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1 // Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. | |
2 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be | |
3 // found in the LICENSE file. | |
4 | |
5 #include "content/child/site_isolation_policy.h" | |
6 | |
7 #include "base/basictypes.h" | |
8 #include "base/command_line.h" | |
9 #include "base/logging.h" | |
10 #include "base/metrics/histogram.h" | |
11 #include "base/strings/string_util.h" | |
12 #include "content/public/common/content_switches.h" | |
13 #include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h" | |
14 #include "net/http/http_response_headers.h" | |
15 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebHTTPHeaderVisitor.h" | |
16 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebString.h" | |
17 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebURL.h" | |
18 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebURLRequest.h" | |
19 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/platform/WebURLResponse.h" | |
20 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebDocument.h" | |
21 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebFrame.h" | |
22 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebFrameClient.h" | |
23 #include "third_party/WebKit/public/web/WebSecurityOrigin.h" | |
24 | |
25 using WebKit::WebDocument; | |
26 using WebKit::WebString; | |
27 using WebKit::WebURL; | |
28 using WebKit::WebURLResponse; | |
29 using WebKit::WebURLRequest; | |
30 | |
31 namespace content { | |
32 | |
33 namespace { | |
34 | |
35 // MIME types | |
36 const char kTextHtml[] = "text/html"; | |
37 const char kTextXml[] = "text/xml"; | |
38 const char xAppRssXml[] = "application/rss+xml"; | |
39 const char kAppXml[] = "application/xml"; | |
40 const char kAppJson[] = "application/json"; | |
41 const char kTextJson[] = "text/json"; | |
42 const char kTextXjson[] = "text/x-json"; | |
43 const char kTextPlain[] = "text/plain"; | |
44 | |
45 } // anonymous namespace | |
46 | |
47 SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::ResponseMetaData() {} | |
48 | |
49 void SiteIsolationPolicy::OnReceivedResponse( | |
50 int request_id, | |
51 GURL& frame_origin, | |
52 GURL& response_url, | |
53 ResourceType::Type resource_type, | |
54 const webkit_glue::ResourceResponseInfo& info) { | |
55 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("SiteIsolation.AllResponses", 1); | |
56 | |
57 // See if this is for navigation. If it is, don't block it, under the | |
58 // assumption that we will put it in an appropriate process. | |
59 if (ResourceType::IsFrame(resource_type)) | |
60 return; | |
61 | |
62 if (!IsBlockableScheme(response_url)) | |
63 return; | |
64 | |
65 if (IsSameSite(frame_origin, response_url)) | |
66 return; | |
67 | |
68 SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::CanonicalMimeType canonical_mime_type = | |
69 GetCanonicalMimeType(info.mime_type); | |
70 | |
71 if (canonical_mime_type == SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::Others) | |
72 return; | |
73 | |
74 // Every CORS request should have the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header even | |
75 // if it is preceded by a pre-flight request. Therefore, if this is a CORS | |
76 // request, it has this header. response.httpHeaderField() internally uses | |
77 // case-insensitive matching for the header name. | |
78 std::string access_control_origin; | |
79 | |
80 // We can use a case-insensitive header name for EnumerateHeader(). | |
81 info.headers->EnumerateHeader( | |
82 NULL, "access-control-allow-origin", &access_control_origin); | |
83 if (IsValidCorsHeaderSet(frame_origin, response_url, access_control_origin)) | |
84 return; | |
85 | |
86 // Real XSD data collection starts from here. | |
87 std::string no_sniff; | |
88 info.headers->EnumerateHeader(NULL, "x-content-type-options", &no_sniff); | |
89 | |
90 ResponseMetaData resp_data; | |
91 resp_data.frame_origin = frame_origin.spec(); | |
92 resp_data.response_url = response_url; | |
93 resp_data.resource_type = resource_type; | |
94 resp_data.canonical_mime_type = canonical_mime_type; | |
95 resp_data.http_status_code = info.headers->response_code(); | |
96 resp_data.no_sniff = LowerCaseEqualsASCII(no_sniff, "nosniff"); | |
97 | |
98 RequestIdToMetaDataMap* metadata_map = GetRequestIdToMetaDataMap(); | |
99 (*metadata_map)[request_id] = resp_data; | |
100 } | |
101 | |
102 // These macros are defined here so that we prevent code size bloat-up due to | |
103 // the UMA_HISTOGRAM_* macros. Similar logic is used for recording UMA stats for | |
104 // different MIME types, but we cannot create a helper function for this since | |
105 // UMA_HISTOGRAM_* macros do not accept variables as their bucket names. As a | |
106 // solution, macros are used instead to capture the repeated pattern for | |
107 // recording UMA stats. TODO(dsjang): this is only needed for collecting UMA | |
108 // stat. Will be deleted when this class is used for actual blocking. | |
109 | |
110 #define SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
111 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS( BUCKET_PREFIX ".Blocked", 1); \ | |
112 result = true; \ | |
113 if (renderable_status_code) { \ | |
114 UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION( \ | |
115 BUCKET_PREFIX ".Blocked.RenderableStatusCode", \ | |
116 resp_data.resource_type, \ | |
117 WebURLRequest::TargetIsUnspecified + 1); \ | |
118 } else { \ | |
119 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(BUCKET_PREFIX ".Blocked.NonRenderableStatusCode",1);\ | |
120 } | |
121 | |
122 #define SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NO_SNIFF_BLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
123 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS( BUCKET_PREFIX ".NoSniffBlocked", 1); \ | |
124 result = true; \ | |
125 if (renderable_status_code) { \ | |
126 UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION( \ | |
127 BUCKET_PREFIX ".NoSniffBlocked.RenderableStatusCode", \ | |
128 resp_data.resource_type, \ | |
129 WebURLRequest::TargetIsUnspecified + 1); \ | |
130 } else { \ | |
131 UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION( \ | |
132 BUCKET_PREFIX ".NoSniffBlocked.NonRenderableStatusCode", \ | |
133 resp_data.resource_type, \ | |
134 WebURLRequest::TargetIsUnspecified + 1); \ | |
135 } | |
136 | |
137 #define SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NOTBLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
138 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(BUCKET_PREFIX ".NotBlocked", 1); \ | |
139 if (is_sniffed_for_js) \ | |
140 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(BUCKET_PREFIX ".NotBlocked.MaybeJS", 1); \ | |
141 | |
142 #define SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SNIFF_EXPR,BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
143 if (SNIFF_EXPR) { \ | |
144 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
145 } else { \ | |
146 if (resp_data.no_sniff) { \ | |
147 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NO_SNIFF_BLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
148 } else { \ | |
149 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NOTBLOCK(BUCKET_PREFIX) \ | |
150 } \ | |
151 } | |
152 | |
153 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::ShouldBlockResponse( | |
154 int request_id, | |
155 const char* data, | |
156 int length, | |
157 std::string* alternative_data) { | |
158 | |
159 RequestIdToMetaDataMap* metadata_map = GetRequestIdToMetaDataMap(); | |
160 RequestIdToResultMap* result_map = GetRequestIdToResultMap(); | |
161 | |
162 // If there's an entry for |request_id| in blocked_map, this request's first | |
163 // data packet has already been examined. We can return the result here. | |
164 if (result_map->count(request_id) != 0) { | |
165 if ((*result_map)[request_id]) { | |
166 // When we block the resource, we also set an alternative data to be sent. | |
167 alternative_data->erase(); | |
168 //alternative_data->insert(0, " "); | |
Charlie Reis
2013/08/22 23:05:22
This should be uncommented or removed. If I had t
| |
169 return true; | |
170 } | |
171 return false; | |
172 } | |
173 | |
174 // If result_map doesn't have an entry for |request_id|, we're receiving the | |
175 // first data packet for request_id. If request_id is not registered, this | |
176 // request is identified as a non-target of our policy. So we return true. | |
177 if (metadata_map->count(request_id) == 0) { | |
178 // We set request_id to true so that we always return true for this request. | |
179 (*result_map)[request_id] = false; | |
180 return false; | |
181 } | |
182 | |
183 // We now look at the first data packet received for request_id. | |
184 ResponseMetaData resp_data = (*metadata_map)[request_id]; | |
185 metadata_map->erase(request_id); | |
186 | |
187 // Record the length of the first received network packet to see if it's | |
188 // enough for sniffing. | |
189 UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("SiteIsolation.XSD.DataLength", length); | |
190 | |
191 // Record the number of cross-site document responses with a specific mime | |
192 // type (text/html, text/xml, etc). | |
193 UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION( | |
194 "SiteIsolation.XSD.MimeType", | |
195 resp_data.canonical_mime_type, | |
196 SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::MaxCanonicalMimeType); | |
197 | |
198 // Store the result of cross-site document blocking analysis. True means we | |
199 // can return this document to the renderer, false means that we have to block | |
200 // the response data. | |
201 bool result = false; | |
202 | |
203 // The content is blocked if it is sniffed for HTML/JSON/XML. When the blocked | |
204 // response is with an error status code, it is not disruptive by the | |
205 // following reasons : 1) the blocked content is not a binary object (such as | |
206 // an image) since it is sniffed for text; 2) then, this blocking only breaks | |
207 // the renderer behavior only if it is either JavaScript or CSS. However, the | |
208 // renderer doesn't use the contents of JS/CSS with unaffected status code | |
209 // (e.g, 404). 3) the renderer is expected not to use the cross-site document | |
210 // content for purposes other than JS/CSS (e.g, XHR). | |
211 bool renderable_status_code = IsRenderableStatusCodeForDocument( | |
212 resp_data.http_status_code); | |
213 | |
214 // This is only used for false-negative analysis for non-blocked resources. | |
215 bool is_sniffed_for_js = SniffForJS(data, length); | |
216 | |
217 // Record the number of responses whose content is sniffed for what its mime | |
218 // type claims it to be. For example, we apply a HTML sniffer for a document | |
219 // tagged with text/html here. Whenever this check becomes true, we'll block | |
220 // the response. | |
221 switch (resp_data.canonical_mime_type) { | |
222 case SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::HTML: | |
223 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SniffForHTML(data, length), | |
224 "SiteIsolation.XSD.HTML"); | |
225 break; | |
226 case SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::XML: | |
227 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SniffForXML(data, length), | |
228 "SiteIsolation.XSD.XML"); | |
229 break; | |
230 case SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::JSON: | |
231 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT(SniffForJSON(data, length), | |
232 "SiteIsolation.XSD.JSON"); | |
233 break; | |
234 case SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::Plain: | |
235 if (SniffForHTML(data, length)) { | |
236 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK( | |
237 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain.HTML"); | |
238 } else if (SniffForXML(data, length)) { | |
239 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK( | |
240 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain.XML"); | |
241 } else if (SniffForJSON(data, length)) { | |
242 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK( | |
243 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain.JSON"); | |
244 } else if (is_sniffed_for_js) { | |
245 if (resp_data.no_sniff) { | |
246 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NO_SNIFF_BLOCK( | |
247 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain"); | |
248 } else { | |
249 SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NOTBLOCK( | |
250 "SiteIsolation.XSD.Plain"); | |
251 } | |
252 } | |
253 break; | |
254 default : | |
255 NOTREACHED() << | |
256 "Not a blockable mime type. This mime type shouldn't reach here."; | |
257 break; | |
258 } | |
259 | |
260 const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess(); | |
261 if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kBlockCrossSiteDocuments)) | |
262 result = false; | |
263 (*result_map)[request_id] = result; | |
264 | |
265 if (result) { | |
266 alternative_data->erase(); | |
267 alternative_data->insert(0, " "); | |
268 LOG(ERROR) << resp_data.response_url | |
269 << " is blocked as an illegal cross-site document from " | |
270 << resp_data.frame_origin; | |
271 | |
272 } | |
273 return result; | |
274 } | |
275 | |
276 #undef SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_NOTBLOCK | |
277 #undef SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_SNIFF_AND_COUNT | |
278 #undef SITE_ISOLATION_POLICY_COUNT_BLOCK | |
279 | |
280 void SiteIsolationPolicy::OnRequestComplete(int request_id) { | |
281 RequestIdToMetaDataMap* metadata_map = GetRequestIdToMetaDataMap(); | |
282 RequestIdToResultMap* result_map = GetRequestIdToResultMap(); | |
283 metadata_map->erase(request_id); | |
284 result_map->erase(request_id); | |
285 } | |
286 | |
287 SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::CanonicalMimeType | |
288 SiteIsolationPolicy::GetCanonicalMimeType(const std::string& mime_type) { | |
289 if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextHtml)) { | |
290 return SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::HTML; | |
291 } | |
292 | |
293 if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextPlain)) { | |
294 return SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::Plain; | |
295 } | |
296 | |
297 if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kAppJson) || | |
298 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextJson) || | |
299 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextXjson)) { | |
300 return SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::JSON; | |
301 } | |
302 | |
303 if (LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kTextXml) || | |
304 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, xAppRssXml) || | |
305 LowerCaseEqualsASCII(mime_type, kAppXml)) { | |
306 return SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::XML; | |
307 } | |
308 | |
309 return SiteIsolationPolicy::ResponseMetaData::Others; | |
310 | |
311 } | |
312 | |
313 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsBlockableScheme(const GURL& url) { | |
314 // We exclude ftp:// from here. FTP doesn't provide a Content-Type | |
315 // header which our policy depends on, so we cannot protect any | |
316 // document from FTP servers. | |
317 return url.SchemeIs("http") || url.SchemeIs("https"); | |
318 } | |
319 | |
320 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsSameSite(const GURL& frame_origin, | |
321 const GURL& response_url) { | |
322 | |
323 if (!frame_origin.is_valid() || !response_url.is_valid()) | |
324 return false; | |
325 | |
326 if (frame_origin.scheme() != response_url.scheme()) | |
327 return false; | |
328 | |
329 // SameDomainOrHost() extracts the effective domains (public suffix plus one) | |
330 // from the two URLs and compare them. | |
331 // TODO(dsjang): use INCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES when http://crbug.com/7988 is | |
332 // fixed. | |
333 return net::registry_controlled_domains::SameDomainOrHost( | |
334 frame_origin, | |
335 response_url, | |
336 net::registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES); | |
337 } | |
338 | |
339 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsFrameNavigating(WebKit::WebFrame* frame) { | |
340 // When a navigation starts, frame->provisionalDataSource() is set | |
341 // to a not-null value which stands for the request made for the | |
342 // navigation. As soon as the network request is committed to the | |
343 // frame, frame->provisionalDataSource() is converted to null, and | |
344 // the committed data source is moved to frame->dataSource(). This | |
345 // is the most reliable way to detect whether the frame is in | |
346 // navigation or not. | |
347 return frame->provisionalDataSource() != NULL; | |
348 } | |
349 | |
350 // We don't use Webkit's existing CORS policy implementation since | |
351 // their policy works in terms of origins, not sites. For example, | |
352 // when frame is sub.a.com and it is not allowed to access a document | |
353 // with sub1.a.com. But under Site Isolation, it's allowed. | |
354 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsValidCorsHeaderSet( | |
355 GURL& frame_origin, | |
356 GURL& website_origin, | |
357 std::string access_control_origin) { | |
358 // Many websites are sending back "\"*\"" instead of "*". This is | |
359 // non-standard practice, and not supported by Chrome. Refer to | |
360 // CrossOriginAccessControl::passesAccessControlCheck(). | |
361 | |
362 // TODO(dsjang): * is not allowed for the response from a request | |
363 // with cookies. This allows for more than what the renderer will | |
364 // eventually be able to receive, so we won't see illegal cross-site | |
365 // documents allowed by this. We have to find a way to see if this | |
366 // response is from a cookie-tagged request or not in the future. | |
367 if (access_control_origin == "*") | |
368 return true; | |
369 | |
370 // TODO(dsjang): The CORS spec only treats a fully specified URL, except for | |
371 // "*", but many websites are using just a domain for access_control_origin, | |
372 // and this is blocked by Webkit's CORS logic here : | |
373 // CrossOriginAccessControl::passesAccessControlCheck(). GURL is set | |
374 // is_valid() to false when it is created from a URL containing * in the | |
375 // domain part. | |
376 | |
377 GURL cors_origin(access_control_origin); | |
378 return IsSameSite(frame_origin, cors_origin); | |
379 } | |
380 | |
381 // This function is a slight modification of |net::SniffForHTML|. | |
382 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForHTML(const char* data, size_t length) { | |
383 // The content sniffer used by Chrome and Firefox are using "<!--" | |
384 // as one of the HTML signatures, but it also appears in valid | |
385 // JavaScript, considered as well-formed JS by the browser. Since | |
386 // we do not want to block any JS, we exclude it from our HTML | |
387 // signatures. This can weaken our document block policy, but we can | |
388 // break less websites. | |
389 // TODO(dsjang): parameterize |net::SniffForHTML| with an option | |
390 // that decides whether to include <!-- or not, so that we can | |
391 // remove this function. | |
392 const char* html_signatures[] = {"<!DOCTYPE html", // HTML5 spec | |
393 "<script", // HTML5 spec, Mozilla | |
394 "<html", // HTML5 spec, Mozilla | |
395 "<head", // HTML5 spec, Mozilla | |
396 "<iframe", // Mozilla | |
397 "<h1", // Mozilla | |
398 "<div", // Mozilla | |
399 "<font", // Mozilla | |
400 "<table", // Mozilla | |
401 "<a", // Mozilla | |
402 "<style", // Mozilla | |
403 "<title", // Mozilla | |
404 "<b", // Mozilla | |
405 "<body", // Mozilla | |
406 "<br", "<p", // Mozilla | |
407 "<?xml" // Mozilla | |
408 }; | |
409 | |
410 if (MatchesSignature( | |
411 data, length, html_signatures, arraysize(html_signatures))) | |
412 return true; | |
413 | |
414 // "<!--" is specially treated since web JS can use "<!--" "-->" pair for | |
415 // comments. | |
416 const char* comment_begins[] = {"<!--" }; | |
417 | |
418 if (MatchesSignature( | |
419 data, length, comment_begins, arraysize(comment_begins))) { | |
420 // Search for --> and do SniffForHTML after that. If we can find the | |
421 // comment's end, we start HTML sniffing from there again. | |
422 const char end_comment[] = "-->"; | |
423 const size_t end_comment_size = strlen(end_comment); | |
424 | |
425 for (size_t i = 0; i <= length - end_comment_size; ++i) { | |
426 if (!strncmp(data + i, end_comment, end_comment_size)) { | |
427 size_t skipped = i + end_comment_size; | |
428 return SniffForHTML(data + skipped, length - skipped); | |
429 } | |
430 } | |
431 } | |
432 | |
433 return false; | |
434 } | |
435 | |
436 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForXML(const char* data, size_t length) { | |
437 // TODO(dsjang): Chrome's mime_sniffer is using strncasecmp() for | |
438 // this signature. However, XML is case-sensitive. Don't we have to | |
439 // be more lenient only to block documents starting with the exact | |
440 // string <?xml rather than <?XML ? | |
441 const char* xml_signatures[] = {"<?xml" // Mozilla | |
442 }; | |
443 return MatchesSignature( | |
444 data, length, xml_signatures, arraysize(xml_signatures)); | |
445 } | |
446 | |
447 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForJSON(const char* data, size_t length) { | |
448 // TODO(dsjang): We have to come up with a better way to sniff | |
449 // JSON. However, even RE cannot help us that much due to the fact | |
450 // that we don't do full parsing. This DFA starts with state 0, and | |
451 // finds {, "/' and : in that order. We're avoiding adding a | |
452 // dependency on a regular expression library. | |
453 const int kInitState = 0; | |
454 const int kLeftBraceState = 1; | |
455 const int kLeftQuoteState = 2; | |
456 const int kColonState = 3; | |
457 const int kDeadState = 4; | |
458 | |
459 int state = kInitState; | |
460 for (size_t i = 0; i < length && state < kColonState; ++i) { | |
461 const char c = data[i]; | |
462 if (c == ' ' || c == '\t' || c == '\r' || c == '\n') | |
463 continue; | |
464 | |
465 switch (state) { | |
466 case kInitState: | |
467 if (c == '{') | |
468 state = kLeftBraceState; | |
469 else | |
470 state = kDeadState; | |
471 break; | |
472 case kLeftBraceState: | |
473 if (c == '\"' || c == '\'') | |
474 state = kLeftQuoteState; | |
475 else | |
476 state = kDeadState; | |
477 break; | |
478 case kLeftQuoteState: | |
479 if (c == ':') | |
480 state = kColonState; | |
481 break; | |
482 default: | |
483 NOTREACHED(); | |
484 break; | |
485 } | |
486 } | |
487 return state == kColonState; | |
488 } | |
489 | |
490 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::MatchesSignature(const char* raw_data, | |
491 size_t raw_length, | |
492 const char* signatures[], | |
493 size_t arr_size) { | |
494 size_t start = 0; | |
495 // Skip white characters at the beginning of the document. | |
496 for (start = 0; start < raw_length; ++start) { | |
497 char c = raw_data[start]; | |
498 if (!(c == ' ' || c == '\t' || c == '\r' || c == '\n')) | |
499 break; | |
500 } | |
501 | |
502 // There is no not-whitespace character in this document. | |
503 if (!(start < raw_length)) | |
504 return false; | |
505 | |
506 const char* data = raw_data + start; | |
507 size_t length = raw_length - start; | |
508 | |
509 for (size_t sig_index = 0; sig_index < arr_size; ++sig_index) { | |
510 const char* signature = signatures[sig_index]; | |
511 size_t signature_length = strlen(signature); | |
512 | |
513 if (length < signature_length) | |
514 continue; | |
515 | |
516 if (!base::strncasecmp(signature, data, signature_length)) | |
517 return true; | |
518 } | |
519 return false; | |
520 } | |
521 | |
522 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::IsRenderableStatusCodeForDocument(int status_code) { | |
523 // Chrome only uses the content of a response with one of these status codes | |
524 // for CSS/JavaScript. For images, Chrome just ignores status code. | |
525 const int renderable_status_code[] = {200, 201, 202, 203, 206, 300, 301, 302, | |
526 303, 305, 306, 307}; | |
527 for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(renderable_status_code); ++i) { | |
528 if (renderable_status_code[i] == status_code) | |
529 return true; | |
530 } | |
531 return false; | |
532 } | |
533 | |
534 bool SiteIsolationPolicy::SniffForJS(const char* data, size_t length) { | |
535 // TODO(dsjang): This is a real hack. The only purpose of this function is to | |
536 // try to see if there's any possibility that this data can be JavaScript | |
537 // (superset of JS). This function will be removed once UMA stats are | |
538 // gathered. | |
539 | |
540 // Search for "var " for JS detection. | |
541 for (size_t i = 0; i < length - 3; ++i) { | |
542 if (strncmp(data + i, "var ", 4) == 0) | |
543 return true; | |
544 } | |
545 return false; | |
546 } | |
547 | |
548 SiteIsolationPolicy::RequestIdToMetaDataMap* | |
549 SiteIsolationPolicy::GetRequestIdToMetaDataMap() { | |
550 CR_DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(RequestIdToMetaDataMap, metadata_map_, ()); | |
551 return &metadata_map_; | |
552 } | |
553 | |
554 SiteIsolationPolicy::RequestIdToResultMap* | |
555 SiteIsolationPolicy::GetRequestIdToResultMap() { | |
556 CR_DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(RequestIdToResultMap, result_map_, ()); | |
557 return &result_map_; | |
558 } | |
559 | |
560 } // namespace content | |
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