| Index: net/cert/cert_verify_proc.cc
|
| diff --git a/net/cert/cert_verify_proc.cc b/net/cert/cert_verify_proc.cc
|
| index eea6a0b673f97876ddbefc5014ff49a5e6b3964f..783b383f7eabdba2c941b2befe6a6033d4afcf36 100644
|
| --- a/net/cert/cert_verify_proc.cc
|
| +++ b/net/cert/cert_verify_proc.cc
|
| @@ -9,13 +9,11 @@
|
| #include "build/build_config.h"
|
| #include "net/base/net_errors.h"
|
| #include "net/base/net_util.h"
|
| -#include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h"
|
| #include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h"
|
| #include "net/cert/cert_verifier.h"
|
| #include "net/cert/cert_verify_result.h"
|
| #include "net/cert/crl_set.h"
|
| #include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
|
| -#include "url/url_canon.h"
|
|
|
| #if defined(USE_NSS) || defined(OS_IOS)
|
| #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_nss.h"
|
| @@ -152,7 +150,10 @@ int CertVerifyProc::Verify(X509Certificate* cert,
|
| // Flag certificates from publicly-trusted CAs that are issued to intranet
|
| // hosts. While the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements (v1.1) permit
|
| // these to be issued until 1 November 2015, they represent a real risk for
|
| - // the deployment of gTLDs and are being phased out.
|
| + // the deployment of gTLDs and are being phased out ahead of the hard
|
| + // deadline.
|
| + // TODO(rsleevi): http://crbug.com/119212 - Also match internal IP address
|
| + // ranges.
|
| if (verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root && IsHostnameNonUnique(hostname)) {
|
| verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME;
|
| }
|
| @@ -293,39 +294,4 @@ bool CertVerifyProc::IsPublicKeyBlacklisted(
|
| return false;
|
| }
|
|
|
| -// static
|
| -bool CertVerifyProc::IsHostnameNonUnique(const std::string& hostname) {
|
| - // CanonicalizeHost requires surrounding brackets to parse an IPv6 address.
|
| - const std::string host_or_ip = hostname.find(':') != std::string::npos ?
|
| - "[" + hostname + "]" : hostname;
|
| - url_canon::CanonHostInfo host_info;
|
| - std::string canonical_name = CanonicalizeHost(host_or_ip, &host_info);
|
| -
|
| - // If canonicalization fails, then the input is truly malformed. However,
|
| - // to avoid mis-reporting bad inputs as "non-unique", treat them as unique.
|
| - if (canonical_name.empty())
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| - // If |hostname| is an IP address, presume it's unique.
|
| - // TODO(rsleevi): In the future, this should also reject IP addresses in
|
| - // IANA-reserved ranges, since those are also non-unique among publicly
|
| - // trusted CAs.
|
| - if (host_info.IsIPAddress())
|
| - return false;
|
| -
|
| - // Check for a registry controlled portion of |hostname|, ignoring private
|
| - // registries, as they already chain to ICANN-administered registries,
|
| - // and explicitly ignoring unknown registries.
|
| - //
|
| - // Note: This means that as new gTLDs are introduced on the Internet, they
|
| - // will be treated as non-unique until the registry controlled domain list
|
| - // is updated. However, because gTLDs are expected to provide significant
|
| - // advance notice to deprecate older versions of this code, this an
|
| - // acceptable tradeoff.
|
| - return 0 == registry_controlled_domains::GetRegistryLength(
|
| - canonical_name,
|
| - registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_UNKNOWN_REGISTRIES,
|
| - registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| } // namespace net
|
|
|