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1 // Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. | |
2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be | |
3 // found in the LICENSE file. | |
4 | |
5 #include "content/child/site_isolation_policy.h" | |
6 | |
7 #include "base/basictypes.h" | |
8 #include "base/logging.h" | |
9 #include "base/metrics/histogram.h" | |
10 #include "base/strings/string_util.h" | |
11 #include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h" | |
12 #include "net/http/http_response_headers.h" | |
13 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebHTTPHeaderVisitor.h" | |
14 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebString.h" | |
15 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebURL.h" | |
16 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebURLRequest.h" | |
17 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebURLResponse.h" | |
18 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebDocument.h" | |
19 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebFrame.h" | |
20 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebFrameClient.h" | |
21 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebSecurityOrigin.h" | |
22 | |
23 using WebKit::WebDocument; | |
24 using WebKit::WebString; | |
25 using WebKit::WebURL; | |
26 using WebKit::WebURLResponse; | |
27 using WebKit::WebURLRequest; | |
28 | |
29 namespace content { | |
30 | |
31 namespace { | |
32 | |
33 // MIME types | |
34 const char kTextHtml[] = "text/html"; | |
35 const char kTextXml[] = "text/xml"; | |
36 const char xAppRssXml[] = "application/rss+xml"; | |
37 const char kAppXml[] = "application/xml"; | |
38 const char kAppJson[] = "application/json"; | |
39 const char kTextJson[] = "text/json"; | |
40 const char kTextXjson[] = "text/x-json"; | |
41 const char kTextPlain[] = "text/plain"; | |
42 | |
43 } // anonymous namespace | |
44 | |
45 SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::ResponseMetaData() {} | |
46 | |
47 void SiteIsolationPolicy::OnReceivedResponse( | |
48 int request_id, | |
49 GURL& frame_origin, | |
50 GURL& response_url, | |
51 ResourceType::Type resource_type, | |
52 const webkit_glue::ResourceResponseInfo& info) { | |
53 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("SiteIsolation.AllResponses", 1); | |
54 | |
55 // See if this is for navigation. If it is, don't block it, under the | |
56 // assumption that we will put it in an appropriate process. | |
57 if (ResourceType::IsFrame(resource_type)) | |
58 return; | |
59 | |
60 if (!IsBlockableScheme(response_url)) | |
61 return; | |
62 | |
63 if (IsSameSite(frame_origin, response_url)) | |
64 return; | |
65 | |
66 SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::CanonicalMimeType canonical_mime_type = | |
67 GetCanonicalMimeType(info.mime_type); | |
68 | |
69 if (canonical_mime_type == SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::Others) | |
70 return; | |
71 | |
72 // Every CORS request should have the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header even | |
73 // if it is preceded by a pre-flight request. Therefore, if this is a CORS | |
74 // request, it has this header. response.httpHeaderField() internally uses | |
75 // case-insensitive matching for the header name. | |
76 std::string access_control_origin; | |
77 | |
78 // We can use a case-insensitive header name for EnumerateHeader(). | |
79 info.headers->EnumerateHeader( | |
80 NULL, "access-control-allow-origin", &access_control_origin); | |
81 if (IsValidCorsHeaderSet(frame_origin, response_url, access_control_origin)) | |
82 return; | |
83 | |
84 // Real XSD data collection starts from here. | |
85 std::string no_sniff; | |
86 info.headers->EnumerateHeader(NULL, "x-content-type-options", &no_sniff); | |
87 | |
88 ResponseMetaData resp_data; | |
89 resp_data.frame_origin = frame_origin.spec(); | |
90 resp_data.response_url = response_url; | |
91 resp_data.resource_type = resource_type; | |
92 resp_data.canonical_mime_type = canonical_mime_type; | |
93 resp_data.http_status_code = info.headers->response_code(); | |
94 resp_data.no_sniff = LowerCaseEqualsASCII(no_sniff, "nosniff"); | |
95 | |
96 RequestIdToMetaDataMap* metadata_map = GetRequestIdToMetaDataMap(); | |
97 (*metadata_map)[request_id] = resp_data; | |
98 } | |
99 | |
100 // These macros are defined here so that we prevent code size bloat-up due to | |
101 // the UMA_HISTOGRAM_* macros. Similar logic is used for recording UMA stats for | |
102 // different MIME types, but we cannot create a helper function for this since | |
103 // UMA_HISTOGRAM_* macros do not accept variables as their bucket names. As a | |
104 // solution, macros are used instead to capture the repeated pattern for | |
105 // recording UMA stats. TODO(dsjang): this is only needed for collecting UMA | |
106 // stat. Will be deleted when this class is used for actual blocking. | |
107 | |
108 #define SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
109 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS( BUCKET_PREFIX ".Blocked", 1); \ | |
110 result = false; \ | |
111 if (renderable_status_code) { \ | |
112 UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION( \ | |
113 BUCKET_PREFIX ".Blocked.RenderableStatusCode", \ | |
114 resp_data.resource_type, \ | |
115 WebURLRequest::TargetIsUnspecified + 1); \ | |
116 } else { \ | |
117 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(BUCKET_PREFIX ".Blocked.NonRenderableStatusCode",1);\ | |
118 } | |
119 | |
120 #define SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NO_SNIFF_BLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
121 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS( BUCKET_PREFIX ".NoSniffBlocked", 1); \ | |
122 result = false; \ | |
123 if (renderable_status_code) { \ | |
124 UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION( \ | |
125 BUCKET_PREFIX ".NoSniffBlocked.RenderableStatusCode", \ | |
126 resp_data.resource_type, \ | |
127 WebURLRequest::TargetIsUnspecified + 1); \ | |
128 } else { \ | |
129 UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION( \ | |
130 BUCKET_PREFIX ".NoSniffBlocked.NonRenderableStatusCode", \ | |
131 resp_data.resource_type, \ | |
132 WebURLRequest::TargetIsUnspecified + 1); \ | |
133 } | |
134 | |
135 #define SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NOTBLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
136 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(BUCKET_PREFIX ".NotBlocked", 1); \ | |
137 if (is_sniffed_for_js) \ | |
138 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(BUCKET_PREFIX ".NotBlocked.MaybeJS", 1); \ | |
139 | |
140 #define SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SNIFF_EXPR,BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
141 if (SNIFF_EXPR) { \ | |
142 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
143 } else { \ | |
144 if (resp_data.no_sniff) { \ | |
145 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NO_SNIFF_BLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
146 } else { \ | |
147 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NOTBLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
148 } \ | |
149 } | |
150 | |
151 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::OnReceivedData( | |
152 int request_id, | |
153 const char* data, | |
154 int length) { | |
155 | |
156 RequestIdToMetaDataMap* metadata_map = GetRequestIdToMetaDataMap(); | |
157 RequestIdToResultMap* result_map = GetRequestIdToResultMap(); | |
158 | |
159 // If there's an entry for |request_id| in blocked_map, this request's first | |
160 // data packet has already been examined. We can return the result here. | |
161 if (result_map->count(request_id) != 0) | |
162 return (*result_map)[request_id]; | |
163 | |
164 // If result_map doesn't have an entry for |request_id|, we're receiving the | |
165 // first data packet for request_id. If request_id is not registered, this | |
166 // request is identified as a non-target of our policy. So we return true. | |
167 if (metadata_map->count(request_id) == 0) { | |
168 // We set request_id to true so that we always return true for this request. | |
169 (*result_map)[request_id] = true; | |
170 return true; | |
171 } | |
172 | |
173 // We now look at the first data packet received for request_id. | |
174 ResponseMetaData resp_data = (*metadata_map)[request_id]; | |
175 metadata_map->erase(request_id); | |
176 | |
177 // Record the length of the first received network packet to see if it's | |
178 // enough for sniffing. | |
179 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("SiteIsolation.XSD.DataLength", length); | |
180 | |
181 // Record the number of cross-site document responses with a specific mime | |
182 // type (text/html, text/xml, etc). | |
183 UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION( | |
184 "SiteIsolation.XSD.MimeType", | |
185 resp_data.canonical_mime_type, | |
186 SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::MaxCanonicalMimeType); | |
187 | |
188 // Store the result of cross-site document blocking analysis. True means we | |
189 // can return this document to the renderer, false means that we have to block | |
190 // the response data. | |
191 bool result = true; | |
192 | |
193 // The content is blocked if it is sniffed for HTML/JSON/XML. When the blocked | |
194 // response is with an error status code, it is not disruptive by the | |
195 // following reasons : 1) the blocked content is not a binary object (such as | |
196 // an image) since it is sniffed for text; 2) then, this blocking only breaks | |
197 // the renderer behavior only if it is either JavaScript or CSS. However, the | |
198 // renderer doesn't use the contents of JS/CSS with unaffected status code | |
199 // (e.g, 404). 3) the renderer is expected not to use the cross-site document | |
200 // content for purposes other than JS/CSS (e.g, XHR). | |
201 bool renderable_status_code = IsRenderableStatusCodeForDocument( | |
202 resp_data.http_status_code); | |
203 | |
204 // This is only used for false-negative analysis for non-blocked resources. | |
205 bool is_sniffed_for_js = SniffForJS(data, length); | |
206 | |
207 // Record the number of responses whose content is sniffed for what its mime | |
208 // type claims it to be. For example, we apply a HTML sniffer for a document | |
209 // tagged with text/html here. Whenever this check becomes true, we'll block | |
210 // the response. | |
211 switch (resp_data.canonical_mime_type) { | |
212 case SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::HTML: | |
213 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SniffForHTML(data, length), | |
214 "SiteIsolation.XSD.HTML"); | |
215 break; | |
216 case SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::XML: | |
217 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SniffForXML(data, length), | |
218 "SiteIsolation.XSD.XML"); | |
219 break; | |
220 case SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::JSON: | |
221 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SniffForJSON(data, length), | |
222 "SiteIsolation.XSD.JSON"); | |
223 break; | |
224 case SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::Plain: | |
225 if (SniffForHTML(data, length)) { | |
226 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK( | |
227 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain.HTML"); | |
228 } else if (SniffForXML(data, length)) { | |
229 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK( | |
230 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain.XML"); | |
231 } else if (SniffForJSON(data, length)) { | |
232 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK( | |
233 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain.JSON"); | |
234 } else if (is_sniffed_for_js) { | |
235 if (resp_data.no_sniff) { | |
236 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NO_SNIFF_BLOCK( | |
237 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain"); | |
238 } else { | |
239 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NOTBLOCK( | |
240 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain"); | |
241 } | |
242 } | |
243 break; | |
244 default : | |
245 NOTREACHED() << | |
246 "Not a blockable mime type. This mime type shouldn't reach here."; | |
247 break; | |
248 } | |
249 | |
250 (*result_map)[request_id] = result; | |
251 return result; | |
252 } | |
253 | |
254 #undef SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NOTBLOCK | |
255 #undef SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT | |
256 #undef SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK | |
257 | |
258 | |
Charlie Reis
2013/08/22 18:23:30
nit: Only one blank line between blocks/functions,
dsjang
2013/08/22 19:05:55
Done.
| |
259 void SiteIsolationPolicy::OnRequestComplete(int request_id) { | |
260 RequestIdToMetaDataMap* metadata_map = GetRequestIdToMetaDataMap(); | |
261 RequestIdToResultMap* result_map = GetRequestIdToResultMap(); | |
262 metadata_map->erase(request_id); | |
263 result_map->erase(request_id); | |
264 } | |
265 | |
266 | |
267 SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::CanonicalMimeType | |
268 SiteIsolationPolicy::GetCanonicalMimeType(const std::string& mime_type) { | |
269 if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextHtml)) { | |
270 return SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::HTML; | |
271 } | |
272 | |
273 if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextPlain)) { | |
274 return SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::Plain; | |
275 } | |
276 | |
277 if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kAppJson) || | |
278 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextJson) || | |
279 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextXjson)) { | |
280 return SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::JSON; | |
281 } | |
282 | |
283 if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextXml) || | |
284 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, xAppRssXml) || | |
285 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kAppXml)) { | |
286 return SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::XML; | |
287 } | |
288 | |
289 return SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::Others; | |
290 | |
291 } | |
292 | |
293 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsBlockableScheme(const GURL& url) { | |
294 // We exclude ftp:// from here. FTP doesn't provide a Content-Type | |
295 // header which our policy depends on, so we cannot protect any | |
296 // document from FTP servers. | |
297 return url.SchemeIs("http") || url.SchemeIs("https"); | |
298 } | |
299 | |
300 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsSameSite(const GURL& frame_origin, | |
301 const GURL& response_url) { | |
302 | |
303 if (!frame_origin.is_valid() || !response_url.is_valid()) | |
304 return false; | |
305 | |
306 if (frame_origin.scheme() != response_url.scheme()) | |
307 return false; | |
308 | |
309 // SameDomainOrHost() extracts the effective domains (public suffix plus one) | |
310 // from the two URLs and compare them. | |
311 // TODO(dsjang): use INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES when http://crbug.com/7988 is | |
312 // fixed. | |
313 return net::registry_controlled_domains::SameDomainOrHost( | |
314 frame_origin, | |
315 response_url, | |
316 net::registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES); | |
317 } | |
318 | |
319 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsFrameNavigating(WebKit::WebFrame* frame) { | |
320 // When a navigation starts, frame->provisionalDataSource() is set | |
321 // to a not-null value which stands for the request made for the | |
322 // navigation. As soon as the network request is committed to the | |
323 // frame, frame->provisionalDataSource() is converted to null, and | |
324 // the committed data source is moved to frame->dataSource(). This | |
325 // is the most reliable way to detect whether the frame is in | |
326 // navigation or not. | |
327 return frame->provisionalDataSource() != NULL; | |
328 } | |
329 | |
330 // We don't use Webkit's existing CORS policy implementation since | |
331 // their policy works in terms of origins, not sites. For example, | |
332 // when frame is sub.a.com and it is not allowed to access a document | |
333 // with sub1.a.com. But under Site Isolation, it's allowed. | |
334 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsValidCorsHeaderSet( | |
335 GURL& frame_origin, | |
336 GURL& website_origin, | |
337 std::string access_control_origin) { | |
338 // Many websites are sending back "\"*\"" instead of "*". This is | |
339 // non-standard practice, and not supported by Chrome. Refer to | |
340 // CrossOriginAccessControl::passesAccessControlCheck(). | |
341 | |
342 // TODO(dsjang): * is not allowed for the response from a request | |
343 // with cookies. This allows for more than what the renderer will | |
344 // eventually be able to receive, so we won't see illegal cross-site | |
345 // documents allowed by this. We have to find a way to see if this | |
346 // response is from a cookie-tagged request or not in the future. | |
347 if (access_control_origin == "*") | |
348 return true; | |
349 | |
350 // TODO(dsjang): The CORS spec only treats a fully specified URL, except for | |
351 // "*", but many websites are using just a domain for access_control_origin, | |
352 // and this is blocked by Webkit's CORS logic here : | |
353 // CrossOriginAccessControl::passesAccessControlCheck(). GURL is set | |
354 // is_valid() to false when it is created from a URL containing * in the | |
355 // domain part. | |
356 | |
357 GURL cors_origin(access_control_origin); | |
358 return IsSameSite(frame_origin, cors_origin); | |
359 } | |
360 | |
361 // This function is a slight modification of |net::SniffForHTML|. | |
362 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForHTML(const char* data, size_t length) { | |
363 // The content sniffer used by Chrome and Firefox are using "<!--" | |
364 // as one of the HTML signatures, but it also appears in valid | |
365 // JavaScript, considered as well-formed JS by the browser. Since | |
366 // we do not want to block any JS, we exclude it from our HTML | |
367 // signatures. This can weaken our document block policy, but we can | |
368 // break less websites. | |
369 // TODO(dsjang): parameterize |net::SniffForHTML| with an option | |
370 // that decides whether to include <!-- or not, so that we can | |
371 // remove this function. | |
372 const char* html_signatures[] = {"<!DOCTYPE html", // HTML5 spec | |
373 "<script", // HTML5 spec, Mozilla | |
374 "<html", // HTML5 spec, Mozilla | |
375 "<head", // HTML5 spec, Mozilla | |
376 "<iframe", // Mozilla | |
377 "<h1", // Mozilla | |
378 "<div", // Mozilla | |
379 "<font", // Mozilla | |
380 "<table", // Mozilla | |
381 "<a", // Mozilla | |
382 "<style", // Mozilla | |
383 "<title", // Mozilla | |
384 "<b", // Mozilla | |
385 "<body", // Mozilla | |
386 "<br", "<p", // Mozilla | |
387 "<?xml" // Mozilla | |
388 }; | |
389 | |
390 if (MatchesSignature( | |
391 data, length, html_signatures, arraysize(html_signatures))) | |
392 return true; | |
393 | |
394 // "<!--" is specially treated since web JS can use "<!--" "-->" pair for | |
395 // comments. | |
396 const char* comment_begins[] = {"<!--" }; | |
397 | |
398 if (MatchesSignature( | |
399 data, length, comment_begins, arraysize(comment_begins))) { | |
400 // Search for --> and do SniffForHTML after that. If we can find the | |
401 // comment's end, we start HTML sniffing from there again. | |
402 const char end_comment[] = "-->"; | |
403 const size_t end_comment_size = strlen(end_comment); | |
404 | |
405 for (size_t i = 0; i <= length - end_comment_size; ++i) { | |
406 if (!strncmp(data + i, end_comment, end_comment_size)) { | |
407 size_t skipped = i + end_comment_size; | |
408 return SniffForHTML(data + skipped, length - skipped); | |
409 } | |
410 } | |
411 } | |
412 | |
413 return false; | |
414 } | |
415 | |
416 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForXML(const char* data, size_t length) { | |
417 // TODO(dsjang): Chrome's mime_sniffer is using strncasecmp() for | |
418 // this signature. However, XML is case-sensitive. Don't we have to | |
419 // be more lenient only to block documents starting with the exact | |
420 // string <?xml rather than <?XML ? | |
421 const char* xml_signatures[] = {"<?xml" // Mozilla | |
422 }; | |
423 return MatchesSignature( | |
424 data, length, xml_signatures, arraysize(xml_signatures)); | |
425 } | |
426 | |
427 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForJSON(const char* data, size_t length) { | |
428 // TODO(dsjang): We have to come up with a better way to sniff | |
429 // JSON. However, even RE cannot help us that much due to the fact | |
430 // that we don't do full parsing. This DFA starts with state 0, and | |
431 // finds {, "/' and : in that order. We're avoiding adding a | |
432 // dependency on a regular expression library. | |
433 const int kInitState = 0; | |
434 const int kLeftBraceState = 1; | |
435 const int kLeftQuoteState = 2; | |
436 const int kColonState = 3; | |
437 const int kDeadState = 4; | |
438 | |
439 int state = kInitState; | |
440 for (size_t i = 0; i < length && state < kColonState; ++i) { | |
441 const char c = data[i]; | |
442 if (c == ' ' || c == '\t' || c == '\r' || c == '\n') | |
443 continue; | |
444 | |
445 switch (state) { | |
446 case kInitState: | |
447 if (c == '{') | |
448 state = kLeftBraceState; | |
449 else | |
450 state = kDeadState; | |
451 break; | |
452 case kLeftBraceState: | |
453 if (c == '\"' || c == '\'') | |
454 state = kLeftQuoteState; | |
455 else | |
456 state = kDeadState; | |
457 break; | |
458 case kLeftQuoteState: | |
459 if (c == ':') | |
460 state = kColonState; | |
461 break; | |
462 default: | |
463 NOTREACHED(); | |
464 break; | |
465 } | |
466 } | |
467 return state == kColonState; | |
468 } | |
469 | |
470 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::MatchesSignature(const char* raw_data, | |
471 size_t raw_length, | |
472 const char* signatures[], | |
473 size_t arr_size) { | |
474 size_t start = 0; | |
475 // Skip white characters at the beginning of the document. | |
476 for (start = 0; start < raw_length; ++start) { | |
477 char c = raw_data[start]; | |
478 if (!(c == ' ' || c == '\t' || c == '\r' || c == '\n')) | |
479 break; | |
480 } | |
481 | |
482 // There is no not-whitespace character in this document. | |
483 if (!(start < raw_length)) | |
484 return false; | |
485 | |
486 const char* data = raw_data + start; | |
487 size_t length = raw_length - start; | |
488 | |
489 for (size_t sig_index = 0; sig_index < arr_size; ++sig_index) { | |
490 const char* signature = signatures[sig_index]; | |
491 size_t signature_length = strlen(signature); | |
492 | |
493 if (length < signature_length) | |
494 continue; | |
495 | |
496 if (!base::strncasecmp(signature, data, signature_length)) | |
497 return true; | |
498 } | |
499 return false; | |
500 } | |
501 | |
502 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsRenderableStatusCodeForDocument(int status_code) { | |
503 // Chrome only uses the content of a response with one of these status codes | |
504 // for CSS/JavaScript. For images, Chrome just ignores status code. | |
505 const int renderable_status_code[] = {200, 201, 202, 203, 206, 300, 301, 302, | |
506 303, 305, 306, 307}; | |
507 for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(renderable_status_code); ++i) { | |
508 if (renderable_status_code[i] == status_code) | |
509 return true; | |
510 } | |
511 return false; | |
512 } | |
513 | |
514 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForJS(const char* data, size_t length) { | |
515 // TODO(dsjang): This is a real hack. The only purpose of this function is to | |
516 // try to see if there's any possibility that this data can be JavaScript | |
517 // (superset of JS). This function will be removed once UMA stats are | |
518 // gathered. | |
519 | |
520 // Search for "var " for JS detection. | |
521 for (size_t i = 0; i < length - 3; ++i) { | |
522 if (strncmp(data + i, "var ", 4) == 0) | |
523 return true; | |
524 } | |
525 return false; | |
526 } | |
527 | |
528 SiteIsolationPolicy::RequestIdToMetaDataMap* | |
529 SiteIsolationPolicy::GetRequestIdToMetaDataMap() { | |
530 CR_DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(RequestIdToMetaDataMap, metadata_map_, ()); | |
531 return &metadata_map_; | |
532 } | |
533 | |
534 SiteIsolationPolicy::RequestIdToResultMap* | |
535 SiteIsolationPolicy::GetRequestIdToResultMap() { | |
536 CR_DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(RequestIdToResultMap, result_map_, ()); | |
537 return &result_map_; | |
538 } | |
539 | |
540 } // namespace content | |
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