| Index: nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
| diff --git a/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c b/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
| deleted file mode 100644
|
| index f0d36cc71f3fcf6b7722b622da460879bb3d9760..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
|
| --- a/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
|
| +++ /dev/null
|
| @@ -1,7625 +0,0 @@
|
| -/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
|
| - * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
|
| - * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
|
| -/*
|
| - * This file implements PKCS 11 on top of our existing security modules
|
| - *
|
| - * For more information about PKCS 11 See PKCS 11 Token Inteface Standard.
|
| - * This implementation has two slots:
|
| - * slot 1 is our generic crypto support. It does not require login.
|
| - * It supports Public Key ops, and all they bulk ciphers and hashes.
|
| - * It can also support Private Key ops for imported Private keys. It does
|
| - * not have any token storage.
|
| - * slot 2 is our private key support. It requires a login before use. It
|
| - * can store Private Keys and Certs as token objects. Currently only private
|
| - * keys and their associated Certificates are saved on the token.
|
| - *
|
| - * In this implementation, session objects are only visible to the session
|
| - * that created or generated them.
|
| - */
|
| -#include "seccomon.h"
|
| -#include "secitem.h"
|
| -#include "secport.h"
|
| -#include "blapi.h"
|
| -#include "pkcs11.h"
|
| -#include "pkcs11i.h"
|
| -#include "pkcs1sig.h"
|
| -#include "lowkeyi.h"
|
| -#include "secder.h"
|
| -#include "secdig.h"
|
| -#include "lowpbe.h" /* We do PBE below */
|
| -#include "pkcs11t.h"
|
| -#include "secoid.h"
|
| -#include "alghmac.h"
|
| -#include "softoken.h"
|
| -#include "secasn1.h"
|
| -#include "secerr.h"
|
| -
|
| -#include "prprf.h"
|
| -#include "prenv.h"
|
| -
|
| -#define __PASTE(x,y) x##y
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * we renamed all our internal functions, get the correct
|
| - * definitions for them...
|
| - */
|
| -#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
|
| -#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
|
| -
|
| -#define CK_EXTERN extern
|
| -#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(func) \
|
| - CK_RV __PASTE(NS,func)
|
| -#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1
|
| -
|
| -#include "pkcs11f.h"
|
| -
|
| -typedef struct {
|
| - PRUint8 client_version[2];
|
| - PRUint8 random[46];
|
| -} SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret;
|
| -
|
| -static void sftk_Null(void *data, PRBool freeit)
|
| -{
|
| - return;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
| -#ifdef EC_DEBUG
|
| -#define SEC_PRINT(str1, str2, num, sitem) \
|
| - printf("pkcs11c.c:%s:%s (keytype=%d) [len=%d]\n", \
|
| - str1, str2, num, sitem->len); \
|
| - for (i = 0; i < sitem->len; i++) { \
|
| - printf("%02x:", sitem->data[i]); \
|
| - } \
|
| - printf("\n")
|
| -#else
|
| -#undef EC_DEBUG
|
| -#define SEC_PRINT(a, b, c, d)
|
| -#endif
|
| -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * free routines.... Free local type allocated data, and convert
|
| - * other free routines to the destroy signature.
|
| - */
|
| -static void
|
| -sftk_FreePrivKey(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, PRBool freeit)
|
| -{
|
| - nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(key);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static void
|
| -sftk_Space(void *data, PRBool freeit)
|
| -{
|
| - PORT_Free(data);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * map all the SEC_ERROR_xxx error codes that may be returned by freebl
|
| - * functions to CKR_xxx. return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR by default for backward
|
| - * compatibility.
|
| - */
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -sftk_MapCryptError(int error)
|
| -{
|
| - switch (error) {
|
| - case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS:
|
| - case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA: /* MP_RANGE gets mapped to this */
|
| - return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
| - case SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN:
|
| - return CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE;
|
| - case SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN:
|
| - return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
|
| - case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE:
|
| - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
|
| - case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY:
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
|
| - return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
|
| - case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY:
|
| - return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
|
| - case SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY: /* an EC public key that fails validation */
|
| - return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE; /* the closest error code */
|
| - case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM:
|
| - return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - /* EC functions set this error if NSS_DISABLE_ECC is defined */
|
| - case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG:
|
| - return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
|
| - case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE:
|
| - return CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID;
|
| - /* key pair generation failed after max number of attempts */
|
| - case SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM:
|
| - return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
| - }
|
| - return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* used by Decrypt and UnwrapKey (indirectly) */
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -sftk_MapDecryptError(int error)
|
| -{
|
| - switch (error) {
|
| - case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA:
|
| - return CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
|
| - default:
|
| - return sftk_MapCryptError(error);
|
| - }
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID instead of CKR_DEVICE_ERROR by default for
|
| - * backward compatibilty.
|
| - */
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -sftk_MapVerifyError(int error)
|
| -{
|
| - CK_RV crv = sftk_MapCryptError(error);
|
| - if (crv == CKR_DEVICE_ERROR)
|
| - crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * turn a CDMF key into a des key. CDMF is an old IBM scheme to export DES by
|
| - * Deprecating a full des key to 40 bit key strenth.
|
| - */
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -sftk_cdmf2des(unsigned char *cdmfkey, unsigned char *deskey)
|
| -{
|
| - unsigned char key1[8] = { 0xc4, 0x08, 0xb0, 0x54, 0x0b, 0xa1, 0xe0, 0xae };
|
| - unsigned char key2[8] = { 0xef, 0x2c, 0x04, 0x1c, 0xe6, 0x38, 0x2f, 0xe6 };
|
| - unsigned char enc_src[8];
|
| - unsigned char enc_dest[8];
|
| - unsigned int leng,i;
|
| - DESContext *descx;
|
| - SECStatus rv;
|
| -
|
| -
|
| - /* zero the parity bits */
|
| - for (i=0; i < 8; i++) {
|
| - enc_src[i] = cdmfkey[i] & 0xfe;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* encrypt with key 1 */
|
| - descx = DES_CreateContext(key1, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE);
|
| - if (descx == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, enc_dest, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8);
|
| - DES_DestroyContext(descx,PR_TRUE);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| -
|
| - /* xor source with des, zero the parity bits and deprecate the key*/
|
| - for (i=0; i < 8; i++) {
|
| - if (i & 1) {
|
| - enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0xfe;
|
| - } else {
|
| - enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0x0e;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* encrypt with key 2 */
|
| - descx = DES_CreateContext(key2, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE);
|
| - if (descx == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, deskey, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8);
|
| - DES_DestroyContext(descx,PR_TRUE);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| -
|
| - /* set the corret parity on our new des key */
|
| - sftk_FormatDESKey(deskey, 8);
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_DestroyObject destroys an object. */
|
| -CK_RV
|
| -NSC_DestroyObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKObject *object;
|
| - SFTKFreeStatus status;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - if (slot == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| - /*
|
| - * This whole block just makes sure we really can destroy the
|
| - * requested object.
|
| - */
|
| - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
|
| - if (session == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - object = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hObject,session);
|
| - if (object == NULL) {
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* don't destroy a private object if we aren't logged in */
|
| - if ((!slot->isLoggedIn) && (slot->needLogin) &&
|
| - (sftk_isTrue(object,CKA_PRIVATE))) {
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(object);
|
| - return CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* don't destroy a token object if we aren't in a rw session */
|
| -
|
| - if (((session->info.flags & CKF_RW_SESSION) == 0) &&
|
| - (sftk_isTrue(object,CKA_TOKEN))) {
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(object);
|
| - return CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - sftk_DeleteObject(session,object);
|
| -
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * get some indication if the object is destroyed. Note: this is not
|
| - * 100%. Someone may have an object reference outstanding (though that
|
| - * should not be the case by here. Also note that the object is "half"
|
| - * destroyed. Our internal representation is destroyed, but it may still
|
| - * be in the data base.
|
| - */
|
| - status = sftk_FreeObject(object);
|
| -
|
| - return (status != SFTK_DestroyFailure) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - ************** Crypto Functions: Utilities ************************
|
| - */
|
| -/*
|
| - * Utility function for converting PSS/OAEP parameter types into
|
| - * HASH_HashTypes. Note: Only SHA family functions are defined in RFC 3447.
|
| - */
|
| -static HASH_HashType
|
| -GetHashTypeFromMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech)
|
| -{
|
| - switch (mech) {
|
| - case CKM_SHA_1:
|
| - case CKG_MGF1_SHA1:
|
| - return HASH_AlgSHA1;
|
| - case CKM_SHA224:
|
| - case CKG_MGF1_SHA224:
|
| - return HASH_AlgSHA224;
|
| - case CKM_SHA256:
|
| - case CKG_MGF1_SHA256:
|
| - return HASH_AlgSHA256;
|
| - case CKM_SHA384:
|
| - case CKG_MGF1_SHA384:
|
| - return HASH_AlgSHA384;
|
| - case CKM_SHA512:
|
| - case CKG_MGF1_SHA512:
|
| - return HASH_AlgSHA512;
|
| - default:
|
| - return HASH_AlgNULL;
|
| - }
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * Returns true if "params" contains a valid set of PSS parameters
|
| - */
|
| -static PRBool
|
| -sftk_ValidatePssParams(const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params)
|
| -{
|
| - if (!params) {
|
| - return PR_FALSE;
|
| - }
|
| - if (GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL ||
|
| - GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf) == HASH_AlgNULL) {
|
| - return PR_FALSE;
|
| - }
|
| - return PR_TRUE;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * Returns true if "params" contains a valid set of OAEP parameters
|
| - */
|
| -static PRBool
|
| -sftk_ValidateOaepParams(const CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS *params)
|
| -{
|
| - if (!params) {
|
| - return PR_FALSE;
|
| - }
|
| - /* The requirements of ulSourceLen/pSourceData come from PKCS #11, which
|
| - * state:
|
| - * If the parameter is empty, pSourceData must be NULL and
|
| - * ulSourceDataLen must be zero.
|
| - */
|
| - if (params->source != CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED ||
|
| - (GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL) ||
|
| - (GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf) == HASH_AlgNULL) ||
|
| - (params->ulSourceDataLen == 0 && params->pSourceData != NULL) ||
|
| - (params->ulSourceDataLen != 0 && params->pSourceData == NULL)) {
|
| - return PR_FALSE;
|
| - }
|
| - return PR_TRUE;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * return a context based on the SFTKContext type.
|
| - */
|
| -SFTKSessionContext *
|
| -sftk_ReturnContextByType(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType type)
|
| -{
|
| - switch (type) {
|
| - case SFTK_ENCRYPT:
|
| - case SFTK_DECRYPT:
|
| - return session->enc_context;
|
| - case SFTK_HASH:
|
| - return session->hash_context;
|
| - case SFTK_SIGN:
|
| - case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER:
|
| - case SFTK_VERIFY:
|
| - case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER:
|
| - return session->hash_context;
|
| - }
|
| - return NULL;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * change a context based on the SFTKContext type.
|
| - */
|
| -void
|
| -sftk_SetContextByType(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType type,
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context)
|
| -{
|
| - switch (type) {
|
| - case SFTK_ENCRYPT:
|
| - case SFTK_DECRYPT:
|
| - session->enc_context = context;
|
| - break;
|
| - case SFTK_HASH:
|
| - session->hash_context = context;
|
| - break;
|
| - case SFTK_SIGN:
|
| - case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER:
|
| - case SFTK_VERIFY:
|
| - case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER:
|
| - session->hash_context = context;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - return;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * code to grab the context. Needed by every C_XXXUpdate, C_XXXFinal,
|
| - * and C_XXX function. The function takes a session handle, the context type,
|
| - * and wether or not the session needs to be multipart. It returns the context,
|
| - * and optionally returns the session pointer (if sessionPtr != NULL) if session
|
| - * pointer is returned, the caller is responsible for freeing it.
|
| - */
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -sftk_GetContext(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle,SFTKSessionContext **contextPtr,
|
| - SFTKContextType type, PRBool needMulti, SFTKSession **sessionPtr)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| -
|
| - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(handle);
|
| - if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - context = sftk_ReturnContextByType(session,type);
|
| - /* make sure the context is valid */
|
| - if((context==NULL)||(context->type!=type)||(needMulti&&!(context->multi))){
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
|
| - }
|
| - *contextPtr = context;
|
| - if (sessionPtr != NULL) {
|
| - *sessionPtr = session;
|
| - } else {
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - }
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/** Terminate operation (in the PKCS#11 spec sense).
|
| - * Intuitive name for FreeContext/SetNullContext pair.
|
| - */
|
| -static void
|
| -sftk_TerminateOp( SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType ctype,
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context )
|
| -{
|
| - sftk_FreeContext( context );
|
| - sftk_SetContextByType( session, ctype, NULL );
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - ************** Crypto Functions: Encrypt ************************
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * All the NSC_InitXXX functions have a set of common checks and processing they
|
| - * all need to do at the beginning. This is done here.
|
| - */
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session,SFTKSessionContext **contextPtr,
|
| - SFTKContextType ctype,SFTKObject **keyPtr,
|
| - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_KEY_TYPE *keyTypePtr,
|
| - CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubKeyType, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKObject *key = NULL;
|
| - SFTKAttribute *att;
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| -
|
| - /* We can only init if there is not current context active */
|
| - if (sftk_ReturnContextByType(session,ctype) != NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* find the key */
|
| - if (keyPtr) {
|
| - key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session);
|
| - if (key == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure it's a valid key for this operation */
|
| - if (((key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) && (key->objclass != pubKeyType))
|
| - || !sftk_isTrue(key,operation)) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - }
|
| - /* get the key type */
|
| - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
|
| - if (att == NULL) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - }
|
| - PORT_Assert(att->attrib.ulValueLen == sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
|
| - if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)) {
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(keyTypePtr, att->attrib.pValue, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
|
| - *keyPtr = key;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* allocate the context structure */
|
| - context = (SFTKSessionContext *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSessionContext));
|
| - if (context == NULL) {
|
| - if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - }
|
| - context->type = ctype;
|
| - context->multi = PR_TRUE;
|
| - context->rsa = PR_FALSE;
|
| - context->cipherInfo = NULL;
|
| - context->hashInfo = NULL;
|
| - context->doPad = PR_FALSE;
|
| - context->padDataLength = 0;
|
| - context->key = key;
|
| - context->blockSize = 0;
|
| - context->maxLen = 0;
|
| -
|
| - *contextPtr = context;
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static int
|
| -sftk_aes_mode(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism)
|
| -{
|
| - switch (mechanism) {
|
| - case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
|
| - case CKM_AES_CBC:
|
| - return NSS_AES_CBC;
|
| - case CKM_AES_ECB:
|
| - return NSS_AES;
|
| - case CKM_AES_CTS:
|
| - return NSS_AES_CTS;
|
| - case CKM_AES_CTR:
|
| - return NSS_AES_CTR;
|
| - case CKM_AES_GCM:
|
| - return NSS_AES_GCM;
|
| - }
|
| - return -1;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_RSAEncryptRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *output,
|
| - unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
|
| - const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
| - if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - rv = RSA_EncryptRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
|
| - inputLen);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
|
| - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return rv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_RSADecryptRaw(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
|
| - unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
|
| - const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
| - if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - rv = RSA_DecryptRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
|
| - inputLen);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
|
| - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return rv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_RSAEncrypt(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *output,
|
| - unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
|
| - const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
| - if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - rv = RSA_EncryptBlock(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
|
| - inputLen);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
|
| - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return rv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_RSADecrypt(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
|
| - unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
|
| - const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
| - if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - rv = RSA_DecryptBlock(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
|
| - inputLen);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
|
| - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return rv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_RSAEncryptOAEP(SFTKOAEPEncryptInfo *info, unsigned char *output,
|
| - unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
|
| - const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
|
| -{
|
| - HASH_HashType hashAlg;
|
| - HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
| - if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->hashAlg);
|
| - maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->mgf);
|
| -
|
| - return RSA_EncryptOAEP(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
|
| - (const unsigned char*)info->params->pSourceData,
|
| - info->params->ulSourceDataLen, NULL, 0,
|
| - output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_RSADecryptOAEP(SFTKOAEPDecryptInfo *info, unsigned char *output,
|
| - unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
|
| - const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
|
| - HASH_HashType hashAlg;
|
| - HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
| - if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->hashAlg);
|
| - maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->mgf);
|
| -
|
| - rv = RSA_DecryptOAEP(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
|
| - (const unsigned char*)info->params->pSourceData,
|
| - info->params->ulSourceDataLen,
|
| - output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
|
| - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| - return rv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *
|
| -sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_CreateContext(const unsigned char *key,
|
| - unsigned int keyLen,
|
| - const CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS *params)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *ctx;
|
| -
|
| - if (params->ulNonceLen != sizeof(ctx->nonce)) {
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - ctx = PORT_New(SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info);
|
| - if (ctx == NULL) {
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (ChaCha20Poly1305_InitContext(&ctx->freeblCtx, key, keyLen,
|
| - params->ulTagLen) != SECSuccess) {
|
| - PORT_Free(ctx);
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(ctx->nonce, params->pNonce, sizeof(ctx->nonce));
|
| -
|
| - if (params->ulAADLen > sizeof(ctx->ad)) {
|
| - /* Need to allocate an overflow buffer for the additional data. */
|
| - ctx->adOverflow = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(params->ulAADLen);
|
| - if (!ctx->adOverflow) {
|
| - PORT_Free(ctx);
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(ctx->adOverflow, params->pAAD, params->ulAADLen);
|
| - } else {
|
| - ctx->adOverflow = NULL;
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(ctx->ad, params->pAAD, params->ulAADLen);
|
| - }
|
| - ctx->adLen = params->ulAADLen;
|
| -
|
| - return ctx;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static void
|
| -sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_DestroyContext(SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *ctx,
|
| - PRBool freeit)
|
| -{
|
| - ChaCha20Poly1305_DestroyContext(&ctx->freeblCtx, PR_FALSE);
|
| - if (ctx->adOverflow != NULL) {
|
| - PORT_Free(ctx->adOverflow);
|
| - ctx->adOverflow = NULL;
|
| - }
|
| - ctx->adLen = 0;
|
| - if (freeit) {
|
| - PORT_Free(ctx);
|
| - }
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_Encrypt(const SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *ctx,
|
| - unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen,
|
| - unsigned int maxOutputLen,
|
| - const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
|
| -{
|
| - const unsigned char *ad = ctx->adOverflow;
|
| -
|
| - if (ad == NULL) {
|
| - ad = ctx->ad;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return ChaCha20Poly1305_Seal(&ctx->freeblCtx, output, outputLen,
|
| - maxOutputLen, input, inputLen, ctx->nonce,
|
| - sizeof(ctx->nonce), ad, ctx->adLen);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_Decrypt(const SFTKChaCha20Poly1305Info *ctx,
|
| - unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen,
|
| - unsigned int maxOutputLen,
|
| - const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
|
| -{
|
| - const unsigned char *ad = ctx->adOverflow;
|
| -
|
| - if (ad == NULL) {
|
| - ad = ctx->ad;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return ChaCha20Poly1305_Open(&ctx->freeblCtx, output, outputLen,
|
| - maxOutputLen, input, inputLen, ctx->nonce,
|
| - sizeof(ctx->nonce), ad, ctx->adLen);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/** NSC_CryptInit initializes an encryption/Decryption operation.
|
| - *
|
| - * Always called by NSC_EncryptInit, NSC_DecryptInit, NSC_WrapKey,NSC_UnwrapKey.
|
| - * Called by NSC_SignInit, NSC_VerifyInit (via sftk_InitCBCMac) only for block
|
| - * ciphers MAC'ing.
|
| - */
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -sftk_CryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
|
| - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey,
|
| - CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE mechUsage, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyUsage,
|
| - SFTKContextType contextType, PRBool isEncrypt)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKObject *key;
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - SFTKAttribute *att;
|
| - CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *rc2_param;
|
| -#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
|
| - CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *rc5_param;
|
| - SECItem rc5Key;
|
| -#endif
|
| - CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
|
| - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
|
| - unsigned effectiveKeyLength;
|
| - unsigned char newdeskey[24];
|
| - PRBool useNewKey=PR_FALSE;
|
| - int t;
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_MechAllowsOperation(pMechanism->mechanism, mechUsage );
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK)
|
| - return crv;
|
| -
|
| - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
|
| - if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,contextType,&key,hKey,&key_type,
|
| - isEncrypt ?CKO_PUBLIC_KEY:CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, keyUsage);
|
| -
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - context->doPad = PR_FALSE;
|
| - switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
|
| - case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
|
| - case CKM_RSA_X_509:
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->multi = PR_FALSE;
|
| - context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
|
| - if (isEncrypt) {
|
| - NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
|
| - if (pubKey == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(pubKey);
|
| - context->cipherInfo = (void *)pubKey;
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher)
|
| - (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
|
| - ? sftk_RSAEncryptRaw : sftk_RSAEncrypt);
|
| - } else {
|
| - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
|
| - if (privKey == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey);
|
| - context->cipherInfo = (void *)privKey;
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher)
|
| - (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
|
| - ? sftk_RSADecryptRaw : sftk_RSADecrypt);
|
| - }
|
| - context->destroy = sftk_Null;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP:
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS) ||
|
| - !sftk_ValidateOaepParams((CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS*)pMechanism->pParameter)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->multi = PR_FALSE;
|
| - context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
|
| - if (isEncrypt) {
|
| - SFTKOAEPEncryptInfo *info = PORT_New(SFTKOAEPEncryptInfo);
|
| - if (info == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - info->key = sftk_GetPubKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
|
| - if (info->key == NULL) {
|
| - PORT_Free(info);
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSAEncryptOAEP;
|
| - context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(info->key);
|
| - context->cipherInfo = info;
|
| - } else {
|
| - SFTKOAEPDecryptInfo *info = PORT_New(SFTKOAEPDecryptInfo);
|
| - if (info == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - info->key = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
|
| - if (info->key == NULL) {
|
| - PORT_Free(info);
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSADecryptOAEP;
|
| - context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(info->key);
|
| - context->cipherInfo = info;
|
| - }
|
| - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD:
|
| - context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
|
| - /* fall thru */
|
| - case CKM_RC2_ECB:
|
| - case CKM_RC2_CBC:
|
| - context->blockSize = 8;
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_RC2) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
|
| - if (att == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - rc2_param = (CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - effectiveKeyLength = (rc2_param->ulEffectiveBits+7)/8;
|
| - context->cipherInfo =
|
| - RC2_CreateContext((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - att->attrib.ulValueLen, rc2_param->iv,
|
| - pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC2_ECB ? NSS_RC2 :
|
| - NSS_RC2_CBC,effectiveKeyLength);
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
|
| - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC2_Encrypt : RC2_Decrypt);
|
| - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC2_DestroyContext;
|
| - break;
|
| -#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
|
| - case CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD:
|
| - context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
|
| - /* fall thru */
|
| - case CKM_RC5_ECB:
|
| - case CKM_RC5_CBC:
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_RC5) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
|
| - if (att == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - rc5_param = (CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - context->blockSize = rc5_param->ulWordsize*2;
|
| - rc5Key.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue;
|
| - rc5Key.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
|
| - context->cipherInfo = RC5_CreateContext(&rc5Key,rc5_param->ulRounds,
|
| - rc5_param->ulWordsize,rc5_param->pIv,
|
| - pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC5_ECB ? NSS_RC5 : NSS_RC5_CBC);
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
|
| - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC5_Encrypt : RC5_Decrypt);
|
| - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC5_DestroyContext;
|
| - break;
|
| -#endif
|
| - case CKM_RC4:
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_RC4) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
|
| - if (att == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->cipherInfo =
|
| - RC4_CreateContext((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - att->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
|
| - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; /* WRONG !!! */
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC4_Encrypt : RC4_Decrypt);
|
| - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC4_DestroyContext;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD:
|
| - context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
|
| - /* fall thru */
|
| - case CKM_CDMF_ECB:
|
| - case CKM_CDMF_CBC:
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_CDMF) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - t = (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_CDMF_ECB) ? NSS_DES : NSS_DES_CBC;
|
| - goto finish_des;
|
| - case CKM_DES_ECB:
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_DES) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - t = NSS_DES;
|
| - goto finish_des;
|
| - case CKM_DES_CBC_PAD:
|
| - context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
|
| - /* fall thru */
|
| - case CKM_DES_CBC:
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_DES) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - t = NSS_DES_CBC;
|
| - goto finish_des;
|
| - case CKM_DES3_ECB:
|
| - if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - t = NSS_DES_EDE3;
|
| - goto finish_des;
|
| - case CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD:
|
| - context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
|
| - /* fall thru */
|
| - case CKM_DES3_CBC:
|
| - if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - t = NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC;
|
| -finish_des:
|
| - context->blockSize = 8;
|
| - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
|
| - if (att == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - if (key_type == CKK_DES2 &&
|
| - (t == NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC || t == NSS_DES_EDE3)) {
|
| - /* extend DES2 key to DES3 key. */
|
| - memcpy(newdeskey, att->attrib.pValue, 16);
|
| - memcpy(newdeskey + 16, newdeskey, 8);
|
| - useNewKey=PR_TRUE;
|
| - } else if (key_type == CKK_CDMF) {
|
| - crv = sftk_cdmf2des((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,newdeskey);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - useNewKey=PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| - context->cipherInfo = DES_CreateContext(
|
| - useNewKey ? newdeskey : (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,t, isEncrypt);
|
| - if (useNewKey)
|
| - memset(newdeskey, 0, sizeof newdeskey);
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
|
| - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? DES_Encrypt : DES_Decrypt);
|
| - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) DES_DestroyContext;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_SEED_CBC_PAD:
|
| - context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
|
| - /* fall thru */
|
| - case CKM_SEED_CBC:
|
| - if (!pMechanism->pParameter ||
|
| - pMechanism->ulParameterLen != 16) {
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - /* fall thru */
|
| - case CKM_SEED_ECB:
|
| - context->blockSize = 16;
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_SEED) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
|
| - if (att == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->cipherInfo = SEED_CreateContext(
|
| - (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,
|
| - pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_SEED_ECB ? NSS_SEED : NSS_SEED_CBC,
|
| - isEncrypt);
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
|
| - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? SEED_Encrypt : SEED_Decrypt);
|
| - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) SEED_DestroyContext;
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD:
|
| - context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
|
| - /* fall thru */
|
| - case CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC:
|
| - if (!pMechanism->pParameter ||
|
| - pMechanism->ulParameterLen != 16) {
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - /* fall thru */
|
| - case CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB:
|
| - context->blockSize = 16;
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_CAMELLIA) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
|
| - if (att == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->cipherInfo = Camellia_CreateContext(
|
| - (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,
|
| - pMechanism->mechanism ==
|
| - CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB ? NSS_CAMELLIA : NSS_CAMELLIA_CBC,
|
| - isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
|
| - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ?
|
| - Camellia_Encrypt : Camellia_Decrypt);
|
| - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) Camellia_DestroyContext;
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
|
| - context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
|
| - /* fall thru */
|
| - case CKM_AES_ECB:
|
| - case CKM_AES_CBC:
|
| - context->blockSize = 16;
|
| - case CKM_AES_CTS:
|
| - case CKM_AES_CTR:
|
| - case CKM_AES_GCM:
|
| - if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_AES_GCM) {
|
| - context->multi = PR_FALSE;
|
| - }
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_AES) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
|
| - if (att == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->cipherInfo = AES_CreateContext(
|
| - (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,
|
| - sftk_aes_mode(pMechanism->mechanism),
|
| - isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen, 16);
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
|
| - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? AES_Encrypt : AES_Decrypt);
|
| - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) AES_DestroyContext;
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
|
| - if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->multi = PR_FALSE;
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_NSS_CHACHA20) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
|
| - if (att == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->cipherInfo = sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_CreateContext(
|
| - (unsigned char*) att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen,
|
| - (CK_NSS_AEAD_PARAMS*) pMechanism->pParameter);
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
|
| - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
|
| - crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_Encrypt :
|
| - sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_Decrypt);
|
| - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_ChaCha20Poly1305_DestroyContext;
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD:
|
| - context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
|
| - /* fall thru */
|
| - case CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP:
|
| - context->multi = PR_FALSE;
|
| - context->blockSize = 8;
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_AES) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
|
| - if (att == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->cipherInfo = AESKeyWrap_CreateContext(
|
| - (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,
|
| - isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
|
| - if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? AESKeyWrap_Encrypt
|
| - : AESKeyWrap_Decrypt);
|
| - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) AESKeyWrap_DestroyContext;
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - default:
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeContext(context);
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| - sftk_SetContextByType(session, contextType, context);
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_EncryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
|
| -{
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| - return sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_ENCRYPT,
|
| - SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption operation. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_EncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
|
| - CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - unsigned int outlen,i;
|
| - unsigned int padoutlen = 0;
|
| - unsigned int maxout = *pulEncryptedPartLen;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| - SECStatus rv;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure we're legal */
|
| - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_TRUE,NULL);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| -
|
| - if (!pEncryptedPart) {
|
| - if (context->doPad) {
|
| - CK_ULONG totalDataAvailable = ulPartLen + context->padDataLength;
|
| - CK_ULONG blocksToSend = totalDataAvailable/context->blockSize;
|
| -
|
| - *pulEncryptedPartLen = blocksToSend * context->blockSize;
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| - }
|
| - *pulEncryptedPartLen = ulPartLen;
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* do padding */
|
| - if (context->doPad) {
|
| - /* deal with previous buffered data */
|
| - if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
|
| - /* fill in the padded to a full block size */
|
| - for (i=context->padDataLength;
|
| - (ulPartLen != 0) && i < context->blockSize; i++) {
|
| - context->padBuf[i] = *pPart++;
|
| - ulPartLen--;
|
| - context->padDataLength++;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* not enough data to encrypt yet? then return */
|
| - if (context->padDataLength != context->blockSize) {
|
| - *pulEncryptedPartLen = 0;
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| - }
|
| - /* encrypt the current padded data */
|
| - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedPart,
|
| - &padoutlen, context->blockSize, context->padBuf,
|
| - context->blockSize);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| - return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| - }
|
| - pEncryptedPart += padoutlen;
|
| - maxout -= padoutlen;
|
| - }
|
| - /* save the residual */
|
| - context->padDataLength = ulPartLen % context->blockSize;
|
| - if (context->padDataLength) {
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf,
|
| - &pPart[ulPartLen-context->padDataLength],
|
| - context->padDataLength);
|
| - ulPartLen -= context->padDataLength;
|
| - }
|
| - /* if we've exhausted our new buffer, we're done */
|
| - if (ulPartLen == 0) {
|
| - *pulEncryptedPartLen = padoutlen;
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -
|
| - /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */
|
| - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pEncryptedPart,
|
| - &outlen, maxout, pPart, ulPartLen);
|
| - *pulEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG) (outlen + padoutlen);
|
| - return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption operation. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_EncryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - unsigned int outlen,i;
|
| - unsigned int maxout = *pulLastEncryptedPartLen;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
|
| - PRBool contextFinished = PR_TRUE;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure we're legal */
|
| - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_TRUE,&session);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| -
|
| - *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = 0;
|
| - if (!pLastEncryptedPart) {
|
| - /* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */
|
| - if (context->blockSize > 0 && context->doPad) {
|
| - *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = context->blockSize;
|
| - contextFinished = PR_FALSE; /* still have padding to go */
|
| - }
|
| - goto finish;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* do padding */
|
| - if (context->doPad) {
|
| - unsigned char padbyte = (unsigned char)
|
| - (context->blockSize - context->padDataLength);
|
| - /* fill out rest of pad buffer with pad magic*/
|
| - for (i=context->padDataLength; i < context->blockSize; i++) {
|
| - context->padBuf[i] = padbyte;
|
| - }
|
| - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pLastEncryptedPart,
|
| - &outlen, maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
|
| - if (rv == SECSuccess) *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -finish:
|
| - if (contextFinished)
|
| - sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, context );
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_Encrypt (CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
|
| - CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
|
| - CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - unsigned int outlen;
|
| - unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulEncryptedDataLen;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| - CK_RV crv2;
|
| - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
|
| - SECItem pText;
|
| -
|
| - pText.type = siBuffer;
|
| - pText.data = pData;
|
| - pText.len = ulDataLen;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure we're legal */
|
| - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,&session);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| -
|
| - if (!pEncryptedData) {
|
| - *pulEncryptedDataLen = context->rsa ? context->maxLen :
|
| - ulDataLen + 2 * context->blockSize;
|
| - goto finish;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (context->doPad) {
|
| - if (context->multi) {
|
| - CK_ULONG finalLen;
|
| - /* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final
|
| - * code deal with it */
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen, pEncryptedData,
|
| - pulEncryptedDataLen);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK)
|
| - *pulEncryptedDataLen = 0;
|
| - maxoutlen -= *pulEncryptedDataLen;
|
| - pEncryptedData += *pulEncryptedDataLen;
|
| - finalLen = maxoutlen;
|
| - crv2 = NSC_EncryptFinal(hSession, pEncryptedData, &finalLen);
|
| - if (crv2 == CKR_OK)
|
| - *pulEncryptedDataLen += finalLen;
|
| - return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv;
|
| - }
|
| - /* doPad without multi means that padding must be done on the first
|
| - ** and only update. There will be no final.
|
| - */
|
| - PORT_Assert(context->blockSize > 1);
|
| - if (context->blockSize > 1) {
|
| - CK_ULONG remainder = ulDataLen % context->blockSize;
|
| - CK_ULONG padding = context->blockSize - remainder;
|
| - pText.len += padding;
|
| - pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len);
|
| - if (pText.data) {
|
| - memcpy(pText.data, pData, ulDataLen);
|
| - memset(pText.data + ulDataLen, padding, padding);
|
| - } else {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - goto fail;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size is big enough. */
|
| - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedData,
|
| - &outlen, maxoutlen, pText.data, pText.len);
|
| - crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| - *pulEncryptedDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
|
| - if (pText.data != pData)
|
| - PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len);
|
| -fail:
|
| - sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, context );
|
| -finish:
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| -
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - ************** Crypto Functions: Decrypt ************************
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_DecryptInit( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
|
| -{
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| - return sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_DECRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT,
|
| - SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption operation. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_DecryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - unsigned int padoutlen = 0;
|
| - unsigned int outlen;
|
| - unsigned int maxout = *pulPartLen;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| - SECStatus rv;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure we're legal */
|
| - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_TRUE,NULL);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| -
|
| - /* this can only happen on an NSS programming error */
|
| - PORT_Assert((context->padDataLength == 0)
|
| - || context->padDataLength == context->blockSize);
|
| -
|
| -
|
| - if (context->doPad) {
|
| - /* Check the data length for block ciphers. If we are padding,
|
| - * then we must be using a block cipher. In the non-padding case
|
| - * the error will be returned by the underlying decryption
|
| - * function when we do the actual decrypt. We need to do the
|
| - * check here to avoid returning a negative length to the caller
|
| - * or reading before the beginning of the pEncryptedPart buffer.
|
| - */
|
| - if ((ulEncryptedPartLen == 0) ||
|
| - (ulEncryptedPartLen % context->blockSize) != 0) {
|
| - return CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (!pPart) {
|
| - if (context->doPad) {
|
| - *pulPartLen =
|
| - ulEncryptedPartLen + context->padDataLength - context->blockSize;
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| - }
|
| - /* for stream ciphers there is are no constraints on ulEncryptedPartLen.
|
| - * for block ciphers, it must be a multiple of blockSize. The error is
|
| - * detected when this function is called again do decrypt the output.
|
| - */
|
| - *pulPartLen = ulEncryptedPartLen;
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (context->doPad) {
|
| - /* first decrypt our saved buffer */
|
| - if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
|
| - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, &padoutlen,
|
| - maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| - pPart += padoutlen;
|
| - maxout -= padoutlen;
|
| - }
|
| - /* now save the final block for the next decrypt or the final */
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf,&pEncryptedPart[ulEncryptedPartLen -
|
| - context->blockSize], context->blockSize);
|
| - context->padDataLength = context->blockSize;
|
| - ulEncryptedPartLen -= context->padDataLength;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */
|
| - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pPart, &outlen,
|
| - maxout, pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen);
|
| - *pulPartLen = (CK_ULONG) (outlen + padoutlen);
|
| - return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption operation. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_DecryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - unsigned int outlen;
|
| - unsigned int maxout = *pulLastPartLen;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure we're legal */
|
| - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_TRUE,&session);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| -
|
| - *pulLastPartLen = 0;
|
| - if (!pLastPart) {
|
| - /* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */
|
| - if (context->padDataLength > 0) {
|
| - *pulLastPartLen = context->padDataLength;
|
| - }
|
| - goto finish;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (context->doPad) {
|
| - /* decrypt our saved buffer */
|
| - if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
|
| - /* this assumes that pLastPart is big enough to hold the *whole*
|
| - * buffer!!! */
|
| - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pLastPart, &outlen,
|
| - maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| - crv = sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| - } else {
|
| - unsigned int padSize =
|
| - (unsigned int) pLastPart[context->blockSize-1];
|
| - if ((padSize > context->blockSize) || (padSize == 0)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
|
| - } else {
|
| - unsigned int i;
|
| - unsigned int badPadding = 0; /* used as a boolean */
|
| - for (i = 0; i < padSize; i++) {
|
| - badPadding |=
|
| - (unsigned int) pLastPart[context->blockSize-1-i] ^
|
| - padSize;
|
| - }
|
| - if (badPadding) {
|
| - crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
|
| - } else {
|
| - *pulLastPartLen = outlen - padSize;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_DECRYPT, context );
|
| -finish:
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
|
| - CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - unsigned int outlen;
|
| - unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| - CK_RV crv2;
|
| - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure we're legal */
|
| - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_FALSE,&session);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| -
|
| - if (!pData) {
|
| - *pulDataLen = ulEncryptedDataLen + context->blockSize;
|
| - goto finish;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (context->doPad && context->multi) {
|
| - CK_ULONG finalLen;
|
| - /* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final
|
| - * code deal with it */
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedData,ulEncryptedDataLen,
|
| - pData, pulDataLen);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK)
|
| - *pulDataLen = 0;
|
| - maxoutlen -= *pulDataLen;
|
| - pData += *pulDataLen;
|
| - finalLen = maxoutlen;
|
| - crv2 = NSC_DecryptFinal(hSession, pData, &finalLen);
|
| - if (crv2 == CKR_OK)
|
| - *pulDataLen += finalLen;
|
| - return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen,
|
| - pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen);
|
| - /* XXX need to do MUCH better error mapping than this. */
|
| - crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| - if (rv == SECSuccess && context->doPad) {
|
| - unsigned int padding = pData[outlen - 1];
|
| - if (padding > context->blockSize || !padding) {
|
| - crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
|
| - } else {
|
| - unsigned int i;
|
| - unsigned int badPadding = 0; /* used as a boolean */
|
| - for (i = 0; i < padding; i++) {
|
| - badPadding |= (unsigned int) pData[outlen - 1 - i] ^ padding;
|
| - }
|
| - if (badPadding) {
|
| - crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
|
| - } else {
|
| - outlen -= padding;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - *pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
|
| - sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_DECRYPT, context );
|
| -finish:
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - ************** Crypto Functions: Digest (HASH) ************************
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_DigestInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
|
| - if (session == NULL)
|
| - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_HASH,NULL,0,NULL, 0, 0);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -#define INIT_MECH(mech,mmm) \
|
| - case mech: { \
|
| - mmm ## Context * mmm ## _ctx = mmm ## _NewContext(); \
|
| - context->cipherInfo = (void *)mmm ## _ctx; \
|
| - context->cipherInfoLen = mmm ## _FlattenSize(mmm ## _ctx); \
|
| - context->currentMech = mech; \
|
| - context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash) mmm ## _Update; \
|
| - context->end = (SFTKEnd) mmm ## _End; \
|
| - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) mmm ## _DestroyContext; \
|
| - context->maxLen = mmm ## _LENGTH; \
|
| - if (mmm ## _ctx) \
|
| - mmm ## _Begin(mmm ## _ctx); \
|
| - else \
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \
|
| - break; \
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
|
| - INIT_MECH(CKM_MD2, MD2)
|
| - INIT_MECH(CKM_MD5, MD5)
|
| - INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA_1, SHA1)
|
| - INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA224, SHA224)
|
| - INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA256, SHA256)
|
| - INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA384, SHA384)
|
| - INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA512, SHA512)
|
| -
|
| - default:
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeContext(context);
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_HASH, context);
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_Digest digests data in a single part. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_Digest(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest,
|
| - CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - unsigned int digestLen;
|
| - unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure we're legal */
|
| - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_HASH,PR_FALSE,&session);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| -
|
| - if (pDigest == NULL) {
|
| - *pulDigestLen = context->maxLen;
|
| - goto finish;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* do it: */
|
| - (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pData, ulDataLen);
|
| - /* NOTE: this assumes buf size is bigenough for the algorithm */
|
| - (*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen,maxout);
|
| - *pulDigestLen = digestLen;
|
| -
|
| - sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_HASH, context );
|
| -finish:
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_DigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
|
| - CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure we're legal */
|
| - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_HASH,PR_TRUE,NULL);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| - /* do it: */
|
| - (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_DigestFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest,
|
| - CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen;
|
| - unsigned int digestLen;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure we're legal */
|
| - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| -
|
| - if (pDigest != NULL) {
|
| - (*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen, maxout);
|
| - *pulDigestLen = digestLen;
|
| - sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_HASH, context );
|
| - } else {
|
| - *pulDigestLen = context->maxLen;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * these helper functions are used by Generic Macing and Signing functions
|
| - * that use hashes as part of their operations.
|
| - */
|
| -#define DOSUB(mmm) \
|
| -static CK_RV \
|
| -sftk_doSub ## mmm(SFTKSessionContext *context) { \
|
| - mmm ## Context * mmm ## _ctx = mmm ## _NewContext(); \
|
| - context->hashInfo = (void *) mmm ## _ctx; \
|
| - context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash) mmm ## _Update; \
|
| - context->end = (SFTKEnd) mmm ## _End; \
|
| - context->hashdestroy = (SFTKDestroy) mmm ## _DestroyContext; \
|
| - if (!context->hashInfo) { \
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \
|
| - } \
|
| - mmm ## _Begin( mmm ## _ctx ); \
|
| - return CKR_OK; \
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -DOSUB(MD2)
|
| -DOSUB(MD5)
|
| -DOSUB(SHA1)
|
| -DOSUB(SHA224)
|
| -DOSUB(SHA256)
|
| -DOSUB(SHA384)
|
| -DOSUB(SHA512)
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_SignCopy(
|
| - CK_ULONG *copyLen,
|
| - void *out, unsigned int *outLength,
|
| - unsigned int maxLength,
|
| - const unsigned char *hashResult,
|
| - unsigned int hashResultLength)
|
| -{
|
| - unsigned int toCopy = *copyLen;
|
| - if (toCopy > maxLength) {
|
| - toCopy = maxLength;
|
| - }
|
| - if (toCopy > hashResultLength) {
|
| - toCopy = hashResultLength;
|
| - }
|
| - memcpy(out, hashResult, toCopy);
|
| - if (outLength) {
|
| - *outLength = toCopy;
|
| - }
|
| - return SECSuccess;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* Verify is just a compare for HMAC */
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_HMACCmp(CK_ULONG *copyLen,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int sigLen,
|
| - unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
|
| -{
|
| - return (PORT_Memcmp(sig,hash,*copyLen) == 0) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure ;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * common HMAC initalization routine
|
| - */
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -sftk_doHMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *context,HASH_HashType hash,
|
| - SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKAttribute *keyval;
|
| - HMACContext *HMACcontext;
|
| - CK_ULONG *intpointer;
|
| - const SECHashObject *hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(hash);
|
| - PRBool isFIPS = (key->slot->slotID == FIPS_SLOT_ID);
|
| -
|
| - /* required by FIPS 198 Section 4 */
|
| - if (isFIPS && (mac_size < 4 || mac_size < hashObj->length/2)) {
|
| - return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - keyval = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
|
| - if (keyval == NULL) return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
|
| -
|
| - HMACcontext = HMAC_Create(hashObj,
|
| - (const unsigned char*)keyval->attrib.pValue,
|
| - keyval->attrib.ulValueLen, isFIPS);
|
| - context->hashInfo = HMACcontext;
|
| - context->multi = PR_TRUE;
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
|
| - if (context->hashInfo == NULL) {
|
| - if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS) {
|
| - return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
|
| - }
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - }
|
| - context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash) HMAC_Update;
|
| - context->end = (SFTKEnd) HMAC_Finish;
|
| -
|
| - context->hashdestroy = (SFTKDestroy) HMAC_Destroy;
|
| - intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG);
|
| - if (intpointer == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - }
|
| - *intpointer = mac_size;
|
| - context->cipherInfo = intpointer;
|
| - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SignCopy;
|
| - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_HMACCmp;
|
| - context->maxLen = hashObj->length;
|
| - HMAC_Begin(HMACcontext);
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * SSL Macing support. SSL Macs are inited, then update with the base
|
| - * hashing algorithm, then finalized in sign and verify
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * FROM SSL:
|
| - * 60 bytes is 3 times the maximum length MAC size that is supported.
|
| - * We probably should have one copy of this table. We still need this table
|
| - * in ssl to 'sign' the handshake hashes.
|
| - */
|
| -static unsigned char ssl_pad_1 [60] = {
|
| - 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
|
| - 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
|
| - 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
|
| - 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
|
| - 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
|
| - 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
|
| - 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
|
| - 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
|
| -};
|
| -static unsigned char ssl_pad_2 [60] = {
|
| - 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
|
| - 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
|
| - 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
|
| - 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
|
| - 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
|
| - 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
|
| - 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
|
| - 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
|
| -};
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_SSLMACSign(SFTKSSLMACInfo *info,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int *sigLen,
|
| - unsigned int maxLen,unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
|
| -{
|
| - unsigned char tmpBuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
|
| - unsigned int out;
|
| -
|
| - info->begin(info->hashContext);
|
| - info->update(info->hashContext,info->key,info->keySize);
|
| - info->update(info->hashContext,ssl_pad_2,info->padSize);
|
| - info->update(info->hashContext,hash,hashLen);
|
| - info->end(info->hashContext,tmpBuf,&out,SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH);
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(sig,tmpBuf,info->macSize);
|
| - *sigLen = info->macSize;
|
| - return SECSuccess;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_SSLMACVerify(SFTKSSLMACInfo *info,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int sigLen,
|
| - unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
|
| -{
|
| - unsigned char tmpBuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
|
| - unsigned int out;
|
| -
|
| - info->begin(info->hashContext);
|
| - info->update(info->hashContext,info->key,info->keySize);
|
| - info->update(info->hashContext,ssl_pad_2,info->padSize);
|
| - info->update(info->hashContext,hash,hashLen);
|
| - info->end(info->hashContext,tmpBuf,&out,SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH);
|
| - return (PORT_Memcmp(sig,tmpBuf,info->macSize) == 0) ?
|
| - SECSuccess : SECFailure;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * common HMAC initalization routine
|
| - */
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -sftk_doSSLMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *context,SECOidTag oid,
|
| - SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKAttribute *keyval;
|
| - SFTKBegin begin;
|
| - int padSize;
|
| - SFTKSSLMACInfo *sslmacinfo;
|
| - CK_RV crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
|
| -
|
| - if (oid == SEC_OID_SHA1) {
|
| - crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| - begin = (SFTKBegin) SHA1_Begin;
|
| - padSize = 40;
|
| - } else {
|
| - crv = sftk_doSubMD5(context);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| - begin = (SFTKBegin) MD5_Begin;
|
| - padSize = 48;
|
| - }
|
| - context->multi = PR_TRUE;
|
| -
|
| - keyval = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
|
| - if (keyval == NULL) return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
|
| -
|
| - context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo,keyval->attrib.pValue,
|
| - keyval->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| - context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo,ssl_pad_1,padSize);
|
| - sslmacinfo = (SFTKSSLMACInfo *) PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSSLMACInfo));
|
| - if (sslmacinfo == NULL) {
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - }
|
| - sslmacinfo->macSize = mac_size;
|
| - sslmacinfo->hashContext = context->hashInfo;
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(sslmacinfo->key,keyval->attrib.pValue,
|
| - keyval->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| - sslmacinfo->keySize = keyval->attrib.ulValueLen;
|
| - sslmacinfo->begin = begin;
|
| - sslmacinfo->end = context->end;
|
| - sslmacinfo->update = context->hashUpdate;
|
| - sslmacinfo->padSize = padSize;
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
|
| - context->cipherInfo = (void *) sslmacinfo;
|
| - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SSLMACSign;
|
| - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_SSLMACVerify;
|
| - context->maxLen = mac_size;
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - ************** Crypto Functions: Sign ************************
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| -/**
|
| - * Check if We're using CBCMacing and initialize the session context if we are.
|
| - * @param contextType SFTK_SIGN or SFTK_VERIFY
|
| - * @param keyUsage check whether key allows this usage
|
| - */
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -sftk_InitCBCMac(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
|
| - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyUsage,
|
| - SFTKContextType contextType)
|
| -
|
| -{
|
| - CK_MECHANISM cbc_mechanism;
|
| - CK_ULONG mac_bytes = SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE;
|
| - CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS rc2_params;
|
| -#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
|
| - CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS rc5_params;
|
| - CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *rc5_mac;
|
| -#endif
|
| - unsigned char ivBlock[SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| - unsigned int blockSize;
|
| -
|
| - switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
|
| - case CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL:
|
| - mac_bytes =
|
| - ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength;
|
| - /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_RC2_MAC:
|
| - /* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the
|
| - * CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS */
|
| - rc2_params.ulEffectiveBits = ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)
|
| - pMechanism->pParameter)->ulEffectiveBits;
|
| - PORT_Memset(rc2_params.iv,0,sizeof(rc2_params.iv));
|
| - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC2_CBC;
|
| - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc2_params;
|
| - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc2_params);
|
| - blockSize = 8;
|
| - break;
|
| -#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
|
| - case CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL:
|
| - mac_bytes =
|
| - ((CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength;
|
| - /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_RC5_MAC:
|
| - /* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the
|
| - * CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS */
|
| - rc5_mac = (CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - rc5_params.ulWordsize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize;
|
| - rc5_params.ulRounds = rc5_mac->ulRounds;
|
| - rc5_params.pIv = ivBlock;
|
| - if( (blockSize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize*2) > SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE )
|
| - return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - rc5_params.ulIvLen = blockSize;
|
| - PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
|
| - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC5_CBC;
|
| - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc5_params;
|
| - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc5_params);
|
| - break;
|
| -#endif
|
| - /* add cast and idea later */
|
| - case CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL:
|
| - mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_DES_MAC:
|
| - blockSize = 8;
|
| - PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
|
| - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES_CBC;
|
| - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
|
| - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL:
|
| - mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_DES3_MAC:
|
| - blockSize = 8;
|
| - PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
|
| - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES3_CBC;
|
| - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
|
| - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL:
|
| - mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_CDMF_MAC:
|
| - blockSize = 8;
|
| - PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
|
| - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_CDMF_CBC;
|
| - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
|
| - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_SEED_MAC_GENERAL:
|
| - mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_SEED_MAC:
|
| - blockSize = 16;
|
| - PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
|
| - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_SEED_CBC;
|
| - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
|
| - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL:
|
| - mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC:
|
| - blockSize = 16;
|
| - PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
|
| - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC;
|
| - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
|
| - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL:
|
| - mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_AES_MAC:
|
| - blockSize = 16;
|
| - PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
|
| - cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_AES_CBC;
|
| - cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
|
| - cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
|
| - break;
|
| - default:
|
| - return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* if MAC size is externally supplied, it should be checked.
|
| - */
|
| - if (mac_bytes == SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE)
|
| - mac_bytes = blockSize >> 1;
|
| - else {
|
| - if( mac_bytes > blockSize )
|
| - return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, &cbc_mechanism, hKey,
|
| - CKA_ENCRYPT, /* CBC mech is able to ENCRYPT, not SIGN/VERIFY */
|
| - keyUsage, contextType, PR_TRUE );
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,contextType,PR_TRUE,NULL);
|
| -
|
| - /* this shouldn't happen! */
|
| - PORT_Assert(crv == CKR_OK);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| - context->blockSize = blockSize;
|
| - context->macSize = mac_bytes;
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * encode RSA PKCS #1 Signature data before signing...
|
| - */
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_RSAHashSign(SFTKHashSignInfo *info, unsigned char *sig,
|
| - unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,
|
| - const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
|
| -{
|
| - PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
| - if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return RSA_HashSign(info->hashOid, info->key, sig, sigLen, maxLen,
|
| - hash, hashLen);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* XXX Old template; want to expunge it eventually. */
|
| -static DERTemplate SECAlgorithmIDTemplate[] = {
|
| - { DER_SEQUENCE,
|
| - 0, NULL, sizeof(SECAlgorithmID) },
|
| - { DER_OBJECT_ID,
|
| - offsetof(SECAlgorithmID,algorithm) },
|
| - { DER_OPTIONAL | DER_ANY,
|
| - offsetof(SECAlgorithmID,parameters) },
|
| - { 0 }
|
| -};
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * XXX OLD Template. Once all uses have been switched over to new one,
|
| - * remove this.
|
| - */
|
| -static DERTemplate SGNDigestInfoTemplate[] = {
|
| - { DER_SEQUENCE,
|
| - 0, NULL, sizeof(SGNDigestInfo) },
|
| - { DER_INLINE,
|
| - offsetof(SGNDigestInfo,digestAlgorithm),
|
| - SECAlgorithmIDTemplate },
|
| - { DER_OCTET_STRING,
|
| - offsetof(SGNDigestInfo,digest) },
|
| - { 0 }
|
| -};
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * encode RSA PKCS #1 Signature data before signing...
|
| - */
|
| -SECStatus
|
| -RSA_HashSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key,
|
| - unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,
|
| - const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
|
| - SECItem digder;
|
| - PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
|
| - SGNDigestInfo *di = NULL;
|
| -
|
| - digder.data = NULL;
|
| -
|
| - arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
|
| - if (!arena) {
|
| - goto loser;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Construct digest info */
|
| - di = SGN_CreateDigestInfo(hashOid, hash, hashLen);
|
| - if (!di) {
|
| - goto loser;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Der encode the digest as a DigestInfo */
|
| - rv = DER_Encode(arena, &digder, SGNDigestInfoTemplate, di);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| - goto loser;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - ** Encrypt signature after constructing appropriate PKCS#1 signature
|
| - ** block
|
| - */
|
| - rv = RSA_Sign(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, maxLen, digder.data,
|
| - digder.len);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
|
| - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - loser:
|
| - SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di);
|
| - if (arena != NULL) {
|
| - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
|
| - }
|
| - return rv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_RSASign(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
|
| - unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen,
|
| - const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
| - if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - rv = RSA_Sign(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxOutputLen, input,
|
| - inputLen);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
|
| - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| - return rv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_RSASignRaw(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
|
| - unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen,
|
| - const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
| - if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - rv = RSA_SignRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxOutputLen, input,
|
| - inputLen);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
|
| - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| - return rv;
|
| -
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_RSASignPSS(SFTKHashSignInfo *info, unsigned char *sig,
|
| - unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,
|
| - const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
|
| - HASH_HashType hashAlg;
|
| - HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
|
| - CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params = (CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)info->params;
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
| - if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg);
|
| - maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf);
|
| -
|
| - rv = RSA_SignPSS(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg, NULL,
|
| - params->sLen, sig, sigLen, maxLen, hash, hashLen);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
|
| - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| - return rv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen,
|
| - void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SECItem signature, digest;
|
| - NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)ctx;
|
| -
|
| - signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
|
| - signature.len = sigLen;
|
| - digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
|
| - digest.len = dataLen;
|
| - return DSA_VerifyDigest(&(key->u.dsa), &signature, &digest);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf,
|
| - unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxSigLen,
|
| - void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SECItem signature, digest;
|
| - SECStatus rv;
|
| - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)ctx;
|
| -
|
| - signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
|
| - signature.len = maxSigLen;
|
| - digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
|
| - digest.len = dataLen;
|
| - rv = DSA_SignDigest(&(key->u.dsa), &signature, &digest);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
|
| - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| - *sigLen = signature.len;
|
| - return rv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen,
|
| - void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SECItem signature, digest;
|
| - NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)ctx;
|
| -
|
| - signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
|
| - signature.len = sigLen;
|
| - digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
|
| - digest.len = dataLen;
|
| - return ECDSA_VerifyDigest(&(key->u.ec), &signature, &digest);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -nsc_ECDSASignStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf,
|
| - unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxSigLen,
|
| - void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SECItem signature, digest;
|
| - SECStatus rv;
|
| - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)ctx;
|
| -
|
| - signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
|
| - signature.len = maxSigLen;
|
| - digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
|
| - digest.len = dataLen;
|
| - rv = ECDSA_SignDigest(&(key->u.ec), &signature, &digest);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
|
| - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| - *sigLen = signature.len;
|
| - return rv;
|
| -}
|
| -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_SignInit setups up the signing operations. There are three basic
|
| - * types of signing:
|
| - * (1) the tradition single part, where "Raw RSA" or "Raw DSA" is applied
|
| - * to data in a single Sign operation (which often looks a lot like an
|
| - * encrypt, with data coming in and data going out).
|
| - * (2) Hash based signing, where we continually hash the data, then apply
|
| - * some sort of signature to the end.
|
| - * (3) Block Encryption CBC MAC's, where the Data is encrypted with a key,
|
| - * and only the final block is part of the mac.
|
| - *
|
| - * For case number 3, we initialize a context much like the Encryption Context
|
| - * (in fact we share code). We detect case 3 in C_SignUpdate, C_Sign, and
|
| - * C_Final by the following method... if it's not multi-part, and it's doesn't
|
| - * have a hash context, it must be a block Encryption CBC MAC.
|
| - *
|
| - * For case number 2, we initialize a hash structure, as well as make it
|
| - * multi-part. Updates are simple calls to the hash update function. Final
|
| - * calls the hashend, then passes the result to the 'update' function (which
|
| - * operates as a final signature function). In some hash based MAC'ing (as
|
| - * opposed to hash base signatures), the update function is can be simply a
|
| - * copy (as is the case with HMAC).
|
| - */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_SignInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKObject *key;
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
|
| - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
|
| - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
|
| - SFTKHashSignInfo *info = NULL;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - /* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/
|
| - crv = sftk_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_SIGN, SFTK_SIGN);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) return crv;
|
| -
|
| - /* we're not using a block cipher mac */
|
| - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
|
| - if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_SIGN,&key,hKey,&key_type,
|
| - CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,CKA_SIGN);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - context->multi = PR_FALSE;
|
| -
|
| -#define INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(mmm) \
|
| - case CKM_ ## mmm ## _RSA_PKCS: \
|
| - context->multi = PR_TRUE; \
|
| - crv = sftk_doSub ## mmm (context); \
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; \
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSAHashSign; \
|
| - info = PORT_New(SFTKHashSignInfo); \
|
| - if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } \
|
| - info->hashOid = SEC_OID_ ## mmm ; \
|
| - goto finish_rsa;
|
| -
|
| - switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
|
| - INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD5)
|
| - INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD2)
|
| - INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA1)
|
| - INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA224)
|
| - INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA256)
|
| - INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA384)
|
| - INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA512)
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSASign;
|
| - goto finish_rsa;
|
| - case CKM_RSA_X_509:
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSASignRaw;
|
| -finish_rsa:
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
|
| - privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
|
| - if (privKey == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - /* OK, info is allocated only if we're doing hash and sign mechanism.
|
| - * It's necessary to be able to set the correct OID in the final
|
| - * signature.
|
| - */
|
| - if (info) {
|
| - info->key = privKey;
|
| - context->cipherInfo = info;
|
| - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space;
|
| - } else {
|
| - context->cipherInfo = privKey;
|
| - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Null;
|
| - }
|
| - context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey);
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
|
| - if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS) ||
|
| - !sftk_ValidatePssParams((const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS*)pMechanism->pParameter)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - info = PORT_New(SFTKHashSignInfo);
|
| - if (info == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - info->key = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
|
| - if (info->key == NULL) {
|
| - PORT_Free(info);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->cipherInfo = info;
|
| - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSASignPSS;
|
| - context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(info->key);
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_DSA_SHA1:
|
| - context->multi = PR_TRUE;
|
| - crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_DSA:
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_DSA) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_DSA,&crv);
|
| - if (privKey == NULL) {
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->cipherInfo = privKey;
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub;
|
| - context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ?
|
| - (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Null:(SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey;
|
| - context->maxLen = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN;
|
| -
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
| - case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1:
|
| - context->multi = PR_TRUE;
|
| - crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_ECDSA:
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_EC) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_EC,&crv);
|
| - if (privKey == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->cipherInfo = privKey;
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) nsc_ECDSASignStub;
|
| - context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ?
|
| - (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Null:(SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey;
|
| - context->maxLen = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2;
|
| -
|
| - break;
|
| -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
|
| -
|
| -#define INIT_HMAC_MECH(mmm) \
|
| - case CKM_ ## mmm ## _HMAC_GENERAL: \
|
| - crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_Alg ## mmm ,key, \
|
| - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); \
|
| - break; \
|
| - case CKM_ ## mmm ## _HMAC: \
|
| - crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_Alg ## mmm ,key, mmm ## _LENGTH); \
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD2)
|
| - INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD5)
|
| - INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA224)
|
| - INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA256)
|
| - INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA384)
|
| - INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA512)
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
|
| - crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,
|
| - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
|
| - crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,SHA1_LENGTH);
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC:
|
| - crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_MD5,key,
|
| - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC:
|
| - crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_SHA1,key,
|
| - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL:
|
| - crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgNULL, 0);
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_TLS_MAC: {
|
| - CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS *tls12_mac_params;
|
| - HASH_HashType tlsPrfHash;
|
| - const char *label;
|
| -
|
| - if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - tls12_mac_params = (CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - if (tls12_mac_params->prfMechanism == CKM_TLS_PRF) {
|
| - /* The TLS 1.0 and 1.1 PRF */
|
| - tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgNULL;
|
| - if (tls12_mac_params->ulMacLength != 12) {
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - } else {
|
| - /* The hash function for the TLS 1.2 PRF */
|
| - tlsPrfHash =
|
| - GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_mac_params->prfMechanism);
|
| - if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL ||
|
| - tls12_mac_params->ulMacLength < 12) {
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - if (tls12_mac_params->ulServerOrClient == 1) {
|
| - label = "server finished";
|
| - } else if (tls12_mac_params->ulServerOrClient == 2) {
|
| - label = "client finished";
|
| - } else {
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, tlsPrfHash,
|
| - tls12_mac_params->ulMacLength);
|
| - if (crv == CKR_OK) {
|
| - context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo, label, 15);
|
| - }
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - case CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256:
|
| - crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgSHA256, 0);
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME: {
|
| - sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx =
|
| - sftk_HMACConstantTime_New(pMechanism,key);
|
| - CK_ULONG *intpointer;
|
| -
|
| - if (ctx == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG);
|
| - if (intpointer == NULL) {
|
| - PORT_Free(ctx);
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - *intpointer = ctx->hash->length;
|
| -
|
| - context->cipherInfo = intpointer;
|
| - context->hashInfo = ctx;
|
| - context->currentMech = pMechanism->mechanism;
|
| - context->hashUpdate = sftk_HMACConstantTime_Update;
|
| - context->hashdestroy = sftk_MACConstantTime_DestroyContext;
|
| - context->end = sftk_MACConstantTime_EndHash;
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SignCopy;
|
| - context->destroy = sftk_Space;
|
| - context->maxLen = 64;
|
| - context->multi = PR_TRUE;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME: {
|
| - sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx =
|
| - sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_New(pMechanism,key);
|
| - CK_ULONG *intpointer;
|
| -
|
| - if (ctx == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG);
|
| - if (intpointer == NULL) {
|
| - PORT_Free(ctx);
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - *intpointer = ctx->hash->length;
|
| -
|
| - context->cipherInfo = intpointer;
|
| - context->hashInfo = ctx;
|
| - context->currentMech = pMechanism->mechanism;
|
| - context->hashUpdate = sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_Update;
|
| - context->hashdestroy = sftk_MACConstantTime_DestroyContext;
|
| - context->end = sftk_MACConstantTime_EndHash;
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SignCopy;
|
| - context->destroy = sftk_Space;
|
| - context->maxLen = 64;
|
| - context->multi = PR_TRUE;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - default:
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - if (info) PORT_Free(info);
|
| - sftk_FreeContext(context);
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_SIGN, context);
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/** MAC one block of data by block cipher
|
| - */
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -sftk_MACBlock( SFTKSessionContext *ctx, void *blk )
|
| -{
|
| - unsigned int outlen;
|
| - return ( SECSuccess == (ctx->update)( ctx->cipherInfo, ctx->macBuf, &outlen,
|
| - SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, blk, ctx->blockSize ))
|
| - ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/** MAC last (incomplete) block of data by block cipher
|
| - *
|
| - * Call once, then terminate MACing operation.
|
| - */
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -sftk_MACFinal( SFTKSessionContext *ctx )
|
| -{
|
| - unsigned int padLen = ctx->padDataLength;
|
| - /* pad and proceed the residual */
|
| - if( padLen ) {
|
| - /* shd clr ctx->padLen to make sftk_MACFinal idempotent */
|
| - PORT_Memset( ctx->padBuf + padLen, 0, ctx->blockSize - padLen );
|
| - return sftk_MACBlock( ctx, ctx->padBuf );
|
| - } else
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/** The common implementation for {Sign,Verify}Update. (S/V only vary in their
|
| - * setup and final operations).
|
| - *
|
| - * A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]
|
| - */
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -sftk_MACUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
|
| - CK_ULONG ulPartLen,SFTKContextType type)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure we're legal */
|
| - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,type, PR_TRUE, &session );
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| -
|
| - if (context->hashInfo) {
|
| - (*context->hashUpdate)(context->hashInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
|
| - } else {
|
| - /* must be block cipher MACing */
|
| -
|
| - unsigned int blkSize = context->blockSize;
|
| - unsigned char *residual = /* free room in context->padBuf */
|
| - context->padBuf + context->padDataLength;
|
| - unsigned int minInput = /* min input for MACing at least one block */
|
| - blkSize - context->padDataLength;
|
| -
|
| - /* not enough data even for one block */
|
| - if( ulPartLen < minInput ) {
|
| - PORT_Memcpy( residual, pPart, ulPartLen );
|
| - context->padDataLength += ulPartLen;
|
| - goto cleanup;
|
| - }
|
| - /* MACing residual */
|
| - if( context->padDataLength ) {
|
| - PORT_Memcpy( residual, pPart, minInput );
|
| - ulPartLen -= minInput;
|
| - pPart += minInput;
|
| - if( CKR_OK != (crv = sftk_MACBlock( context, context->padBuf )) )
|
| - goto terminate;
|
| - }
|
| - /* MACing full blocks */
|
| - while( ulPartLen >= blkSize )
|
| - {
|
| - if( CKR_OK != (crv = sftk_MACBlock( context, pPart )) )
|
| - goto terminate;
|
| - ulPartLen -= blkSize;
|
| - pPart += blkSize;
|
| - }
|
| - /* save the residual */
|
| - if( (context->padDataLength = ulPartLen) )
|
| - PORT_Memcpy( context->padBuf, pPart, ulPartLen );
|
| - } /* blk cipher MACing */
|
| -
|
| - goto cleanup;
|
| -
|
| -terminate:
|
| - sftk_TerminateOp( session, type, context );
|
| -cleanup:
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation,
|
| - * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data,
|
| - * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature
|
| - *
|
| - * A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]
|
| - */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_SignUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
|
| - CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
|
| -{
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| - return sftk_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, SFTK_SIGN);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation,
|
| - * returning the signature. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_SignFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
|
| - CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - unsigned int outlen;
|
| - unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure we're legal */
|
| - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_SIGN,PR_TRUE,&session);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| -
|
| - if (context->hashInfo) {
|
| - unsigned int digestLen;
|
| - unsigned char tmpbuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
|
| -
|
| - if( !pSignature ) {
|
| - outlen = context->maxLen; goto finish;
|
| - }
|
| - (*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf));
|
| - if( SECSuccess != (context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
|
| - &outlen, maxoutlen, tmpbuf, digestLen))
|
| - crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| - /* CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL here isn't continuable, let operation terminate.
|
| - * Keeping "too small" CK_RV intact is a standard violation, but allows
|
| - * application read EXACT signature length */
|
| - } else {
|
| - /* must be block cipher MACing */
|
| - outlen = context->macSize;
|
| - /* null or "too small" buf doesn't terminate operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]*/
|
| - if( !pSignature || maxoutlen < outlen ) {
|
| - if( pSignature ) crv = CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
|
| - goto finish;
|
| - }
|
| - if( CKR_OK == (crv = sftk_MACFinal( context )) )
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(pSignature, context->macBuf, outlen );
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_SIGN, context );
|
| -finish:
|
| - *pulSignatureLen = outlen;
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single part,
|
| - * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data,
|
| - * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pData,CK_ULONG ulDataLen,CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
|
| - CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure we're legal */
|
| - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_SIGN,PR_FALSE,&session);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| -
|
| - if (!pSignature) {
|
| - /* see also how C_SignUpdate implements this */
|
| - *pulSignatureLen = (!context->multi || context->hashInfo)
|
| - ? context->maxLen
|
| - : context->macSize; /* must be block cipher MACing */
|
| - goto finish;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* multi part Signing are completely implemented by SignUpdate and
|
| - * sign Final */
|
| - if (context->multi) {
|
| - /* SignFinal can't follow failed SignUpdate */
|
| - if( CKR_OK == (crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession,pData,ulDataLen) ))
|
| - crv = NSC_SignFinal(hSession, pSignature, pulSignatureLen);
|
| - } else {
|
| - /* single-part PKC signature (e.g. CKM_ECDSA) */
|
| - unsigned int outlen;
|
| - unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen;
|
| - if( SECSuccess != (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
|
| - &outlen, maxoutlen, pData, ulDataLen))
|
| - crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| - *pulSignatureLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
|
| - /* "too small" here is certainly continuable */
|
| - if( crv != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL )
|
| - sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_SIGN, context);
|
| - } /* single-part */
|
| -
|
| -finish:
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - ************** Crypto Functions: Sign Recover ************************
|
| - */
|
| -/* NSC_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation,
|
| - * where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature.
|
| - * E.g. encryption with the user's private key */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_SignRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
|
| -{
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
|
| - case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
|
| - case CKM_RSA_X_509:
|
| - return NSC_SignInit(hSession,pMechanism,hKey);
|
| - default:
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_SignRecover signs data in a single operation
|
| - * where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature.
|
| - * E.g. encryption with the user's private key */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_SignRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
|
| - CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
|
| -{
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - return NSC_Sign(hSession,pData,ulDataLen,pSignature,pulSignatureLen);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - ************** Crypto Functions: verify ************************
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| -/* Handle RSA Signature formatting */
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_hashCheckSign(SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info, const unsigned char *sig,
|
| - unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
|
| - unsigned int digestLen)
|
| -{
|
| - PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
| - if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return RSA_HashCheckSign(info->hashOid, info->key, sig, sigLen, digest,
|
| - digestLen);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -SECStatus
|
| -RSA_HashCheckSign(SECOidTag digestOid, NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key,
|
| - const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen,
|
| - const unsigned char *digestData, unsigned int digestLen)
|
| -{
|
| - unsigned char *pkcs1DigestInfoData;
|
| - SECItem pkcs1DigestInfo;
|
| - SECItem digest;
|
| - unsigned int bufferSize;
|
| - SECStatus rv;
|
| -
|
| - /* pkcs1DigestInfo.data must be less than key->u.rsa.modulus.len */
|
| - bufferSize = key->u.rsa.modulus.len;
|
| - pkcs1DigestInfoData = PORT_ZAlloc(bufferSize);
|
| - if (!pkcs1DigestInfoData) {
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - pkcs1DigestInfo.data = pkcs1DigestInfoData;
|
| - pkcs1DigestInfo.len = bufferSize;
|
| -
|
| - /* decrypt the block */
|
| - rv = RSA_CheckSignRecover(&key->u.rsa, pkcs1DigestInfo.data,
|
| - &pkcs1DigestInfo.len, pkcs1DigestInfo.len,
|
| - sig, sigLen);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
| - } else {
|
| - digest.data = (PRUint8*) digestData;
|
| - digest.len = digestLen;
|
| - rv = _SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo(
|
| - digestOid, &digest, &pkcs1DigestInfo,
|
| - PR_TRUE /*XXX: unsafeAllowMissingParameters*/);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Free(pkcs1DigestInfoData);
|
| - return rv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_RSACheckSign(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, const unsigned char *sig,
|
| - unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
|
| - unsigned int digestLen)
|
| -{
|
| - PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
| - if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return RSA_CheckSign(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_RSACheckSignRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, const unsigned char *sig,
|
| - unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
|
| - unsigned int digestLen)
|
| -{
|
| - PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
| - if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return RSA_CheckSignRaw(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_RSACheckSignPSS(SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info, const unsigned char *sig,
|
| - unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
|
| - unsigned int digestLen)
|
| -{
|
| - HASH_HashType hashAlg;
|
| - HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
|
| - CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params = (CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)info->params;
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
| - if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg);
|
| - maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf);
|
| -
|
| - return RSA_CheckSignPSS(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
|
| - params->sLen, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation,
|
| - * where the signature is an appendix to the data,
|
| - * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA) */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_VerifyInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKObject *key;
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
|
| - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
|
| - NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
|
| - SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info = NULL;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - /* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/
|
| - crv = sftk_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_VERIFY, SFTK_VERIFY);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) return crv;
|
| -
|
| - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
|
| - if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,&key,hKey,&key_type,
|
| - CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_VERIFY);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - context->multi = PR_FALSE;
|
| -
|
| -#define INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(mmm) \
|
| - case CKM_ ## mmm ## _RSA_PKCS: \
|
| - context->multi = PR_TRUE; \
|
| - crv = sftk_doSub ## mmm (context); \
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break; \
|
| - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_hashCheckSign; \
|
| - info = PORT_New(SFTKHashVerifyInfo); \
|
| - if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } \
|
| - info->hashOid = SEC_OID_ ## mmm ; \
|
| - goto finish_rsa;
|
| -
|
| - switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
|
| - INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD5)
|
| - INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD2)
|
| - INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA1)
|
| - INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA224)
|
| - INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA256)
|
| - INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA384)
|
| - INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA512)
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
|
| - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_RSACheckSign;
|
| - goto finish_rsa;
|
| - case CKM_RSA_X_509:
|
| - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_RSACheckSignRaw;
|
| -finish_rsa:
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
|
| - if (info) PORT_Free(info);
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
|
| - pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
|
| - if (pubKey == NULL) {
|
| - if (info) PORT_Free(info);
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - if (info) {
|
| - info->key = pubKey;
|
| - context->cipherInfo = info;
|
| - context->destroy = sftk_Space;
|
| - } else {
|
| - context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
|
| - context->destroy = sftk_Null;
|
| - }
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
|
| - if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS) ||
|
| - !sftk_ValidatePssParams((const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS*)pMechanism->pParameter)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - info = PORT_New(SFTKHashVerifyInfo);
|
| - if (info == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - info->key = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
|
| - if (info->key == NULL) {
|
| - PORT_Free(info);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->cipherInfo = info;
|
| - context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
|
| - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_RSACheckSignPSS;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_DSA_SHA1:
|
| - context->multi = PR_TRUE;
|
| - crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_DSA:
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_DSA) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_DSA,&crv);
|
| - if (pubKey == NULL) {
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
|
| - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub;
|
| - context->destroy = sftk_Null;
|
| - break;
|
| -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
| - case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1:
|
| - context->multi = PR_TRUE;
|
| - crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_ECDSA:
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_EC) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_EC,&crv);
|
| - if (pubKey == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
|
| - context->verify = (SFTKVerify) nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub;
|
| - context->destroy = sftk_Null;
|
| - break;
|
| -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
|
| -
|
| - INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD2)
|
| - INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD5)
|
| - INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA224)
|
| - INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA256)
|
| - INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA384)
|
| - INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA512)
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
|
| - crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,
|
| - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
|
| - crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,SHA1_LENGTH);
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC:
|
| - crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_MD5,key,
|
| - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC:
|
| - crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_SHA1,key,
|
| - *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL:
|
| - crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgNULL, 0);
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256:
|
| - crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgSHA256, 0);
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - default:
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - if (info) PORT_Free(info);
|
| - sftk_FreeContext(context);
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY, context);
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation,
|
| - * where the signature is an appendix to the data,
|
| - * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
|
| - CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure we're legal */
|
| - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,PR_FALSE,&session);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| -
|
| - /* multi part Verifying are completely implemented by VerifyUpdate and
|
| - * VerifyFinal */
|
| - if (context->multi) {
|
| - /* VerifyFinal can't follow failed VerifyUpdate */
|
| - if( CKR_OK == (crv = NSC_VerifyUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen)))
|
| - crv = NSC_VerifyFinal(hSession, pSignature, ulSignatureLen);
|
| - } else {
|
| - if (SECSuccess != (*context->verify)(context->cipherInfo,pSignature,
|
| - ulSignatureLen, pData, ulDataLen))
|
| - crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| -
|
| - sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_VERIFY, context );
|
| - }
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification operation,
|
| - * where the signature is an appendix to the data,
|
| - * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature
|
| - *
|
| - * A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]
|
| - */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_VerifyUpdate( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
|
| - CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
|
| -{
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| - return sftk_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, SFTK_VERIFY);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification operation,
|
| - * checking the signature. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_VerifyFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - if (!pSignature)
|
| - return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure we're legal */
|
| - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,PR_TRUE,&session);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK)
|
| - return crv;
|
| -
|
| - if (context->hashInfo) {
|
| - unsigned int digestLen;
|
| - unsigned char tmpbuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
|
| -
|
| - (*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf));
|
| - if( SECSuccess != (context->verify)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
|
| - ulSignatureLen, tmpbuf, digestLen))
|
| - crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| - } else if (ulSignatureLen != context->macSize) {
|
| - /* must be block cipher MACing */
|
| - crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE;
|
| - } else if (CKR_OK == (crv = sftk_MACFinal(context))) {
|
| - if (PORT_Memcmp(pSignature, context->macBuf, ulSignatureLen))
|
| - crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_VERIFY, context );
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return crv;
|
| -
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - ************** Crypto Functions: Verify Recover ************************
|
| - */
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_RSACheckSignRecover(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *data,
|
| - unsigned int *dataLen, unsigned int maxDataLen,
|
| - const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen)
|
| -{
|
| - PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
| - if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return RSA_CheckSignRecover(&key->u.rsa, data, dataLen, maxDataLen,
|
| - sig, sigLen);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_RSACheckSignRecoverRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *data,
|
| - unsigned int *dataLen, unsigned int maxDataLen,
|
| - const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen)
|
| -{
|
| - PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
|
| - if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return RSA_CheckSignRecoverRaw(&key->u.rsa, data, dataLen, maxDataLen,
|
| - sig, sigLen);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification operation,
|
| - * where the data is recovered from the signature.
|
| - * E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_VerifyRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKObject *key;
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
|
| - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
|
| - NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
|
| - if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER,
|
| - &key,hKey,&key_type,CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - context->multi = PR_TRUE;
|
| -
|
| - switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
|
| - case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
|
| - case CKM_RSA_X_509:
|
| - if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->multi = PR_FALSE;
|
| - context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
|
| - pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
|
| - if (pubKey == NULL) {
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
|
| - context->update = (SFTKCipher) (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
|
| - ? sftk_RSACheckSignRecoverRaw : sftk_RSACheckSignRecover);
|
| - context->destroy = sftk_Null;
|
| - break;
|
| - default:
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - PORT_Free(context);
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, context);
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part operation,
|
| - * where the data is recovered from the signature.
|
| - * E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_VerifyRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pData,CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - unsigned int outlen;
|
| - unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| - SECStatus rv;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure we're legal */
|
| - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER,
|
| - PR_FALSE,&session);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| - if (pData == NULL) {
|
| - /* to return the actual size, we need to do the decrypt, just return
|
| - * the max size, which is the size of the input signature. */
|
| - *pulDataLen = ulSignatureLen;
|
| - rv = SECSuccess;
|
| - goto finish;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen,
|
| - pSignature, ulSignatureLen);
|
| - *pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
|
| -
|
| - sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, context);
|
| -finish:
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapVerifyError(PORT_GetError());
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - **************************** Random Functions: ************************
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's random number
|
| - * generator. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_SeedRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed,
|
| - CK_ULONG ulSeedLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SECStatus rv;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - rv = RNG_RandomUpdate(pSeed, ulSeedLen);
|
| - return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_GenerateRandom generates random data. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_GenerateRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomData, CK_ULONG ulRandomLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SECStatus rv;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(pRandomData, ulRandomLen);
|
| - /*
|
| - * This may fail with SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM, which means the RNG isn't
|
| - * seeded with enough entropy.
|
| - */
|
| - return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - **************************** Key Functions: ************************
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * generate a password based encryption key. This code uses
|
| - * PKCS5 to do the work.
|
| - */
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -nsc_pbe_key_gen(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pkcs5_pbe, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
|
| - void *buf, CK_ULONG *key_length, PRBool faulty3DES)
|
| -{
|
| - SECItem *pbe_key = NULL, iv, pwitem;
|
| - CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
|
| - CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkd2_params = NULL;
|
| -
|
| - *key_length = 0;
|
| - iv.data = NULL; iv.len = 0;
|
| -
|
| - if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2) {
|
| - pbkd2_params = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - pwitem.data = (unsigned char *)pbkd2_params->pPassword;
|
| - /* was this a typo in the PKCS #11 spec? */
|
| - pwitem.len = *pbkd2_params->ulPasswordLen;
|
| - } else {
|
| - pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - pwitem.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pPassword;
|
| - pwitem.len = pbe_params->ulPasswordLen;
|
| - }
|
| - pbe_key = nsspkcs5_ComputeKeyAndIV(pkcs5_pbe, &pwitem, &iv, faulty3DES);
|
| - if (pbe_key == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(buf, pbe_key->data, pbe_key->len);
|
| - *key_length = pbe_key->len;
|
| - SECITEM_ZfreeItem(pbe_key, PR_TRUE);
|
| - pbe_key = NULL;
|
| -
|
| - if (iv.data) {
|
| - if (pbe_params && pbe_params->pInitVector != NULL) {
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(pbe_params->pInitVector, iv.data, iv.len);
|
| - }
|
| - PORT_Free(iv.data);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * this is coded for "full" support. These selections will be limitted to
|
| - * the official subset by freebl.
|
| - */
|
| -static unsigned int
|
| -sftk_GetSubPrimeFromPrime(unsigned int primeBits)
|
| -{
|
| - if (primeBits <= 1024) {
|
| - return 160;
|
| - } else if (primeBits <= 2048) {
|
| - return 224;
|
| - } else if (primeBits <= 3072) {
|
| - return 256;
|
| - } else if (primeBits <= 7680) {
|
| - return 384;
|
| - } else {
|
| - return 512;
|
| - }
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -nsc_parameter_gen(CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, SFTKObject *key)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKAttribute *attribute;
|
| - CK_ULONG counter;
|
| - unsigned int seedBits = 0;
|
| - unsigned int subprimeBits = 0;
|
| - unsigned int primeBits;
|
| - unsigned int j = 8; /* default to 1024 bits */
|
| - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
|
| - PQGParams *params = NULL;
|
| - PQGVerify *vfy = NULL;
|
| - SECStatus rv;
|
| -
|
| - attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_PRIME_BITS);
|
| - if (attribute == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
|
| - }
|
| - primeBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
|
| - if (primeBits < 1024) {
|
| - j = PQG_PBITS_TO_INDEX(primeBits);
|
| - if (j == (unsigned int)-1) {
|
| - return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED_BITS);
|
| - if (attribute != NULL) {
|
| - seedBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS);
|
| - if (attribute != NULL) {
|
| - subprimeBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_PRIME_BITS);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED_BITS);
|
| -
|
| - /* use the old PQG interface if we have old input data */
|
| - if ((primeBits < 1024) || ((primeBits == 1024) && (subprimeBits == 0))) {
|
| - if (seedBits == 0) {
|
| - rv = PQG_ParamGen(j, ¶ms, &vfy);
|
| - } else {
|
| - rv = PQG_ParamGenSeedLen(j,seedBits/8, ¶ms, &vfy);
|
| - }
|
| - } else {
|
| - if (subprimeBits == 0) {
|
| - subprimeBits = sftk_GetSubPrimeFromPrime(primeBits);
|
| - }
|
| - if (seedBits == 0) {
|
| - seedBits = primeBits;
|
| - }
|
| - rv = PQG_ParamGenV2(primeBits, subprimeBits, seedBits/8, ¶ms, &vfy);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| - if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
|
| - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| - return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_PRIME,
|
| - params->prime.data, params->prime.len);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_SUBPRIME,
|
| - params->subPrime.data, params->subPrime.len);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_BASE,
|
| - params->base.data, params->base.len);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
|
| - counter = vfy->counter;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_COUNTER,
|
| - &counter, sizeof(counter));
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED,
|
| - vfy->seed.data, vfy->seed.len);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_H,
|
| - vfy->h.data, vfy->h.len);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
|
| -
|
| -loser:
|
| - PQG_DestroyParams(params);
|
| -
|
| - if (vfy) {
|
| - PQG_DestroyVerify(vfy);
|
| - }
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism, CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type,
|
| - CK_ULONG *key_length)
|
| -{
|
| - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
|
| -
|
| - switch (mechanism) {
|
| - case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN:
|
| - *key_type = CKK_RC2;
|
| - if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
|
| - break;
|
| -#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
|
| - case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN:
|
| - *key_type = CKK_RC5;
|
| - if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
|
| - break;
|
| -#endif
|
| - case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
|
| - *key_type = CKK_RC4;
|
| - if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN:
|
| - *key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
|
| - if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
|
| - *key_type = CKK_CDMF;
|
| - *key_length = 8;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
|
| - *key_type = CKK_DES;
|
| - *key_length = 8;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
|
| - *key_type = CKK_DES2;
|
| - *key_length = 16;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
|
| - *key_type = CKK_DES3;
|
| - *key_length = 24;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN:
|
| - *key_type = CKK_SEED;
|
| - *key_length = 16;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN:
|
| - *key_type = CKK_CAMELLIA;
|
| - if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
|
| - *key_type = CKK_AES;
|
| - if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_KEY_GEN:
|
| - *key_type = CKK_NSS_CHACHA20;
|
| - if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
|
| - break;
|
| - default:
|
| - PORT_Assert(0);
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -CK_RV
|
| -nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter **pbe)
|
| -{
|
| - SECItem salt;
|
| - CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
|
| - NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params;
|
| - PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
|
| - SECStatus rv;
|
| -
|
| - *pbe = NULL;
|
| -
|
| - arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
|
| - if (arena == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - params = (NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *) PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
|
| - sizeof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter));
|
| - if (params == NULL) {
|
| - PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE);
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - params->poolp = arena;
|
| - params->ivLen = 0;
|
| - params->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PKCS12_V2;
|
| - params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
|
| - params->encAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1; /* any invalid value */
|
| - params->is2KeyDES = PR_FALSE;
|
| - params->keyID = pbeBitGenIntegrityKey;
|
| - pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - params->iter = pbe_params->ulIteration;
|
| -
|
| - salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt;
|
| - salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen;
|
| - salt.type = siBuffer;
|
| - rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena,¶ms->salt,&salt);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| - PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE);
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - }
|
| - switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
|
| - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
|
| - case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC:
|
| - params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
|
| - params->keyLen = 20;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
|
| - params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD5;
|
| - params->keyLen = 16;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
|
| - params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD2;
|
| - params->keyLen = 16;
|
| - break;
|
| - default:
|
| - PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE);
|
| - return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| - *pbe = params;
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* maybe this should be table driven? */
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter **pbe,
|
| - CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type, CK_ULONG *key_length)
|
| -{
|
| - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
|
| - SECOidData *oid;
|
| - CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
|
| - NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params = NULL;
|
| - HASH_HashType hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
|
| - CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkd2_params = NULL;
|
| - SECItem salt;
|
| - CK_ULONG iteration = 0;
|
| -
|
| - *pbe = NULL;
|
| -
|
| - oid = SECOID_FindOIDByMechanism(pMechanism->mechanism);
|
| - if (oid == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2) {
|
| - pbkd2_params = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - if (pbkd2_params == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| - switch (pbkd2_params->prf) {
|
| - case CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1:
|
| - hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA224:
|
| - hashType = HASH_AlgSHA224;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA256:
|
| - hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA384:
|
| - hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA512:
|
| - hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512;
|
| - break;
|
| - default:
|
| - return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| - if (pbkd2_params->saltSource != CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED) {
|
| - return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| - salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbkd2_params->pSaltSourceData;
|
| - salt.len = (unsigned int)pbkd2_params->ulSaltSourceDataLen;
|
| - iteration = pbkd2_params->iterations;
|
| - } else {
|
| - pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt;
|
| - salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen;
|
| - iteration = pbe_params->ulIteration;
|
| - }
|
| - params=nsspkcs5_NewParam(oid->offset, hashType, &salt, iteration);
|
| - if (params == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - switch (params->encAlg) {
|
| - case SEC_OID_DES_CBC:
|
| - *key_type = CKK_DES;
|
| - *key_length = params->keyLen;
|
| - break;
|
| - case SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC:
|
| - *key_type = params->is2KeyDES ? CKK_DES2 : CKK_DES3;
|
| - *key_length = params->keyLen;
|
| - break;
|
| - case SEC_OID_RC2_CBC:
|
| - *key_type = CKK_RC2;
|
| - *key_length = params->keyLen;
|
| - break;
|
| - case SEC_OID_RC4:
|
| - *key_type = CKK_RC4;
|
| - *key_length = params->keyLen;
|
| - break;
|
| - case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2:
|
| - /* key type must already be set */
|
| - if (*key_type == CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - /* PBKDF2 needs to calculate the key length from the other parameters
|
| - */
|
| - if (*key_length == 0) {
|
| - *key_length = sftk_MapKeySize(*key_type);
|
| - }
|
| - if (*key_length == 0) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - params->keyLen = *key_length;
|
| - break;
|
| - default:
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
|
| - nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(params);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - if (crv == CKR_OK) {
|
| - *pbe = params;
|
| - }
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key object. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,CK_ULONG ulCount,
|
| - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKObject *key;
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - PRBool checkWeak = PR_FALSE;
|
| - CK_ULONG key_length = 0;
|
| - CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE;
|
| - CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
|
| - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
|
| - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
|
| - int i;
|
| - SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
|
| - unsigned char buf[MAX_KEY_LEN];
|
| - enum {nsc_pbe, nsc_ssl, nsc_bulk, nsc_param, nsc_jpake} key_gen_type;
|
| - NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param;
|
| - SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *rsa_pms;
|
| - CK_VERSION *version;
|
| - /* in very old versions of NSS, there were implementation errors with key
|
| - * generation methods. We want to beable to read these, but not
|
| - * produce them any more. The affected algorithm was 3DES.
|
| - */
|
| - PRBool faultyPBE3DES = PR_FALSE;
|
| - HASH_HashType hashType = HASH_AlgNULL;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - if (!slot) {
|
| - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| - /*
|
| - * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
|
| - */
|
| - key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
|
| - if (key == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * load the template values into the object
|
| - */
|
| - for (i=0; i < (int) ulCount; i++) {
|
| - if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
|
| - key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
|
| - continue;
|
| - }
|
| - /* some algorithms need keytype specified */
|
| - if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) {
|
| - key_type = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
|
| - continue;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - }
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_CLASS);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE);
|
| -
|
| - /* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
|
| - key_gen_type = nsc_bulk; /* bulk key by default */
|
| - switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
|
| - case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
|
| - case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
|
| - case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
|
| - case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
|
| - checkWeak = PR_TRUE;
|
| - /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN:
|
| - case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
|
| - case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN:
|
| - case CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN:
|
| - case CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN:
|
| - case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
|
| - case CKM_NSS_CHACHA20_KEY_GEN:
|
| -#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
|
| - case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN:
|
| -#endif
|
| - crv = nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(pMechanism->mechanism,&key_type,&key_length);
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN:
|
| - key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
|
| - key_length = 48;
|
| - key_gen_type = nsc_ssl;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC:
|
| - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
|
| - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
|
| - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
|
| - key_gen_type = nsc_pbe;
|
| - key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
|
| - crv = nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(pMechanism, &pbe_param);
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_FAULTY_3DES_CBC:
|
| - faultyPBE3DES = PR_TRUE;
|
| - /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC:
|
| - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC2_CBC:
|
| - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC:
|
| - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC2_CBC:
|
| - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC4:
|
| - case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC4:
|
| - case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC:
|
| - case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC:
|
| - case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC:
|
| - case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC:
|
| - case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128:
|
| - case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40:
|
| - case CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC:
|
| - case CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC:
|
| - case CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2:
|
| - key_gen_type = nsc_pbe;
|
| - crv = nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(pMechanism,&pbe_param, &key_type, &key_length);
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN:
|
| - key_gen_type = nsc_param;
|
| - key_type = CKK_DSA;
|
| - objclass = CKO_KG_PARAMETERS;
|
| - crv = CKR_OK;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA1: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; goto jpake1;
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto jpake1;
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto jpake1;
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto jpake1;
|
| -jpake1:
|
| - key_gen_type = nsc_jpake;
|
| - key_type = CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1;
|
| - objclass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
|
| - if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
|
| - pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - if (sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_TOKEN)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = CKR_OK;
|
| - break;
|
| - default:
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure we aren't going to overflow the buffer */
|
| - if (sizeof(buf) < key_length) {
|
| - /* someone is getting pretty optimistic about how big their key can
|
| - * be... */
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
|
| -
|
| - /* if there was no error,
|
| - * key_type *MUST* be set in the switch statement above */
|
| - PORT_Assert( key_type != CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE );
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * now to the actual key gen.
|
| - */
|
| - switch (key_gen_type) {
|
| - case nsc_pbe:
|
| - crv = nsc_pbe_key_gen(pbe_param, pMechanism, buf, &key_length,
|
| - faultyPBE3DES);
|
| - nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(pbe_param);
|
| - break;
|
| - case nsc_ssl:
|
| - rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *)buf;
|
| - version = (CK_VERSION *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - rsa_pms->client_version[0] = version->major;
|
| - rsa_pms->client_version[1] = version->minor;
|
| - crv =
|
| - NSC_GenerateRandom(0,&rsa_pms->random[0], sizeof(rsa_pms->random));
|
| - break;
|
| - case nsc_bulk:
|
| - /* get the key, check for weak keys and repeat if found */
|
| - do {
|
| - crv = NSC_GenerateRandom(0, buf, key_length);
|
| - } while (crv == CKR_OK && checkWeak && sftk_IsWeakKey(buf,key_type));
|
| - break;
|
| - case nsc_param:
|
| - /* generate parameters */
|
| - *buf = 0;
|
| - crv = nsc_parameter_gen(key_type,key);
|
| - break;
|
| - case nsc_jpake:
|
| - crv = jpake_Round1(hashType,
|
| - (CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params *) pMechanism->pParameter,
|
| - key);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
|
| -
|
| - /* Add the class, key_type, and value */
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_CLASS,&objclass,sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type,sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
|
| - if (key_length != 0) {
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE,buf,key_length);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* get the session */
|
| - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
|
| - if (session == NULL) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * handle the base object stuff
|
| - */
|
| - crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session);
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - }
|
| - if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(key,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - }
|
| - if (crv == CKR_OK) {
|
| - *phKey = key->handle;
|
| - }
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -#define PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA1_LENGTH /* 160-bits */
|
| -#define PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH 20 /* 160-bits */
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * FIPS 140-2 pairwise consistency check utilized to validate key pair.
|
| - *
|
| - * This function returns
|
| - * CKR_OK if pairwise consistency check passed
|
| - * CKR_GENERAL_ERROR if pairwise consistency check failed
|
| - * other error codes if paiswise consistency check could not be
|
| - * performed, for example, CKR_HOST_MEMORY.
|
| - */
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - SFTKObject *publicKey, SFTKObject *privateKey, CK_KEY_TYPE keyType)
|
| -{
|
| - /*
|
| - * Key type Mechanism type
|
| - * --------------------------------
|
| - * For encrypt/decrypt: CKK_RSA => CKM_RSA_PKCS
|
| - * others => CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM
|
| - *
|
| - * For sign/verify: CKK_RSA => CKM_RSA_PKCS
|
| - * CKK_DSA => CKM_DSA
|
| - * CKK_EC => CKM_ECDSA
|
| - * others => CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM
|
| - *
|
| - * None of these mechanisms has a parameter.
|
| - */
|
| - CK_MECHANISM mech = {0, NULL, 0};
|
| -
|
| - CK_ULONG modulusLen = 0;
|
| - CK_ULONG subPrimeLen = 0;
|
| - PRBool isEncryptable = PR_FALSE;
|
| - PRBool canSignVerify = PR_FALSE;
|
| - PRBool isDerivable = PR_FALSE;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| -
|
| - /* Variables used for Encrypt/Decrypt functions. */
|
| - unsigned char *known_message = (unsigned char *)"Known Crypto Message";
|
| - unsigned char plaintext[PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH];
|
| - CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted;
|
| - unsigned char *ciphertext;
|
| - unsigned char *text_compared;
|
| - CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted;
|
| - CK_ULONG bytes_compared;
|
| - CK_ULONG pairwise_digest_length = PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH;
|
| -
|
| - /* Variables used for Signature/Verification functions. */
|
| - /* Must be at least 256 bits for DSA2 digest */
|
| - unsigned char *known_digest = (unsigned char *)
|
| - "Mozilla Rules the World through NSS!";
|
| - unsigned char *signature;
|
| - CK_ULONG signature_length;
|
| -
|
| - if (keyType == CKK_RSA) {
|
| - SFTKAttribute *attribute;
|
| -
|
| - /* Get modulus length of private key. */
|
| - attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(privateKey, CKA_MODULUS);
|
| - if (attribute == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
| - }
|
| - modulusLen = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
|
| - if (*(unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue == 0) {
|
| - modulusLen--;
|
| - }
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
|
| - } else if (keyType == CKK_DSA) {
|
| - SFTKAttribute *attribute;
|
| -
|
| - /* Get subprime length of private key. */
|
| - attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(privateKey, CKA_SUBPRIME);
|
| - if (attribute == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
| - }
|
| - subPrimeLen = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
|
| - if (subPrimeLen > 1 && *(unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue == 0) {
|
| - subPrimeLen--;
|
| - }
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /**************************************************/
|
| - /* Pairwise Consistency Check of Encrypt/Decrypt. */
|
| - /**************************************************/
|
| -
|
| - isEncryptable = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DECRYPT);
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * If the decryption attribute is set, attempt to encrypt
|
| - * with the public key and decrypt with the private key.
|
| - */
|
| - if (isEncryptable) {
|
| - if (keyType != CKK_RSA) {
|
| - return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
| - }
|
| - bytes_encrypted = modulusLen;
|
| - mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
|
| -
|
| - /* Allocate space for ciphertext. */
|
| - ciphertext = (unsigned char *) PORT_ZAlloc(bytes_encrypted);
|
| - if (ciphertext == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Prepare for encryption using the public key. */
|
| - crv = NSC_EncryptInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - PORT_Free(ciphertext);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Encrypt using the public key. */
|
| - crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession,
|
| - known_message,
|
| - PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH,
|
| - ciphertext,
|
| - &bytes_encrypted);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - PORT_Free(ciphertext);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Always use the smaller of these two values . . . */
|
| - bytes_compared = PR_MIN(bytes_encrypted, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * If there was a failure, the plaintext
|
| - * goes at the end, therefore . . .
|
| - */
|
| - text_compared = ciphertext + bytes_encrypted - bytes_compared;
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * Check to ensure that ciphertext does
|
| - * NOT EQUAL known input message text
|
| - * per FIPS PUB 140-2 directive.
|
| - */
|
| - if (PORT_Memcmp(text_compared, known_message,
|
| - bytes_compared) == 0) {
|
| - /* Set error to Invalid PRIVATE Key. */
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
|
| - PORT_Free(ciphertext);
|
| - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Prepare for decryption using the private key. */
|
| - crv = NSC_DecryptInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - PORT_Free(ciphertext);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - memset(plaintext, 0, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * Initialize bytes decrypted to be the
|
| - * expected PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH.
|
| - */
|
| - bytes_decrypted = PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH;
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * Decrypt using the private key.
|
| - * NOTE: No need to reset the
|
| - * value of bytes_encrypted.
|
| - */
|
| - crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession,
|
| - ciphertext,
|
| - bytes_encrypted,
|
| - plaintext,
|
| - &bytes_decrypted);
|
| -
|
| - /* Finished with ciphertext; free it. */
|
| - PORT_Free(ciphertext);
|
| -
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * Check to ensure that the output plaintext
|
| - * does EQUAL known input message text.
|
| - */
|
| - if ((bytes_decrypted != PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) ||
|
| - (PORT_Memcmp(plaintext, known_message,
|
| - PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) != 0)) {
|
| - /* Set error to Bad PUBLIC Key. */
|
| - PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
|
| - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /**********************************************/
|
| - /* Pairwise Consistency Check of Sign/Verify. */
|
| - /**********************************************/
|
| -
|
| - canSignVerify = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_SIGN);
|
| -
|
| - if (canSignVerify) {
|
| - /* Determine length of signature. */
|
| - switch (keyType) {
|
| - case CKK_RSA:
|
| - signature_length = modulusLen;
|
| - mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKK_DSA:
|
| - signature_length = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN;
|
| - pairwise_digest_length = subPrimeLen;
|
| - mech.mechanism = CKM_DSA;
|
| - break;
|
| -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
| - case CKK_EC:
|
| - signature_length = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2;
|
| - mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
|
| - break;
|
| -#endif
|
| - default:
|
| - return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Allocate space for signature data. */
|
| - signature = (unsigned char *) PORT_ZAlloc(signature_length);
|
| - if (signature == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Sign the known hash using the private key. */
|
| - crv = NSC_SignInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - PORT_Free(signature);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - crv = NSC_Sign(hSession,
|
| - known_digest,
|
| - pairwise_digest_length,
|
| - signature,
|
| - &signature_length);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - PORT_Free(signature);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Verify the known hash using the public key. */
|
| - crv = NSC_VerifyInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - PORT_Free(signature);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - crv = NSC_Verify(hSession,
|
| - known_digest,
|
| - pairwise_digest_length,
|
| - signature,
|
| - signature_length);
|
| -
|
| - /* Free signature data. */
|
| - PORT_Free(signature);
|
| -
|
| - if ((crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE) ||
|
| - (crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID)) {
|
| - return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
|
| - }
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /**********************************************/
|
| - /* Pairwise Consistency Check for Derivation */
|
| - /**********************************************/
|
| -
|
| - isDerivable = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DERIVE);
|
| -
|
| - if (isDerivable) {
|
| - /*
|
| - * We are not doing consistency check for Diffie-Hellman Key -
|
| - * otherwise it would be here
|
| - * This is also true for Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman keys
|
| - * NOTE: EC keys are currently subjected to pairwise
|
| - * consistency check for signing/verification.
|
| - */
|
| - /*
|
| - * FIPS 140-2 had the following pairwise consistency test for
|
| - * public and private keys used for key agreement:
|
| - * If the keys are used to perform key agreement, then the
|
| - * cryptographic module shall create a second, compatible
|
| - * key pair. The cryptographic module shall perform both
|
| - * sides of the key agreement algorithm and shall compare
|
| - * the resulting shared values. If the shared values are
|
| - * not equal, the test shall fail.
|
| - * This test was removed in Change Notice 3.
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair,
|
| - * creating new key objects. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_GenerateKeyPair (CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate,
|
| - CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate,
|
| - CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey,
|
| - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKObject * publicKey,*privateKey;
|
| - SFTKSession * session;
|
| - CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
|
| - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
|
| - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
|
| - SECStatus rv;
|
| - CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
|
| - CK_OBJECT_CLASS privClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
|
| - int i;
|
| - SFTKSlot * slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
|
| - unsigned int bitSize;
|
| -
|
| - /* RSA */
|
| - int public_modulus_bits = 0;
|
| - SECItem pubExp;
|
| - RSAPrivateKey * rsaPriv;
|
| -
|
| - /* DSA */
|
| - PQGParams pqgParam;
|
| - DHParams dhParam;
|
| - DSAPrivateKey * dsaPriv;
|
| -
|
| - /* Diffie Hellman */
|
| - DHPrivateKey * dhPriv;
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
| - /* Elliptic Curve Cryptography */
|
| - SECItem ecEncodedParams; /* DER Encoded parameters */
|
| - ECPrivateKey * ecPriv;
|
| - ECParams * ecParams;
|
| -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - if (!slot) {
|
| - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| - /*
|
| - * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
|
| - */
|
| - publicKey = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
|
| - if (publicKey == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * load the template values into the publicKey
|
| - */
|
| - for (i=0; i < (int) ulPublicKeyAttributeCount; i++) {
|
| - if (pPublicKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_MODULUS_BITS) {
|
| - public_modulus_bits = *(CK_ULONG *)pPublicKeyTemplate[i].pValue;
|
| - continue;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,
|
| - sftk_attr_expand(&pPublicKeyTemplate[i]));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - privateKey = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
|
| - if (privateKey == NULL) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - }
|
| - /*
|
| - * now load the private key template
|
| - */
|
| - for (i=0; i < (int) ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount; i++) {
|
| - if (pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_BITS) {
|
| - continue;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,
|
| - sftk_attr_expand(&pPrivateKeyTemplate[i]));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - }
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_CLASS);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_CLASS);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE);
|
| -
|
| - /* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
|
| - switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
|
| - case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
|
| - /* format the keys */
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_MODULUS);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_MODULUS);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_1);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_2);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_1);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_2);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_COEFFICIENT);
|
| - key_type = CKK_RSA;
|
| - if (public_modulus_bits == 0) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - if (public_modulus_bits < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
|
| - crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - if (public_modulus_bits % 2 != 0) {
|
| - crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* extract the exponent */
|
| - crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pubExp,publicKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pubExp.data, pubExp.len);
|
| - if (bitSize < 2) {
|
| - crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&pubExp));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - PORT_Free(pubExp.data);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - rsaPriv = RSA_NewKey(public_modulus_bits, &pubExp);
|
| - PORT_Free(pubExp.data);
|
| - if (rsaPriv == NULL) {
|
| - if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
|
| - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the public key */
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_MODULUS,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
|
| - /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_MODULUS,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->privateExponent));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_1,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime1));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_2,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime2));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_1,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent1));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_2,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent2));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_COEFFICIENT,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->coefficient));
|
| -kpg_done:
|
| - /* Should zeroize the contents first, since this func doesn't. */
|
| - PORT_FreeArena(rsaPriv->arena, PR_TRUE);
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_SUBPRIME);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE);
|
| - key_type = CKK_DSA;
|
| -
|
| - /* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to the private key */
|
| - crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.prime,publicKey,CKA_PRIME);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.subPrime,publicKey,
|
| - CKA_SUBPRIME);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.base,publicKey,CKA_BASE);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.prime));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_SUBPRIME,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.subPrime));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.base));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * these are checked by DSA_NewKey
|
| - */
|
| - bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.subPrime.data,
|
| - pqgParam.subPrime.len);
|
| - if ((bitSize < DSA_MIN_Q_BITS) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_Q_BITS)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.prime.data,pqgParam.prime.len);
|
| - if ((bitSize < DSA_MIN_P_BITS) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_P_BITS)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.base.data,pqgParam.base.len);
|
| - if ((bitSize < 2) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_P_BITS)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Generate the key */
|
| - rv = DSA_NewKey(&pqgParam, &dsaPriv);
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
|
| -
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| - if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
|
| - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* store the generated key into the attributes */
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dsagn_done;
|
| -
|
| - /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dsagn_done;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->privateValue));
|
| -
|
| -dsagn_done:
|
| - /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
|
| - PORT_FreeArena(dsaPriv->params.arena, PR_TRUE);
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
|
| - key_type = CKK_DH;
|
| -
|
| - /* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */
|
| - crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.prime, publicKey,
|
| - CKA_PRIME);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.base, publicKey, CKA_BASE);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.prime));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_BASE,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.base));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(dhParam.prime.data,dhParam.prime.len);
|
| - if ((bitSize < DH_MIN_P_BITS) || (bitSize > DH_MAX_P_BITS)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
|
| - PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(dhParam.base.data,dhParam.base.len);
|
| - if ((bitSize < 1) || (bitSize > DH_MAX_P_BITS)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
|
| - PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - rv = DH_NewKey(&dhParam, &dhPriv);
|
| - PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| - if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
|
| - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - crv=sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dhgn_done;
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dhgn_done;
|
| -
|
| - crv=sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->privateValue));
|
| -
|
| -dhgn_done:
|
| - /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
|
| - PORT_FreeArena(dhPriv->arena, PR_TRUE);
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
| - case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EC_PARAMS);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE);
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
|
| - key_type = CKK_EC;
|
| -
|
| - /* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */
|
| - crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &ecEncodedParams, publicKey,
|
| - CKA_EC_PARAMS);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&ecEncodedParams));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - PORT_Free(ecEncodedParams.data);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Decode ec params before calling EC_NewKey */
|
| - rv = EC_DecodeParams(&ecEncodedParams, &ecParams);
|
| - PORT_Free(ecEncodedParams.data);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| - crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - rv = EC_NewKey(ecParams, &ecPriv);
|
| - PORT_FreeArena(ecParams->arena, PR_TRUE);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| - if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
|
| - sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT")) {
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue));
|
| - } else {
|
| - SECItem *pubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL,
|
| - &ecPriv->publicValue,
|
| - SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
|
| - if (!pubValue) {
|
| - crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
| - goto ecgn_done;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(pubValue));
|
| - SECITEM_FreeItem(pubValue, PR_TRUE);
|
| - }
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto ecgn_done;
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->privateValue));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto ecgn_done;
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue));
|
| -ecgn_done:
|
| - /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
|
| - PORT_FreeArena(ecPriv->ecParams.arena, PR_TRUE);
|
| - break;
|
| -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
|
| -
|
| - default:
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -
|
| - /* Add the class, key_type The loop lets us check errors blow out
|
| - * on errors and clean up at the bottom */
|
| - session = NULL; /* make pedtantic happy... session cannot leave the*/
|
| - /* loop below NULL unless an error is set... */
|
| - do {
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_CLASS,&privClass,
|
| - sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_CLASS,&pubClass,
|
| - sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type,
|
| - sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type,
|
| - sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
|
| - if (session == NULL) crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - } while (0);
|
| -
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * handle the base object cleanup for the public Key
|
| - */
|
| - crv = sftk_handleObject(privateKey,session);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * handle the base object cleanup for the private Key
|
| - * If we have any problems, we destroy the public Key we've
|
| - * created and linked.
|
| - */
|
| - crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey,session);
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
|
| - NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,privateKey->handle);
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| - if (sftk_isTrue(privateKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,
|
| - &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - }
|
| - if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(publicKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,
|
| - &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - }
|
| - if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(privateKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
|
| - &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - }
|
| - if (crv == CKR_OK && !sftk_isTrue(publicKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
|
| - &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (crv == CKR_OK) {
|
| - /* Perform FIPS 140-2 pairwise consistency check. */
|
| - crv = sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(hSession,
|
| - publicKey, privateKey, key_type);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - if (sftk_audit_enabled) {
|
| - char msg[128];
|
| - PR_snprintf(msg,sizeof msg,
|
| - "C_GenerateKeyPair(hSession=0x%08lX, "
|
| - "pMechanism->mechanism=0x%08lX)=0x%08lX "
|
| - "self-test: pair-wise consistency test failed",
|
| - (PRUint32)hSession,(PRUint32)pMechanism->mechanism,
|
| - (PRUint32)crv);
|
| - sftk_LogAuditMessage(NSS_AUDIT_ERROR, NSS_AUDIT_SELF_TEST, msg);
|
| - }
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,publicKey->handle);
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
|
| - NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,privateKey->handle);
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - *phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
|
| - *phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
|
| -
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static SECItem *sftk_PackagePrivateKey(SFTKObject *key, CK_RV *crvp)
|
| -{
|
| - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lk = NULL;
|
| - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL;
|
| - SFTKAttribute *attribute = NULL;
|
| - PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
|
| - SECOidTag algorithm = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
|
| - void *dummy, *param = NULL;
|
| - SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
|
| - SECItem *encodedKey = NULL;
|
| -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
| -#ifdef EC_DEBUG
|
| - SECItem *fordebug;
|
| -#endif
|
| - int savelen;
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - if(!key) {
|
| - *crvp = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; /* really can't happen */
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
|
| - if(!attribute) {
|
| - *crvp = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - lk = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)attribute->attrib.pValue, crvp);
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
|
| - if(!lk) {
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - arena = PORT_NewArena(2048); /* XXX different size? */
|
| - if(!arena) {
|
| - *crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - rv = SECFailure;
|
| - goto loser;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
|
| - sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo));
|
| - if(!pki) {
|
| - *crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - rv = SECFailure;
|
| - goto loser;
|
| - }
|
| - pki->arena = arena;
|
| -
|
| - param = NULL;
|
| - switch(lk->keyType) {
|
| - case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey:
|
| - prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lk);
|
| - dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
|
| - nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate);
|
| - algorithm = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
|
| - break;
|
| - case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey:
|
| - prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lk);
|
| - dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
|
| - nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate);
|
| - prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lk->u.dsa.params);
|
| - param = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &(lk->u.dsa.params),
|
| - nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate);
|
| - algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE;
|
| - break;
|
| -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
| - case NSSLOWKEYECKey:
|
| - prepare_low_ec_priv_key_for_asn1(lk);
|
| - /* Public value is encoded as a bit string so adjust length
|
| - * to be in bits before ASN encoding and readjust
|
| - * immediately after.
|
| - *
|
| - * Since the SECG specification recommends not including the
|
| - * parameters as part of ECPrivateKey, we zero out the curveOID
|
| - * length before encoding and restore it later.
|
| - */
|
| - lk->u.ec.publicValue.len <<= 3;
|
| - savelen = lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len;
|
| - lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = 0;
|
| - dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
|
| - nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate);
|
| - lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = savelen;
|
| - lk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3;
|
| -
|
| -#ifdef EC_DEBUG
|
| - fordebug = &pki->privateKey;
|
| - SEC_PRINT("sftk_PackagePrivateKey()", "PrivateKey", lk->keyType,
|
| - fordebug);
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - param = SECITEM_DupItem(&lk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding);
|
| -
|
| - algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY;
|
| - break;
|
| -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
|
| - case NSSLOWKEYDHKey:
|
| - default:
|
| - dummy = NULL;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if(!dummy || ((lk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYDSAKey) && !param)) {
|
| - *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */
|
| - rv = SECFailure;
|
| - goto loser;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, &pki->algorithm, algorithm,
|
| - (SECItem*)param);
|
| - if(rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| - *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */
|
| - rv = SECFailure;
|
| - goto loser;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(arena, &pki->version,
|
| - NSSLOWKEY_PRIVATE_KEY_INFO_VERSION);
|
| - if(!dummy) {
|
| - *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */
|
| - rv = SECFailure;
|
| - goto loser;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - encodedKey = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, pki,
|
| - nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate);
|
| - *crvp = encodedKey ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
|
| -
|
| -#ifdef EC_DEBUG
|
| - fordebug = encodedKey;
|
| - SEC_PRINT("sftk_PackagePrivateKey()", "PrivateKeyInfo", lk->keyType,
|
| - fordebug);
|
| -#endif
|
| -loser:
|
| - if(arena) {
|
| - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if(lk && (lk != key->objectInfo)) {
|
| - nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lk);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if(param) {
|
| - SECITEM_ZfreeItem((SECItem*)param, PR_TRUE);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if(rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return encodedKey;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* it doesn't matter yet, since we colapse error conditions in the
|
| - * level above, but we really should map those few key error differences */
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -sftk_mapWrap(CK_RV crv)
|
| -{
|
| - switch (crv) {
|
| - case CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID: crv = CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID; break;
|
| - }
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_WrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey,
|
| - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey,
|
| - CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKAttribute *attribute;
|
| - SFTKObject *key;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
|
| - if (session == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session);
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - if (key == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - switch(key->objclass) {
|
| - case CKO_SECRET_KEY:
|
| - {
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL;
|
| - SECItem pText;
|
| -
|
| - attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
|
| -
|
| - if (attribute == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey,
|
| - CKA_WRAP, CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - pText.type = siBuffer;
|
| - pText.data = (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
|
| - pText.len = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
|
| -
|
| - /* Find out if this is a block cipher. */
|
| - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK || !context)
|
| - break;
|
| - if (context->blockSize > 1) {
|
| - unsigned int remainder = pText.len % context->blockSize;
|
| - if (!context->doPad && remainder) {
|
| - /* When wrapping secret keys with unpadded block ciphers,
|
| - ** the keys are zero padded, if necessary, to fill out
|
| - ** a full block.
|
| - */
|
| - pText.len += context->blockSize - remainder;
|
| - pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len);
|
| - if (pText.data)
|
| - memcpy(pText.data, attribute->attrib.pValue,
|
| - attribute->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| - else {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, (CK_BYTE_PTR)pText.data,
|
| - pText.len, pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen);
|
| - /* always force a finalize, both on errors and when
|
| - * we are just getting the size */
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) {
|
| - CK_RV lcrv ;
|
| - lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,
|
| - SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL);
|
| - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL);
|
| - if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context) {
|
| - sftk_FreeContext(context);
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (pText.data != (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue)
|
| - PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len);
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY:
|
| - {
|
| - SECItem *bpki = sftk_PackagePrivateKey(key, &crv);
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL;
|
| -
|
| - if(!bpki) {
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey,
|
| - CKA_WRAP, CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE);
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, bpki->data, bpki->len,
|
| - pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen);
|
| - /* always force a finalize */
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) {
|
| - CK_RV lcrv ;
|
| - lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,
|
| - SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL);
|
| - sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL);
|
| - if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context) {
|
| - sftk_FreeContext(context);
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - default:
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| -
|
| - return sftk_mapWrap(crv);
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * import a pprivate key info into the desired slot
|
| - */
|
| -static SECStatus
|
| -sftk_unwrapPrivateKey(SFTKObject *key, SECItem *bpki)
|
| -{
|
| - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
|
| - CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RSA;
|
| - SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
|
| - const SEC_ASN1Template *keyTemplate, *paramTemplate;
|
| - void *paramDest = NULL;
|
| - PLArenaPool *arena;
|
| - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lpk = NULL;
|
| - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL;
|
| - CK_RV crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| -
|
| - arena = PORT_NewArena(2048);
|
| - if(!arena) {
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
|
| - sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo));
|
| - if(!pki) {
|
| - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if(SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(arena, pki, nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate, bpki)
|
| - != SECSuccess) {
|
| - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - lpk = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
|
| - sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey));
|
| - if(lpk == NULL) {
|
| - goto loser;
|
| - }
|
| - lpk->arena = arena;
|
| -
|
| - switch(SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&pki->algorithm)) {
|
| - case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
|
| - keyTemplate = nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate;
|
| - paramTemplate = NULL;
|
| - paramDest = NULL;
|
| - lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYRSAKey;
|
| - prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk);
|
| - break;
|
| - case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE:
|
| - keyTemplate = nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate;
|
| - paramTemplate = nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate;
|
| - paramDest = &(lpk->u.dsa.params);
|
| - lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYDSAKey;
|
| - prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lpk);
|
| - prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lpk->u.dsa.params);
|
| - break;
|
| - /* case NSSLOWKEYDHKey: */
|
| -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
| - case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY:
|
| - keyTemplate = nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate;
|
| - paramTemplate = NULL;
|
| - paramDest = &(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding);
|
| - lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYECKey;
|
| - prepare_low_ec_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk);
|
| - prepare_low_ecparams_for_asn1(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams);
|
| - break;
|
| -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
|
| - default:
|
| - keyTemplate = NULL;
|
| - paramTemplate = NULL;
|
| - paramDest = NULL;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if(!keyTemplate) {
|
| - goto loser;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* decode the private key and any algorithm parameters */
|
| - rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, lpk, keyTemplate, &pki->privateKey);
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
| - if (lpk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYECKey) {
|
| - /* convert length in bits to length in bytes */
|
| - lpk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3;
|
| - rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena,
|
| - &(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding),
|
| - &(pki->algorithm.parameters));
|
| - if(rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| - goto loser;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
|
| -
|
| - if(rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| - goto loser;
|
| - }
|
| - if(paramDest && paramTemplate) {
|
| - rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, paramDest, paramTemplate,
|
| - &(pki->algorithm.parameters));
|
| - if(rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| - goto loser;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - rv = SECFailure;
|
| -
|
| - switch (lpk->keyType) {
|
| - case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey:
|
| - keyType = CKK_RSA;
|
| - if(sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) {
|
| - sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
|
| - sizeof(keyType));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_UNWRAP, &cktrue,
|
| - sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DECRYPT, &cktrue,
|
| - sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
|
| - sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
|
| - sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_MODULUS,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.modulus));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.publicExponent));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.privateExponent));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_1,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime1));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_2,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime2));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_1,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent1));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_2,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent2));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_COEFFICIENT,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.coefficient));
|
| - break;
|
| - case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey:
|
| - keyType = CKK_DSA;
|
| - crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) ? CKR_OK :
|
| - CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
|
| - sizeof(keyType));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
|
| - sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
|
| - sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.prime));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SUBPRIME,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.subPrime));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_BASE,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.base));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.privateValue));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - break;
|
| -#ifdef notdef
|
| - case NSSLOWKEYDHKey:
|
| - template = dhTemplate;
|
| - templateCount = sizeof(dhTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE);
|
| - keyType = CKK_DH;
|
| - break;
|
| -#endif
|
| - /* what about fortezza??? */
|
| -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
| - case NSSLOWKEYECKey:
|
| - keyType = CKK_EC;
|
| - crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) ? CKR_OK :
|
| - CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
|
| - sizeof(keyType));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
|
| - sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
|
| - sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue,
|
| - sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE,
|
| - sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.privateValue));
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - /* XXX Do we need to decode the EC Params here ?? */
|
| - break;
|
| -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
|
| - default:
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -loser:
|
| - if(lpk) {
|
| - nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lpk);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if(crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - return SECFailure;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return SECSuccess;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new key object. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_UnwrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen,
|
| - CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount,
|
| - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKObject *key = NULL;
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - CK_ULONG key_length = 0;
|
| - unsigned char * buf = NULL;
|
| - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
|
| - int i;
|
| - CK_ULONG bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen;
|
| - SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
|
| - SECItem bpki;
|
| - CK_OBJECT_CLASS target_type = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - if (!slot) {
|
| - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| - /*
|
| - * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
|
| - */
|
| - key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
|
| - if (key == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * load the template values into the object
|
| - */
|
| - for (i=0; i < (int) ulAttributeCount; i++) {
|
| - if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
|
| - key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
|
| - continue;
|
| - }
|
| - if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_CLASS) {
|
| - target_type = *(CK_OBJECT_CLASS *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - }
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession,pMechanism,hUnwrappingKey,CKA_UNWRAP,
|
| - CKA_UNWRAP, SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - return sftk_mapWrap(crv);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* allocate the buffer to decrypt into
|
| - * this assumes the unwrapped key is never larger than the
|
| - * wrapped key. For all the mechanisms we support this is true */
|
| - buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc( ulWrappedKeyLen);
|
| - bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen;
|
| -
|
| - crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession, pWrappedKey, ulWrappedKeyLen, buf, &bsize);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - PORT_Free(buf);
|
| - return sftk_mapWrap(crv);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - switch(target_type) {
|
| - case CKO_SECRET_KEY:
|
| - if (!sftk_hasAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (key_length == 0 || key_length > bsize) {
|
| - key_length = bsize;
|
| - }
|
| - if (key_length > MAX_KEY_LEN) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* add the value */
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE,buf,key_length);
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY:
|
| - bpki.data = (unsigned char *)buf;
|
| - bpki.len = bsize;
|
| - crv = CKR_OK;
|
| - if(sftk_unwrapPrivateKey(key, &bpki) != SECSuccess) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
|
| - }
|
| - break;
|
| - default:
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - PORT_ZFree(buf, bsize);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
|
| -
|
| - /* get the session */
|
| - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
|
| - if (session == NULL) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * handle the base object stuff
|
| - */
|
| - crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session);
|
| - *phKey = key->handle;
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| -
|
| - return crv;
|
| -
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * The SSL key gen mechanism create's lots of keys. This function handles the
|
| - * details of each of these key creation.
|
| - */
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -sftk_buildSSLKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, SFTKObject *baseKey,
|
| - PRBool isMacKey, unsigned char *keyBlock, unsigned int keySize,
|
| - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *keyHandle)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKObject *key;
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
|
| - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
|
| - CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
|
| - CK_RV crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
|
| - */
|
| - *keyHandle = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
|
| - key = sftk_NewObject(baseKey->slot);
|
| - if (key == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key)->wasDerived = PR_TRUE;
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_CopyObject(key,baseKey);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
|
| - if (isMacKey) {
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&keyType,sizeof(keyType));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DERIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_ENCRYPT,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DECRYPT,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_SIGN,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VERIFY,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_WRAP,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_UNWRAP,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,keyBlock,keySize);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
|
| -
|
| - /* get the session */
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
|
| - if (session == NULL) { goto loser; }
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session);
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - *keyHandle = key->handle;
|
| -loser:
|
| - if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * if there is an error, we need to free the keys we already created in SSL
|
| - * This is the routine that will do it..
|
| - */
|
| -static void
|
| -sftk_freeSSLKeys(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
|
| - CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT *returnedMaterial )
|
| -{
|
| - if (returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
|
| - NSC_DestroyObject(session,returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret);
|
| - }
|
| - if (returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
|
| - NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret);
|
| - }
|
| - if (returnedMaterial->hClientKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
|
| - NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hClientKey);
|
| - }
|
| - if (returnedMaterial->hServerKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
|
| - NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerKey);
|
| - }
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * when deriving from sensitive and extractable keys, we need to preserve some
|
| - * of the semantics in the derived key. This helper routine maintains these
|
| - * semantics.
|
| - */
|
| -static CK_RV
|
| -sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(SFTKObject *baseKey,SFTKObject *destKey)
|
| -{
|
| - PRBool hasSensitive;
|
| - PRBool sensitive = PR_FALSE;
|
| - PRBool hasExtractable;
|
| - PRBool extractable = PR_TRUE;
|
| - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
|
| - SFTKAttribute *att;
|
| -
|
| - hasSensitive = PR_FALSE;
|
| - att = sftk_FindAttribute(destKey,CKA_SENSITIVE);
|
| - if (att) {
|
| - hasSensitive = PR_TRUE;
|
| - sensitive = (PRBool) *(CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue;
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - hasExtractable = PR_FALSE;
|
| - att = sftk_FindAttribute(destKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE);
|
| - if (att) {
|
| - hasExtractable = PR_TRUE;
|
| - extractable = (PRBool) *(CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue;
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -
|
| - /* don't make a key more accessible */
|
| - if (sftk_isTrue(baseKey,CKA_SENSITIVE) && hasSensitive &&
|
| - (sensitive == PR_FALSE)) {
|
| - return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
|
| - }
|
| - if (!sftk_isTrue(baseKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE) && hasExtractable &&
|
| - (extractable == PR_TRUE)) {
|
| - return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* inherit parent's sensitivity */
|
| - if (!hasSensitive) {
|
| - att = sftk_FindAttribute(baseKey,CKA_SENSITIVE);
|
| - if (att == NULL) return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey,sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib));
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| - }
|
| - if (!hasExtractable) {
|
| - att = sftk_FindAttribute(baseKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE);
|
| - if (att == NULL) return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey,sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib));
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* we should inherit the parent's always extractable/ never sensitive info,
|
| - * but handleObject always forces this attributes, so we would need to do
|
| - * something special. */
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * make known fixed PKCS #11 key types to their sizes in bytes
|
| - */
|
| -unsigned long
|
| -sftk_MapKeySize(CK_KEY_TYPE keyType)
|
| -{
|
| - switch (keyType) {
|
| - case CKK_CDMF:
|
| - return 8;
|
| - case CKK_DES:
|
| - return 8;
|
| - case CKK_DES2:
|
| - return 16;
|
| - case CKK_DES3:
|
| - return 24;
|
| - /* IDEA and CAST need to be added */
|
| - default:
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - return 0;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
| -/* Inputs:
|
| - * key_len: Length of derived key to be generated.
|
| - * SharedSecret: a shared secret that is the output of a key agreement primitive.
|
| - * SharedInfo: (Optional) some data shared by the entities computing the secret key.
|
| - * SharedInfoLen: the length in octets of SharedInfo
|
| - * Hash: The hash function to be used in the KDF
|
| - * HashLen: the length in octets of the output of Hash
|
| - * Output:
|
| - * key: Pointer to a buffer containing derived key, if return value is SECSuccess.
|
| - */
|
| -static CK_RV sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(CK_BYTE **key, CK_ULONG key_len, SECItem *SharedSecret,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR SharedInfo, CK_ULONG SharedInfoLen,
|
| - SECStatus Hash(unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, PRUint32),
|
| - CK_ULONG HashLen)
|
| -{
|
| - unsigned char *buffer = NULL, *output_buffer = NULL;
|
| - PRUint32 buffer_len, max_counter, i;
|
| - SECStatus rv;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| -
|
| - /* Check that key_len isn't too long. The maximum key length could be
|
| - * greatly increased if the code below did not limit the 4-byte counter
|
| - * to a maximum value of 255. */
|
| - if (key_len > 254 * HashLen)
|
| - return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
| -
|
| - if (SharedInfo == NULL)
|
| - SharedInfoLen = 0;
|
| -
|
| - buffer_len = SharedSecret->len + 4 + SharedInfoLen;
|
| - buffer = (CK_BYTE *)PORT_Alloc(buffer_len);
|
| - if (buffer == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - goto loser;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - max_counter = key_len/HashLen;
|
| - if (key_len > max_counter * HashLen)
|
| - max_counter++;
|
| -
|
| - output_buffer = (CK_BYTE *)PORT_Alloc(max_counter * HashLen);
|
| - if (output_buffer == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - goto loser;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Populate buffer with SharedSecret || Counter || [SharedInfo]
|
| - * where Counter is 0x00000001 */
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(buffer, SharedSecret->data, SharedSecret->len);
|
| - buffer[SharedSecret->len] = 0;
|
| - buffer[SharedSecret->len + 1] = 0;
|
| - buffer[SharedSecret->len + 2] = 0;
|
| - buffer[SharedSecret->len + 3] = 1;
|
| - if (SharedInfo) {
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(&buffer[SharedSecret->len + 4], SharedInfo, SharedInfoLen);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - for(i=0; i < max_counter; i++) {
|
| - rv = Hash(&output_buffer[i * HashLen], buffer, buffer_len);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| - /* 'Hash' should not fail. */
|
| - crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
| - goto loser;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Increment counter (assumes max_counter < 255) */
|
| - buffer[SharedSecret->len + 3]++;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - PORT_ZFree(buffer, buffer_len);
|
| - if (key_len < max_counter * HashLen) {
|
| - PORT_Memset(output_buffer + key_len, 0, max_counter * HashLen - key_len);
|
| - }
|
| - *key = output_buffer;
|
| -
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -
|
| - loser:
|
| - if (buffer) {
|
| - PORT_ZFree(buffer, buffer_len);
|
| - }
|
| - if (output_buffer) {
|
| - PORT_ZFree(output_buffer, max_counter * HashLen);
|
| - }
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -static CK_RV sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(CK_BYTE **key, CK_ULONG key_len,
|
| - SECItem *SharedSecret,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR SharedInfo, CK_ULONG SharedInfoLen,
|
| - CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf)
|
| -{
|
| - if (kdf == CKD_SHA1_KDF)
|
| - return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
|
| - SharedInfoLen, SHA1_HashBuf, SHA1_LENGTH);
|
| - else if (kdf == CKD_SHA224_KDF)
|
| - return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
|
| - SharedInfoLen, SHA224_HashBuf, SHA224_LENGTH);
|
| - else if (kdf == CKD_SHA256_KDF)
|
| - return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
|
| - SharedInfoLen, SHA256_HashBuf, SHA256_LENGTH);
|
| - else if (kdf == CKD_SHA384_KDF)
|
| - return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
|
| - SharedInfoLen, SHA384_HashBuf, SHA384_LENGTH);
|
| - else if (kdf == CKD_SHA512_KDF)
|
| - return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
|
| - SharedInfoLen, SHA512_HashBuf, SHA512_LENGTH);
|
| - else
|
| - return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
|
| -}
|
| -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
|
| -
|
| -/*
|
| - * SSL Key generation given pre master secret
|
| - */
|
| -#define NUM_MIXERS 9
|
| -static const char * const mixers[NUM_MIXERS] = {
|
| - "A",
|
| - "BB",
|
| - "CCC",
|
| - "DDDD",
|
| - "EEEEE",
|
| - "FFFFFF",
|
| - "GGGGGGG",
|
| - "HHHHHHHH",
|
| - "IIIIIIIII" };
|
| -#define SSL3_PMS_LENGTH 48
|
| -#define SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH 48
|
| -#define SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH 32
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key object. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_DeriveKey( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey,
|
| - CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount,
|
| - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession * session;
|
| - SFTKSlot * slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
|
| - SFTKObject * key;
|
| - SFTKObject * sourceKey;
|
| - SFTKAttribute * att = NULL;
|
| - SFTKAttribute * att2 = NULL;
|
| - unsigned char * buf;
|
| - SHA1Context * sha;
|
| - MD5Context * md5;
|
| - MD2Context * md2;
|
| - CK_ULONG macSize;
|
| - CK_ULONG tmpKeySize;
|
| - CK_ULONG IVSize;
|
| - CK_ULONG keySize = 0;
|
| - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
|
| - CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
|
| - CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
|
| - CK_OBJECT_CLASS classType = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
|
| - CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *stringPtr;
|
| - CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = pMechanism->mechanism;
|
| - PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE;
|
| - PRBool isDH = PR_FALSE;
|
| - HASH_HashType tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgNULL;
|
| - SECStatus rv;
|
| - int i;
|
| - unsigned int outLen;
|
| - unsigned char sha_out[SHA1_LENGTH];
|
| - unsigned char key_block[NUM_MIXERS * MD5_LENGTH];
|
| - unsigned char key_block2[MD5_LENGTH];
|
| - PRBool isFIPS;
|
| - HASH_HashType hashType;
|
| - PRBool extractValue = PR_TRUE;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - if (!slot) {
|
| - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| - /*
|
| - * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
|
| - */
|
| - if (phKey) *phKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
|
| -
|
| - key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
|
| - if (key == NULL) {
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - }
|
| - isFIPS = (slot->slotID == FIPS_SLOT_ID);
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * load the template values into the object
|
| - */
|
| - for (i=0; i < (int) ulAttributeCount; i++) {
|
| - crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| -
|
| - if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) {
|
| - keyType = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
|
| - }
|
| - if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
|
| - keySize = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
|
| -
|
| - if (keySize == 0) {
|
| - keySize = sftk_MapKeySize(keyType);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - switch (mechanism) {
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA1: /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256: /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA384: /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA512:
|
| - extractValue = PR_FALSE;
|
| - classType = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA1: /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256: /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384: /* fall through */
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512:
|
| - extractValue = PR_FALSE;
|
| - /* fall through */
|
| - default:
|
| - classType = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_CLASS,&classType,sizeof(classType));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* look up the base key we're deriving with */
|
| - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
|
| - if (session == NULL) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - sourceKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hBaseKey,session);
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - if (sourceKey == NULL) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (extractValue) {
|
| - /* get the value of the base key */
|
| - att = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_VALUE);
|
| - if (att == NULL) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey);
|
| - return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - switch (mechanism) {
|
| - /*
|
| - * generate the master secret
|
| - */
|
| - case CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
|
| - case CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
|
| - case CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256:
|
| - case CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256:
|
| - case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
|
| - case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
|
| - case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
|
| - case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
|
| - {
|
| - CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *ssl3_master;
|
| - SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret * rsa_pms;
|
| - unsigned char crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
|
| -
|
| - if ((mechanism == CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE) ||
|
| - (mechanism == CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH)) {
|
| - CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *tls12_master =
|
| - (CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - tlsPrfHash = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_master->prfHashMechanism);
|
| - if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - } else if ((mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256) ||
|
| - (mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256)) {
|
| - tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgSHA256;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if ((mechanism != CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE) &&
|
| - (mechanism != CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH)) {
|
| - isTLS = PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| - if ((mechanism == CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH) ||
|
| - (mechanism == CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH) ||
|
| - (mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256) ||
|
| - (mechanism == CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH)) {
|
| - isDH = PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* first do the consistency checks */
|
| - if (!isDH && (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_PMS_LENGTH)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
|
| - if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue !=
|
| - CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) {
|
| - if (att2) sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
|
| - if (keyType != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - if ((keySize != 0) && (keySize != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* finally do the key gen */
|
| - ssl3_master = (CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *)
|
| - pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata,
|
| - ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
|
| - ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
|
| -
|
| - if (ssl3_master->pVersion) {
|
| - SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key);
|
| - rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *) att->attrib.pValue;
|
| - /* don't leak more key material then necessary for SSL to work */
|
| - if ((sessKey == NULL) || sessKey->wasDerived) {
|
| - ssl3_master->pVersion->major = 0xff;
|
| - ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = 0xff;
|
| - } else {
|
| - ssl3_master->pVersion->major = rsa_pms->client_version[0];
|
| - ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = rsa_pms->client_version[1];
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) {
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) {
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (isTLS) {
|
| - SECStatus status;
|
| - SECItem crsr = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
|
| - SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
|
| - SECItem pms = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
|
| -
|
| - crsr.data = crsrdata;
|
| - crsr.len = sizeof crsrdata;
|
| - master.data = key_block;
|
| - master.len = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH;
|
| - pms.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue;
|
| - pms.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
|
| -
|
| - if (tlsPrfHash != HASH_AlgNULL) {
|
| - status = TLS_P_hash(tlsPrfHash, &pms, "master secret",
|
| - &crsr, &master, isFIPS);
|
| - } else {
|
| - status = TLS_PRF(&pms, "master secret", &crsr, &master, isFIPS);
|
| - }
|
| - if (status != SECSuccess) {
|
| - crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - } else {
|
| - /* now allocate the hash contexts */
|
| - md5 = MD5_NewContext();
|
| - if (md5 == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - sha = SHA1_NewContext();
|
| - if (sha == NULL) {
|
| - PORT_Free(md5);
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
|
| - SHA1_Begin(sha);
|
| - SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char*) mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i]));
|
| - SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - att->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| - SHA1_Update(sha, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata);
|
| - SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH);
|
| - PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH);
|
| -
|
| - MD5_Begin(md5);
|
| - MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - att->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| - MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen);
|
| - MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i*MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
|
| - PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH);
|
| - }
|
| - PORT_Free(md5);
|
| - PORT_Free(sha);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* store the results */
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute
|
| - (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&keyType,sizeof(keyType));
|
| - if (isTLS) {
|
| - /* TLS's master secret is used to "sign" finished msgs with PRF. */
|
| - /* XXX This seems like a hack. But SFTK_Derive only accepts
|
| - * one "operation" argument. */
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VERIFY,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - /* While we're here, we might as well force this, too. */
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DERIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - }
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Extended master key derivation [draft-ietf-tls-session-hash] */
|
| - case CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
|
| - case CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
|
| - {
|
| - CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *ems_params;
|
| - SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *rsa_pms;
|
| - SECStatus status;
|
| - SECItem pms = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
|
| - SECItem seed = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
|
| - SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
|
| -
|
| - ems_params = (CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS*)
|
| - pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| -
|
| - /* First do the consistency checks */
|
| - if ((mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE) &&
|
| - (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_PMS_LENGTH)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
|
| - if ((att2 == NULL) ||
|
| - (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) {
|
| - if (att2) sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
|
| - if (keyType != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - if ((keySize != 0) && (keySize != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Do the key derivation */
|
| - pms.data = (unsigned char*) att->attrib.pValue;
|
| - pms.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
|
| - seed.data = ems_params->pSessionHash;
|
| - seed.len = ems_params->ulSessionHashLen;
|
| - master.data = key_block;
|
| - master.len = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH;
|
| - if (ems_params-> prfHashMechanism == CKM_TLS_PRF) {
|
| - /*
|
| - * In this case, the session hash is the concatenation of SHA-1
|
| - * and MD5, so it should be 36 bytes long.
|
| - */
|
| - if (seed.len != MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - status = TLS_PRF(&pms, "extended master secret",
|
| - &seed, &master, isFIPS);
|
| - } else {
|
| - const SECHashObject *hashObj;
|
| -
|
| - tlsPrfHash = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(ems_params->prfHashMechanism);
|
| - if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(tlsPrfHash);
|
| - if (seed.len != hashObj->length) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - status = TLS_P_hash(tlsPrfHash, &pms, "extended master secret",
|
| - &seed, &master, isFIPS);
|
| - }
|
| - if (status != SECSuccess) {
|
| - crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Reflect the version if required */
|
| - if (ems_params->pVersion) {
|
| - SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key);
|
| - rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *) att->attrib.pValue;
|
| - /* don't leak more key material than necessary for SSL to work */
|
| - if ((sessKey == NULL) || sessKey->wasDerived) {
|
| - ems_params->pVersion->major = 0xff;
|
| - ems_params->pVersion->minor = 0xff;
|
| - } else {
|
| - ems_params->pVersion->major = rsa_pms->client_version[0];
|
| - ems_params->pVersion->minor = rsa_pms->client_version[1];
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Store the results */
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, key_block,
|
| - SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
|
| - case CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256:
|
| - case CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
|
| - case CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
|
| - {
|
| - CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *ssl3_keys;
|
| - CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT * ssl3_keys_out;
|
| - CK_ULONG effKeySize;
|
| - unsigned int block_needed;
|
| - unsigned char srcrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
|
| - unsigned char crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
|
| -
|
| - if (mechanism == CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE) {
|
| - CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *tls12_keys =
|
| - (CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - tlsPrfHash = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_keys->prfHashMechanism);
|
| - if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - } else if (mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256) {
|
| - tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgSHA256;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (mechanism != CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE) {
|
| - isTLS = PR_TRUE;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| -
|
| - if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
|
| - if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue !=
|
| - CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) {
|
| - if (att2) sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
|
| - md5 = MD5_NewContext();
|
| - if (md5 == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - sha = SHA1_NewContext();
|
| - if (sha == NULL) {
|
| - PORT_Free(md5);
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - ssl3_keys = (CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata,
|
| - ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
|
| - ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata,
|
| - ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
|
| - ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * clear out our returned keys so we can recover on failure
|
| - */
|
| - ssl3_keys_out = ssl3_keys->pReturnedKeyMaterial;
|
| - ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
|
| - ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
|
| - ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
|
| - ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * How much key material do we need?
|
| - */
|
| - macSize = ssl3_keys->ulMacSizeInBits/8;
|
| - effKeySize = ssl3_keys->ulKeySizeInBits/8;
|
| - IVSize = ssl3_keys->ulIVSizeInBits/8;
|
| - if (keySize == 0) {
|
| - effKeySize = keySize;
|
| - }
|
| - block_needed = 2 * (macSize + effKeySize +
|
| - ((!ssl3_keys->bIsExport) * IVSize));
|
| - PORT_Assert(block_needed <= sizeof key_block);
|
| - if (block_needed > sizeof key_block)
|
| - block_needed = sizeof key_block;
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * generate the key material: This looks amazingly similar to the
|
| - * PMS code, and is clearly crying out for a function to provide it.
|
| - */
|
| - if (isTLS) {
|
| - SECStatus status;
|
| - SECItem srcr = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
|
| - SECItem keyblk = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
|
| - SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
|
| -
|
| - srcr.data = srcrdata;
|
| - srcr.len = sizeof srcrdata;
|
| - keyblk.data = key_block;
|
| - keyblk.len = block_needed;
|
| - master.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue;
|
| - master.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
|
| -
|
| - if (tlsPrfHash != HASH_AlgNULL) {
|
| - status = TLS_P_hash(tlsPrfHash, &master, "key expansion",
|
| - &srcr, &keyblk, isFIPS);
|
| - } else {
|
| - status = TLS_PRF(&master, "key expansion", &srcr, &keyblk,
|
| - isFIPS);
|
| - }
|
| - if (status != SECSuccess) {
|
| - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
|
| - }
|
| - } else {
|
| - unsigned int block_bytes = 0;
|
| - /* key_block =
|
| - * MD5(master_secret + SHA('A' + master_secret +
|
| - * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
|
| - * MD5(master_secret + SHA('BB' + master_secret +
|
| - * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
|
| - * MD5(master_secret + SHA('CCC' + master_secret +
|
| - * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
|
| - * [...];
|
| - */
|
| - for (i = 0; i < NUM_MIXERS && block_bytes < block_needed; i++) {
|
| - SHA1_Begin(sha);
|
| - SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char*) mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i]));
|
| - SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - att->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| - SHA1_Update(sha, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata);
|
| - SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH);
|
| - PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH);
|
| - MD5_Begin(md5);
|
| - MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - att->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| - MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen);
|
| - MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i*MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
|
| - PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH);
|
| - block_bytes += outLen;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * Put the key material where it goes.
|
| - */
|
| - i = 0; /* now shows how much consumed */
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * The key_block is partitioned as follows:
|
| - * client_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size]
|
| - */
|
| - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_TRUE,&key_block[i],macSize,
|
| - &ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK)
|
| - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
|
| -
|
| - i += macSize;
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * server_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size]
|
| - */
|
| - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_TRUE,&key_block[i],macSize,
|
| - &ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
|
| - }
|
| - i += macSize;
|
| -
|
| - if (keySize) {
|
| - if (!ssl3_keys->bIsExport) {
|
| - /*
|
| - ** Generate Domestic write keys and IVs.
|
| - ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
|
| - */
|
| - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,&key_block[i],
|
| - keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
|
| - }
|
| - i += keySize;
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
|
| - */
|
| - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,&key_block[i],
|
| - keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
|
| - }
|
| - i += keySize;
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - ** client_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size]
|
| - */
|
| - if (IVSize > 0) {
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient,
|
| - &key_block[i], IVSize);
|
| - i += IVSize;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - ** server_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size]
|
| - */
|
| - if (IVSize > 0) {
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer,
|
| - &key_block[i], IVSize);
|
| - i += IVSize;
|
| - }
|
| - PORT_Assert(i <= sizeof key_block);
|
| -
|
| - } else if (!isTLS) {
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - ** Generate SSL3 Export write keys and IVs.
|
| - ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
|
| - ** final_client_write_key = MD5(client_write_key +
|
| - ** ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random);
|
| - */
|
| - MD5_Begin(md5);
|
| - MD5_Update(md5, &key_block[i], effKeySize);
|
| - MD5_Update(md5, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata);
|
| - MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
|
| - i += effKeySize;
|
| - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,key_block2,
|
| - keySize,&ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
|
| - ** final_server_write_key = MD5(server_write_key +
|
| - ** ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random);
|
| - */
|
| - MD5_Begin(md5);
|
| - MD5_Update(md5, &key_block[i], effKeySize);
|
| - MD5_Update(md5, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata);
|
| - MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
|
| - i += effKeySize;
|
| - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,key_block2,
|
| - keySize,&ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - ** client_write_IV =
|
| - ** MD5(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random);
|
| - */
|
| - MD5_Begin(md5);
|
| - MD5_Update(md5, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata);
|
| - MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, key_block2, IVSize);
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - ** server_write_IV =
|
| - ** MD5(ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random);
|
| - */
|
| - MD5_Begin(md5);
|
| - MD5_Update(md5, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata);
|
| - MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, key_block2, IVSize);
|
| -
|
| - } else {
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - ** Generate TLS 1.0 Export write keys and IVs.
|
| - */
|
| - SECStatus status;
|
| - SECItem secret = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
|
| - SECItem crsr = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
|
| - SECItem keyblk = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
|
| - ** final_client_write_key = PRF(client_write_key,
|
| - ** "client write key",
|
| - ** client_random + server_random);
|
| - */
|
| - secret.data = &key_block[i];
|
| - secret.len = effKeySize;
|
| - i += effKeySize;
|
| - crsr.data = crsrdata;
|
| - crsr.len = sizeof crsrdata;
|
| - keyblk.data = key_block2;
|
| - keyblk.len = sizeof key_block2;
|
| - status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "client write key", &crsr, &keyblk,
|
| - isFIPS);
|
| - if (status != SECSuccess) {
|
| - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, key_block2,
|
| - keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
|
| - ** final_server_write_key = PRF(server_write_key,
|
| - ** "server write key",
|
| - ** client_random + server_random);
|
| - */
|
| - secret.data = &key_block[i];
|
| - secret.len = effKeySize;
|
| - i += effKeySize;
|
| - keyblk.data = key_block2;
|
| - keyblk.len = sizeof key_block2;
|
| - status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "server write key", &crsr, &keyblk,
|
| - isFIPS);
|
| - if (status != SECSuccess) {
|
| - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, key_block2,
|
| - keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - ** iv_block = PRF("", "IV block",
|
| - ** client_random + server_random);
|
| - ** client_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size]
|
| - ** server_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size]
|
| - */
|
| - if (IVSize) {
|
| - secret.data = NULL;
|
| - secret.len = 0;
|
| - keyblk.data = &key_block[i];
|
| - keyblk.len = 2 * IVSize;
|
| - status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "IV block", &crsr, &keyblk,
|
| - isFIPS);
|
| - if (status != SECSuccess) {
|
| - goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
|
| - }
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, keyblk.data, IVSize);
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, keyblk.data + IVSize,
|
| - IVSize);
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - crv = CKR_OK;
|
| -
|
| - if (0) {
|
| -key_and_mac_derive_fail:
|
| - if (crv == CKR_OK)
|
| - crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
| - sftk_freeSSLKeys(hSession, ssl3_keys_out);
|
| - }
|
| - MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE);
|
| - SHA1_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE);
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - key = NULL;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY:
|
| - {
|
| - SFTKObject *newKey;
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| -
|
| - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
|
| - if (session == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - newKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(*(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *)
|
| - pMechanism->pParameter,session);
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - if ( newKey == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (sftk_isTrue(newKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(newKey,CKA_SENSITIVE,&cktrue,
|
| - sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(newKey,CKA_VALUE);
|
| - if (att2 == NULL) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
|
| - crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+att2->attrib.ulValueLen;
|
| - if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
|
| - if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
|
| - if (buf == NULL) {
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,att->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(buf+att->attrib.ulValueLen,
|
| - att2->attrib.pValue,att2->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
|
| - PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize);
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA:
|
| - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| -
|
| - stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *) pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+stringPtr->ulLen;
|
| - if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
|
| - if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
|
| - if (buf == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,att->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(buf+att->attrib.ulValueLen,stringPtr->pData,
|
| - stringPtr->ulLen);
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
|
| - PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize);
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE:
|
| - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| -
|
| - stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+stringPtr->ulLen;
|
| - if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
|
| - if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
|
| - if (buf == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(buf,stringPtr->pData,stringPtr->ulLen);
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(buf+stringPtr->ulLen,att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - att->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
|
| - PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize);
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA:
|
| - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| -
|
| - stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - tmpKeySize = PR_MIN(att->attrib.ulValueLen,stringPtr->ulLen);
|
| - if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
|
| - if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(keySize);
|
| - if (buf == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,keySize);
|
| - for (i=0; i < (int)keySize; i++) {
|
| - buf[i] ^= stringPtr->pData[i];
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
|
| - PORT_ZFree(buf,keySize);
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY:
|
| - {
|
| - /* the following assumes 8 bits per byte */
|
| - CK_ULONG extract = *(CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - CK_ULONG shift = extract & 0x7; /* extract mod 8 the fast way */
|
| - CK_ULONG offset = extract >> 3; /* extract div 8 the fast way */
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| -
|
| - if (keySize == 0) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - /* make sure we have enough bits in the original key */
|
| - if (att->attrib.ulValueLen <
|
| - (offset + keySize + ((shift != 0)? 1 :0)) ) {
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(keySize);
|
| - if (buf == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* copy the bits we need into the new key */
|
| - for (i=0; i < (int)keySize; i++) {
|
| - unsigned char *value =
|
| - ((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue)+offset+i;
|
| - if (shift) {
|
| - buf[i] = (value[0] << (shift)) | (value[1] >> (8 - shift));
|
| - } else {
|
| - buf[i] = value[0];
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
|
| - PORT_ZFree(buf,keySize);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - case CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION:
|
| - if (keySize == 0) keySize = MD2_LENGTH;
|
| - if (keySize > MD2_LENGTH) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - /* now allocate the hash contexts */
|
| - md2 = MD2_NewContext();
|
| - if (md2 == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - MD2_Begin(md2);
|
| - MD2_Update(md2,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - att->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| - MD2_End(md2,key_block,&outLen,MD2_LENGTH);
|
| - MD2_DestroyContext(md2, PR_TRUE);
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION:
|
| - if (keySize == 0) keySize = MD5_LENGTH;
|
| - if (keySize > MD5_LENGTH) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - MD5_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - att->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
|
| - break;
|
| - case CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION:
|
| - if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA1_LENGTH;
|
| - if (keySize > SHA1_LENGTH) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - SHA1_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - att->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION:
|
| - if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA224_LENGTH;
|
| - if (keySize > SHA224_LENGTH) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - SHA224_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - att->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION:
|
| - if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA256_LENGTH;
|
| - if (keySize > SHA256_LENGTH) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - SHA256_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - att->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION:
|
| - if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA384_LENGTH;
|
| - if (keySize > SHA384_LENGTH) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - SHA384_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - att->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION:
|
| - if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA512_LENGTH;
|
| - if (keySize > SHA512_LENGTH) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - SHA512_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - att->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE:
|
| - {
|
| - SECItem derived, dhPublic;
|
| - SECItem dhPrime, dhValue;
|
| - /* sourceKey - values for the local existing low key */
|
| - /* get prime and value attributes */
|
| - crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime, sourceKey, CKA_PRIME);
|
| - if (crv != SECSuccess) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhValue, sourceKey, CKA_VALUE);
|
| - if (crv != SECSuccess) {
|
| - PORT_Free(dhPrime.data);
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - dhPublic.data = pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - dhPublic.len = pMechanism->ulParameterLen;
|
| -
|
| - /* calculate private value - oct */
|
| - rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize);
|
| -
|
| - PORT_Free(dhPrime.data);
|
| - PORT_Free(dhValue.data);
|
| -
|
| - if (rv == SECSuccess) {
|
| - sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len);
|
| - PORT_ZFree(derived.data, derived.len);
|
| - } else
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| -
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
| - case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE:
|
| - case CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE:
|
| - {
|
| - SECItem ecScalar, ecPoint;
|
| - SECItem tmp;
|
| - PRBool withCofactor = PR_FALSE;
|
| - unsigned char *secret;
|
| - unsigned char *keyData = NULL;
|
| - unsigned int secretlen, curveLen, pubKeyLen;
|
| - CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *mechParams;
|
| - NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
|
| - PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
|
| -
|
| - /* Check mechanism parameters */
|
| - mechParams = (CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - if ((pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS)) ||
|
| - ((mechParams->kdf == CKD_NULL) &&
|
| - ((mechParams->ulSharedDataLen != 0) ||
|
| - (mechParams->pSharedData != NULL)))) {
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(sourceKey, CKK_EC, &crv);
|
| - if (privKey == NULL) {
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* Now we are working with a non-NULL private key */
|
| - SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ecScalar, &privKey->u.ec.privateValue);
|
| -
|
| - ecPoint.data = mechParams->pPublicData;
|
| - ecPoint.len = mechParams->ulPublicDataLen;
|
| -
|
| - curveLen = (privKey->u.ec.ecParams.fieldID.size +7)/8;
|
| - pubKeyLen = (2*curveLen) + 1;
|
| -
|
| - /* if the len is too small, can't be a valid point */
|
| - if (ecPoint.len < pubKeyLen) {
|
| - goto ec_loser;
|
| - }
|
| - /* if the len is too large, must be an encoded point (length is
|
| - * equal case just falls through */
|
| - if (ecPoint.len > pubKeyLen) {
|
| - SECItem newPoint;
|
| -
|
| - arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
|
| - if (arena == NULL) {
|
| - goto ec_loser;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &newPoint,
|
| - SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate),
|
| - &ecPoint);
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| - goto ec_loser;
|
| - }
|
| - ecPoint = newPoint;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (mechanism == CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE) {
|
| - withCofactor = PR_TRUE;
|
| - } else {
|
| - /* When not using cofactor derivation, one should
|
| - * validate the public key to avoid small subgroup
|
| - * attacks.
|
| - */
|
| - if (EC_ValidatePublicKey(&privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecPoint)
|
| - != SECSuccess) {
|
| - goto ec_loser;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - rv = ECDH_Derive(&ecPoint, &privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecScalar,
|
| - withCofactor, &tmp);
|
| - PORT_Free(ecScalar.data);
|
| - ecScalar.data = NULL;
|
| - if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo) {
|
| - nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
|
| - privKey=NULL;
|
| - }
|
| - if (arena) {
|
| - PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_FALSE);
|
| - arena=NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (rv != SECSuccess) {
|
| - crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * apply the kdf function.
|
| - */
|
| - if (mechParams->kdf == CKD_NULL) {
|
| - /*
|
| - * tmp is the raw data created by ECDH_Derive,
|
| - * secret and secretlen are the values we will
|
| - * eventually pass as our generated key.
|
| - */
|
| - secret = tmp.data;
|
| - secretlen = tmp.len;
|
| - } else {
|
| - secretlen = keySize;
|
| - crv = sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(&secret, keySize,
|
| - &tmp, mechParams->pSharedData,
|
| - mechParams->ulSharedDataLen, mechParams->kdf);
|
| - PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - tmp.data = secret;
|
| - tmp.len = secretlen;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * if keySize is supplied, then we are generating a key of a specific
|
| - * length. This is done by taking the least significant 'keySize'
|
| - * bytes from the unsigned value calculated by ECDH. Note: this may
|
| - * mean padding temp with extra leading zeros from what ECDH_Derive
|
| - * already returned (which itself may contain leading zeros).
|
| - */
|
| - if (keySize) {
|
| - if (secretlen < keySize) {
|
| - keyData = PORT_ZAlloc(keySize);
|
| - if (!keyData) {
|
| - PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[keySize-secretlen],secret,secretlen);
|
| - secret = keyData;
|
| - } else {
|
| - secret += (secretlen - keySize);
|
| - }
|
| - secretlen = keySize;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, secret, secretlen);
|
| - PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
|
| - if (keyData) {
|
| - PORT_ZFree(keyData, keySize);
|
| - }
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| -ec_loser:
|
| - crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
|
| - PORT_Free(ecScalar.data);
|
| - if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo)
|
| - nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
|
| - if (arena) {
|
| - PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
|
| - }
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - }
|
| -#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
|
| -
|
| - /* See RFC 5869 and CK_NSS_HKDFParams for documentation. */
|
| - case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA1: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; goto hkdf;
|
| - case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto hkdf;
|
| - case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto hkdf;
|
| - case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto hkdf;
|
| -hkdf: {
|
| - const CK_NSS_HKDFParams * params =
|
| - (const CK_NSS_HKDFParams *) pMechanism->pParameter;
|
| - const SECHashObject * rawHash;
|
| - unsigned hashLen;
|
| - CK_BYTE buf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
|
| - CK_BYTE * prk; /* psuedo-random key */
|
| - CK_ULONG prkLen;
|
| - CK_BYTE * okm; /* output keying material */
|
| -
|
| - rawHash = HASH_GetRawHashObject(hashType);
|
| - if (rawHash == NULL || rawHash->length > sizeof buf) {
|
| - crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - hashLen = rawHash->length;
|
| -
|
| - if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_HKDFParams) ||
|
| - !params || (!params->bExpand && !params->bExtract) ||
|
| - (params->bExtract && params->ulSaltLen > 0 && !params->pSalt) ||
|
| - (params->bExpand && params->ulInfoLen > 0 && !params->pInfo)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - if (keySize == 0 || keySize > sizeof key_block ||
|
| - (!params->bExpand && keySize > hashLen) ||
|
| - (params->bExpand && keySize > 255 * hashLen)) {
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK)
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - /* HKDF-Extract(salt, base key value) */
|
| - if (params->bExtract) {
|
| - CK_BYTE * salt;
|
| - CK_ULONG saltLen;
|
| - HMACContext * hmac;
|
| - unsigned int bufLen;
|
| -
|
| - salt = params->pSalt;
|
| - saltLen = params->ulSaltLen;
|
| - if (salt == NULL) {
|
| - saltLen = hashLen;
|
| - salt = buf;
|
| - memset(salt, 0, saltLen);
|
| - }
|
| - hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, salt, saltLen, isFIPS);
|
| - if (!hmac) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - HMAC_Begin(hmac);
|
| - HMAC_Update(hmac, (const unsigned char*) att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - att->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| - HMAC_Finish(hmac, buf, &bufLen, sizeof(buf));
|
| - HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
|
| - PORT_Assert(bufLen == rawHash->length);
|
| - prk = buf;
|
| - prkLen = bufLen;
|
| - } else {
|
| - /* PRK = base key value */
|
| - prk = (CK_BYTE*) att->attrib.pValue;
|
| - prkLen = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* HKDF-Expand */
|
| - if (!params->bExpand) {
|
| - okm = prk;
|
| - } else {
|
| - /* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
|
| - * T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
|
| - * key material = T(1) | ... | T(n)
|
| - */
|
| - HMACContext * hmac;
|
| - CK_BYTE i;
|
| - unsigned iterations = PR_ROUNDUP(keySize, hashLen) / hashLen;
|
| - hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, prk, prkLen, isFIPS);
|
| - if (hmac == NULL) {
|
| - crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - break;
|
| - }
|
| - for (i = 1; i <= iterations; ++i) {
|
| - unsigned len;
|
| - HMAC_Begin(hmac);
|
| - if (i > 1) {
|
| - HMAC_Update(hmac, key_block + ((i-2) * hashLen), hashLen);
|
| - }
|
| - if (params->ulInfoLen != 0) {
|
| - HMAC_Update(hmac, params->pInfo, params->ulInfoLen);
|
| - }
|
| - HMAC_Update(hmac, &i, 1);
|
| - HMAC_Finish(hmac, key_block + ((i-1) * hashLen), &len,
|
| - hashLen);
|
| - PORT_Assert(len == hashLen);
|
| - }
|
| - HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
|
| - okm = key_block;
|
| - }
|
| - /* key material = prk */
|
| - crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, okm, keySize);
|
| - break;
|
| - } /* end of CKM_NSS_HKDF_* */
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA1: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; goto jpake2;
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto jpake2;
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto jpake2;
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto jpake2;
|
| -jpake2:
|
| - if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
|
| - pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params))
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_TOKEN))
|
| - crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - if (crv == CKR_OK)
|
| - crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key);
|
| - if (crv == CKR_OK)
|
| - crv = jpake_Round2(hashType,
|
| - (CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params *) pMechanism->pParameter,
|
| - sourceKey, key);
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA1: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; goto jpakeFinal;
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto jpakeFinal;
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto jpakeFinal;
|
| - case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto jpakeFinal;
|
| -jpakeFinal:
|
| - if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
|
| - pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams))
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
|
| - /* We purposely do not do the derive sensitivity check; we want to be
|
| - able to derive non-sensitive keys while allowing the ROUND1 and
|
| - ROUND2 keys to be sensitive (which they always are, since they are
|
| - in the CKO_PRIVATE_KEY class). The caller must include CKA_SENSITIVE
|
| - in the template in order for the resultant keyblock key to be
|
| - sensitive.
|
| - */
|
| - if (crv == CKR_OK)
|
| - crv = jpake_Final(hashType,
|
| - (CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams *) pMechanism->pParameter,
|
| - sourceKey, key);
|
| - break;
|
| -
|
| - default:
|
| - crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| - if (att) {
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
|
| - }
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) {
|
| - if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - return crv;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* link the key object into the list */
|
| - if (key) {
|
| - SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key);
|
| - PORT_Assert(sessKey);
|
| - /* get the session */
|
| - sessKey->wasDerived = PR_TRUE;
|
| - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
|
| - if (session == NULL) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session);
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - *phKey = key->handle;
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - }
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_GetFunctionStatus obtains an updated status of a function running
|
| - * in parallel with an application. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_GetFunctionStatus(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
|
| -{
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_CancelFunction cancels a function running in parallel */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_CancelFunction(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
|
| -{
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_GetOperationState saves the state of the cryptographic
|
| - *operation in a session.
|
| - * NOTE: This code only works for digest functions for now. eventually need
|
| - * to add full flatten/resurect to our state stuff so that all types of state
|
| - * can be saved */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_GetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| - CK_ULONG pOSLen = *pulOperationStateLen;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure we're legal */
|
| - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| -
|
| - *pulOperationStateLen = context->cipherInfoLen + sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)
|
| - + sizeof(SFTKContextType);
|
| - if (pOperationState == NULL) {
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| - } else {
|
| - if (pOSLen < *pulOperationStateLen) {
|
| - return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,&context->type,sizeof(SFTKContextType));
|
| - pOperationState += sizeof(SFTKContextType);
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,&context->currentMech,
|
| - sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
|
| - pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE);
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,context->cipherInfo,context->cipherInfoLen);
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - return CKR_OK;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -#define sftk_Decrement(stateSize,len) \
|
| - stateSize = ((stateSize) > (CK_ULONG)(len)) ? \
|
| - ((stateSize) - (CK_ULONG)(len)) : 0;
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic
|
| - * operation in a session. This is coded like it can restore lots of
|
| - * states, but it only works for truly flat cipher structures. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_SetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen,
|
| - CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSessionContext *context;
|
| - SFTKSession *session;
|
| - SFTKContextType type;
|
| - CK_MECHANISM mech;
|
| - CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - while (ulOperationStateLen != 0) {
|
| - /* get what type of state we're dealing with... */
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(&type,pOperationState, sizeof(SFTKContextType));
|
| -
|
| - /* fix up session contexts based on type */
|
| - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
|
| - if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - context = sftk_ReturnContextByType(session, type);
|
| - sftk_SetContextByType(session, type, NULL);
|
| - if (context) {
|
| - sftk_FreeContext(context);
|
| - }
|
| - pOperationState += sizeof(SFTKContextType);
|
| - sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen,sizeof(SFTKContextType));
|
| -
|
| -
|
| - /* get the mechanism structure */
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(&mech.mechanism,pOperationState,sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
|
| - pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE);
|
| - sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen, sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
|
| - /* should be filled in... but not necessary for hash */
|
| - mech.pParameter = NULL;
|
| - mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
|
| - switch (type) {
|
| - case SFTK_HASH:
|
| - crv = NSC_DigestInit(hSession,&mech);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE,
|
| - NULL);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - PORT_Memcpy(context->cipherInfo,pOperationState,
|
| - context->cipherInfoLen);
|
| - pOperationState += context->cipherInfoLen;
|
| - sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen,context->cipherInfoLen);
|
| - break;
|
| - default:
|
| - /* do sign/encrypt/decrypt later */
|
| - crv = CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
|
| - }
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting and encryption
|
| - * operation. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
|
| - CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
|
| - CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
|
| -{
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart,
|
| - pulEncryptedPartLen);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| - crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen);
|
| -
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
|
| - * digesting operation. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen)
|
| -{
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen,
|
| - pPart, pulPartLen);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| - crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,pPart,*pulPartLen);
|
| -
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and
|
| - * encryption operation. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_SignEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
|
| - CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
|
| - CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
|
| -{
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart,
|
| - pulEncryptedPartLen);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| - crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen);
|
| -
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption
|
| - * and verify operation. */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,
|
| - CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
|
| -{
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
|
| - pData, pulDataLen);
|
| - if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
|
| - crv = NSC_VerifyUpdate(hSession, pData, *pulDataLen);
|
| -
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* NSC_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting operation,
|
| - * by digesting the value of a secret key as part of the data already digested.
|
| - */
|
| -CK_RV NSC_DigestKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
|
| -{
|
| - SFTKSession *session = NULL;
|
| - SFTKObject *key = NULL;
|
| - SFTKAttribute *att;
|
| - CK_RV crv;
|
| -
|
| - CHECK_FORK();
|
| -
|
| - session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
|
| - if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| -
|
| - key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session);
|
| - sftk_FreeSession(session);
|
| - if (key == NULL) return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| -
|
| - /* PUT ANY DIGEST KEY RESTRICTION CHECKS HERE */
|
| -
|
| - /* make sure it's a valid key for this operation */
|
| - if (key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
|
| - }
|
| - /* get the key value */
|
| - att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
|
| - sftk_FreeObject(key);
|
| - if (!att) {
|
| - return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
|
| - }
|
| - crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,(CK_BYTE_PTR)att->attrib.pValue,
|
| - att->attrib.ulValueLen);
|
| - sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
|
| - return crv;
|
| -}
|
|
|
Chromium Code Reviews
Issue 2078763002:
Delete bundled copy of NSS and replace with README. (Closed)
Base URL: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/deps/nss@master