Normalize certificate name verification across all platforms

net/cert/cert_verify_proc_nss.cc

 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_nss.h"
 
 #include <string>
 #include <vector>
 
 #include <cert.h>
@@ skipping 746 matching lines @@
 #if defined(OS_IOS)
   // For iOS, the entire chain must be loaded into NSS's in-memory certificate
   // store.
   x509_util_ios::NSSCertChain scoped_chain(cert);
   CERTCertificate* cert_handle = scoped_chain.cert_handle();
 #else
   CERTCertificate* cert_handle = cert->os_cert_handle();
 #endif  // defined(OS_IOS)
 
   // Make sure that the hostname matches with the common name of the cert.
-  SECStatus status = CERT_VerifyCertName(cert_handle, hostname.c_str());
-  if (status != SECSuccess)
+  if (!cert->VerifyNameMatch(hostname))
     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID;
 
   // Make sure that the cert is valid now.
   SECCertTimeValidity validity = CERT_CheckCertValidTimes(
       cert_handle, PR_Now(), PR_TRUE);
   if (validity != secCertTimeValid)
     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID;
 
   CERTValOutParam cvout[3];
   int cvout_index = 0;
@@ skipping 19 matching lines @@
       (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
   if (check_revocation)
     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
 
   ScopedCERTCertList trust_anchors;
   if (SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() && !additional_trust_anchors.empty()) {
     trust_anchors.reset(
         CertificateListToCERTCertList(additional_trust_anchors));
   }
 
-  status = PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, check_revocation, false,
-                          cert_io_enabled, NULL, 0, trust_anchors.get(),
-                          cvout);
+  SECStatus status = PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, check_revocation, false,
+                                    cert_io_enabled, NULL, 0,
+                                    trust_anchors.get(), cvout);
 
   if (status == SECSuccess &&
       (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS) &&
       !IsKnownRoot(cvout[cvout_trust_anchor_index].value.pointer.cert)) {
     // TODO(rsleevi): Optimize this by supplying the constructed chain to
     // libpkix via cvin. Omitting for now, due to lack of coverage in upstream
     // NSS tests for that feature.
     scoped_cvout.Clear();
     verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
     status = PKIXVerifyCert(cert_handle, true, true,
@@ skipping 62 matching lines @@
     if (VerifyEV(cert_handle, flags, crl_set, check_revocation, metadata,
                  ev_policy_oid, trust_anchors.get())) {
       verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_IS_EV;
     }
   }
 
   return OK;
 }
 
 }  // namespace net