Implementation of the "Redirect URLs to Packaged Apps" feature.

chrome/renderer/chrome_content_renderer_client.cc

Index: chrome/renderer/chrome_content_renderer_client.cc
diff --git a/chrome/renderer/chrome_content_renderer_client.cc b/chrome/renderer/chrome_content_renderer_client.cc
index f2c7bbb05a54c78db8709534f14b630c4709b429..ad7deb7abc3aac24e01d0ffc75465b4cf5fa05b1 100644
--- a/chrome/renderer/chrome_content_renderer_client.cc
+++ b/chrome/renderer/chrome_content_renderer_client.cc
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include "chrome/common/chrome_switches.h"
 #include "chrome/common/content_settings_pattern.h"
 #include "chrome/common/extensions/api/extension_action/page_action_handler.h"
+#include "chrome/common/extensions/api/url_handlers/url_handlers_parser.h"
 #include "chrome/common/extensions/background_info.h"
 #include "chrome/common/extensions/csp_handler.h"
 #include "chrome/common/extensions/extension.h"
@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@
 #include "components/autofill/renderer/password_generation_manager.h"
 #include "components/visitedlink/renderer/visitedlink_slave.h"
 #include "content/public/common/content_constants.h"
+#include "content/public/common/url_handling_messages.h"
 #include "content/public/renderer/render_thread.h"
 #include "content/public/renderer/render_view.h"
 #include "content/public/renderer/render_view_visitor.h"
@@ -93,6 +95,7 @@
 #include "third_party/WebKit/Source/WebKit/chromium/public/WebDocument.h"
 #include "third_party/WebKit/Source/WebKit/chromium/public/WebElement.h"
 #include "third_party/WebKit/Source/WebKit/chromium/public/WebFrame.h"
+#include "third_party/WebKit/Source/WebKit/chromium/public/WebNavigationType.h"
 #include "third_party/WebKit/Source/WebKit/chromium/public/WebPluginContainer.h"
 #include "third_party/WebKit/Source/WebKit/chromium/public/WebPluginParams.h"
 #include "third_party/WebKit/Source/WebKit/chromium/public/WebSecurityOrigin.h"
@@ -133,6 +136,7 @@ using WebKit::WebURLError;
 using WebKit::WebURLRequest;
 using WebKit::WebURLResponse;
 using WebKit::WebVector;
+using WebKit::WebNavigationType;
 
 namespace {
 
@@ -152,6 +156,7 @@ void RegisterExtensionManifestHandlers() {
   (new extensions::IncognitoHandler)->Register();
   (new extensions::PageActionHandler)->Register();
   (new extensions::SandboxedPageHandler)->Register();
+  (new extensions::UrlHandlersParser)->Register();
   (new extensions::WebAccessibleResourcesHandler)->Register();
 }
 
@@ -891,6 +896,41 @@ bool ChromeContentRendererClient::AllowPopup() {
        extensions::Feature::CONTENT_SCRIPT_CONTEXT);
 }
 
+bool ChromeContentRendererClient::HandleNavigation(
+    WebKit::WebFrame* frame,
+    const WebKit::WebURLRequest& request,
+    WebKit::WebNavigationType type,
+    WebKit::WebNavigationPolicy default_policy,
+    bool is_redirect) {
+  switch (type) {
+    // For user-initiated gestures, try to find a platform app that has
+    // registered a URL handler that matches the URL being navigated to.
+    // If found, delegate further URL processing to the browser (the browser
+    // is supposed to launch the app), and return true to cancel navigation on
+    // on the renderer side. Otherwise, return false to continue navigation.
+    case WebKit::WebNavigationTypeLinkClicked:
+    case WebKit::WebNavigationTypeFormSubmitted:
+    case WebKit::WebNavigationTypeFormResubmitted: {
+      const GURL& url = request.url();
+      const ExtensionSet* exts = extension_dispatcher_->extensions();
+      for (ExtensionSet::const_iterator it = exts->begin();
+           it != exts->end(); ++it) {
+        if (extensions::UrlHandlers::CanExtensionHandleUrl(*it, url)) {
+          const GURL referrer_url(
+              request.httpHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8("Referer")));
+          return RenderThread::Get()->Send(
+              new RendererHostMsg_ForwardUrlToBrowser(url, referrer_url));

[not at google - send to devlin, 2013/08/29 17:35:56]

I wonder whether there are any issues here with the browser trusting the
renderer.

[sergeygs, 2013/09/02 07:36:21]

In this first version, apps are severely restricted in what URLs they can handle
(only ones from an app-owned domain). So even with a compromised renderer, I
don't really see what sensible harm it could do other than opening a GDocs
document in the GDocs app.
Still, if you concern is valid, what do you think could be done here to detect
and prevent an attack?

+        }
+      }
+      break;
+    }
+
+    default:
+      break;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
 bool ChromeContentRendererClient::ShouldFork(WebFrame* frame,
                                              const GURL& url,
                                              const std::string& http_method,