed */ | |
| 3072 ekt_write_data(stream->ekt, auth_tag, tag_len, pkt_octet_len, | |
| 3073 rdbx_get_packet_index(&stream->rtp_rdbx)); | |
| 3074 | |
| 3075 /* | |
| 3076 * check sequence number for overruns, and copy it into the packet | |
| 3077 * if its value isn't too big | |
| 3078 */ | |
| 3079 status = rdb_increment(&stream->rtcp_rdb); | |
| 3080 if (status) | |
| 3081 return status; | |
| 3082 seq_num = rdb_get_value(&stream->rtcp_rdb); | |
| 3083 *trailer |= htonl(seq_num); | |
| 3084 debug_print(mod_srtp, "srtcp index: %x", seq_num); | |
| 3085 | |
| 3086 /* | |
| 3087 * if we're using rindael counter mode, set nonce and seq | |
| 3088 */ | |
| 3089 if (stream->rtcp_cipher->type->id == AES_ICM) { | |
| 3090 v128_t iv; | |
| 3091 | |
| 3092 iv.v32[0] = 0; | |
| 3093 iv.v32[1] = hdr->ssrc; /* still in network order! */ | |
| 3094 iv.v32[2] = htonl(seq_num >> 16); | |
| 3095 iv.v32[3] = htonl(seq_num << 16); | |
| 3096 status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtcp_cipher, &iv, direction_encrypt); | |
| 3097 | |
| 3098 } else { | |
| 3099 v128_t iv; | |
| 3100 | |
| 3101 /* otherwise, just set the index to seq_num */ | |
| 3102 iv.v32[0] = 0; | |
| 3103 iv.v32[1] = 0; | |
| 3104 iv.v32[2] = 0; | |
| 3105 iv.v32[3] = htonl(seq_num); | |
| 3106 status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtcp_cipher, &iv, direction_encrypt); | |
| 3107 } | |
| 3108 if (status) | |
| 3109 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 3110 | |
| 3111 /* | |
| 3112 * if we're authenticating using a universal hash, put the keystream | |
| 3113 * prefix into the authentication tag | |
| 3114 */ | |
| 3115 | |
| 3116 /* if auth_start is non-null, then put keystream into tag */ | |
| 3117 if (auth_start) { | |
| 3118 | |
| 3119 /* put keystream prefix into auth_tag */ | |
| 3120 prefix_len = auth_get_prefix_length(stream->rtcp_auth); | |
| 3121 status = cipher_output(stream->rtcp_cipher, auth_tag, prefix_len); | |
| 3122 | |
| 3123 debug_print(mod_srtp, "keystream prefix: %s", | |
| 3124 octet_string_hex_string(auth_tag, prefix_len)); | |
| 3125 | |
| 3126 if (status) | |
| 3127 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 3128 } | |
| 3129 | |
| 3130 /* if we're encrypting, exor keystream into the message */ | |
| 3131 if (enc_start) { | |
| 3132 status = cipher_encrypt(stream->rtcp_cipher, | |
| 3133 (uint8_t *)enc_start, &enc_octet_len); | |
| 3134 if (status) | |
| 3135 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 3136 } | |
| 3137 | |
| 3138 /* initialize auth func context */ | |
| 3139 auth_start(stream->rtcp_auth); | |
| 3140 | |
| 3141 /* | |
| 3142 * run auth func over packet (including trailer), and write the | |
| 3143 * result at auth_tag | |
| 3144 */ | |
| 3145 status = auth_compute(stream->rtcp_auth, | |
| 3146 (uint8_t *)auth_start, | |
| 3147 (*pkt_octet_len) + sizeof(srtcp_trailer_t), | |
| 3148 auth_tag); | |
| 3149 debug_print(mod_srtp, "srtcp auth tag: %s", | |
| 3150 octet_string_hex_string(auth_tag, tag_len)); | |
| 3151 if (status) | |
| 3152 return err_status_auth_fail; | |
| 3153 | |
| 3154 /* increase the packet length by the length of the auth tag and seq_num*/ | |
| 3155 *pkt_octet_len += (tag_len + sizeof(srtcp_trailer_t)); | |
| 3156 | |
| 3157 return err_status_ok; | |
| 3158 } | |
| 3159 | |
| 3160 | |
| 3161 err_status_t | |
| 3162 srtp_unprotect_rtcp(srtp_t ctx, void *srtcp_hdr, int *pkt_octet_len) { | |
| 3163 srtcp_hdr_t *hdr = (srtcp_hdr_t *)srtcp_hdr; | |
| 3164 uint32_t *enc_start; /* pointer to start of encrypted portion */ | |
| 3165 uint32_t *auth_start; /* pointer to start of auth. portion */ | |
| 3166 uint32_t *trailer; /* pointer to start of trailer */ | |
| 3167 unsigned int enc_octet_len = 0;/* number of octets in encrypted portion */ | |
| 3168 uint8_t *auth_tag = NULL; /* location of auth_tag within packet */ | |
| 3169 uint8_t tmp_tag[SRTP_MAX_TAG_LEN]; | |
| 3170 uint8_t tag_copy[SRTP_MAX_TAG_LEN]; | |
| 3171 err_status_t status; | |
| 3172 unsigned int auth_len; | |
| 3173 int tag_len; | |
| 3174 srtp_stream_ctx_t *stream; | |
| 3175 int prefix_len; | |
| 3176 uint32_t seq_num; | |
| 3177 int e_bit_in_packet; /* whether the E-bit was found in the packet */ | |
| 3178 int sec_serv_confidentiality; /* whether confidentiality was requested */ | |
| 3179 | |
| 3180 /* we assume the hdr is 32-bit aligned to start */ | |
| 3181 | |
| 3182 /* check that the length value is sane; we'll check again once we | |
| 3183 know the tag length, but we at least want to know that it is | |
| 3184 a positive value */ | |
| 3185 if (*pkt_octet_len < octets_in_rtcp_header + sizeof(srtcp_trailer_t)) | |
| 3186 return err_status_bad_param; | |
| 3187 | |
| 3188 /* | |
| 3189 * look up ssrc in srtp_stream list, and process the packet with | |
| 3190 * the appropriate stream. if we haven't seen this stream before, | |
| 3191 * there's only one key for this srtp_session, and the cipher | |
| 3192 * supports key-sharing, then we assume that a new stream using | |
| 3193 * that key has just started up | |
| 3194 */ | |
| 3195 stream = srtp_get_stream(ctx, hdr->ssrc); | |
| 3196 if (stream == NULL) { | |
| 3197 if (ctx->stream_template != NULL) { | |
| 3198 stream = ctx->stream_template; | |
| 3199 | |
| 3200 /* | |
| 3201 * check to see if stream_template has an EKT data structure, in | |
| 3202 * which case we initialize the template using the EKT policy | |
| 3203 * referenced by that data (which consists of decrypting the | |
| 3204 * master key from the EKT field) | |
| 3205 * | |
| 3206 * this function initializes a *provisional* stream, and this | |
| 3207 * stream should not be accepted until and unless the packet | |
| 3208 * passes its authentication check | |
| 3209 */ | |
| 3210 if (stream->ekt != NULL) { | |
| 3211 status = srtp_stream_init_from_ekt(stream, srtcp_hdr, *pkt_octet_len); | |
| 3212 if (status) | |
| 3213 return status; | |
| 3214 } | |
| 3215 | |
| 3216 debug_print(mod_srtp, "srtcp using provisional stream (SSRC: 0x%08x)", | |
| 3217 hdr->ssrc); | |
| 3218 } else { | |
| 3219 /* no template stream, so we return an error */ | |
| 3220 return err_status_no_ctx; | |
| 3221 } | |
| 3222 } | |
| 3223 | |
| 3224 /* get tag length from stream context */ | |
| 3225 tag_len = auth_get_tag_length(stream->rtcp_auth); | |
| 3226 | |
| 3227 /* check the packet length - it must contain at least a full RTCP | |
| 3228 header, an auth tag (if applicable), and the SRTCP encrypted flag | |
| 3229 and 31-bit index value */ | |
| 3230 if (*pkt_octet_len < (int) (octets_in_rtcp_header + tag_len + sizeof(srtcp_tra
iler_t))) { | |
| 3231 return err_status_bad_param; | |
| 3232 } | |
| 3233 | |
| 3234 /* | |
| 3235 * Check if this is an AEAD stream (GCM mode). If so, then dispatch | |
| 3236 * the request to our AEAD handler. | |
| 3237 */ | |
| 3238 if (stream->rtp_cipher->algorithm == AES_128_GCM || | |
| 3239 stream->rtp_cipher->algorithm == AES_256_GCM) { | |
| 3240 return srtp_unprotect_rtcp_aead(ctx, stream, srtcp_hdr, (unsigned int*)pkt
_octet_len); | |
| 3241 } | |
| 3242 | |
| 3243 sec_serv_confidentiality = stream->rtcp_services == sec_serv_conf || | |
| 3244 stream->rtcp_services == sec_serv_conf_and_auth; | |
| 3245 | |
| 3246 /* | |
| 3247 * set encryption start, encryption length, and trailer | |
| 3248 */ | |
| 3249 enc_octet_len = *pkt_octet_len - | |
| 3250 (octets_in_rtcp_header + tag_len + sizeof(srtcp_trailer_t)); | |
| 3251 /* index & E (encryption) bit follow normal data. hdr->len | |
| 3252 is the number of words (32-bit) in the normal packet minus 1 */ | |
| 3253 /* This should point trailer to the word past the end of the | |
| 3254 normal data. */ | |
| 3255 /* This would need to be modified for optional mikey data */ | |
| 3256 /* | |
| 3257 * NOTE: trailer is 32-bit aligned because RTCP 'packets' are always | |
| 3258 * multiples of 32-bits (RFC 3550 6.1) | |
| 3259 */ | |
| 3260 trailer = (uint32_t *) ((char *) hdr + | |
| 3261 *pkt_octet_len -(tag_len + sizeof(srtcp_trailer_t))); | |
| 3262 e_bit_in_packet = | |
| 3263 (*((unsigned char *) trailer) & SRTCP_E_BYTE_BIT) == SRTCP_E_BYTE_BIT; | |
| 3264 if (e_bit_in_packet != sec_serv_confidentiality) { | |
| 3265 return err_status_cant_check; | |
| 3266 } | |
| 3267 if (sec_serv_confidentiality) { | |
| 3268 enc_start = (uint32_t *)hdr + uint32s_in_rtcp_header; | |
| 3269 } else { | |
| 3270 enc_octet_len = 0; | |
| 3271 enc_start = NULL; /* this indicates that there's no encryption */ | |
| 3272 } | |
| 3273 | |
| 3274 /* | |
| 3275 * set the auth_start and auth_tag pointers to the proper locations | |
| 3276 * (note that srtcp *always* uses authentication, unlike srtp) | |
| 3277 */ | |
| 3278 auth_start = (uint32_t *)hdr; | |
| 3279 auth_len = *pkt_octet_len - tag_len; | |
| 3280 auth_tag = (uint8_t *)hdr + auth_len; | |
| 3281 | |
| 3282 /* | |
| 3283 * if EKT is in use, then we make a copy of the tag from the packet, | |
| 3284 * and then zeroize the location of the base tag | |
| 3285 * | |
| 3286 * we first re-position the auth_tag pointer so that it points to | |
| 3287 * the base tag | |
| 3288 */ | |
| 3289 if (stream->ekt) { | |
| 3290 auth_tag -= ekt_octets_after_base_tag(stream->ekt); | |
| 3291 memcpy(tag_copy, auth_tag, tag_len); | |
| 3292 octet_string_set_to_zero(auth_tag, tag_len); | |
| 3293 auth_tag = tag_copy; | |
| 3294 auth_len += tag_len; | |
| 3295 } | |
| 3296 | |
| 3297 /* | |
| 3298 * check the sequence number for replays | |
| 3299 */ | |
| 3300 /* this is easier than dealing with bitfield access */ | |
| 3301 seq_num = ntohl(*trailer) & SRTCP_INDEX_MASK; | |
| 3302 debug_print(mod_srtp, "srtcp index: %x", seq_num); | |
| 3303 status = rdb_check(&stream->rtcp_rdb, seq_num); | |
| 3304 if (status) | |
| 3305 return status; | |
| 3306 | |
| 3307 /* | |
| 3308 * if we're using aes counter mode, set nonce and seq | |
| 3309 */ | |
| 3310 if (stream->rtcp_cipher->type->id == AES_ICM) { | |
| 3311 v128_t iv; | |
| 3312 | |
| 3313 iv.v32[0] = 0; | |
| 3314 iv.v32[1] = hdr->ssrc; /* still in network order! */ | |
| 3315 iv.v32[2] = htonl(seq_num >> 16); | |
| 3316 iv.v32[3] = htonl(seq_num << 16); | |
| 3317 status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtcp_cipher, &iv, direction_decrypt); | |
| 3318 | |
| 3319 } else { | |
| 3320 v128_t iv; | |
| 3321 | |
| 3322 /* otherwise, just set the index to seq_num */ | |
| 3323 iv.v32[0] = 0; | |
| 3324 iv.v32[1] = 0; | |
| 3325 iv.v32[2] = 0; | |
| 3326 iv.v32[3] = htonl(seq_num); | |
| 3327 status = cipher_set_iv(stream->rtcp_cipher, &iv, direction_decrypt); | |
| 3328 | |
| 3329 } | |
| 3330 if (status) | |
| 3331 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 3332 | |
| 3333 /* initialize auth func context */ | |
| 3334 auth_start(stream->rtcp_auth); | |
| 3335 | |
| 3336 /* run auth func over packet, put result into tmp_tag */ | |
| 3337 status = auth_compute(stream->rtcp_auth, (uint8_t *)auth_start, | |
| 3338 auth_len, tmp_tag); | |
| 3339 debug_print(mod_srtp, "srtcp computed tag: %s", | |
| 3340 octet_string_hex_string(tmp_tag, tag_len)); | |
| 3341 if (status) | |
| 3342 return err_status_auth_fail; | |
| 3343 | |
| 3344 /* compare the tag just computed with the one in the packet */ | |
| 3345 debug_print(mod_srtp, "srtcp tag from packet: %s", | |
| 3346 octet_string_hex_string(auth_tag, tag_len)); | |
| 3347 if (octet_string_is_eq(tmp_tag, auth_tag, tag_len)) | |
| 3348 return err_status_auth_fail; | |
| 3349 | |
| 3350 /* | |
| 3351 * if we're authenticating using a universal hash, put the keystream | |
| 3352 * prefix into the authentication tag | |
| 3353 */ | |
| 3354 prefix_len = auth_get_prefix_length(stream->rtcp_auth); | |
| 3355 if (prefix_len) { | |
| 3356 status = cipher_output(stream->rtcp_cipher, auth_tag, prefix_len); | |
| 3357 debug_print(mod_srtp, "keystream prefix: %s", | |
| 3358 octet_string_hex_string(auth_tag, prefix_len)); | |
| 3359 if (status) | |
| 3360 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 3361 } | |
| 3362 | |
| 3363 /* if we're decrypting, exor keystream into the message */ | |
| 3364 if (enc_start) { | |
| 3365 status = cipher_decrypt(stream->rtcp_cipher, | |
| 3366 (uint8_t *)enc_start, &enc_octet_len); | |
| 3367 if (status) | |
| 3368 return err_status_cipher_fail; | |
| 3369 } | |
| 3370 | |
| 3371 /* decrease the packet length by the length of the auth tag and seq_num */ | |
| 3372 *pkt_octet_len -= (tag_len + sizeof(srtcp_trailer_t)); | |
| 3373 | |
| 3374 /* | |
| 3375 * if EKT is in effect, subtract the EKT data out of the packet | |
| 3376 * length | |
| 3377 */ | |
| 3378 *pkt_octet_len -= ekt_octets_after_base_tag(stream->ekt); | |
| 3379 | |
| 3380 /* | |
| 3381 * verify that stream is for received traffic - this check will | |
| 3382 * detect SSRC collisions, since a stream that appears in both | |
| 3383 * srtp_protect() and srtp_unprotect() will fail this test in one of | |
| 3384 * those functions. | |
| 3385 * | |
| 3386 * we do this check *after* the authentication check, so that the | |
| 3387 * latter check will catch any attempts to fool us into thinking | |
| 3388 * that we've got a collision | |
| 3389 */ | |
| 3390 if (stream->direction != dir_srtp_receiver) { | |
| 3391 if (stream->direction == dir_unknown) { | |
| 3392 stream->direction = dir_srtp_receiver; | |
| 3393 } else { | |
| 3394 srtp_handle_event(ctx, stream, event_ssrc_collision); | |
| 3395 } | |
| 3396 } | |
| 3397 | |
| 3398 /* | |
| 3399 * if the stream is a 'provisional' one, in which the template context | |
| 3400 * is used, then we need to allocate a new stream at this point, since | |
| 3401 * the authentication passed | |
| 3402 */ | |
| 3403 if (stream == ctx->stream_template) { | |
| 3404 srtp_stream_ctx_t *new_stream; | |
| 3405 | |
| 3406 /* | |
| 3407 * allocate and initialize a new stream | |
| 3408 * | |
| 3409 * note that we indicate failure if we can't allocate the new | |
| 3410 * stream, and some implementations will want to not return | |
| 3411 * failure here | |
| 3412 */ | |
| 3413 status = srtp_stream_clone(ctx->stream_template, hdr->ssrc, &new_stream); | |
| 3414 if (status) | |
| 3415 return status; | |
| 3416 | |
| 3417 /* add new stream to the head of the stream_list */ | |
| 3418 new_stream->next = ctx->stream_list; | |
| 3419 ctx->stream_list = new_stream; | |
| 3420 | |
| 3421 /* set stream (the pointer used in this function) */ | |
| 3422 stream = new_stream; | |
| 3423 } | |
| 3424 | |
| 3425 /* we've passed the authentication check, so add seq_num to the rdb */ | |
| 3426 rdb_add_index(&stream->rtcp_rdb, seq_num); | |
| 3427 | |
| 3428 | |
| 3429 return err_status_ok; | |
| 3430 } | |
| 3431 | |
| 3432 | |
| 3433 /* | |
| 3434 * user data within srtp_t context | |
| 3435 */ | |
| 3436 | |
| 3437 void | |
| 3438 srtp_set_user_data(srtp_t ctx, void *data) { | |
| 3439 ctx->user_data = data; | |
| 3440 } | |
| 3441 | |
| 3442 void* | |
| 3443 srtp_get_user_data(srtp_t ctx) { | |
| 3444 return ctx->user_data; | |
| 3445 } | |
| 3446 | |
| 3447 | |
| 3448 /* | |
| 3449 * dtls keying for srtp | |
| 3450 */ | |
| 3451 | |
| 3452 err_status_t | |
| 3453 crypto_policy_set_from_profile_for_rtp(crypto_policy_t *policy, | |
| 3454 srtp_profile_t profile) { | |
| 3455 | |
| 3456 /* set SRTP policy from the SRTP profile in the key set */ | |
| 3457 switch(profile) { | |
| 3458 case srtp_profile_aes128_cm_sha1_80: | |
| 3459 crypto_policy_set_aes_cm_128_hmac_sha1_80(policy); | |
| 3460 break; | |
| 3461 case srtp_profile_aes128_cm_sha1_32: | |
| 3462 crypto_policy_set_aes_cm_128_hmac_sha1_32(policy); | |
| 3463 break; | |
| 3464 case srtp_profile_null_sha1_80: | |
| 3465 crypto_policy_set_null_cipher_hmac_sha1_80(policy); | |
| 3466 break; | |
| 3467 case srtp_profile_aes256_cm_sha1_80: | |
| 3468 crypto_policy_set_aes_cm_256_hmac_sha1_80(policy); | |
| 3469 break; | |
| 3470 case srtp_profile_aes256_cm_sha1_32: | |
| 3471 crypto_policy_set_aes_cm_256_hmac_sha1_32(policy); | |
| 3472 break; | |
| 3473 /* the following profiles are not (yet) supported */ | |
| 3474 case srtp_profile_null_sha1_32: | |
| 3475 default: | |
| 3476 return err_status_bad_param; | |
| 3477 } | |
| 3478 | |
| 3479 return err_status_ok; | |
| 3480 } | |
| 3481 | |
| 3482 err_status_t | |
| 3483 crypto_policy_set_from_profile_for_rtcp(crypto_policy_t *policy, | |
| 3484 srtp_profile_t profile) { | |
| 3485 | |
| 3486 /* set SRTP policy from the SRTP profile in the key set */ | |
| 3487 switch(profile) { | |
| 3488 case srtp_profile_aes128_cm_sha1_80: | |
| 3489 crypto_policy_set_aes_cm_128_hmac_sha1_80(policy); | |
| 3490 break; | |
| 3491 case srtp_profile_aes128_cm_sha1_32: | |
| 3492 /* We do not honor the 32-bit auth tag request since | |
| 3493 * this is not compliant with RFC 3711 */ | |
| 3494 crypto_policy_set_aes_cm_128_hmac_sha1_80(policy); | |
| 3495 break; | |
| 3496 case srtp_profile_null_sha1_80: | |
| 3497 crypto_policy_set_null_cipher_hmac_sha1_80(policy); | |
| 3498 break; | |
| 3499 case srtp_profile_aes256_cm_sha1_80: | |
| 3500 crypto_policy_set_aes_cm_256_hmac_sha1_80(policy); | |
| 3501 break; | |
| 3502 case srtp_profile_aes256_cm_sha1_32: | |
| 3503 /* We do not honor the 32-bit auth tag request since | |
| 3504 * this is not compliant with RFC 3711 */ | |
| 3505 crypto_policy_set_aes_cm_256_hmac_sha1_80(policy); | |
| 3506 break; | |
| 3507 /* the following profiles are not (yet) supported */ | |
| 3508 case srtp_profile_null_sha1_32: | |
| 3509 default: | |
| 3510 return err_status_bad_param; | |
| 3511 } | |
| 3512 | |
| 3513 return err_status_ok; | |
| 3514 } | |
| 3515 | |
| 3516 void | |
| 3517 append_salt_to_key(uint8_t *key, unsigned int bytes_in_key, | |
| 3518 uint8_t *salt, unsigned int bytes_in_salt) { | |
| 3519 | |
| 3520 memcpy(key + bytes_in_key, salt, bytes_in_salt); | |
| 3521 | |
| 3522 } | |
| 3523 | |
| 3524 unsigned int | |
| 3525 srtp_profile_get_master_key_length(srtp_profile_t profile) { | |
| 3526 | |
| 3527 switch(profile) { | |
| 3528 case srtp_profile_aes128_cm_sha1_80: | |
| 3529 return 16; | |
| 3530 break; | |
| 3531 case srtp_profile_aes128_cm_sha1_32: | |
| 3532 return 16; | |
| 3533 break; | |
| 3534 case srtp_profile_null_sha1_80: | |
| 3535 return 16; | |
| 3536 break; | |
| 3537 case srtp_profile_aes256_cm_sha1_80: | |
| 3538 return 32; | |
| 3539 break; | |
| 3540 case srtp_profile_aes256_cm_sha1_32: | |
| 3541 return 32; | |
| 3542 break; | |
| 3543 /* the following profiles are not (yet) supported */ | |
| 3544 case srtp_profile_null_sha1_32: | |
| 3545 default: | |
| 3546 return 0; /* indicate error by returning a zero */ | |
| 3547 } | |
| 3548 } | |
| 3549 | |
| 3550 unsigned int | |
| 3551 srtp_profile_get_master_salt_length(srtp_profile_t profile) { | |
| 3552 | |
| 3553 switch(profile) { | |
| 3554 case srtp_profile_aes128_cm_sha1_80: | |
| 3555 return 14; | |
| 3556 break; | |
| 3557 case srtp_profile_aes128_cm_sha1_32: | |
| 3558 return 14; | |
| 3559 break; | |
| 3560 case srtp_profile_null_sha1_80: | |
| 3561 return 14; | |
| 3562 break; | |
| 3563 case srtp_profile_aes256_cm_sha1_80: | |
| 3564 return 14; | |
| 3565 break; | |
| 3566 case srtp_profile_aes256_cm_sha1_32: | |
| 3567 return 14; | |
| 3568 break; | |
| 3569 /* the following profiles are not (yet) supported */ | |
| 3570 case srtp_profile_null_sha1_32: | |
| 3571 default: | |
| 3572 return 0; /* indicate error by returning a zero */ | |
| 3573 } | |
| 3574 } | |
| OLD | NEW |