Add OCSPVerifyResult for tracking stapled OCSP responses cross-platform.

net/tools/testserver/minica.py

Index: net/tools/testserver/minica.py
diff --git a/net/tools/testserver/minica.py b/net/tools/testserver/minica.py
index acf68fcbb935059182661b275a106bb3c74472ad..eb9a2d056f70782d75bab66de8bd051baf67f243 100644
--- a/net/tools/testserver/minica.py
+++ b/net/tools/testserver/minica.py
@@ -3,9 +3,23 @@
 # found in the LICENSE file.
 
 import asn1
+import datetime
 import hashlib
 import os
+import time
 
+GENERALIZED_TIME_FORMAT = "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ"
+
+OCSP_STATE_GOOD = 1
+OCSP_STATE_REVOKED = 2
+OCSP_STATE_INVALID = 3
+OCSP_STATE_UNAUTHORIZED = 4
+OCSP_STATE_UNKNOWN = 5
+
+OCSP_DATE_VALID = 1
+OCSP_DATE_OLD = 2
+OCSP_DATE_EARLY = 3
+OCSP_DATE_LONG = 4
 
 # This file implements very minimal certificate and OCSP generation. It's
 # designed to test revocation checking.
@@ -245,8 +259,7 @@ def MakeCertificate(
     asn1.BitString(privkey.Sign(tbsCert)),
   ]))
 
-
-def MakeOCSPResponse(issuer_cn, issuer_key, serial, ocsp_state):
+def MakeOCSPResponse(issuer_cn, issuer_key, serial, ocsp_state, ocsp_date):
   # https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2560
   issuer_name_hash = asn1.OCTETSTRING(
       hashlib.sha1(asn1.ToDER(Name(cn = issuer_cn))).digest())
@@ -264,9 +277,26 @@ def MakeOCSPResponse(issuer_cn, issuer_key, serial, ocsp_state):
   else:
     raise ValueError('Bad OCSP state: ' + str(ocsp_state))
 
+  now = datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(time.mktime(time.gmtime()))
+  if ocsp_date == OCSP_DATE_VALID:
+    thisUpdate = now - datetime.timedelta(days=1)
+    nextUpdate = thisUpdate + datetime.timedelta(weeks=1)
+  elif ocsp_date == OCSP_DATE_OLD:
+    thisUpdate = now - datetime.timedelta(hours=1, weeks=1)
+    nextUpdate = thisUpdate + datetime.timedelta(weeks=1)
+  elif ocsp_date == OCSP_DATE_EARLY:
+    thisUpdate = now + datetime.timedelta(hours=1)
+    nextUpdate = thisUpdate + datetime.timedelta(weeks=1)
+  elif ocsp_date == OCSP_DATE_LONG:
+    thisUpdate = now - datetime.timedelta(days=365)
+    nextUpdate = thisUpdate + datetime.timedelta(hours=1, days=365)
+  else:
+    raise ValueError('Bad OCSP date: ' + str(ocsp_date))
+  producedAt = thisUpdate

[dadrian, 2016/06/27 22:43:03]

I had to modify producedAt because apparently NSS enforces some level of
recentness of producedAt relative to thisUpdate. I'm not sure how recent it has
to be, just that the previous value was definitely too old, and NSS validation
was failing when thisUpdate and nextUpdate were dynamically set, but producedAt
was not. Probably a question for rsleevi, but do we know what restrictions other
platforms enforce on producedAt? The current date validation ignores it, and I
don't believe any particular policy is specified in RFC 6960.

[svaldez, 2016/06/29 14:41:23]

From the RFC, the only requirement on producedAt is that it should be within the
validity period of the certificate that signed the response.

Unfortunately it looks like NSS adds a bunch of additional constraints, which
aren't necessarily valid
(https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/nss/lib/certhigh/ocsp...).

We should probably still allow responses where producedAt < thisUpdate, since
pre-signing is allowed by the spec.

[dadrian, 2016/06/30 21:52:43]

I added a check to make sure notBefore <= producedAt <= notAfter.

[Ryan Sleevi, 2016/06/30 22:14:50]

There were some security bugs about this. From an ops side, CAs presigning
creates substantial risk for compromise, so we haven't been too keen to allow a
large window here. I'd have to dig up bugzilla for the details.

For Windows/OS X, I'd have to check the implementation, I don't know off the top
of my head. How pressing is it?

[dadrian, 2016/07/08 22:17:30]

I mangled these down to one test class that _should_ be platform independent.
We'll see what happens once these hit the try bots after the dependent CL lands.

+
   basic_resp_data_der = asn1.ToDER(asn1.SEQUENCE([
     asn1.Explicit(2, issuer_key_hash),
-    asn1.GeneralizedTime("20100101060000Z"), # producedAt
+    asn1.GeneralizedTime(producedAt.strftime(GENERALIZED_TIME_FORMAT)),
     asn1.SEQUENCE([
       asn1.SEQUENCE([ # SingleResponse
         asn1.SEQUENCE([ # CertID
@@ -279,8 +309,13 @@ def MakeOCSPResponse(issuer_cn, issuer_key, serial, ocsp_state):
           serial,
         ]),
         cert_status,
-        asn1.GeneralizedTime("20100101060000Z"), # thisUpdate
-        asn1.Explicit(0, asn1.GeneralizedTime("20300101060000Z")), # nextUpdate
+        asn1.GeneralizedTime( # thisUpdate
+          thisUpdate.strftime(GENERALIZED_TIME_FORMAT)
+        ),
+        asn1.Explicit( # nextUpdate
+          0,
+          asn1.GeneralizedTime(nextUpdate.strftime(GENERALIZED_TIME_FORMAT))
+        ),
       ]),
     ]),
   ]))
@@ -311,12 +346,6 @@ def DERToPEM(der):
   pem += '-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n'
   return pem
 
-OCSP_STATE_GOOD = 1
-OCSP_STATE_REVOKED = 2
-OCSP_STATE_INVALID = 3
-OCSP_STATE_UNAUTHORIZED = 4
-OCSP_STATE_UNKNOWN = 5
-
 # unauthorizedDER is an OCSPResponse with a status of 6:
 # SEQUENCE { ENUM(6) }
 unauthorizedDER = '30030a0106'.decode('hex')
@@ -324,6 +353,7 @@ unauthorizedDER = '30030a0106'.decode('hex')
 def GenerateCertKeyAndOCSP(subject = "127.0.0.1",
                            ocsp_url = "http://127.0.0.1",
                            ocsp_state = OCSP_STATE_GOOD,
+                           ocsp_date = OCSP_DATE_VALID,
                            serial = 0):
   '''GenerateCertKeyAndOCSP returns a (cert_and_key_pem, ocsp_der) where:
        * cert_and_key_pem contains a certificate and private key in PEM format
@@ -344,6 +374,7 @@ def GenerateCertKeyAndOCSP(subject = "127.0.0.1",
     elif ocsp_state == OCSP_STATE_INVALID:
       ocsp_der = '3'
     else:
-      ocsp_der = MakeOCSPResponse(ISSUER_CN, KEY, serial, ocsp_state)
+      ocsp_der = MakeOCSPResponse(
+          ISSUER_CN, KEY, serial, ocsp_state, ocsp_date)
 
   return (cert_pem + KEY_PEM, ocsp_der)