Delete bundled copy of NSS and replace with README.

nss/lib/softoken/sftkpwd.c

Index: nss/lib/softoken/sftkpwd.c
diff --git a/nss/lib/softoken/sftkpwd.c b/nss/lib/softoken/sftkpwd.c
deleted file mode 100644
index f17da7e00f5074baa475ae340cc403bda907ca3d..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/nss/lib/softoken/sftkpwd.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1273 +0,0 @@
-/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
- * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
- * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
-/* 
- *  The following code handles the storage of PKCS 11 modules used by the
- * NSS. For the rest of NSS, only one kind of database handle exists:
- *
- *     SFTKDBHandle
- *
- * There is one SFTKDBHandle for the each key database and one for each cert 
- * database. These databases are opened as associated pairs, one pair per
- * slot. SFTKDBHandles are reference counted objects.
- *
- * Each SFTKDBHandle points to a low level database handle (SDB). This handle
- * represents the underlying physical database. These objects are not 
- * reference counted, an are 'owned' by their respective SFTKDBHandles.
- *
- *  
- */
-#include "sftkdb.h"
-#include "sftkdbti.h"
-#include "pkcs11t.h"
-#include "pkcs11i.h"
-#include "sdb.h"
-#include "prprf.h" 
-#include "secasn1.h"
-#include "pratom.h"
-#include "blapi.h"
-#include "secoid.h"
-#include "lowpbe.h"
-#include "secdert.h"
-#include "prsystem.h"
-#include "lgglue.h"
-#include "secerr.h"
-#include "softoken.h"
-  
-/******************************************************************
- * 
- * Key DB password handling functions
- *
- * These functions manage the key db password (set, reset, initialize, use).
- *
- * The key is managed on 'this side' of the database. All private data is
- * encrypted before it is sent to the database itself. Besides PBE's, the
- * database management code can also mix in various fixed keys so the data
- * in the database is no longer considered 'plain text'.
- */
-
-
-/* take string password and turn it into a key. The key is dependent
- * on a global salt entry acquired from the database. This salted
- * value will be based to a pkcs5 pbe function before it is used
- * in an actual encryption */
-static SECStatus
-sftkdb_passwordToKey(SFTKDBHandle *keydb, SECItem *salt,
-			const char *pw, SECItem *key)
-{
-    SHA1Context *cx = NULL;
-    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
-
-    key->data = PORT_Alloc(SHA1_LENGTH);
-    if (key->data == NULL) {
-	goto loser;
-    }
-    key->len = SHA1_LENGTH;
-
-    cx = SHA1_NewContext();
-    if ( cx == NULL) {
-	goto loser;
-    }
-    SHA1_Begin(cx);
-    if (salt  && salt->data ) {
-	SHA1_Update(cx, salt->data, salt->len);
-    }
-    SHA1_Update(cx, (unsigned char *)pw, PORT_Strlen(pw));
-    SHA1_End(cx, key->data, &key->len, key->len);
-    rv = SECSuccess;
-    
-loser:
-    if (cx) {
-	SHA1_DestroyContext(cx, PR_TRUE);
-    }
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	if (key->data != NULL) {
-	    PORT_ZFree(key->data,key->len);
-	}
-	key->data = NULL;
-    }
-    return rv;
-}
-
-/*
- * Cipher text stored in the database contains 3 elements:
- * 1) an identifier describing the encryption algorithm.
- * 2) an entry specific salt value.
- * 3) the encrypted value.
- *
- * The following data structure represents the encrypted data in a decoded
- * (but still encrypted) form.
- */
-typedef struct sftkCipherValueStr sftkCipherValue;
-struct sftkCipherValueStr {
-    PLArenaPool *arena;
-    SECOidTag  alg;
-    NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *param;
-    SECItem    salt;
-    SECItem    value;
-};
-
-#define SFTK_CIPHERTEXT_VERSION 3
-
-struct SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfoStr {
-    SECAlgorithmID algorithm;
-    SECItem encryptedData;
-};
-typedef struct SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfoStr SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfo;
-
-SEC_ASN1_MKSUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate)
-
-const SEC_ASN1Template sftkdb_EncryptedDataInfoTemplate[] = {
-    { SEC_ASN1_SEQUENCE,
-        0, NULL, sizeof(SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfo) },
-    { SEC_ASN1_INLINE | SEC_ASN1_XTRN ,
-        offsetof(SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfo,algorithm),
-        SEC_ASN1_SUB(SECOID_AlgorithmIDTemplate) },
-    { SEC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
-        offsetof(SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfo,encryptedData) },
-    { 0 }
-};
-
-/*
- * This parses the cipherText into cipher value. NOTE: cipherValue will point
- * to data in cipherText, if cipherText is freed, cipherValue will be invalid.
- */
-static SECStatus
-sftkdb_decodeCipherText(SECItem *cipherText, sftkCipherValue *cipherValue)
-{
-    PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
-    SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfo edi;
-    SECStatus rv;
-
-    arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
-    if (arena == NULL) {
-	return SECFailure;
-    }
-    cipherValue->arena = NULL;
-    cipherValue->param = NULL;
-
-    rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &edi, sftkdb_EncryptedDataInfoTemplate,
-                            cipherText);
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	goto loser;
-    }
-    cipherValue->alg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&edi.algorithm);
-    cipherValue->param = nsspkcs5_AlgidToParam(&edi.algorithm);
-    if (cipherValue->param == NULL) {
-	goto loser;
-    }
-    cipherValue->value = edi.encryptedData;
-    cipherValue->arena = arena;
-
-    return SECSuccess;
-loser:
-    if (cipherValue->param) {
-	nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(cipherValue->param);
-	cipherValue->param = NULL;
-    }
-    if (arena) {
-	PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_FALSE);
-    }
-    return SECFailure;
-}
-
-
-
-/* 
- * unlike decode, Encode actually allocates a SECItem the caller must free
- * The caller can pass an optional arena to to indicate where to place
- * the resultant cipherText.
- */
-static SECStatus
-sftkdb_encodeCipherText(PLArenaPool *arena, sftkCipherValue *cipherValue, 
-                        SECItem **cipherText)
-{
-    SFTKDBEncryptedDataInfo edi;
-    SECAlgorithmID *algid;
-    SECStatus rv;
-    PLArenaPool *localArena = NULL;
-
-
-    localArena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
-    if (localArena == NULL) {
-	return SECFailure;
-    }
-
-    algid = nsspkcs5_CreateAlgorithmID(localArena, cipherValue->alg, 
-					cipherValue->param);
-    if (algid == NULL) {
-	rv = SECFailure;
-	goto loser;
-    }
-    rv = SECOID_CopyAlgorithmID(localArena, &edi.algorithm, algid);
-    SECOID_DestroyAlgorithmID(algid, PR_TRUE);
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	goto loser;
-    }
-    edi.encryptedData = cipherValue->value;
-
-    *cipherText = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, NULL, &edi, 
-				    sftkdb_EncryptedDataInfoTemplate);
-    if (*cipherText == NULL) {
-	rv = SECFailure;
-    }
-
-loser:
-    if (localArena) {
-	PORT_FreeArena(localArena,PR_FALSE);
-    }
-
-    return rv;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Use our key to decode a cipherText block from the database.
- *
- * plain text is allocated by nsspkcs5_CipherData and must be freed
- * with SECITEM_FreeItem by the caller.
- */
-SECStatus
-sftkdb_DecryptAttribute(SECItem *passKey, SECItem *cipherText, SECItem **plain) 
-{
-    SECStatus rv;
-    sftkCipherValue cipherValue;
-
-    /* First get the cipher type */
-    rv = sftkdb_decodeCipherText(cipherText, &cipherValue);
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	goto loser;
-    }
-
-    *plain = nsspkcs5_CipherData(cipherValue.param, passKey, &cipherValue.value, 
-				    PR_FALSE, NULL);
-    if (*plain == NULL) {
-	rv = SECFailure;
-	goto loser;
-    } 
-
-loser:
-    if (cipherValue.param) {
-	nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(cipherValue.param);
-    }
-    if (cipherValue.arena) {
-	PORT_FreeArena(cipherValue.arena,PR_FALSE);
-    }
-    return rv;
-}
-
-/*
- * encrypt a block. This function returned the encrypted ciphertext which
- * the caller must free. If the caller provides an arena, cipherText will
- * be allocated out of that arena. This also generated the per entry
- * salt automatically.
- */
-SECStatus
-sftkdb_EncryptAttribute(PLArenaPool *arena, SECItem *passKey, 
-		SECItem *plainText, SECItem **cipherText) 
-{
-    SECStatus rv;
-    sftkCipherValue cipherValue;
-    SECItem *cipher = NULL;
-    NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *param = NULL;
-    unsigned char saltData[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
-
-    cipherValue.alg = SEC_OID_PKCS12_PBE_WITH_SHA1_AND_TRIPLE_DES_CBC;
-    cipherValue.salt.len = SHA1_LENGTH;
-    cipherValue.salt.data = saltData;
-    RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(saltData,cipherValue.salt.len);
-
-    param = nsspkcs5_NewParam(cipherValue.alg, HASH_AlgSHA1, &cipherValue.salt,
-                              1);
-    if (param == NULL) {
-	rv = SECFailure;
-	goto loser;
-    }
-    cipher = nsspkcs5_CipherData(param, passKey, plainText, PR_TRUE, NULL);
-    if (cipher == NULL) {
-	rv = SECFailure;
-	goto loser;
-    } 
-    cipherValue.value = *cipher;
-    cipherValue.param = param;
-
-    rv = sftkdb_encodeCipherText(arena, &cipherValue, cipherText);
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	goto loser;
-    }
-
-loser:
-    if (cipher) {
-	SECITEM_FreeItem(cipher, PR_TRUE);
-    }
-    if (param) {
-	nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(param);
-    }
-    return rv;
-}
-
-/*
- * use the password and the pbe parameters to generate an HMAC for the
- * given plain text data. This is used by sftkdb_VerifyAttribute and
- * sftkdb_SignAttribute. Signature is returned in signData. The caller
- * must preallocate the space in the secitem.
- */
-static SECStatus
-sftkdb_pbehash(SECOidTag sigOid, SECItem *passKey, 
-	       NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *param,
-	       CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE attrType,
-	       SECItem *plainText, SECItem *signData)
-{
-    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
-    SECItem *key = NULL;
-    HMACContext *hashCx = NULL;
-    HASH_HashType hashType = HASH_AlgNULL;
-    const SECHashObject *hashObj;
-    unsigned char addressData[SDB_ULONG_SIZE];
-
-    hashType = HASH_FromHMACOid(param->encAlg);
-    if (hashType == HASH_AlgNULL) {
-	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
-	return SECFailure;
-    }
-
-    hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(hashType);
-    if (hashObj == NULL) {
-	goto loser;
-    }
-
-    key = nsspkcs5_ComputeKeyAndIV(param, passKey, NULL, PR_FALSE);
-    if (!key) {
-	goto loser;
-    }
-
-    hashCx = HMAC_Create(hashObj, key->data, key->len, PR_TRUE);
-    if (!hashCx) {
-	goto loser;
-    }
-    HMAC_Begin(hashCx);
-    /* Tie this value to a particular object. This is most important for
-     * the trust attributes, where and attacker could copy a value for
-     * 'validCA' from another cert in the database */
-    sftk_ULong2SDBULong(addressData, objectID);
-    HMAC_Update(hashCx, addressData, SDB_ULONG_SIZE);
-    sftk_ULong2SDBULong(addressData, attrType);
-    HMAC_Update(hashCx, addressData, SDB_ULONG_SIZE);
-
-    HMAC_Update(hashCx, plainText->data, plainText->len);
-    rv = HMAC_Finish(hashCx, signData->data, &signData->len, signData->len);
-
-loser:
-    if (hashCx) {
-	HMAC_Destroy(hashCx, PR_TRUE);
-    }
-    if (key) {
-	SECITEM_FreeItem(key,PR_TRUE);
-    }
-    return rv;
-}
-
-/*
- * Use our key to verify a signText block from the database matches
- * the plainText from the database. The signText is a PKCS 5 v2 pbe.
- * plainText is the plainText of the attribute.
- */
-SECStatus
-sftkdb_VerifyAttribute(SECItem *passKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID, 
-	     CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE attrType, 
-	     SECItem *plainText, SECItem *signText) 
-{
-    SECStatus rv;
-    sftkCipherValue signValue;
-    SECItem signature;
-    unsigned char signData[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
-    
-
-    /* First get the cipher type */
-    rv = sftkdb_decodeCipherText(signText, &signValue);
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	goto loser;
-    }
-    signature.data = signData;
-    signature.len = sizeof(signData);
-
-    rv = sftkdb_pbehash(signValue.alg, passKey, signValue.param, 
-			objectID, attrType, plainText, &signature);
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	goto loser;
-    }
-    if (SECITEM_CompareItem(&signValue.value,&signature) != 0) {
-	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
-	rv = SECFailure;
-    }
-
-loser:
-    if (signValue.param) {
-	nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(signValue.param);
-    }
-    if (signValue.arena) {
-	PORT_FreeArena(signValue.arena,PR_FALSE);
-    }
-    return rv;
-}
-
-/*
- * Use our key to create a signText block the plain text of an
- * attribute. The signText is a PKCS 5 v2 pbe.
- */
-SECStatus
-sftkdb_SignAttribute(PLArenaPool *arena, SECItem *passKey, 
-	 CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE attrType, 
-	 SECItem *plainText, SECItem **signature) 
-{
-    SECStatus rv;
-    sftkCipherValue signValue;
-    NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *param = NULL;
-    unsigned char saltData[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
-    unsigned char signData[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
-    SECOidTag hmacAlg = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256; /* hash for authentication */
-    SECOidTag prfAlg = SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256;  /* hash for pb key generation */
-    HASH_HashType prfType;
-    unsigned int hmacLength;
-    unsigned int prfLength;
-
-    /* this code allows us to fetch the lengths and hashes on the fly
-     * by simply changing the OID above */
-    prfType = HASH_FromHMACOid(prfAlg);
-    PORT_Assert(prfType != HASH_AlgNULL);
-    prfLength = HASH_GetRawHashObject(prfType)->length;
-    PORT_Assert(prfLength <= HASH_LENGTH_MAX);
-
-    hmacLength = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_FromHMACOid(hmacAlg))->length;
-    PORT_Assert(hmacLength <= HASH_LENGTH_MAX);
-
-    /* initialize our CipherValue structure */
-    signValue.alg = SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1;
-    signValue.salt.len = prfLength;
-    signValue.salt.data = saltData;
-    signValue.value.data = signData;
-    signValue.value.len = hmacLength;
-    RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(saltData,prfLength);
-
-    /* initialize our pkcs5 parameter */
-    param = nsspkcs5_NewParam(signValue.alg, HASH_AlgSHA1, &signValue.salt, 1);
-    if (param == NULL) {
-	rv = SECFailure;
-	goto loser;
-    }
-    param->keyID = pbeBitGenIntegrityKey;
-    /* set the PKCS 5 v2 parameters, not extractable from the
-     * data passed into nsspkcs5_NewParam */
-    param->encAlg = hmacAlg;
-    param->hashType = prfType;
-    param->keyLen = hmacLength;
-    rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(param->poolp, &param->prfAlg, prfAlg, NULL);
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	goto loser;
-    }
-
-
-    /* calculate the mac */
-    rv = sftkdb_pbehash(signValue.alg, passKey, param, objectID, attrType,
-			plainText, &signValue.value);
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	goto loser;
-    }
-    signValue.param = param;
-
-    /* write it out */
-    rv = sftkdb_encodeCipherText(arena, &signValue, signature);
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	goto loser;
-    }
-
-loser:
-    if (param) {
-	nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(param);
-    }
-    return rv;
-}
-
-/*
- * safely swith the passed in key for the one caches in the keydb handle
- * 
- * A key attached to the handle tells us the the token is logged in.
- * We can used the key attached to the handle in sftkdb_EncryptAttribute 
- *  and sftkdb_DecryptAttribute calls.
- */  
-static void 
-sftkdb_switchKeys(SFTKDBHandle *keydb, SECItem *passKey)
-{
-    unsigned char *data;
-    int len;
-
-    if (keydb->passwordLock == NULL) {
-	PORT_Assert(keydb->type != SFTK_KEYDB_TYPE);
-	return;
-    }
-
-    /* an atomic pointer set would be nice */
-    SKIP_AFTER_FORK(PZ_Lock(keydb->passwordLock));
-    data = keydb->passwordKey.data;
-    len = keydb->passwordKey.len;
-    keydb->passwordKey.data = passKey->data;
-    keydb->passwordKey.len = passKey->len;
-    passKey->data = data;
-    passKey->len = len;
-    SKIP_AFTER_FORK(PZ_Unlock(keydb->passwordLock));
-}
-
-/*
- * returns true if we are in a middle of a merge style update.
- */
-PRBool
-sftkdb_InUpdateMerge(SFTKDBHandle *keydb)
-{
-    return keydb->updateID ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
-}
-
-/*
- * returns true if we are looking for the password for the user's old source
- * database as part of a merge style update.
- */
-PRBool
-sftkdb_NeedUpdateDBPassword(SFTKDBHandle *keydb)
-{
-    if (!sftkdb_InUpdateMerge(keydb)) {
-	return PR_FALSE;
-    }
-    if (keydb->updateDBIsInit && !keydb->updatePasswordKey) {
-	return PR_TRUE;
-    }
-    return PR_FALSE;
-}
-
-/*
- * fetch an update password key from a handle.
- */
-SECItem *
-sftkdb_GetUpdatePasswordKey(SFTKDBHandle *handle)
-{
-    SECItem *key = NULL;
-
-    /* if we're a cert db, fetch it from our peer key db */
-    if (handle->type == SFTK_CERTDB_TYPE) {
-	handle = handle->peerDB;
-    }
-
-    /* don't have one */
-    if (!handle) {
-	return NULL;
-    }
-
-    PZ_Lock(handle->passwordLock);
-    if (handle->updatePasswordKey) {
-	key = SECITEM_DupItem(handle->updatePasswordKey);
-    }
-    PZ_Unlock(handle->passwordLock);
-
-    return key;
-}
-
-/*
- * free the update password key from a handle.
- */
-void
-sftkdb_FreeUpdatePasswordKey(SFTKDBHandle *handle)
-{
-    SECItem *key = NULL;
-
-    /* don't have one */
-    if (!handle) {
-	return;
-    }
-
-    /* if we're a cert db, we don't have one */
-    if (handle->type == SFTK_CERTDB_TYPE) {
-	return;
-    }
-
-    PZ_Lock(handle->passwordLock);
-    if (handle->updatePasswordKey) {
-	key = handle->updatePasswordKey;
-	handle->updatePasswordKey = NULL;
-    }
-    PZ_Unlock(handle->passwordLock);
-
-    if (key) {
-	SECITEM_ZfreeItem(key, PR_TRUE);
-    }
-
-    return;
-}
-
-/*
- * what password db we use depends heavily on the update state machine
- * 
- *  1) no update db, return the normal database.
- *  2) update db and no merge return the update db.
- *  3) update db and in merge: 
- *      return the update db if we need the update db's password, 
- *      otherwise return our normal datbase.
- */
-static SDB *
-sftk_getPWSDB(SFTKDBHandle *keydb)
-{
-    if (!keydb->update) {
-	return keydb->db;
-    }
-    if (!sftkdb_InUpdateMerge(keydb)) {
-	return keydb->update;
-    }
-    if (sftkdb_NeedUpdateDBPassword(keydb)) {
-	return keydb->update;
-    }
-    return keydb->db;
-}
-
-/*
- * return success if we have a valid password entry.
- * This is will show up outside of PKCS #11 as CKF_USER_PIN_INIT
- * in the token flags.
- */
-SECStatus 
-sftkdb_HasPasswordSet(SFTKDBHandle *keydb)
-{
-    SECItem salt, value;
-    unsigned char saltData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
-    unsigned char valueData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
-    CK_RV crv;
-    SDB *db;
-
-    if (keydb == NULL) {
-	return SECFailure;
-    }
-
-    db = sftk_getPWSDB(keydb);
-    if (db == NULL) {
-	return SECFailure;
-    }
-
-    salt.data = saltData;
-    salt.len = sizeof(saltData);
-    value.data = valueData;
-    value.len = sizeof(valueData);
-    crv = (*db->sdb_GetMetaData)(db, "password", &salt, &value);
-
-    /* If no password is set, we can update right away */
-    if (((keydb->db->sdb_flags & SDB_RDONLY) == 0) && keydb->update 
-	&& crv != CKR_OK) {
-	/* update the peer certdb if it exists */
-	if (keydb->peerDB) {
-	    sftkdb_Update(keydb->peerDB, NULL);
-	}
-	sftkdb_Update(keydb, NULL);
-    }
-    return (crv == CKR_OK) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
-}
-
-#define SFTK_PW_CHECK_STRING "password-check"
-#define SFTK_PW_CHECK_LEN 14
-
-/*
- * check if the supplied password is valid
- */
-SECStatus  
-sftkdb_CheckPassword(SFTKDBHandle *keydb, const char *pw, PRBool *tokenRemoved)
-{
-    SECStatus rv;
-    SECItem salt, value;
-    unsigned char saltData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
-    unsigned char valueData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
-    SECItem key;
-    SECItem *result = NULL;
-    SDB *db;
-    CK_RV crv;
-
-    if (keydb == NULL) {
-	return SECFailure;
-    }
-
-    db = sftk_getPWSDB(keydb);
-    if (db == NULL) {
-	return SECFailure;
-    }
-
-    key.data = NULL;
-    key.len = 0;
-
-    if (pw == NULL) pw="";
-
-    /* get the entry from the database */
-    salt.data = saltData;
-    salt.len = sizeof(saltData);
-    value.data = valueData;
-    value.len = sizeof(valueData);
-    crv = (*db->sdb_GetMetaData)(db, "password", &salt, &value);
-    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-	rv = SECFailure;
-	goto done;
-    }
-
-    /* get our intermediate key based on the entry salt value */
-    rv = sftkdb_passwordToKey(keydb, &salt, pw, &key);
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	goto done;
-    }
-
-    /* decrypt the entry value */
-    rv = sftkdb_DecryptAttribute(&key, &value, &result);
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	goto done;
-    }
-
-    /* if it's what we expect, update our key in the database handle and
-     * return Success */
-    if ((result->len == SFTK_PW_CHECK_LEN) &&
-      PORT_Memcmp(result->data, SFTK_PW_CHECK_STRING, SFTK_PW_CHECK_LEN) == 0){
-	/*
-	 * We have a password, now lets handle any potential update cases..
-	 * 
-	 * First, the normal case: no update. In this case we only need the
-	 *  the password for our only DB, which we now have, we switch 
-	 *  the keys and fall through.
-	 * Second regular (non-merge) update: The target DB does not yet have
-	 *  a password initialized, we now have the password for the source DB,
-	 *  so we can switch the keys and simply update the target database.
-	 * Merge update case: This one is trickier.
-	 *   1) If we need the source DB password, then we just got it here.
-	 *       We need to save that password,
-	 *       then we need to check to see if we need or have the target 
-	 *         database password.
-	 *       If we have it (it's the same as the source), or don't need 
-	 *         it (it's not set or is ""), we can start the update now.
-	 *       If we don't have it, we need the application to get it from 
-	 *         the user. Clear our sessions out to simulate a token 
-	 *         removal. C_GetTokenInfo will change the token description 
-	 *         and the token will still appear to be logged out.
-	 *   2) If we already have the source DB  password, this password is 
-	 *         for the target database. We can now move forward with the 
-	 *         update, as we now have both required passwords.
-	 *
-	 */
-        PZ_Lock(keydb->passwordLock);
-	if (sftkdb_NeedUpdateDBPassword(keydb)) {
-	    /* Squirrel this special key away.
-	     * This has the side effect of turning sftkdb_NeedLegacyPW off,
-	     * as well as changing which database is returned from 
-	     * SFTK_GET_PW_DB (thus effecting both sftkdb_CheckPassword()
-	     * and sftkdb_HasPasswordSet()) */
-	    keydb->updatePasswordKey = SECITEM_DupItem(&key);
-	    PZ_Unlock(keydb->passwordLock);
-	    if (keydb->updatePasswordKey == NULL) {
-		/* PORT_Error set by SECITEM_DupItem */
-		rv = SECFailure;
-		goto done;
-	    }
-
-	    /* Simulate a token removal -- we need to do this any
-             * any case at this point so the token name is correct. */
-	    *tokenRemoved = PR_TRUE;
-
-	    /* 
-	     * OK, we got the update DB password, see if we need a password
-	     * for the target...
-	     */
-	    if (sftkdb_HasPasswordSet(keydb) == SECSuccess) {
-		/* We have a password, do we know what the password is?
-		 *  check 1) for the password the user supplied for the 
-		 *           update DB,
-		 *    and 2) for the null password.
-		 *
-		 * RECURSION NOTE: we are calling ourselves here. This means
-		 *  any updates, switchKeys, etc will have been completed
-		 *  if these functions return successfully, in those cases
-		 *  just exit returning Success. We don't recurse infinitely
-		 *  because we are making this call from a NeedUpdateDBPassword
-		 *  block and we've already set that update password at this
-		 *  point.  */
-		rv = sftkdb_CheckPassword(keydb, pw, tokenRemoved);
-		if (rv == SECSuccess) {
-		    /* source and target databases have the same password, we 
-		     * are good to go */
-		    goto done;
-		}
-		sftkdb_CheckPassword(keydb, "", tokenRemoved);
-
-		/*
-		 * Important 'NULL' code here. At this point either we 
-		 * succeeded in logging in with "" or we didn't.
-                 *
-                 *  If we did succeed at login, our machine state will be set
-		 * to logged in appropriately. The application will find that 
-		 * it's logged in as soon as it opens a new session. We have 
-		 * also completed the update. Life is good.
-		 * 
-		 *  If we did not succeed, well the user still successfully
-		 * logged into the update database, since we faked the token 
-		 * removal it's just like the user logged into his smart card 
-		 * then removed it. the actual login work, so we report that 
-		 * success back to the user, but we won't actually be
-		 * logged in. The application will find this out when it
-		 * checks it's login state, thus triggering another password
-		 * prompt so we can get the real target DB password.
-		 *
-		 * summary, we exit from here with SECSuccess no matter what.
-		 */
-		rv = SECSuccess;
-		goto done;
-	    } else {
-		/* there is no password, just fall through to update.
-		 * update will write the source DB's password record
-		 * into the target DB just like it would in a non-merge
-		 * update case. */
-	    }
-	} else {
-	    PZ_Unlock(keydb->passwordLock);
-	}
-	/* load the keys, so the keydb can parse it's key set */
-	sftkdb_switchKeys(keydb, &key);
-
-	/* we need to update, do it now */
-	if (((keydb->db->sdb_flags & SDB_RDONLY) == 0) && keydb->update) {
-	    /* update the peer certdb if it exists */
-	    if (keydb->peerDB) {
-		sftkdb_Update(keydb->peerDB, &key);
-	    }
-	    sftkdb_Update(keydb, &key);
-	}
-    } else {
-        rv = SECFailure;
-	/*PORT_SetError( bad password); */
-    }
-
-done:
-    if (key.data) {
-	PORT_ZFree(key.data,key.len);
-    }
-    if (result) {
-	SECITEM_FreeItem(result,PR_TRUE);
-    }
-    return rv;
-}
-
-/*
- * return Success if the there is a cached password key.
- */
-SECStatus
-sftkdb_PWCached(SFTKDBHandle *keydb)
-{
-    return keydb->passwordKey.data ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
-}
-
-
-static CK_RV
-sftk_updateMacs(PLArenaPool *arena, SFTKDBHandle *handle,
-		       CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id, SECItem *newKey)
-{
-    CK_ATTRIBUTE authAttrs[] = {
-	{CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0},
-	{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0},
-	{CKA_CERT_SHA1_HASH, NULL, 0},
-	{CKA_CERT_MD5_HASH, NULL, 0},
-	{CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH, NULL, 0},
-	{CKA_TRUST_CLIENT_AUTH, NULL, 0},
-	{CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION, NULL, 0},
-	{CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING, NULL, 0},
-	{CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED, NULL, 0},
-	{CKA_NSS_OVERRIDE_EXTENSIONS, NULL, 0},
-    };
-    CK_ULONG authAttrCount = sizeof(authAttrs)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE);
-    unsigned int i, count;
-    SFTKDBHandle *keyHandle = handle;
-    SDB *keyTarget = NULL;
-
-    id &= SFTK_OBJ_ID_MASK;
-
-    if (handle->type != SFTK_KEYDB_TYPE) {
-	keyHandle = handle->peerDB;
-    }
-
-    if (keyHandle == NULL) {
-	return CKR_OK;
-    }
-
-    /* old DB's don't have meta data, finished with MACs */
-    keyTarget = SFTK_GET_SDB(keyHandle);
-    if ((keyTarget->sdb_flags &SDB_HAS_META) == 0) {
-	return CKR_OK;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * STEP 1: find the MACed attributes of this object 
-     */
-    (void)sftkdb_GetAttributeValue(handle, id, authAttrs, authAttrCount);
-    count = 0;
-    /* allocate space for the attributes */
-    for (i=0; i < authAttrCount; i++) {
-	if ((authAttrs[i].ulValueLen == -1) || (authAttrs[i].ulValueLen == 0)){
-	    continue;
-	}
-	count++;
-        authAttrs[i].pValue = PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena,authAttrs[i].ulValueLen);
-	if (authAttrs[i].pValue == NULL) {
-	    break;
-	}
-    }
-
-    /* if count was zero, none were found, finished with MACs */
-    if (count == 0) {
-	return CKR_OK;
-    }
-
-    (void)sftkdb_GetAttributeValue(handle, id, authAttrs, authAttrCount);
-    /* ignore error code, we expect some possible errors */
-
-    /* GetAttributeValue just verified the old macs, safe to write
-     * them out then... */
-    for (i=0; i < authAttrCount; i++) {
-	SECItem *signText;
-	SECItem plainText;
-	SECStatus rv;
-
-	if ((authAttrs[i].ulValueLen == -1) || (authAttrs[i].ulValueLen == 0)){
-	    continue;
-	}
-
-	plainText.data = authAttrs[i].pValue;
-	plainText.len = authAttrs[i].ulValueLen;
-	rv = sftkdb_SignAttribute(arena, newKey, id, 
-			authAttrs[i].type, &plainText, &signText);
-	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	    return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
-	}
-	rv = sftkdb_PutAttributeSignature(handle, keyTarget, id, 
-				authAttrs[i].type, signText);
-	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	    return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
-	}
-    }
-
-    return CKR_OK;
-}
-	
-static CK_RV
-sftk_updateEncrypted(PLArenaPool *arena, SFTKDBHandle *keydb,
-		       CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id, SECItem *newKey)
-{
-    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
-    CK_RV crv2;
-    CK_ATTRIBUTE *first, *last;
-    CK_ATTRIBUTE privAttrs[] = {
-	{CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0},
-	{CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, NULL, 0},
-	{CKA_PRIME_1, NULL, 0},
-	{CKA_PRIME_2, NULL, 0},
-	{CKA_EXPONENT_1, NULL, 0},
-	{CKA_EXPONENT_2, NULL, 0},
-	{CKA_COEFFICIENT, NULL, 0} };
-    CK_ULONG privAttrCount = sizeof(privAttrs)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE);
-    unsigned int i, count;
-
-    /*
-     * STEP 1. Read the old attributes in the clear.
-     */
-
-    /* Get the attribute sizes.
-     *  ignore the error code, we will have unknown attributes here */
-    crv2 = sftkdb_GetAttributeValue(keydb, id, privAttrs, privAttrCount);
-
-    /*
-     * find the valid block of attributes and fill allocate space for
-     * their data */
-    first = last = NULL;
-    for (i=0; i < privAttrCount; i++) {
-         /* find the block of attributes that are appropriate for this 
-          * objects. There should only be once contiguous block, if not 
-          * there's an error.
-          *
-          * find the first and last good entry.
-          */
-	if ((privAttrs[i].ulValueLen == -1) || (privAttrs[i].ulValueLen == 0)){
-	    if (!first) continue;
-	    if (!last) {
-		/* previous entry was last good entry */
-		last= &privAttrs[i-1];
-	    }
-	    continue;
-	}
-	if (!first) {
-	    first = &privAttrs[i];
-	}
-	if (last) {
-	   /* OOPS, we've found another good entry beyond the end of the
-	    * last good entry, we need to fail here. */
-	   crv = CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
-	   break;
-	}
-        privAttrs[i].pValue = PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena,privAttrs[i].ulValueLen);
-	if (privAttrs[i].pValue == NULL) {
-	    crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
-	    break;
-	}
-    }
-    if (first == NULL) {
-	/* no valid entries found, return error based on crv2 */
-	return crv2;
-    }
-    if (last == NULL) {
-	last = &privAttrs[privAttrCount-1];
-    }
-    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-	return crv;
-    }
-    /* read the attributes */
-    count = (last-first)+1;
-    crv = sftkdb_GetAttributeValue(keydb, id, first, count);
-    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-	return crv;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * STEP 2: read the encrypt the attributes with the new key.
-     */
-    for (i=0; i < count; i++) {
-	SECItem plainText;
-	SECItem *result;
-	SECStatus rv;
-
-	plainText.data = first[i].pValue;
-	plainText.len = first[i].ulValueLen;
-    	rv = sftkdb_EncryptAttribute(arena, newKey, &plainText, &result);
-	if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	   return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
-	}
-	first[i].pValue = result->data;
-	first[i].ulValueLen = result->len;
-	/* clear our sensitive data out */
-	PORT_Memset(plainText.data, 0, plainText.len);
-    }
-
-
-    /*
-     * STEP 3: write the newly encrypted attributes out directly
-     */
-    id &= SFTK_OBJ_ID_MASK;
-    keydb->newKey = newKey;
-    crv = (*keydb->db->sdb_SetAttributeValue)(keydb->db, id, first, count);
-    keydb->newKey = NULL;
-
-    return crv;
-}
-	
-static CK_RV
-sftk_convertAttributes(SFTKDBHandle *handle, 
-			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id, SECItem *newKey)
-{
-    CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
-    PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
-
-    /* get a new arena to simplify cleanup */
-    arena = PORT_NewArena(1024);
-    if (!arena) {
-	return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * first handle the MACS
-     */
-    crv = sftk_updateMacs(arena, handle, id, newKey);
-    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-	goto loser;
-    }
-
-    if (handle->type == SFTK_KEYDB_TYPE) {
-	crv = sftk_updateEncrypted(arena, handle, id, newKey);
-	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-	    goto loser;
-	}
-    }
-
-    /* free up our mess */
-    /* NOTE: at this point we know we've cleared out any unencrypted data */
-    PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
-    return CKR_OK;
-
-loser:
-    /* there may be unencrypted data, clear it out down */
-    PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
-    return crv;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * must be called with the old key active.
- */
-CK_RV
-sftkdb_convertObjects(SFTKDBHandle *handle, CK_ATTRIBUTE *template, 
-			CK_ULONG count, SECItem *newKey)
-{
-    SDBFind *find = NULL;
-    CK_ULONG idCount = SFTK_MAX_IDS;
-    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ids[SFTK_MAX_IDS];
-    CK_RV crv, crv2;
-    unsigned int i;
-
-    crv = sftkdb_FindObjectsInit(handle, template, count, &find);
-
-    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-	return crv;
-    }
-    while ((crv == CKR_OK) && (idCount == SFTK_MAX_IDS)) {
-	crv = sftkdb_FindObjects(handle, find, ids, SFTK_MAX_IDS, &idCount);
-	for (i=0; (crv == CKR_OK) && (i < idCount); i++) {
-	    crv = sftk_convertAttributes(handle, ids[i], newKey);
-	}
-    }
-    crv2 = sftkdb_FindObjectsFinal(handle, find);
-    if (crv == CKR_OK) crv = crv2;
-
-    return crv;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * change the database password.
- */
-SECStatus
-sftkdb_ChangePassword(SFTKDBHandle *keydb, 
-                      char *oldPin, char *newPin, PRBool *tokenRemoved)
-{
-    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
-    SECItem plainText;
-    SECItem newKey;
-    SECItem *result = NULL;
-    SECItem salt, value;
-    SFTKDBHandle *certdb;
-    unsigned char saltData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
-    unsigned char valueData[SDB_MAX_META_DATA_LEN];
-    CK_RV crv;
-    SDB *db;
-
-    if (keydb == NULL) {
-	return SECFailure;
-    }
-
-    db = SFTK_GET_SDB(keydb);
-    if (db == NULL) {
-	return SECFailure;
-    }
-
-    newKey.data = NULL;
-
-    /* make sure we have a valid old pin */
-    crv = (*keydb->db->sdb_Begin)(keydb->db);
-    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-	rv = SECFailure;
-	goto loser;
-    }
-    salt.data = saltData;
-    salt.len = sizeof(saltData);
-    value.data = valueData;
-    value.len = sizeof(valueData);
-    crv = (*db->sdb_GetMetaData)(db, "password", &salt, &value);
-    if (crv == CKR_OK) {
-	rv = sftkdb_CheckPassword(keydb, oldPin, tokenRemoved);
-	if (rv == SECFailure) {
-	    goto loser;
-	}
-    } else {
-	salt.len = SHA1_LENGTH;
-    	RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(salt.data,salt.len);
-    }
-
-    rv = sftkdb_passwordToKey(keydb, &salt, newPin, &newKey);
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	goto loser;
-    }
-
-
-    /*
-     * convert encrypted entries here.
-     */
-    crv = sftkdb_convertObjects(keydb, NULL, 0, &newKey);
-    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-	rv = SECFailure;
-	goto loser;
-    }
-    /* fix up certdb macs */
-    certdb = keydb->peerDB;
-    if (certdb) {
-	CK_ATTRIBUTE objectType = { CKA_CLASS, 0, sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS) };
-	CK_OBJECT_CLASS myClass = CKO_NETSCAPE_TRUST;
-
-	objectType.pValue = &myClass;
-	crv = sftkdb_convertObjects(certdb, &objectType, 1, &newKey);
-	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-	    rv = SECFailure;
-	    goto loser;
-	}
-	myClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
-	crv = sftkdb_convertObjects(certdb, &objectType, 1, &newKey);
-	if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-	    rv = SECFailure;
-	    goto loser;
-	}
-    }
-
-
-    plainText.data = (unsigned char *)SFTK_PW_CHECK_STRING;
-    plainText.len = SFTK_PW_CHECK_LEN;
-
-    rv = sftkdb_EncryptAttribute(NULL, &newKey, &plainText, &result);
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-	goto loser;
-    }
-    value.data = result->data;
-    value.len = result->len;
-    crv = (*keydb->db->sdb_PutMetaData)(keydb->db, "password", &salt, &value);
-    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-	rv = SECFailure;
-	goto loser;
-    }
-    crv = (*keydb->db->sdb_Commit)(keydb->db);
-    if (crv != CKR_OK) {
-	rv = SECFailure;
-	goto loser;
-    }
-
-    keydb->newKey = NULL;
-
-    sftkdb_switchKeys(keydb, &newKey);
-
-loser:
-    if (newKey.data) {
-	PORT_ZFree(newKey.data,newKey.len);
-    }
-    if (result) {
-	SECITEM_FreeItem(result, PR_TRUE);
-    }
-    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
-        (*keydb->db->sdb_Abort)(keydb->db);
-    }
-    
-    return rv;
-}
-
-/*
- * lose our cached password
- */
-SECStatus
-sftkdb_ClearPassword(SFTKDBHandle *keydb)
-{
-    SECItem oldKey;
-    oldKey.data = NULL;
-    oldKey.len = 0;
-    sftkdb_switchKeys(keydb, &oldKey);
-    if (oldKey.data) {
-	PORT_ZFree(oldKey.data, oldKey.len);
-    }
-    return SECSuccess;
-}
-
-