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| 1 // Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
| 2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| 3 // found in the LICENSE file. |
| 4 |
| 5 #include "content/child/site_isolation_policy.h" |
| 6 |
| 7 #include "base/basictypes.h" |
| 8 #include "base/logging.h" |
| 9 #include "base/metrics/histogram.h" |
| 10 #include "base/strings/string_util.h" |
| 11 #include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h" |
| 12 #include "net/http/http_response_headers.h" |
| 13 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebHTTPHeaderVisitor.h" |
| 14 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebString.h" |
| 15 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebURL.h" |
| 16 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebURLRequest.h" |
| 17 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebURLResponse.h" |
| 18 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebDocument.h" |
| 19 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebFrame.h" |
| 20 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebFrameClient.h" |
| 21 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebSecurityOrigin.h" |
| 22 |
| 23 using WebKit::WebDocument; |
| 24 using WebKit::WebString; |
| 25 using WebKit::WebURL; |
| 26 using WebKit::WebURLResponse; |
| 27 using WebKit::WebURLRequest; |
| 28 |
| 29 namespace content { |
| 30 |
| 31 namespace { |
| 32 |
| 33 // MIME types |
| 34 const char kTextHtml[] = "text/html"; |
| 35 const char kTextXml[] = "text/xml"; |
| 36 const char xAppRssXml[] = "application/rss+xml"; |
| 37 const char kAppXml[] = "application/xml"; |
| 38 const char kAppJson[] = "application/json"; |
| 39 const char kTextJson[] = "text/json"; |
| 40 const char kTextXjson[] = "text/x-json"; |
| 41 const char kTextPlain[] = "text/plain"; |
| 42 |
| 43 } // anonymous namespace |
| 44 |
| 45 SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::ResponseMetaData() {} |
| 46 |
| 47 void SiteIsolationPolicy::OnReceivedResponse( |
| 48 int request_id, |
| 49 GURL& frame_origin, |
| 50 GURL& response_url, |
| 51 ResourceType::Type resource_type, |
| 52 const webkit_glue::ResourceResponseInfo& info) { |
| 53 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("SiteIsolation.AllResponses", 1); |
| 54 |
| 55 // See if this is for navigation. If it is, don't block it, under the |
| 56 // assumption that we will put it in an appropriate process. |
| 57 if (ResourceType::IsFrame(resource_type)) |
| 58 return; |
| 59 |
| 60 if (!IsBlockableScheme(response_url)) |
| 61 return; |
| 62 |
| 63 if (IsSameSite(frame_origin, response_url)) |
| 64 return; |
| 65 |
| 66 SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::CanonicalMimeType canonical_mime_type = |
| 67 GetCanonicalMimeType(info.mime_type); |
| 68 |
| 69 if (canonical_mime_type == SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::Others) |
| 70 return; |
| 71 |
| 72 // Every CORS request should have the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header even |
| 73 // if it is preceded by a pre-flight request. Therefore, if this is a CORS |
| 74 // request, it has this header. response.httpHeaderField() internally uses |
| 75 // case-insensitive matching for the header name. |
| 76 std::string access_control_origin; |
| 77 |
| 78 // We can use a case-insensitive header name for EnumerateHeader(). |
| 79 info.headers->EnumerateHeader( |
| 80 NULL, "access-control-allow-origin", &access_control_origin); |
| 81 if (IsValidCorsHeaderSet(frame_origin, response_url, access_control_origin)) |
| 82 return; |
| 83 |
| 84 // Real XSD data collection starts from here. |
| 85 std::string no_sniff; |
| 86 info.headers->EnumerateHeader(NULL, "x-content-type-options", &no_sniff); |
| 87 |
| 88 ResponseMetaData resp_data; |
| 89 resp_data.frame_origin = frame_origin.spec(); |
| 90 resp_data.response_url = response_url; |
| 91 resp_data.resource_type = resource_type; |
| 92 resp_data.canonical_mime_type = canonical_mime_type; |
| 93 resp_data.http_status_code = info.headers->response_code(); |
| 94 resp_data.no_sniff = LowerCaseEqualsASCII(no_sniff, "nosniff"); |
| 95 |
| 96 RequestIdToMetaDataMap* metadata_map = GetRequestIdToMetaDataMap(); |
| 97 (*metadata_map)[request_id] = resp_data; |
| 98 } |
| 99 |
| 100 // These macros are defined here so that we prevent code size bloat-up due to |
| 101 // the UMA_HISTOGRAM_* macros. Similar logic is used for recording UMA stats for |
| 102 // different MIME types, but we cannot create a helper function for this since |
| 103 // UMA_HISTOGRAM_* macros do not accept variables as their bucket names. As a |
| 104 // solution, macros are used instead to capture the repeated pattern for |
| 105 // recording UMA stats. TODO(dsjang): this is only needed for collecting UMA |
| 106 // stat. Will be deleted when this class is used for actual blocking. |
| 107 |
| 108 #define SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ |
| 109 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS( BUCKET_PREFIX ".Blocked", 1); \ |
| 110 result = true; \ |
| 111 if (renderable_status_code) { \ |
| 112 UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION( \ |
| 113 BUCKET_PREFIX ".Blocked.RenderableStatusCode", \ |
| 114 resp_data.resource_type, \ |
| 115 WebURLRequest::TargetIsUnspecified + 1); \ |
| 116 } else { \ |
| 117 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(BUCKET_PREFIX ".Blocked.NonRenderableStatusCode",1);\ |
| 118 } |
| 119 |
| 120 #define SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NO_SNIFF_BLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ |
| 121 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS( BUCKET_PREFIX ".NoSniffBlocked", 1); \ |
| 122 result = true; \ |
| 123 if (renderable_status_code) { \ |
| 124 UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION( \ |
| 125 BUCKET_PREFIX ".NoSniffBlocked.RenderableStatusCode", \ |
| 126 resp_data.resource_type, \ |
| 127 WebURLRequest::TargetIsUnspecified + 1); \ |
| 128 } else { \ |
| 129 UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION( \ |
| 130 BUCKET_PREFIX ".NoSniffBlocked.NonRenderableStatusCode", \ |
| 131 resp_data.resource_type, \ |
| 132 WebURLRequest::TargetIsUnspecified + 1); \ |
| 133 } |
| 134 |
| 135 #define SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NOTBLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ |
| 136 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(BUCKET_PREFIX ".NotBlocked", 1); \ |
| 137 if (is_sniffed_for_js) \ |
| 138 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(BUCKET_PREFIX ".NotBlocked.MaybeJS", 1); \ |
| 139 |
| 140 #define SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SNIFF_EXPR,BUCKET_PREFIX) \ |
| 141 if (SNIFF_EXPR) { \ |
| 142 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ |
| 143 } else { \ |
| 144 if (resp_data.no_sniff) { \ |
| 145 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NO_SNIFF_BLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ |
| 146 } else { \ |
| 147 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NOTBLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ |
| 148 } \ |
| 149 } |
| 150 |
| 151 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::ShouldBlockResponse( |
| 152 int request_id, |
| 153 const char* data, |
| 154 int length) { |
| 155 |
| 156 RequestIdToMetaDataMap* metadata_map = GetRequestIdToMetaDataMap(); |
| 157 RequestIdToResultMap* result_map = GetRequestIdToResultMap(); |
| 158 |
| 159 // If there's an entry for |request_id| in blocked_map, this request's first |
| 160 // data packet has already been examined. We can return the result here. |
| 161 if (result_map->count(request_id) != 0) |
| 162 return (*result_map)[request_id]; |
| 163 |
| 164 // If result_map doesn't have an entry for |request_id|, we're receiving the |
| 165 // first data packet for request_id. If request_id is not registered, this |
| 166 // request is identified as a non-target of our policy. So we return true. |
| 167 if (metadata_map->count(request_id) == 0) { |
| 168 // We set request_id to true so that we always return true for this request. |
| 169 (*result_map)[request_id] = false; |
| 170 return false; |
| 171 } |
| 172 |
| 173 // We now look at the first data packet received for request_id. |
| 174 ResponseMetaData resp_data = (*metadata_map)[request_id]; |
| 175 metadata_map->erase(request_id); |
| 176 |
| 177 // Record the length of the first received network packet to see if it's |
| 178 // enough for sniffing. |
| 179 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("SiteIsolation.XSD.DataLength", length); |
| 180 |
| 181 // Record the number of cross-site document responses with a specific mime |
| 182 // type (text/html, text/xml, etc). |
| 183 UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION( |
| 184 "SiteIsolation.XSD.MimeType", |
| 185 resp_data.canonical_mime_type, |
| 186 SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::MaxCanonicalMimeType); |
| 187 |
| 188 // Store the result of cross-site document blocking analysis. True means we |
| 189 // can return this document to the renderer, false means that we have to block |
| 190 // the response data. |
| 191 bool result = false; |
| 192 |
| 193 // The content is blocked if it is sniffed for HTML/JSON/XML. When the blocked |
| 194 // response is with an error status code, it is not disruptive by the |
| 195 // following reasons : 1) the blocked content is not a binary object (such as |
| 196 // an image) since it is sniffed for text; 2) then, this blocking only breaks |
| 197 // the renderer behavior only if it is either JavaScript or CSS. However, the |
| 198 // renderer doesn't use the contents of JS/CSS with unaffected status code |
| 199 // (e.g, 404). 3) the renderer is expected not to use the cross-site document |
| 200 // content for purposes other than JS/CSS (e.g, XHR). |
| 201 bool renderable_status_code = IsRenderableStatusCodeForDocument( |
| 202 resp_data.http_status_code); |
| 203 |
| 204 // This is only used for false-negative analysis for non-blocked resources. |
| 205 bool is_sniffed_for_js = SniffForJS(data, length); |
| 206 |
| 207 // Record the number of responses whose content is sniffed for what its mime |
| 208 // type claims it to be. For example, we apply a HTML sniffer for a document |
| 209 // tagged with text/html here. Whenever this check becomes true, we'll block |
| 210 // the response. |
| 211 switch (resp_data.canonical_mime_type) { |
| 212 case SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::HTML: |
| 213 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SniffForHTML(data, length), |
| 214 "SiteIsolation.XSD.HTML"); |
| 215 break; |
| 216 case SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::XML: |
| 217 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SniffForXML(data, length), |
| 218 "SiteIsolation.XSD.XML"); |
| 219 break; |
| 220 case SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::JSON: |
| 221 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SniffForJSON(data, length), |
| 222 "SiteIsolation.XSD.JSON"); |
| 223 break; |
| 224 case SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::Plain: |
| 225 if (SniffForHTML(data, length)) { |
| 226 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK( |
| 227 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain.HTML"); |
| 228 } else if (SniffForXML(data, length)) { |
| 229 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK( |
| 230 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain.XML"); |
| 231 } else if (SniffForJSON(data, length)) { |
| 232 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK( |
| 233 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain.JSON"); |
| 234 } else if (is_sniffed_for_js) { |
| 235 if (resp_data.no_sniff) { |
| 236 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NO_SNIFF_BLOCK( |
| 237 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain"); |
| 238 } else { |
| 239 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NOTBLOCK( |
| 240 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain"); |
| 241 } |
| 242 } |
| 243 break; |
| 244 default : |
| 245 NOTREACHED() << |
| 246 "Not a blockable mime type. This mime type shouldn't reach here."; |
| 247 break; |
| 248 } |
| 249 |
| 250 (*result_map)[request_id] = result; |
| 251 return result; |
| 252 } |
| 253 |
| 254 #undef SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NOTBLOCK |
| 255 #undef SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT |
| 256 #undef SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK |
| 257 |
| 258 void SiteIsolationPolicy::OnRequestComplete(int request_id) { |
| 259 RequestIdToMetaDataMap* metadata_map = GetRequestIdToMetaDataMap(); |
| 260 RequestIdToResultMap* result_map = GetRequestIdToResultMap(); |
| 261 metadata_map->erase(request_id); |
| 262 result_map->erase(request_id); |
| 263 } |
| 264 |
| 265 SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::CanonicalMimeType |
| 266 SiteIsolationPolicy::GetCanonicalMimeType(const std::string& mime_type) { |
| 267 if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextHtml)) { |
| 268 return SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::HTML; |
| 269 } |
| 270 |
| 271 if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextPlain)) { |
| 272 return SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::Plain; |
| 273 } |
| 274 |
| 275 if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kAppJson) || |
| 276 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextJson) || |
| 277 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextXjson)) { |
| 278 return SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::JSON; |
| 279 } |
| 280 |
| 281 if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextXml) || |
| 282 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, xAppRssXml) || |
| 283 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kAppXml)) { |
| 284 return SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::XML; |
| 285 } |
| 286 |
| 287 return SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::Others; |
| 288 |
| 289 } |
| 290 |
| 291 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsBlockableScheme(const GURL& url) { |
| 292 // We exclude ftp:// from here. FTP doesn't provide a Content-Type |
| 293 // header which our policy depends on, so we cannot protect any |
| 294 // document from FTP servers. |
| 295 return url.SchemeIs("http") || url.SchemeIs("https"); |
| 296 } |
| 297 |
| 298 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsSameSite(const GURL& frame_origin, |
| 299 const GURL& response_url) { |
| 300 |
| 301 if (!frame_origin.is_valid() || !response_url.is_valid()) |
| 302 return false; |
| 303 |
| 304 if (frame_origin.scheme() != response_url.scheme()) |
| 305 return false; |
| 306 |
| 307 // SameDomainOrHost() extracts the effective domains (public suffix plus one) |
| 308 // from the two URLs and compare them. |
| 309 // TODO(dsjang): use INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES when http://crbug.com/7988 is |
| 310 // fixed. |
| 311 return net::registry_controlled_domains::SameDomainOrHost( |
| 312 frame_origin, |
| 313 response_url, |
| 314 net::registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES); |
| 315 } |
| 316 |
| 317 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsFrameNavigating(WebKit::WebFrame* frame) { |
| 318 // When a navigation starts, frame->provisionalDataSource() is set |
| 319 // to a not-null value which stands for the request made for the |
| 320 // navigation. As soon as the network request is committed to the |
| 321 // frame, frame->provisionalDataSource() is converted to null, and |
| 322 // the committed data source is moved to frame->dataSource(). This |
| 323 // is the most reliable way to detect whether the frame is in |
| 324 // navigation or not. |
| 325 return frame->provisionalDataSource() != NULL; |
| 326 } |
| 327 |
| 328 // We don't use Webkit's existing CORS policy implementation since |
| 329 // their policy works in terms of origins, not sites. For example, |
| 330 // when frame is sub.a.com and it is not allowed to access a document |
| 331 // with sub1.a.com. But under Site Isolation, it's allowed. |
| 332 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsValidCorsHeaderSet( |
| 333 GURL& frame_origin, |
| 334 GURL& website_origin, |
| 335 std::string access_control_origin) { |
| 336 // Many websites are sending back "\"*\"" instead of "*". This is |
| 337 // non-standard practice, and not supported by Chrome. Refer to |
| 338 // CrossOriginAccessControl::passesAccessControlCheck(). |
| 339 |
| 340 // TODO(dsjang): * is not allowed for the response from a request |
| 341 // with cookies. This allows for more than what the renderer will |
| 342 // eventually be able to receive, so we won't see illegal cross-site |
| 343 // documents allowed by this. We have to find a way to see if this |
| 344 // response is from a cookie-tagged request or not in the future. |
| 345 if (access_control_origin == "*") |
| 346 return true; |
| 347 |
| 348 // TODO(dsjang): The CORS spec only treats a fully specified URL, except for |
| 349 // "*", but many websites are using just a domain for access_control_origin, |
| 350 // and this is blocked by Webkit's CORS logic here : |
| 351 // CrossOriginAccessControl::passesAccessControlCheck(). GURL is set |
| 352 // is_valid() to false when it is created from a URL containing * in the |
| 353 // domain part. |
| 354 |
| 355 GURL cors_origin(access_control_origin); |
| 356 return IsSameSite(frame_origin, cors_origin); |
| 357 } |
| 358 |
| 359 // This function is a slight modification of |net::SniffForHTML|. |
| 360 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForHTML(const char* data, size_t length) { |
| 361 // The content sniffer used by Chrome and Firefox are using "<!--" |
| 362 // as one of the HTML signatures, but it also appears in valid |
| 363 // JavaScript, considered as well-formed JS by the browser. Since |
| 364 // we do not want to block any JS, we exclude it from our HTML |
| 365 // signatures. This can weaken our document block policy, but we can |
| 366 // break less websites. |
| 367 // TODO(dsjang): parameterize |net::SniffForHTML| with an option |
| 368 // that decides whether to include <!-- or not, so that we can |
| 369 // remove this function. |
| 370 const char* html_signatures[] = {"<!DOCTYPE html", // HTML5 spec |
| 371 "<script", // HTML5 spec, Mozilla |
| 372 "<html", // HTML5 spec, Mozilla |
| 373 "<head", // HTML5 spec, Mozilla |
| 374 "<iframe", // Mozilla |
| 375 "<h1", // Mozilla |
| 376 "<div", // Mozilla |
| 377 "<font", // Mozilla |
| 378 "<table", // Mozilla |
| 379 "<a", // Mozilla |
| 380 "<style", // Mozilla |
| 381 "<title", // Mozilla |
| 382 "<b", // Mozilla |
| 383 "<body", // Mozilla |
| 384 "<br", "<p", // Mozilla |
| 385 "<?xml" // Mozilla |
| 386 }; |
| 387 |
| 388 if (MatchesSignature( |
| 389 data, length, html_signatures, arraysize(html_signatures))) |
| 390 return true; |
| 391 |
| 392 // "<!--" is specially treated since web JS can use "<!--" "-->" pair for |
| 393 // comments. |
| 394 const char* comment_begins[] = {"<!--" }; |
| 395 |
| 396 if (MatchesSignature( |
| 397 data, length, comment_begins, arraysize(comment_begins))) { |
| 398 // Search for --> and do SniffForHTML after that. If we can find the |
| 399 // comment's end, we start HTML sniffing from there again. |
| 400 const char end_comment[] = "-->"; |
| 401 const size_t end_comment_size = strlen(end_comment); |
| 402 |
| 403 for (size_t i = 0; i <= length - end_comment_size; ++i) { |
| 404 if (!strncmp(data + i, end_comment, end_comment_size)) { |
| 405 size_t skipped = i + end_comment_size; |
| 406 return SniffForHTML(data + skipped, length - skipped); |
| 407 } |
| 408 } |
| 409 } |
| 410 |
| 411 return false; |
| 412 } |
| 413 |
| 414 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForXML(const char* data, size_t length) { |
| 415 // TODO(dsjang): Chrome's mime_sniffer is using strncasecmp() for |
| 416 // this signature. However, XML is case-sensitive. Don't we have to |
| 417 // be more lenient only to block documents starting with the exact |
| 418 // string <?xml rather than <?XML ? |
| 419 const char* xml_signatures[] = {"<?xml" // Mozilla |
| 420 }; |
| 421 return MatchesSignature( |
| 422 data, length, xml_signatures, arraysize(xml_signatures)); |
| 423 } |
| 424 |
| 425 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForJSON(const char* data, size_t length) { |
| 426 // TODO(dsjang): We have to come up with a better way to sniff |
| 427 // JSON. However, even RE cannot help us that much due to the fact |
| 428 // that we don't do full parsing. This DFA starts with state 0, and |
| 429 // finds {, "/' and : in that order. We're avoiding adding a |
| 430 // dependency on a regular expression library. |
| 431 const int kInitState = 0; |
| 432 const int kLeftBraceState = 1; |
| 433 const int kLeftQuoteState = 2; |
| 434 const int kColonState = 3; |
| 435 const int kDeadState = 4; |
| 436 |
| 437 int state = kInitState; |
| 438 for (size_t i = 0; i < length && state < kColonState; ++i) { |
| 439 const char c = data[i]; |
| 440 if (c == ' ' || c == '\t' || c == '\r' || c == '\n') |
| 441 continue; |
| 442 |
| 443 switch (state) { |
| 444 case kInitState: |
| 445 if (c == '{') |
| 446 state = kLeftBraceState; |
| 447 else |
| 448 state = kDeadState; |
| 449 break; |
| 450 case kLeftBraceState: |
| 451 if (c == '\"' || c == '\'') |
| 452 state = kLeftQuoteState; |
| 453 else |
| 454 state = kDeadState; |
| 455 break; |
| 456 case kLeftQuoteState: |
| 457 if (c == ':') |
| 458 state = kColonState; |
| 459 break; |
| 460 default: |
| 461 NOTREACHED(); |
| 462 break; |
| 463 } |
| 464 } |
| 465 return state == kColonState; |
| 466 } |
| 467 |
| 468 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::MatchesSignature(const char* raw_data, |
| 469 size_t raw_length, |
| 470 const char* signatures[], |
| 471 size_t arr_size) { |
| 472 size_t start = 0; |
| 473 // Skip white characters at the beginning of the document. |
| 474 for (start = 0; start < raw_length; ++start) { |
| 475 char c = raw_data[start]; |
| 476 if (!(c == ' ' || c == '\t' || c == '\r' || c == '\n')) |
| 477 break; |
| 478 } |
| 479 |
| 480 // There is no not-whitespace character in this document. |
| 481 if (!(start < raw_length)) |
| 482 return false; |
| 483 |
| 484 const char* data = raw_data + start; |
| 485 size_t length = raw_length - start; |
| 486 |
| 487 for (size_t sig_index = 0; sig_index < arr_size; ++sig_index) { |
| 488 const char* signature = signatures[sig_index]; |
| 489 size_t signature_length = strlen(signature); |
| 490 |
| 491 if (length < signature_length) |
| 492 continue; |
| 493 |
| 494 if (!base::strncasecmp(signature, data, signature_length)) |
| 495 return true; |
| 496 } |
| 497 return false; |
| 498 } |
| 499 |
| 500 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsRenderableStatusCodeForDocument(int status_code) { |
| 501 // Chrome only uses the content of a response with one of these status codes |
| 502 // for CSS/JavaScript. For images, Chrome just ignores status code. |
| 503 const int renderable_status_code[] = {200, 201, 202, 203, 206, 300, 301, 302, |
| 504 303, 305, 306, 307}; |
| 505 for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(renderable_status_code); ++i) { |
| 506 if (renderable_status_code[i] == status_code) |
| 507 return true; |
| 508 } |
| 509 return false; |
| 510 } |
| 511 |
| 512 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForJS(const char* data, size_t length) { |
| 513 // TODO(dsjang): This is a real hack. The only purpose of this function is to |
| 514 // try to see if there's any possibility that this data can be JavaScript |
| 515 // (superset of JS). This function will be removed once UMA stats are |
| 516 // gathered. |
| 517 |
| 518 // Search for "var " for JS detection. |
| 519 for (size_t i = 0; i < length - 3; ++i) { |
| 520 if (strncmp(data + i, "var ", 4) == 0) |
| 521 return true; |
| 522 } |
| 523 return false; |
| 524 } |
| 525 |
| 526 SiteIsolationPolicy::RequestIdToMetaDataMap* |
| 527 SiteIsolationPolicy::GetRequestIdToMetaDataMap() { |
| 528 CR_DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(RequestIdToMetaDataMap, metadata_map_, ()); |
| 529 return &metadata_map_; |
| 530 } |
| 531 |
| 532 SiteIsolationPolicy::RequestIdToResultMap* |
| 533 SiteIsolationPolicy::GetRequestIdToResultMap() { |
| 534 CR_DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(RequestIdToResultMap, result_map_, ()); |
| 535 return &result_map_; |
| 536 } |
| 537 |
| 538 } // namespace content |
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