Introduce the ability to require CT for specific hosts

net/socket/ssl_client_socket_impl.cc

 // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
 // found in the LICENSE file.
 
 #include "net/socket/ssl_client_socket_impl.h"
 
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <openssl/bio.h>
 #include <openssl/bytestring.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
@@ skipping 1309 matching lines @@
   if (!start_cert_verification_time_.is_null()) {
     base::TimeDelta verify_time =
         base::TimeTicks::Now() - start_cert_verification_time_;
     if (result == OK) {
       UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("Net.SSLCertVerificationTime", verify_time);
     } else {
       UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("Net.SSLCertVerificationTimeError", verify_time);
     }
   }
 
+  // If the connection was good, check HPKP and CT status simultaneously,
+  // but prefer to treat the HPKP error as more serious, if there was one.
   const CertStatus cert_status = server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status;
   if ((result == OK ||
-       (IsCertificateError(result) && IsCertStatusMinorError(cert_status))) &&
-      !transport_security_state_->CheckPublicKeyPins(
-          host_and_port_, server_cert_verify_result_.is_issued_by_known_root,
-          server_cert_verify_result_.public_key_hashes, server_cert_.get(),
-          server_cert_verify_result_.verified_cert.get(),
-          TransportSecurityState::ENABLE_PIN_REPORTS, &pinning_failure_log_)) {
-    if (server_cert_verify_result_.is_issued_by_known_root) {
-      server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_PINNED_KEY_MISSING;
-      result = ERR_SSL_PINNED_KEY_NOT_IN_CERT_CHAIN;
-    } else {
-      pkp_bypassed_ = true;
+       (IsCertificateError(result) && IsCertStatusMinorError(cert_status)))) {
+    int ct_result = VerifyCT();
+    if (!transport_security_state_->CheckPublicKeyPins(
+            host_and_port_, server_cert_verify_result_.is_issued_by_known_root,
+            server_cert_verify_result_.public_key_hashes, server_cert_.get(),
+            server_cert_verify_result_.verified_cert.get(),
+            TransportSecurityState::ENABLE_PIN_REPORTS,
+            &pinning_failure_log_)) {
+      if (server_cert_verify_result_.is_issued_by_known_root) {
+        server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status |=
+            CERT_STATUS_PINNED_KEY_MISSING;
+        result = ERR_SSL_PINNED_KEY_NOT_IN_CERT_CHAIN;
+      } else {
+        pkp_bypassed_ = true;
+      }
     }
+    if (result != ERR_SSL_PINNED_KEY_NOT_IN_CERT_CHAIN && ct_result != OK)
+      result = ct_result;
   }
 
   if (result == OK) {
-    // Only check Certificate Transparency if there were no other errors with
-    // the connection.
-    VerifyCT();
-
     DCHECK(!certificate_verified_);
     certificate_verified_ = true;
     MaybeCacheSession();
   }
 
   completed_connect_ = true;
   // Exit DoHandshakeLoop and return the result to the caller to Connect.
   DCHECK_EQ(STATE_NONE, next_handshake_state_);
   return result;
 }
 
 void SSLClientSocketImpl::DoConnectCallback(int rv) {
   if (!user_connect_callback_.is_null()) {
     CompletionCallback c = user_connect_callback_;
     user_connect_callback_.Reset();
     c.Run(rv > OK ? OK : rv);
   }
 }
 
 void SSLClientSocketImpl::UpdateServerCert() {
   server_cert_chain_->Reset(SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl_));
   server_cert_ = server_cert_chain_->AsOSChain();
   if (server_cert_.get()) {
     net_log_.AddEvent(NetLog::TYPE_SSL_CERTIFICATES_RECEIVED,
                       base::Bind(&NetLogX509CertificateCallback,
                                  base::Unretained(server_cert_.get())));
   }
 }
 
-void SSLClientSocketImpl::VerifyCT() {
-  const uint8_t* ocsp_response_raw;
-  size_t ocsp_response_len;
-  SSL_get0_ocsp_response(ssl_, &ocsp_response_raw, &ocsp_response_len);
-  std::string ocsp_response;
-  if (ocsp_response_len > 0) {
-    ocsp_response.assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(ocsp_response_raw),
-                         ocsp_response_len);
-  }
-
-  const uint8_t* sct_list_raw;
-  size_t sct_list_len;
-  SSL_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list(ssl_, &sct_list_raw, &sct_list_len);
-  std::string sct_list;
-  if (sct_list_len > 0)
-    sct_list.assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(sct_list_raw), sct_list_len);
-
-  // Note that this is a completely synchronous operation: The CT Log Verifier
-  // gets all the data it needs for SCT verification and does not do any
-  // external communication.
-  cert_transparency_verifier_->Verify(
-      server_cert_verify_result_.verified_cert.get(), ocsp_response, sct_list,
-      &ct_verify_result_, net_log_);
-
-  ct_verify_result_.ct_policies_applied = true;
-  ct_verify_result_.ev_policy_compliance =
-      ct::EVPolicyCompliance::EV_POLICY_DOES_NOT_APPLY;
-  if (server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV) {
-    scoped_refptr<ct::EVCertsWhitelist> ev_whitelist =
-        SSLConfigService::GetEVCertsWhitelist();
-    ct::EVPolicyCompliance ev_policy_compliance =
-        policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
-            server_cert_verify_result_.verified_cert.get(), ev_whitelist.get(),
-            ct_verify_result_.verified_scts, net_log_);
-    ct_verify_result_.ev_policy_compliance = ev_policy_compliance;
-    if (ev_policy_compliance !=
-            ct::EVPolicyCompliance::EV_POLICY_DOES_NOT_APPLY &&
-        ev_policy_compliance !=
-            ct::EVPolicyCompliance::EV_POLICY_COMPLIES_VIA_WHITELIST &&
-        ev_policy_compliance !=
-            ct::EVPolicyCompliance::EV_POLICY_COMPLIES_VIA_SCTS) {
-      server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status |=
-          CERT_STATUS_CT_COMPLIANCE_FAILED;
-      server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_IS_EV;
-    }
-  }
-  ct_verify_result_.cert_policy_compliance =
-      policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCertPolicy(
-          server_cert_verify_result_.verified_cert.get(),
-          ct_verify_result_.verified_scts, net_log_);
-}
-
 void SSLClientSocketImpl::OnHandshakeIOComplete(int result) {
   int rv = DoHandshakeLoop(result);
   if (rv != ERR_IO_PENDING) {
     LogConnectEndEvent(rv);
     DoConnectCallback(rv);
   }
 }
 
 void SSLClientSocketImpl::OnSendComplete(int result) {
   if (next_handshake_state_ == STATE_HANDSHAKE) {
@@ skipping 368 matching lines @@
   } else {
     bytes_read = result;
   }
   DCHECK_GE(recv_buffer_->RemainingCapacity(), bytes_read);
   int ret = BIO_zero_copy_get_write_buf_done(transport_bio_, bytes_read);
   DCHECK_EQ(1, ret);
   transport_recv_busy_ = false;
   return result;
 }
 
+int SSLClientSocketImpl::VerifyCT() {
+  const uint8_t* ocsp_response_raw;
+  size_t ocsp_response_len;
+  SSL_get0_ocsp_response(ssl_, &ocsp_response_raw, &ocsp_response_len);
+  std::string ocsp_response;
+  if (ocsp_response_len > 0) {
+    ocsp_response.assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(ocsp_response_raw),
+                         ocsp_response_len);
+  }
+
+  const uint8_t* sct_list_raw;
+  size_t sct_list_len;
+  SSL_get0_signed_cert_timestamp_list(ssl_, &sct_list_raw, &sct_list_len);
+  std::string sct_list;
+  if (sct_list_len > 0)
+    sct_list.assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(sct_list_raw), sct_list_len);
+
+  // Note that this is a completely synchronous operation: The CT Log Verifier
+  // gets all the data it needs for SCT verification and does not do any
+  // external communication.
+  cert_transparency_verifier_->Verify(
+      server_cert_verify_result_.verified_cert.get(), ocsp_response, sct_list,
+      &ct_verify_result_, net_log_);
+
+  ct_verify_result_.ct_policies_applied = true;
+  ct_verify_result_.ev_policy_compliance =
+      ct::EVPolicyCompliance::EV_POLICY_DOES_NOT_APPLY;
+  if (server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV) {
+    scoped_refptr<ct::EVCertsWhitelist> ev_whitelist =
+        SSLConfigService::GetEVCertsWhitelist();
+    ct::EVPolicyCompliance ev_policy_compliance =
+        policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCTEVPolicy(
+            server_cert_verify_result_.verified_cert.get(), ev_whitelist.get(),
+            ct_verify_result_.verified_scts, net_log_);
+    ct_verify_result_.ev_policy_compliance = ev_policy_compliance;
+    if (ev_policy_compliance !=
+            ct::EVPolicyCompliance::EV_POLICY_DOES_NOT_APPLY &&
+        ev_policy_compliance !=
+            ct::EVPolicyCompliance::EV_POLICY_COMPLIES_VIA_WHITELIST &&
+        ev_policy_compliance !=
+            ct::EVPolicyCompliance::EV_POLICY_COMPLIES_VIA_SCTS) {
+      server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status |=
+          CERT_STATUS_CT_COMPLIANCE_FAILED;
+      server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_IS_EV;
+    }
+  }
+  ct_verify_result_.cert_policy_compliance =
+      policy_enforcer_->DoesConformToCertPolicy(
+          server_cert_verify_result_.verified_cert.get(),
+          ct_verify_result_.verified_scts, net_log_);
+
+  if (ct_verify_result_.cert_policy_compliance !=

[Ryan Sleevi, 2016/06/21 00:09:33]

I know moving around can be a pain, sorry about that. This is the only new
code/change in this section.

+          ct::CertPolicyCompliance::CERT_POLICY_COMPLIES_VIA_SCTS &&
+      transport_security_state_->ShouldRequireCT(
+          host_and_port_.host(), server_cert_verify_result_.verified_cert.get(),
+          server_cert_verify_result_.public_key_hashes)) {
+    server_cert_verify_result_.cert_status |=
+        CERT_STATUS_CERTIFICATE_TRANSPARENCY_REQUIRED;
+    return ERR_CERTIFICATE_TRANSPARENCY_REQUIRED;
+  }
+
+  return OK;
+}
+
 int SSLClientSocketImpl::ClientCertRequestCallback(SSL* ssl) {
   DCHECK(ssl == ssl_);
 
   net_log_.AddEvent(NetLog::TYPE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_REQUESTED);
 
   // Clear any currently configured certificates.
   SSL_certs_clear(ssl_);
 
 #if defined(OS_IOS)
   // TODO(droger): Support client auth on iOS. See http://crbug.com/145954).
@@ skipping 474 matching lines @@
   if (rv != OK) {
     net_log_.EndEventWithNetErrorCode(NetLog::TYPE_SSL_CONNECT, rv);
     return;
   }
 
   net_log_.EndEvent(NetLog::TYPE_SSL_CONNECT,
                     base::Bind(&NetLogSSLInfoCallback, base::Unretained(this)));
 }
 
 }  // namespace net