| Index: net/cert/cert_verify_proc.cc | 
| diff --git a/net/cert/cert_verify_proc.cc b/net/cert/cert_verify_proc.cc | 
| index eea6a0b673f97876ddbefc5014ff49a5e6b3964f..783b383f7eabdba2c941b2befe6a6033d4afcf36 100644 | 
| --- a/net/cert/cert_verify_proc.cc | 
| +++ b/net/cert/cert_verify_proc.cc | 
| @@ -9,13 +9,11 @@ | 
| #include "build/build_config.h" | 
| #include "net/base/net_errors.h" | 
| #include "net/base/net_util.h" | 
| -#include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h" | 
| #include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h" | 
| #include "net/cert/cert_verifier.h" | 
| #include "net/cert/cert_verify_result.h" | 
| #include "net/cert/crl_set.h" | 
| #include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h" | 
| -#include "url/url_canon.h" | 
|  | 
| #if defined(USE_NSS) || defined(OS_IOS) | 
| #include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_nss.h" | 
| @@ -152,7 +150,10 @@ int CertVerifyProc::Verify(X509Certificate* cert, | 
| // Flag certificates from publicly-trusted CAs that are issued to intranet | 
| // hosts. While the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements (v1.1) permit | 
| // these to be issued until 1 November 2015, they represent a real risk for | 
| -  // the deployment of gTLDs and are being phased out. | 
| +  // the deployment of gTLDs and are being phased out ahead of the hard | 
| +  // deadline. | 
| +  // TODO(rsleevi): http://crbug.com/119212 - Also match internal IP address | 
| +  // ranges. | 
| if (verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root && IsHostnameNonUnique(hostname)) { | 
| verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME; | 
| } | 
| @@ -293,39 +294,4 @@ bool CertVerifyProc::IsPublicKeyBlacklisted( | 
| return false; | 
| } | 
|  | 
| -// static | 
| -bool CertVerifyProc::IsHostnameNonUnique(const std::string& hostname) { | 
| -  // CanonicalizeHost requires surrounding brackets to parse an IPv6 address. | 
| -  const std::string host_or_ip = hostname.find(':') != std::string::npos ? | 
| -      "[" + hostname + "]" : hostname; | 
| -  url_canon::CanonHostInfo host_info; | 
| -  std::string canonical_name = CanonicalizeHost(host_or_ip, &host_info); | 
| - | 
| -  // If canonicalization fails, then the input is truly malformed. However, | 
| -  // to avoid mis-reporting bad inputs as "non-unique", treat them as unique. | 
| -  if (canonical_name.empty()) | 
| -    return false; | 
| - | 
| -  // If |hostname| is an IP address, presume it's unique. | 
| -  // TODO(rsleevi): In the future, this should also reject IP addresses in | 
| -  // IANA-reserved ranges, since those are also non-unique among publicly | 
| -  // trusted CAs. | 
| -  if (host_info.IsIPAddress()) | 
| -    return false; | 
| - | 
| -  // Check for a registry controlled portion of |hostname|, ignoring private | 
| -  // registries, as they already chain to ICANN-administered registries, | 
| -  // and explicitly ignoring unknown registries. | 
| -  // | 
| -  // Note: This means that as new gTLDs are introduced on the Internet, they | 
| -  // will be treated as non-unique until the registry controlled domain list | 
| -  // is updated. However, because gTLDs are expected to provide significant | 
| -  // advance notice to deprecate older versions of this code, this an | 
| -  // acceptable tradeoff. | 
| -  return 0 == registry_controlled_domains::GetRegistryLength( | 
| -                  canonical_name, | 
| -                  registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_UNKNOWN_REGISTRIES, | 
| -                  registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES); | 
| -} | 
| - | 
| }  // namespace net | 
|  |