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1 // Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. | |
2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be | |
3 // found in the LICENSE file. | |
4 | |
5 #include "webkit/child/site_isolation_policy.h" | |
6 | |
7 #include "base/basictypes.h" | |
8 #include "base/logging.h" | |
9 #include "base/metrics/histogram.h" | |
10 #include "base/strings/string_util.h" | |
11 #include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h" | |
12 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebHTTPHeaderVisitor.h" | |
13 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebString.h" | |
14 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebURL.h" | |
15 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebURLRequest.h" | |
16 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebURLResponse.h" | |
17 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebDocument.h" | |
18 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebFrame.h" | |
19 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebFrameClient.h" | |
20 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebSecurityOrigin.h" | |
21 | |
22 using base::strncasecmp; | |
23 using WebKit::WebDocument; | |
24 using WebKit::WebString; | |
25 using WebKit::WebURL; | |
26 using WebKit::WebURLResponse; | |
27 using WebKit::WebURLRequest; | |
28 | |
29 | |
30 namespace webkit_glue { | |
31 | |
32 std::map<unsigned, WebURLRequest::TargetType> | |
33 SiteIsolationPolicy::id_target_map_; | |
34 std::map<std::string, ResponseMetaData> | |
35 SiteIsolationPolicy::url_responsedata_map_; | |
36 std::map<unsigned, std::string> SiteIsolationPolicy::id_url_map_; | |
37 | |
38 void SiteIsolationPolicy::WillSendRequest( | |
39 unsigned identifier, | |
40 WebURLRequest::TargetType target_type) { | |
41 // When identifier already exists in the map, it means that this | |
42 // request has been redirected to issue another request. We don't | |
43 // overwrite the existing target_type since it becomes | |
44 // TargetIsSubresource no matter what the original target_type was. | |
Charlie Reis
2013/08/09 00:39:03
Much clearer. Thanks.
dsjang
2013/08/09 01:31:23
Done.
| |
45 if (!id_target_map_.count(identifier)) | |
46 id_target_map_[identifier] = target_type; | |
47 } | |
48 | |
49 void SiteIsolationPolicy::DidReceiveResponse(WebKit::WebFrame* frame, | |
50 unsigned identifier, | |
51 const WebURLResponse& response) { | |
52 DCHECK_EQ(id_target_map_.count(identifier),1U); | |
53 | |
54 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("XSDP.ALL", 1); | |
Charlie Reis
2013/08/09 00:39:03
For the naming scheme, let's stick to SiteIsolatio
dsjang
2013/08/09 01:31:23
Done.
| |
55 | |
56 GURL response_url = response.url(); | |
57 WebURLRequest::TargetType target_type = id_target_map_[identifier]; | |
58 id_target_map_.erase(identifier); | |
59 | |
60 // See if this is for navigation. If it is, let it pass. | |
Charlie Reis
2013/08/09 00:39:03
"let it pass" -> "don't block it, under the assump
dsjang
2013/08/09 01:31:23
Done.
| |
61 if (IsFrameInNavigation(frame)) { | |
62 LOG(INFO) << "SiteIsolationPolicy.FrameInNavigation"; | |
63 return; | |
64 } | |
65 | |
66 GURL frame_origin(frame->document().securityOrigin().toString().utf8()); | |
Charlie Reis
2013/08/09 00:39:03
I don't think you need the utf8() call here, do yo
dsjang
2013/08/09 01:31:23
Done.
| |
67 | |
68 // TODO(dsjang): Find out all network related schemes here. | |
Charlie Reis
2013/08/09 00:39:03
Is there more to be done here?
dsjang
2013/08/09 01:31:23
Done.
| |
69 if (!IsNetworkScheme(frame_origin)) { | |
70 LOG(INFO) << "SiteIsolationPolicy.NotNetworkScheme:" << frame_origin; | |
71 return; | |
72 } | |
73 | |
74 if (IsSameSite(frame_origin, response_url)) { | |
75 LOG(INFO) << "SiteIsolationPolicy.SameSite:" << frame_origin << "," | |
76 << response_url; | |
77 return; | |
78 } | |
79 | |
80 ResponseMetaData::CanonicalMimeType canonical_mime_type = | |
81 GetCanonicalMimeType(response); | |
82 | |
83 if (canonical_mime_type == ResponseMetaData::IsOthers) { | |
84 LOG(INFO) << "SiteIsolationPolicy.mimetype:" << frame_origin << "," | |
85 << response_url << ",[" << response.mimeType().utf8() << "]"; | |
86 return; | |
87 } | |
88 | |
89 // There was a possiblity that a CORS request preceded by a | |
Charlie Reis
2013/08/09 00:39:03
Do we need this comment? Or perhaps we can just s
dsjang
2013/08/09 01:31:23
Done.
| |
90 // pre-flight request does not have "Access-Control-Allow-Origin" | |
91 // header. But it turns out that every CORS request should have the | |
92 // header no matter what CORS request it is. Therefore, if this is a | |
93 // CORS request, it has this header. | |
94 std::string access_control_origin = response | |
95 .httpHeaderField( | |
Charlie Reis
2013/08/09 00:39:03
Style nit: Better to response and .httpHeaderField
dsjang
2013/08/09 01:31:23
Done.
| |
96 WebKit::WebString::fromUTF8("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")).utf8(); | |
97 | |
98 if (IsValidCorsHeaderSet(frame_origin, response_url, access_control_origin)) { | |
99 LOG(INFO) << "SiteIsolationPolicy.CorsIsSafe:"; | |
100 return; | |
101 } | |
102 | |
103 // Real XSD data collection starts from here. | |
104 LOG(INFO) << "SiteIsolationPolicy.XSD:from header:" << canonical_mime_type << | |
105 ":" << response_url; | |
106 | |
107 // TODO(dsjang): Apply X-Content-Type option here. | |
Charlie Reis
2013/08/09 00:39:03
What does this mean?
dsjang
2013/08/09 01:31:23
I'm planning to detect X-Content-Type: nosniff hea
| |
108 ResponseMetaData resp_data; | |
109 resp_data.frame_origin = frame_origin.spec(); | |
110 resp_data.response_url = response_url.spec(); | |
111 resp_data.identifier = identifier; | |
112 resp_data.target_type = target_type; | |
113 resp_data.canonical_mime_type = canonical_mime_type; | |
114 resp_data.http_status_code = response.httpStatusCode(); | |
115 | |
116 url_responsedata_map_[resp_data.response_url] = resp_data; | |
117 id_url_map_[identifier] = resp_data.response_url; | |
118 | |
119 return; | |
120 } | |
121 | |
122 #define COUNT_BLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
Charlie Reis
2013/08/09 00:39:03
Introducing new macros is generally frowned upon:
dsjang
2013/08/09 01:31:23
Done.
| |
123 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(""BUCKET_PREFIX".Blocked", 1); \ | |
124 if (ok_status_code) { \ | |
125 UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION( \ | |
126 ""BUCKET_PREFIX".Blocked.OKStatusCode", \ | |
127 resp_data.target_type, \ | |
128 WebURLRequest::TargetIsUnspecified + 1); \ | |
129 } else { \ | |
130 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(""BUCKET_PREFIX".Blocked.ErrorStatusCode", 1); \ | |
131 } | |
132 | |
133 #define COUNT_NOTBLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
134 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(""BUCKET_PREFIX".NotBlocked", 1); \ | |
135 if (is_sniffed_for_js) \ | |
136 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(""BUCKET_PREFIX".NotBlocked.MaybeJS", 1); \ | |
137 | |
138 #define SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SNIFF_EXPR,BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
139 if (SNIFF_EXPR) { \ | |
140 COUNT_BLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
141 } else { \ | |
142 COUNT_NOTBLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
143 } | |
144 | |
145 void SiteIsolationPolicy::DidReceiveData(const char* data, | |
146 int length, | |
147 WebURL& web_response_url) { | |
148 // We only record XSDs whose content is actually non-zero. | |
149 GURL response_url(web_response_url); | |
150 | |
151 std::string response_url_str = response_url.spec(); | |
152 if (url_responsedata_map_.count(response_url_str) == 0) | |
153 return; | |
154 | |
155 DCHECK_EQ(url_responsedata_map_.count(response_url_str), 1U); | |
156 ResponseMetaData resp_data = url_responsedata_map_[response_url_str]; | |
157 url_responsedata_map_.erase(response_url_str); | |
158 | |
159 // Record the length of the first received network packet to see if | |
160 // it's enough for sniffing. | |
161 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("XSDP.XSD.DataLength", length); | |
162 | |
163 // Record the entire number of responses with a specific mime | |
164 // type(text/html, text/xml, etc). | |
165 UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("XSDP.XSD.MimeType", | |
166 resp_data.canonical_mime_type, | |
167 ResponseMetaData::MaxCanonicalMimeType); | |
168 | |
169 // Blocking only happens when the content is sniffed for | |
170 // HTML/JSON/XML. So if the status code is an error status code, it | |
171 // is not disruptive by the following reasons : 1) the blocked | |
172 // content is not a binary object (such as an image) since it is | |
173 // sniffed as a text document. 2) then, this blocking only breaks | |
174 // the renderer behavior only if it is either JavaScript or | |
175 // CSS. However, the renderer doesn't use the contents of JS/CSS | |
176 // with unaffected status code(e.g, 404). *) the renderer is | |
177 // expected not to use the cross-site document content for purposes | |
178 // other than JS/CSS (e.g, XHR). | |
179 bool ok_status_code = !IsErrorStatusCode(resp_data.http_status_code); | |
180 | |
181 // This is only used for measuring false-negative analysis for | |
182 // non-blocked resources. | |
183 bool is_sniffed_for_js = SniffForJS(data, length); | |
184 | |
185 // Record the number of responses whose content is sniffed for what | |
186 // its mime type claims it to be. For example, we apply a HTML | |
187 // sniffer for a document tagged with text/html here. Whenever this | |
188 // check becomes true, we'll block the response. | |
189 switch (resp_data.canonical_mime_type) { | |
190 case ResponseMetaData::IsHTML: | |
191 SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SniffForHTML(data, length), "XSDP.XSD.MimeType.HTML"); | |
192 break; | |
193 case ResponseMetaData::IsXML: | |
194 SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SniffForXML(data, length), "XSDP.XSD.MimeType.XML"); | |
195 break; | |
196 case ResponseMetaData::IsJSON: | |
197 SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SniffForJSON(data, length), "XSDP.XSD.MimeType.JSON"); | |
198 break; | |
199 case ResponseMetaData::IsPlain: | |
200 if (SniffForHTML(data, length)) { | |
201 COUNT_BLOCK("XSDP.XSD.MimeType.Plain.HTML"); | |
202 } else if (SniffForXML(data, length)) { | |
203 COUNT_BLOCK("XSDP.XSD.MimeType.Plain.XML"); | |
204 } else if (SniffForJSON(data, length)) { | |
205 COUNT_BLOCK("XSDP.XSD.MimeType.Plain.JSON"); | |
206 } else if (is_sniffed_for_js) { | |
207 COUNT_NOTBLOCK("XSDP.XSD.MimeType.Plain"); | |
208 } | |
209 break; | |
210 default : | |
211 DCHECK(false); | |
212 break; | |
213 } | |
214 } | |
215 | |
216 void SiteIsolationPolicy::DidFinishResourceLoad(unsigned identifier) { | |
217 id_target_map_.erase(identifier); | |
218 if (!id_url_map_.count(identifier)) { | |
219 url_responsedata_map_.erase(id_url_map_[identifier]); | |
220 id_url_map_.erase(identifier); | |
221 } | |
222 } | |
223 | |
224 void SiteIsolationPolicy::DidFinishResourceLoadForUrl( | |
225 const WebKit::WebURL& web_response_url) { | |
226 GURL response_url(web_response_url); | |
227 | |
228 if (!url_responsedata_map_.count(response_url.spec())) { | |
229 ResponseMetaData meta_data = url_responsedata_map_[response_url.spec()]; | |
230 url_responsedata_map_.erase(response_url.spec()); | |
231 id_target_map_.erase(meta_data.identifier); | |
232 id_url_map_.erase(meta_data.identifier); | |
233 } | |
234 } | |
235 | |
236 ResponseMetaData::CanonicalMimeType SiteIsolationPolicy::GetCanonicalMimeType( | |
237 const WebURLResponse& response) { | |
238 static const char TEXT_HTML[] = "text/html"; | |
239 static const char TEXT_XML[] = "text/xml"; | |
240 static const char APP_RSS_XML[] = "application/rss+xml"; | |
241 static const char APP_XML[] = "application/xml"; | |
242 static const char APP_JSON[] = "application/json"; | |
243 static const char TEXT_XJSON[] = "text/x-json"; | |
244 static const char TEXT_JSON[] = "text/json"; | |
245 static const char TEXT_PLAIN[] = "text/json"; | |
246 | |
247 const std::string mime_type = response.mimeType().utf8(); | |
248 | |
249 LOG(ERROR) << "mimetype:" << mime_type << "==[" << TEXT_HTML << "]"; | |
250 | |
251 // These are a thorough list of the mime types crawled over the top | |
252 // 50k sites related to HTML, XML, JSON, Plain. | |
253 if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, TEXT_HTML)) { | |
254 return ResponseMetaData::IsHTML; | |
255 } else if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, TEXT_XML) || | |
256 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, APP_RSS_XML) || | |
257 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, APP_XML)) { | |
258 return ResponseMetaData::IsXML; | |
259 } else if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, APP_JSON) || | |
260 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, TEXT_XJSON) || | |
261 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, TEXT_JSON)) { | |
262 return ResponseMetaData::IsJSON; | |
263 } else if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, TEXT_PLAIN)) { | |
264 return ResponseMetaData::IsPlain; | |
265 } else { | |
266 return ResponseMetaData::IsOthers; | |
267 } | |
268 } | |
269 | |
270 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsNetworkScheme(GURL& url) { | |
271 // We exclude ftp:// from here. FTP doesn't provide a Content-Type | |
272 // header which our policy depends on, so we cannot protect any | |
273 // document from FTP servers. | |
274 return url.SchemeIs("http") || url.SchemeIs("https"); | |
275 } | |
276 | |
277 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsSameSite(GURL& frame_origin, GURL& response_url) { | |
278 if (frame_origin.scheme() != response_url.scheme()) | |
279 return false; | |
280 | |
281 // Extract the effective domains (public suffix plus one) of the | |
282 // urls. | |
283 | |
284 // TODO(dsjang): Is there any reason why we don't use | |
285 // net::registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES | |
286 // instead of | |
287 // net::registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUSE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES? If | |
288 // we allow sites to use their private registries, they can use | |
289 // "finer grained" sites than only using public ones. | |
290 std::string frame_domain = | |
291 net::registry_controlled_domains::GetDomainAndRegistry( | |
292 frame_origin, | |
293 net::registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES); | |
294 std::string response_domain = | |
295 net::registry_controlled_domains::GetDomainAndRegistry( | |
296 response_url, | |
297 net::registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES); | |
298 | |
299 return frame_domain == response_domain; | |
300 } | |
301 | |
302 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsFrameInNavigation(WebKit::WebFrame* frame) { | |
303 // When a navigation starts, frame->provisionalDataSource() is set | |
304 // to a not-null value which stands for the request made for the | |
305 // navigation. As soon as the network request is committed to the | |
306 // frame, frame->provisionalDataSource() is converted to null, and | |
307 // the committed data source is moved to frame->dataSource(). This | |
308 // is the most reliable way to detect whether the frame is in | |
309 // navigation or not by far. | |
310 return frame->provisionalDataSource() != NULL; | |
311 } | |
312 | |
313 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsValidCorsHeaderSet( | |
314 GURL& frame_origin, | |
315 GURL& website_origin, | |
316 std::string access_control_origin) { | |
317 | |
318 size_t access_control_origin_len = access_control_origin.size(); | |
319 | |
320 // TODO(dsjang): Is this actually true? The server seems to return | |
321 // an empty string or "null". | |
322 if (access_control_origin_len == 0) | |
323 return false; | |
324 | |
325 // Many websites are sending back "\"*\"" instead of "*". This is | |
326 // non-standard practice, and seems not supported by the | |
327 // brwoser. Refer to | |
328 // CrossOriginAccessControl::passesAccessControlCheck(). | |
329 | |
330 // TODO(dsjang): * is not allowed for the response from a request | |
331 // with cookies. This allows for more than what the renderer will | |
332 // eventually be able to receive, so we won't see illegal cross-site | |
333 // documents alllowed by this. We have to have t a way to see if | |
334 // this response is from a cookie-tagged request or not in the | |
335 // future. | |
336 if (access_control_origin == "*") | |
337 return true; | |
338 | |
339 // TODO(dsjang): The CORS spec only treats a fully specified URL, | |
340 // except for "*", but many websites are using just a domain for | |
341 // access_control_origin, and this is blocked by Webkit's CORS logic | |
342 // here : CrossOriginAccessControl::passesAccessControlCheck() | |
343 | |
344 // We don't use Webkit's existing CORS policy implementation since | |
345 // their policy works in terms of origins, not sites. For | |
346 // example, when frame is sub.a.com and it is not allowed to access | |
347 // a document with sub1.a.com. But under Site Isolation, it's | |
348 // allowed. | |
349 | |
350 // TODO(dsjang): examine createFromString()'s behavior for a URL | |
351 // containing * in it. | |
352 WebKit::WebSecurityOrigin cors_security_origin = | |
353 WebKit::WebSecurityOrigin::createFromString( | |
354 WebKit::WebString::fromUTF8(access_control_origin)); | |
355 GURL cors_origin(cors_security_origin.toString().utf8()); | |
356 | |
357 LOG(ERROR) << cors_security_origin.toString().utf8(); | |
358 return IsSameSite(frame_origin, cors_origin); | |
359 } | |
360 | |
361 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForHTML(const char* data, size_t length) { | |
362 // TODO(dsjang): The content sniffer used by Chrome and Firefox are | |
363 // using "<!--" as one of the HTML signatures, but it also appears | |
364 // in valid JavaScript, considered as well-formed JS by the browser. | |
365 // Since we do not want to block any JS, we exclude it from our HTML | |
366 // signatures. This can weaken our document block policy, but we can | |
367 // break less websites. | |
368 const char* html_signatures[] = {"<!DOCTYPE html", // HTML5 spec | |
369 "<script", // HTML5 spec, Mozilla | |
370 "<html", // HTML5 spec, Mozilla | |
371 "<head", // HTML5 spec, Mozilla | |
372 "<iframe", // Mozilla | |
373 "<h1", // Mozilla | |
374 "<div", // Mozilla | |
375 "<font", // Mozilla | |
376 "<table", // Mozilla | |
377 "<a", // Mozilla | |
378 "<style", // Mozilla | |
379 "<title", // Mozilla | |
380 "<b", // Mozilla | |
381 "<body", // Mozilla | |
382 "<br", "<p" // Mozilla | |
383 }; | |
384 return DoSignatureMatching( | |
385 data, length, html_signatures, arraysize(html_signatures)); | |
386 } | |
387 | |
388 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForXML(const char* data, size_t length) { | |
389 const char* xml_signatures[] = {"<?xml" // Mozilla | |
390 }; | |
391 return DoSignatureMatching( | |
392 data, length, xml_signatures, arraysize(xml_signatures)); | |
393 } | |
394 | |
395 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForJSON(const char* data, size_t length) { | |
396 // TODO(dsjang): We have to come up with a better way to sniff | |
397 // JSON. However, even RE cannot help us that much due to the fact | |
398 // that we don't do full parsing. This DFA starts with state 0, and | |
399 // finds 1) {, 2) "or', 3) : in the order. This is intentionally not | |
400 // using a regular expression library so that we can make the | |
401 // trusted code base as small as possible. State 4 is a dead state. | |
402 const int INIT_ST = 0; | |
403 const int LBRACE_ST = 1; | |
404 const int LQUOTE_ST = 2; | |
405 const int COLON_ST = 3; | |
406 const int DEAD_ST = 4; | |
407 | |
408 int state = INIT_ST; | |
409 for (size_t i = 0; i < length && state < COLON_ST; ++i, ++data) { | |
410 const char c = *data; | |
411 if (c == ' ' || c == '\t' || c == '\r' || c == '\n') | |
412 continue; | |
413 | |
414 switch (state) { | |
415 case INIT_ST: | |
416 if (c == '{') | |
417 state = LBRACE_ST; | |
418 else | |
419 state = DEAD_ST; | |
420 break; | |
421 case LBRACE_ST: | |
422 if (c == '\"' || c == '\'') | |
423 state = LQUOTE_ST; | |
424 else | |
425 state = DEAD_ST; | |
426 break; | |
427 case LQUOTE_ST: | |
428 if (c == ':') { | |
429 state = COLON_ST; | |
430 } | |
431 break; | |
432 default: | |
433 break; | |
434 } | |
435 } | |
436 return state == COLON_ST; | |
437 } | |
438 | |
439 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::DoSignatureMatching(const char* data, | |
440 size_t length, | |
441 const char* signatures[], | |
442 size_t arr_size) { | |
443 for (size_t sig_index = 0; sig_index < arr_size; ++sig_index) { | |
444 const char* signature = signatures[sig_index]; | |
445 size_t signature_length = strlen(signature); | |
446 size_t i = 0; | |
447 // Skip the white characters at the beginning of the document. | |
448 for (i = 0; i < length; ++i) { | |
449 char c = *data; | |
450 if (!(c == ' ' || c == '\r' || c == '\n' || c == '\t')) { | |
451 break; | |
452 } | |
453 ++data; | |
454 } | |
455 length = length - i; | |
456 if (length < signature_length) | |
457 continue; | |
458 if (!base::strncasecmp(signature, data, signature_length)) { | |
459 return true; | |
460 } | |
461 } | |
462 return false; | |
463 } | |
464 | |
465 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsErrorStatusCode(int status_code) { | |
466 // Chrome only uses the content of a response with one of these | |
467 // status codes for CSS/JavaScript. For images, Chrome just ignores | |
468 // status code. | |
469 const int renderable_status_code[] = {200, 201, 202, 203, 206, 300, 301, 302, | |
470 303, 305, 306, 307}; | |
471 for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(renderable_status_code); ++i) { | |
472 if (renderable_status_code[i] == status_code) | |
473 return false; | |
474 } | |
475 return true; | |
476 } | |
477 | |
478 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForJS(const char* data, size_t length) { | |
479 // TODO(dsjang): This is a real hacking. The only purpose of this | |
480 // function is to try to see if there's any possibility that this | |
481 // data can be JavaScript.(superset of JS). This function will be | |
482 // removed for the production code. | |
483 | |
484 // Search for "var " for JS detection. :-) | |
485 for (size_t i = 0; i < length - 3; ++i) { | |
486 if (strncmp(data, "var ", 4) == 0) { | |
487 return true; | |
488 } | |
489 ++data; | |
490 } | |
491 return false; | |
492 } | |
493 | |
494 } // namespace webkit_glue | |
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