CertVerifyProcMac: Add Keychain re-ordering hack, check CRLsets in path pruning loop.

net/cert/cert_verify_proc_unittest.cc

Index: net/cert/cert_verify_proc_unittest.cc
diff --git a/net/cert/cert_verify_proc_unittest.cc b/net/cert/cert_verify_proc_unittest.cc
index e60b2e772761b8b265e555fe33064274da9ac0a7..ee6a9b14f554e41f9b9b0e63db8fbf64c3db581b 100644
--- a/net/cert/cert_verify_proc_unittest.cc
+++ b/net/cert/cert_verify_proc_unittest.cc
@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
 #include "base/android/build_info.h"
 #endif
 
+#if defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
+#include "net/cert/test_keychain_search_list_mac.h"
+#endif
+
 using net::test::IsError;
 using net::test::IsOk;
 
@@ -1340,6 +1344,157 @@ TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, CRLSetDuringPathBuilding) {
 
 #endif
 
+#if defined(OS_MACOSX) && !defined(OS_IOS)
+// Test that a CRLSet blocking one of the intermediates supplied by the server
+// can be worked around by the chopping workaround for path building. (Once the
+// supplied chain is chopped back to just the target, a better path can be
+// found out-of-band. Normally that would be by AIA fetching, for the purposes
+// of this test the better path is supplied by a test keychain.)
+//
+// In this test, there are two possible paths to validate a leaf (A):
+// 1. A(B) -> B(C) -> C(E) -> E(E)
+// 2. A(B) -> B(F) -> F(E) -> E(E)
+//
+// A(B) -> B(C) -> C(E) is supplied to the verifier.
+// B(F) and F(E) are supplied in a test keychain.
+// C is blocked by a CRLset.
+//
+// The verifier should rollback until it just tries A(B) alone, at which point
+// it will pull B(F) & F(E) from the keychain and succeed.
+TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, MacCRLIntermediate) {
+  const char* const kPath2Files[] = {
+      "multi-root-A-by-B.pem", "multi-root-B-by-C.pem", "multi-root-C-by-E.pem",
+      "multi-root-E-by-E.pem"};
+  CertificateList path_2_certs;
+  ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(LoadCertificateFiles(kPath2Files, &path_2_certs));
+
+  const char* const kPath3Files[] = {
+      "multi-root-A-by-B.pem", "multi-root-B-by-F.pem", "multi-root-F-by-E.pem",
+      "multi-root-E-by-E.pem"};
+
+  CertificateList path_3_certs;
+  ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(LoadCertificateFiles(kPath3Files, &path_3_certs));
+
+  // Add E as trust anchor.
+  ScopedTestRoot test_root_E(path_3_certs[3].get());  // E-by-E
+
+  X509Certificate::OSCertHandles intermediates;
+  intermediates.push_back(path_2_certs[1]->os_cert_handle());  // B-by-C
+  intermediates.push_back(path_2_certs[2]->os_cert_handle());  // C-by-E
+  scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(
+      path_3_certs[0]->os_cert_handle(), intermediates);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
+
+  std::unique_ptr<TestKeychainSearchList> test_keychain_search_list(
+      TestKeychainSearchList::Create());
+  ASSERT_TRUE(test_keychain_search_list);
+
+  base::FilePath keychain_path(
+      GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("multi-root-BFE.keychain"));
+  // SecKeychainOpen does not fail if the file doesn't exist, so assert it here
+  // for easier debugging.
+  ASSERT_TRUE(base::PathExists(keychain_path));
+  SecKeychainRef keychain;
+  OSStatus status =
+      SecKeychainOpen(keychain_path.MaybeAsASCII().c_str(), &keychain);
+  ASSERT_EQ(errSecSuccess, status);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(keychain);
+  base::ScopedCFTypeRef<SecKeychainRef> scoped_keychain(keychain);
+  test_keychain_search_list->AddKeychain(keychain);
+
+  scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set;
+  std::string crl_set_bytes;
+  // CRL which blocks C by SPKI.
+  EXPECT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
+      GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("multi-root-crlset-C.raw"),
+      &crl_set_bytes));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSetStorage::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
+
+  int flags = 0;
+  CertVerifyResult verify_result;
+  int error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, crl_set.get(),
+                     empty_cert_list_, &verify_result);
+
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, error);
+  ASSERT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert.get());
+
+  const X509Certificate::OSCertHandles& verified_intermediates =
+      verify_result.verified_cert->GetIntermediateCertificates();
+  ASSERT_EQ(3U, verified_intermediates.size());
+
+  scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> intermediate =
+      X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(verified_intermediates[1],
+                                        X509Certificate::OSCertHandles());
+  ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate);
+
+  scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> expected_intermediate = path_3_certs[2];
+  EXPECT_TRUE(expected_intermediate->Equals(intermediate.get()))
+      << "Expected: " << expected_intermediate->subject().common_name
+      << " issued by " << expected_intermediate->issuer().common_name
+      << "; Got: " << intermediate->subject().common_name << " issued by "
+      << intermediate->issuer().common_name;
+}
+
+// Test that if a keychain is present which trusts a less-desirable root (ex,
+// one using SHA1), that the keychain reordering hack will cause the better
+// root in the System Roots to be used instead.
+TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, MacKeychainReordering) {
+  // Note: target cert expires Apr  2 23:59:59 2018 GMT
+  scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
+      GetTestCertsDirectory(), "tripadvisor-verisign-chain.pem",
+      X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
+
+  // Create a test keychain search list that will Always Trust the SHA1
+  // cross-signed VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5
+  std::unique_ptr<TestKeychainSearchList> test_keychain_search_list(
+      TestKeychainSearchList::Create());
+  ASSERT_TRUE(test_keychain_search_list);
+
+  base::FilePath keychain_path(GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII(
+      "verisign_class3_g5_crosssigned-trusted.keychain"));
+  // SecKeychainOpen does not fail if the file doesn't exist, so assert it here
+  // for easier debugging.
+  ASSERT_TRUE(base::PathExists(keychain_path));
+  SecKeychainRef keychain;
+  OSStatus status =
+      SecKeychainOpen(keychain_path.MaybeAsASCII().c_str(), &keychain);
+  ASSERT_EQ(errSecSuccess, status);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(keychain);
+  base::ScopedCFTypeRef<SecKeychainRef> scoped_keychain(keychain);
+  test_keychain_search_list->AddKeychain(keychain);
+
+  int flags = 0;
+  CertVerifyResult verify_result;
+  int error = Verify(cert.get(), "www.tripadvisor.com", flags,
+                     nullptr /* crl_set */, empty_cert_list_, &verify_result);
+
+  ASSERT_EQ(OK, error);
+  EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
+  EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.has_sha1);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert.get());
+
+  const X509Certificate::OSCertHandles& verified_intermediates =
+      verify_result.verified_cert->GetIntermediateCertificates();
+  ASSERT_EQ(2U, verified_intermediates.size());
+}
+
+// Test that the system root certificate keychain is in the expected location
+// and can be opened. Other tests would fail if this was not true, but this
+// test makes the reason for the failure obvious.
+TEST_F(CertVerifyProcTest, MacSystemRootCertificateKeychainLocation) {
+  const char* root_keychain_path =
+      "/System/Library/Keychains/SystemRootCertificates.keychain";
+  ASSERT_TRUE(base::PathExists(base::FilePath(root_keychain_path)));
+
+  SecKeychainRef keychain;
+  OSStatus status = SecKeychainOpen(root_keychain_path, &keychain);
+  ASSERT_EQ(errSecSuccess, status);
+  CFRelease(keychain);
+}
+#endif
+
 enum ExpectedAlgorithms {
   EXPECT_MD2 = 1 << 0,
   EXPECT_MD4 = 1 << 1,