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1 // Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. | |
2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be | |
3 // found in the LICENSE file. | |
4 | |
5 #include "webkit/child/site_isolation_policy.h" | |
6 | |
7 #include "base/basictypes.h" | |
8 #include "base/logging.h" | |
9 #include "base/metrics/histogram.h" | |
10 #include "base/strings/string_util.h" | |
11 #include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h" | |
12 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebHTTPHeaderVisitor.h" | |
13 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebString.h" | |
14 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebURL.h" | |
15 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebURLRequest.h" | |
16 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebURLResponse.h" | |
17 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebDocument.h" | |
18 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebFrame.h" | |
19 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebFrameClient.h" | |
20 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebSecurityOrigin.h" | |
21 | |
22 using WebKit::WebDocument; | |
23 using WebKit::WebString; | |
24 using WebKit::WebURL; | |
25 using WebKit::WebURLResponse; | |
26 using WebKit::WebURLRequest; | |
27 | |
28 | |
29 namespace webkit_glue { | |
30 | |
31 ResponseMetaData::ResponseMetaData() {} | |
32 | |
33 void SiteIsolationPolicy::WillSendRequest( | |
34 unsigned identifier, | |
35 WebURLRequest::TargetType target_type) { | |
36 TargetTypeMap* id_target_map = GetIdTargetMap(); | |
37 // When |identifier| already exists in the map, it means that this request has | |
38 // been redirected to issue another request. We don't overwrite the existing | |
39 // target_type since it becomes TargetIsSubresource no matter what the | |
40 // original target_type was. | |
41 if (!id_target_map->count(identifier)) | |
42 (*id_target_map)[identifier] = target_type; | |
43 } | |
44 | |
45 void SiteIsolationPolicy::DidReceiveResponse(WebKit::WebFrame* frame, | |
46 unsigned identifier, | |
47 const WebURLResponse& response) { | |
48 TargetTypeMap* id_target_map = GetIdTargetMap(); | |
49 DCHECK_EQ(id_target_map->count(identifier),1U); | |
50 | |
51 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("SiteIsolation.AllResponses", 1); | |
52 | |
53 GURL response_url = response.url(); | |
54 WebURLRequest::TargetType target_type = (*id_target_map)[identifier]; | |
55 id_target_map->erase(identifier); | |
56 | |
57 // See if this is for navigation. If it is, don't block it, under the | |
58 // assumption that we will put it in an appropriate process. | |
59 if (IsFrameNavigating(frame)) { | |
60 return; | |
61 } | |
62 | |
63 GURL frame_origin(frame->document().securityOrigin().toString()); | |
64 | |
65 if (!IsBlockableScheme(frame_origin)) { | |
66 return; | |
67 } | |
68 | |
69 if (IsSameSite(frame_origin, response_url)) { | |
70 return; | |
71 } | |
72 | |
73 ResponseMetaData::CanonicalMimeType canonical_mime_type = | |
74 GetCanonicalMimeType(response); | |
75 | |
76 if (canonical_mime_type == ResponseMetaData::Others) { | |
77 return; | |
78 } | |
79 | |
80 // Every CORS request should have the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header even | |
81 // if it is preceded by a pre-flight request. Therefore, if this is a CORS | |
82 // request, it has this header. response.httpHeaderField() internally uses | |
83 // case-insensitive matching for the header name. | |
84 std::string access_control_origin = response.httpHeaderField( | |
85 WebKit::WebString::fromUTF8("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")).utf8(); | |
86 | |
87 if (IsValidCorsHeaderSet(frame_origin, response_url, access_control_origin)) { | |
88 return; | |
89 } | |
90 | |
91 // Real XSD data collection starts from here. | |
92 std::string no_sniff = response.httpHeaderField( | |
93 WebKit::WebString::fromUTF8("X-Content-Type-Options")).utf8(); | |
94 | |
95 ResponseMetaData resp_data; | |
96 resp_data.frame_origin = frame_origin.spec(); | |
97 resp_data.response_url = response_url; | |
98 resp_data.request_identifier = identifier; | |
99 resp_data.target_type = target_type; | |
100 resp_data.canonical_mime_type = canonical_mime_type; | |
101 resp_data.http_status_code = response.httpStatusCode(); | |
102 resp_data.no_sniff = (no_sniff == "nosniff"); | |
103 | |
104 UrlResponseMetaDataMap* url_responsedata_map = GetUrlResponseMetaDataMap(); | |
105 IdUrlMap* id_url_map = GetIdUrlMap(); | |
106 | |
107 (*url_responsedata_map)[resp_data.response_url] = resp_data; | |
108 (*id_url_map)[identifier] = resp_data.response_url; | |
109 } | |
110 | |
111 // These macros are defined here so that we prevent code size bloat-up due to | |
112 // the UMA_HISTOGRAM_* macros. Similar logic is used for recording UMA stats for | |
113 // different MIME types, but we cannot create a helper function for this since | |
114 // UMA_HISTOGRAM_* macros do not accept variabls as their bucket names. As a | |
Charlie Reis
2013/08/13 21:09:03
nit: variables
dsjang
2013/08/13 21:49:52
Done.
| |
115 // solution, macros are used instead to capture the repeated pattern for | |
116 // recording UMA stats. | |
117 // TODO(dsjang): this is only needed for collecting UMA stat. Will be deleted | |
118 // when this class is used for actual blocking. | |
119 | |
120 #define SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
121 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS( BUCKET_PREFIX ".Blocked", 1); \ | |
122 if (renderable_status_code) { \ | |
123 UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION( \ | |
124 BUCKET_PREFIX ".Blocked.RenderableStatusCode", \ | |
125 resp_data.target_type, \ | |
126 WebURLRequest::TargetIsUnspecified + 1); \ | |
127 } else { \ | |
128 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(BUCKET_PREFIX ".Blocked.NonRenderableStatusCode",1);\ | |
129 } | |
130 | |
131 #define SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NO_SNIFF_BLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
132 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS( BUCKET_PREFIX ".NoSniffBlocked", 1); \ | |
133 if (renderable_status_code) { \ | |
134 UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION( \ | |
135 BUCKET_PREFIX ".NoSniffBlocked.RenderableStatusCode", \ | |
136 resp_data.target_type, \ | |
137 WebURLRequest::TargetIsUnspecified + 1); \ | |
138 } else { \ | |
139 UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION( \ | |
140 BUCKET_PREFIX ".NoSniffBlocked.NonRenderableStatusCode", \ | |
141 resp_data.target_type, \ | |
142 WebURLRequest::TargetIsUnspecified + 1); \ | |
143 } | |
144 | |
145 #define SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NOTBLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
146 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(BUCKET_PREFIX ".NotBlocked", 1); \ | |
147 if (is_sniffed_for_js) \ | |
148 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(BUCKET_PREFIX ".NotBlocked.MaybeJS", 1); \ | |
149 | |
150 #define SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SNIFF_EXPR,BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
151 if (SNIFF_EXPR) { \ | |
152 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
153 } else { \ | |
154 if (resp_data.no_sniff) { \ | |
155 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NO_SNIFF_BLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
156 } else { \ | |
157 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NOTBLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
158 } \ | |
159 } | |
160 | |
161 void SiteIsolationPolicy::DidReceiveData(const char* data, | |
162 int length, | |
163 WebURL& web_response_url) { | |
164 GURL response_url(web_response_url); | |
165 | |
166 UrlResponseMetaDataMap* url_responsedata_map = GetUrlResponseMetaDataMap(); | |
167 | |
168 if (url_responsedata_map->count(response_url) == 0) | |
169 return; | |
170 | |
171 DCHECK_EQ(url_responsedata_map->count(response_url), 1U); | |
172 ResponseMetaData resp_data = (*url_responsedata_map)[response_url]; | |
173 url_responsedata_map->erase(response_url); | |
174 | |
175 // Record the length of the first received network packet to see if it's | |
176 // enough for sniffing. | |
177 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("SiteIsolation.XSD.DataLength", length); | |
178 | |
179 // Record the number of cross-site document responses with a specific mime | |
180 // type (text/html, text/xml, etc). | |
181 UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("SiteIsolation.XSD.MimeType", | |
182 resp_data.canonical_mime_type, | |
183 ResponseMetaData::MaxCanonicalMimeType); | |
184 | |
185 // The content is blocked if it is sniffed for HTML/JSON/XML. When the blocked | |
186 // response is with an error status code, it is not disruptive by the | |
187 // following reasons : 1) the blocked content is not a binary object (such as | |
188 // an image) since it is sniffed for text; 2) then, this blocking only breaks | |
189 // the renderer behavior only if it is either JavaScript or CSS. However, the | |
190 // renderer doesn't use the contents of JS/CSS with unaffected status code | |
191 // (e.g, 404). 3) the renderer is expected not to use the cross-site document | |
192 // content for purposes other than JS/CSS (e.g, XHR). | |
193 bool renderable_status_code = IsRenderableStatusCodeForDocument( | |
194 resp_data.http_status_code); | |
195 | |
196 // This is only used for false-negative analysis for non-blocked resources. | |
197 bool is_sniffed_for_js = SniffForJS(data, length); | |
198 | |
199 // Record the number of responses whose content is sniffed for what its mime | |
200 // type claims it to be. For example, we apply a HTML sniffer for a document | |
201 // tagged with text/html here. Whenever this check becomes true, we'll block | |
202 // the response. | |
203 switch (resp_data.canonical_mime_type) { | |
204 case ResponseMetaData::HTML: | |
205 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SniffForHTML(data, length), | |
206 "SiteIsolation.XSD.HTML"); | |
207 break; | |
208 case ResponseMetaData::XML: | |
209 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SniffForXML(data, length), | |
210 "SiteIsolation.XSD.XML"); | |
211 break; | |
212 case ResponseMetaData::JSON: | |
213 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SniffForJSON(data, length), | |
214 "SiteIsolation.XSD.JSON"); | |
215 break; | |
216 case ResponseMetaData::Plain: | |
217 if (SniffForHTML(data, length)) { | |
218 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK( | |
219 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain.HTML"); | |
220 } else if (SniffForXML(data, length)) { | |
221 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK( | |
222 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain.XML"); | |
223 } else if (SniffForJSON(data, length)) { | |
224 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK( | |
225 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain.JSON"); | |
226 } else if (is_sniffed_for_js) { | |
227 if (resp_data.no_sniff) { | |
228 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NO_SNIFF_BLOCK( | |
229 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain"); | |
230 } else { | |
231 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NOTBLOCK( | |
232 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain"); | |
233 } | |
234 } | |
235 break; | |
236 default : | |
237 NOTREACHED() << | |
238 "Not a blockable mime type. This mime type shouldn't reach here."; | |
239 break; | |
240 } | |
241 } | |
242 | |
243 #undef SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NOTBLOCK | |
244 #undef SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT | |
245 #undef SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK | |
246 | |
247 | |
248 void SiteIsolationPolicy::DidFinishResourceLoad(unsigned identifier) { | |
249 TargetTypeMap* id_target_map = GetIdTargetMap(); | |
250 UrlResponseMetaDataMap* url_responsedata_map = GetUrlResponseMetaDataMap(); | |
251 IdUrlMap* id_url_map = GetIdUrlMap(); | |
252 | |
253 id_target_map->erase(identifier); | |
254 if (!id_url_map->count(identifier)) { | |
255 url_responsedata_map->erase((*id_url_map)[identifier]); | |
256 id_url_map->erase(identifier); | |
257 } | |
258 } | |
259 | |
260 void SiteIsolationPolicy::DidFinishResourceLoadForUrl( | |
261 const WebKit::WebURL& web_response_url) { | |
262 GURL response_url(web_response_url); | |
263 | |
264 TargetTypeMap* id_target_map = GetIdTargetMap(); | |
265 UrlResponseMetaDataMap* url_responsedata_map = GetUrlResponseMetaDataMap(); | |
266 IdUrlMap* id_url_map = GetIdUrlMap(); | |
267 | |
268 if (!url_responsedata_map->count(response_url)) { | |
269 ResponseMetaData meta_data = (*url_responsedata_map)[response_url]; | |
270 url_responsedata_map->erase(response_url); | |
271 id_target_map->erase(meta_data.request_identifier); | |
272 id_url_map->erase(meta_data.request_identifier); | |
273 } | |
274 } | |
275 | |
276 ResponseMetaData::CanonicalMimeType SiteIsolationPolicy::GetCanonicalMimeType( | |
277 const WebURLResponse& response) { | |
278 | |
279 // These are a thorough list of the mime types crawled over the top | |
280 // 50k sites related to HTML, XML, JSON, Plain. | |
281 static const char kTextHtml[] = "text/html"; | |
282 static const char kTextXml[] = "text/xml"; | |
283 static const char xAppRssXml[] = "application/rss+xml"; | |
284 static const char kAppXml[] = "application/xml"; | |
285 static const char kAppJson[] = "application/json"; | |
286 static const char kTextJson[] = "text/json"; | |
287 static const char kTextXjson[] = "text/x-json"; | |
288 static const char kTextPlain[] = "text/plain"; | |
289 | |
290 const std::string mime_type = response.mimeType().utf8(); | |
291 | |
292 if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextHtml)) { | |
293 return ResponseMetaData::HTML; | |
294 } else if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextPlain)) { | |
295 return ResponseMetaData::Plain; | |
296 } else if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kAppJson) || | |
297 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextJson) || | |
298 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextXjson)) { | |
299 return ResponseMetaData::JSON; | |
300 } else if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextXml) || | |
301 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, xAppRssXml) || | |
302 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kAppXml)) { | |
303 return ResponseMetaData::XML; | |
304 } else { | |
305 return ResponseMetaData::Others; | |
306 } | |
307 } | |
308 | |
309 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsBlockableScheme(const GURL& url) { | |
310 // We exclude ftp:// from here. FTP doesn't provide a Content-Type | |
311 // header which our policy depends on, so we cannot protect any | |
312 // document from FTP servers. | |
313 return url.SchemeIs("http") || url.SchemeIs("https"); | |
314 } | |
315 | |
316 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsSameSite(const GURL& frame_origin, | |
317 const GURL& response_url) { | |
Charlie Reis
2013/08/13 21:09:03
Please add a check for whether either URL is inval
dsjang
2013/08/13 21:49:52
Done.
| |
318 if (frame_origin.scheme() != response_url.scheme()) | |
319 return false; | |
320 | |
321 // SameDomainOrHost() extracts the effective domains (public suffix plus one) | |
322 // from the two URLs and compare them. | |
323 // TODO(dsjang): use INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES when http://crbug.com/7988 is | |
324 // fixed. | |
325 return net::registry_controlled_domains::SameDomainOrHost( | |
326 frame_origin, | |
327 response_url, | |
328 net::registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES); | |
329 } | |
330 | |
331 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsFrameNavigating(WebKit::WebFrame* frame) { | |
332 // When a navigation starts, frame->provisionalDataSource() is set | |
333 // to a not-null value which stands for the request made for the | |
334 // navigation. As soon as the network request is committed to the | |
335 // frame, frame->provisionalDataSource() is converted to null, and | |
336 // the committed data source is moved to frame->dataSource(). This | |
337 // is the most reliable way to detect whether the frame is in | |
338 // navigation or not. | |
339 return frame->provisionalDataSource() != NULL; | |
340 } | |
341 | |
342 // We don't use Webkit's existing CORS policy implementation since | |
343 // their policy works in terms of origins, not sites. For example, | |
344 // when frame is sub.a.com and it is not allowed to access a document | |
345 // with sub1.a.com. But under Site Isolation, it's allowed. | |
346 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsValidCorsHeaderSet( | |
347 GURL& frame_origin, | |
348 GURL& website_origin, | |
349 std::string access_control_origin) { | |
350 // Many websites are sending back "\"*\"" instead of "*". This is | |
351 // non-standard practice, and not supported by Chrome. Refer to | |
352 // CrossOriginAccessControl::passesAccessControlCheck(). | |
353 | |
354 // TODO(dsjang): * is not allowed for the response from a request | |
355 // with cookies. This allows for more than what the renderer will | |
356 // eventually be able to receive, so we won't see illegal cross-site | |
357 // documents allowed by this. We have to find a way to see if this | |
358 // response is from a cookie-tagged request or not in the future. | |
359 if (access_control_origin == "*") | |
360 return true; | |
361 | |
362 // TODO(dsjang): The CORS spec only treats a fully specified URL, except for | |
363 // "*", but many websites are using just a domain for access_control_origin, | |
364 // and this is blocked by Webkit's CORS logic here : | |
365 // CrossOriginAccessControl::passesAccessControlCheck(). GURL is set | |
366 // is_valid() to false when it is created from a URL containing * in the | |
367 // domain part. | |
368 | |
369 GURL cors_origin(access_control_origin); | |
370 return IsSameSite(frame_origin, cors_origin); | |
371 } | |
372 | |
373 // This function is a slight modification of |net::SniffForHTML|. | |
374 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForHTML(const char* data, size_t length) { | |
375 // The content sniffer used by Chrome and Firefox are using "<!--" | |
376 // as one of the HTML signatures, but it also appears in valid | |
377 // JavaScript, considered as well-formed JS by the browser. Since | |
378 // we do not want to block any JS, we exclude it from our HTML | |
379 // signatures. This can weaken our document block policy, but we can | |
380 // break less websites. | |
381 // TODO(dsjang): parameterize |net::SniffForHTML| with an option | |
382 // that decides whether to include <!-- or not, so that we can | |
383 // remove this function. | |
384 const char* html_signatures[] = {"<!DOCTYPE html", // HTML5 spec | |
385 "<script", // HTML5 spec, Mozilla | |
386 "<html", // HTML5 spec, Mozilla | |
387 "<head", // HTML5 spec, Mozilla | |
388 "<iframe", // Mozilla | |
389 "<h1", // Mozilla | |
390 "<div", // Mozilla | |
391 "<font", // Mozilla | |
392 "<table", // Mozilla | |
393 "<a", // Mozilla | |
394 "<style", // Mozilla | |
395 "<title", // Mozilla | |
396 "<b", // Mozilla | |
397 "<body", // Mozilla | |
398 "<br", "<p" // Mozilla | |
399 }; | |
400 return MatchesSignature( | |
401 data, length, html_signatures, arraysize(html_signatures)); | |
402 } | |
403 | |
404 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForXML(const char* data, size_t length) { | |
405 // TODO(dsjang): Chrome's mime_sniffer is using strncasecmp() for | |
406 // this signature. However, XML is case-sensitive. Don't we have to | |
407 // be more lenient only to block documents starting with the exact | |
408 // string <?xml rather than <?XML ? | |
409 const char* xml_signatures[] = {"<?xml" // Mozilla | |
410 }; | |
411 return MatchesSignature( | |
412 data, length, xml_signatures, arraysize(xml_signatures)); | |
413 } | |
414 | |
415 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForJSON(const char* data, size_t length) { | |
416 // TODO(dsjang): We have to come up with a better way to sniff | |
417 // JSON. However, even RE cannot help us that much due to the fact | |
418 // that we don't do full parsing. This DFA starts with state 0, and | |
419 // finds {, "/' and : in that order. We're avoiding adding a | |
420 // dependency on a regular expression library. | |
421 const int kInitState = 0; | |
422 const int kLeftBraceState = 1; | |
423 const int kLeftQuoteState = 2; | |
424 const int kColonState = 3; | |
425 const int kDeadState = 4; | |
426 | |
427 int state = kInitState; | |
428 for (size_t i = 0; i < length && state < kColonState; ++i) { | |
429 const char c = data[i]; | |
430 if (c == ' ' || c == '\t' || c == '\r' || c == '\n') | |
431 continue; | |
432 | |
433 switch (state) { | |
434 case kInitState: | |
435 if (c == '{') | |
436 state = kLeftBraceState; | |
437 else | |
438 state = kDeadState; | |
439 break; | |
440 case kLeftBraceState: | |
441 if (c == '\"' || c == '\'') | |
442 state = kLeftQuoteState; | |
443 else | |
444 state = kDeadState; | |
445 break; | |
446 case kLeftQuoteState: | |
447 if (c == ':') | |
448 state = kColonState; | |
449 break; | |
450 default: | |
451 NOTREACHED(); | |
452 break; | |
453 } | |
454 } | |
455 return state == kColonState; | |
456 } | |
457 | |
458 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::MatchesSignature(const char* raw_data, | |
459 size_t raw_length, | |
460 const char* signatures[], | |
461 size_t arr_size) { | |
462 size_t start = 0; | |
463 // Skip white characters at the beginning of the document. | |
464 for (start = 0; start < raw_length; ++start) { | |
465 char c = raw_data[start]; | |
466 if (!(c == ' ' || c == '\r' || c == '\n' || c == '\t')) | |
467 break; | |
468 } | |
469 | |
470 // There is no not-whitespace character in this document. | |
471 if (!(start < raw_length)) | |
472 return false; | |
473 | |
474 const char* data = raw_data + start; | |
475 size_t length = raw_length - start; | |
476 | |
477 for (size_t sig_index = 0; sig_index < arr_size; ++sig_index) { | |
478 const char* signature = signatures[sig_index]; | |
479 size_t signature_length = strlen(signature); | |
480 | |
481 if (length < signature_length) | |
482 continue; | |
483 | |
484 if (!base::strncasecmp(signature, data, signature_length)) | |
485 return true; | |
486 } | |
487 return false; | |
488 } | |
489 | |
490 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsRenderableStatusCodeForDocument(int status_code) { | |
491 // Chrome only uses the content of a response with one of these status codes | |
492 // for CSS/JavaScript. For images, Chrome just ignores status code. | |
493 const int renderable_status_code[] = {200, 201, 202, 203, 206, 300, 301, 302, | |
494 303, 305, 306, 307}; | |
495 for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(renderable_status_code); ++i) { | |
496 if (renderable_status_code[i] == status_code) | |
497 return true; | |
498 } | |
499 return false; | |
500 } | |
501 | |
502 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForJS(const char* data, size_t length) { | |
503 // TODO(dsjang): This is a real hack. The only purpose of this function is to | |
504 // try to see if there's any possibility that this data can be JavaScript | |
505 // (superset of JS). This function will be removed once UMA stats are | |
506 // gathered. | |
507 | |
508 // Search for "var " for JS detection. | |
509 for (size_t i = 0; i < length - 3; ++i) { | |
510 if (strncmp(data + i, "var ", 4) == 0) | |
511 return true; | |
512 } | |
513 return false; | |
514 } | |
515 | |
516 TargetTypeMap* SiteIsolationPolicy::GetIdTargetMap() { | |
517 CR_DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(TargetTypeMap, id_target_map_, ()); | |
518 return &id_target_map_; | |
519 } | |
520 | |
521 UrlResponseMetaDataMap* SiteIsolationPolicy::GetUrlResponseMetaDataMap() { | |
522 CR_DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(UrlResponseMetaDataMap, url_responsedata_map_, ()); | |
523 return &url_responsedata_map_; | |
524 } | |
525 | |
526 IdUrlMap* SiteIsolationPolicy::GetIdUrlMap() { | |
527 CR_DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(IdUrlMap, id_url_map_, ()); | |
528 return &id_url_map_; | |
529 } | |
530 | |
531 } // namespace webkit_glue | |
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