Index: openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-s390x.pl |
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-s390x.pl b/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-s390x.pl |
deleted file mode 100644 |
index 6a40d5d89c0cd25ca6e884746f58b25ccf726bba..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 |
--- a/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-s390x.pl |
+++ /dev/null |
@@ -1,262 +0,0 @@ |
-#!/usr/bin/env perl |
- |
-# ==================================================================== |
-# Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL |
-# project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and |
-# CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further |
-# details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. |
-# ==================================================================== |
- |
-# September 2010. |
-# |
-# The module implements "4-bit" GCM GHASH function and underlying |
-# single multiplication operation in GF(2^128). "4-bit" means that it |
-# uses 256 bytes per-key table [+128 bytes shared table]. Performance |
-# was measured to be ~18 cycles per processed byte on z10, which is |
-# almost 40% better than gcc-generated code. It should be noted that |
-# 18 cycles is worse result than expected: loop is scheduled for 12 |
-# and the result should be close to 12. In the lack of instruction- |
-# level profiling data it's impossible to tell why... |
- |
-# November 2010. |
-# |
-# Adapt for -m31 build. If kernel supports what's called "highgprs" |
-# feature on Linux [see /proc/cpuinfo], it's possible to use 64-bit |
-# instructions and achieve "64-bit" performance even in 31-bit legacy |
-# application context. The feature is not specific to any particular |
-# processor, as long as it's "z-CPU". Latter implies that the code |
-# remains z/Architecture specific. On z990 it was measured to perform |
-# 2.8x better than 32-bit code generated by gcc 4.3. |
- |
-# March 2011. |
-# |
-# Support for hardware KIMD-GHASH is verified to produce correct |
-# result and therefore is engaged. On z196 it was measured to process |
-# 8KB buffer ~7 faster than software implementation. It's not as |
-# impressive for smaller buffer sizes and for smallest 16-bytes buffer |
-# it's actually almost 2 times slower. Which is the reason why |
-# KIMD-GHASH is not used in gcm_gmult_4bit. |
- |
-$flavour = shift; |
- |
-if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/) { |
- $SIZE_T=4; |
- $g=""; |
-} else { |
- $SIZE_T=8; |
- $g="g"; |
-} |
- |
-while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/^\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} |
-open STDOUT,">$output"; |
- |
-$softonly=0; |
- |
-$Zhi="%r0"; |
-$Zlo="%r1"; |
- |
-$Xi="%r2"; # argument block |
-$Htbl="%r3"; |
-$inp="%r4"; |
-$len="%r5"; |
- |
-$rem0="%r6"; # variables |
-$rem1="%r7"; |
-$nlo="%r8"; |
-$nhi="%r9"; |
-$xi="%r10"; |
-$cnt="%r11"; |
-$tmp="%r12"; |
-$x78="%r13"; |
-$rem_4bit="%r14"; |
- |
-$sp="%r15"; |
- |
-$code.=<<___; |
-.text |
- |
-.globl gcm_gmult_4bit |
-.align 32 |
-gcm_gmult_4bit: |
-___ |
-$code.=<<___ if(!$softonly && 0); # hardware is slow for single block... |
- larl %r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P |
- lg %r0,0(%r1) |
- tmhl %r0,0x4000 # check for message-security-assist |
- jz .Lsoft_gmult |
- lghi %r0,0 |
- la %r1,16($sp) |
- .long 0xb93e0004 # kimd %r0,%r4 |
- lg %r1,24($sp) |
- tmhh %r1,0x4000 # check for function 65 |
- jz .Lsoft_gmult |
- stg %r0,16($sp) # arrange 16 bytes of zero input |
- stg %r0,24($sp) |
- lghi %r0,65 # function 65 |
- la %r1,0($Xi) # H lies right after Xi in gcm128_context |
- la $inp,16($sp) |
- lghi $len,16 |
- .long 0xb93e0004 # kimd %r0,$inp |
- brc 1,.-4 # pay attention to "partial completion" |
- br %r14 |
-.align 32 |
-.Lsoft_gmult: |
-___ |
-$code.=<<___; |
- stm${g} %r6,%r14,6*$SIZE_T($sp) |
- |
- aghi $Xi,-1 |
- lghi $len,1 |
- lghi $x78,`0xf<<3` |
- larl $rem_4bit,rem_4bit |
- |
- lg $Zlo,8+1($Xi) # Xi |
- j .Lgmult_shortcut |
-.type gcm_gmult_4bit,\@function |
-.size gcm_gmult_4bit,(.-gcm_gmult_4bit) |
- |
-.globl gcm_ghash_4bit |
-.align 32 |
-gcm_ghash_4bit: |
-___ |
-$code.=<<___ if(!$softonly); |
- larl %r1,OPENSSL_s390xcap_P |
- lg %r0,0(%r1) |
- tmhl %r0,0x4000 # check for message-security-assist |
- jz .Lsoft_ghash |
- lghi %r0,0 |
- la %r1,16($sp) |
- .long 0xb93e0004 # kimd %r0,%r4 |
- lg %r1,24($sp) |
- tmhh %r1,0x4000 # check for function 65 |
- jz .Lsoft_ghash |
- lghi %r0,65 # function 65 |
- la %r1,0($Xi) # H lies right after Xi in gcm128_context |
- .long 0xb93e0004 # kimd %r0,$inp |
- brc 1,.-4 # pay attention to "partial completion" |
- br %r14 |
-.align 32 |
-.Lsoft_ghash: |
-___ |
-$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /3[12]/); |
- llgfr $len,$len |
-___ |
-$code.=<<___; |
- stm${g} %r6,%r14,6*$SIZE_T($sp) |
- |
- aghi $Xi,-1 |
- srlg $len,$len,4 |
- lghi $x78,`0xf<<3` |
- larl $rem_4bit,rem_4bit |
- |
- lg $Zlo,8+1($Xi) # Xi |
- lg $Zhi,0+1($Xi) |
- lghi $tmp,0 |
-.Louter: |
- xg $Zhi,0($inp) # Xi ^= inp |
- xg $Zlo,8($inp) |
- xgr $Zhi,$tmp |
- stg $Zlo,8+1($Xi) |
- stg $Zhi,0+1($Xi) |
- |
-.Lgmult_shortcut: |
- lghi $tmp,0xf0 |
- sllg $nlo,$Zlo,4 |
- srlg $xi,$Zlo,8 # extract second byte |
- ngr $nlo,$tmp |
- lgr $nhi,$Zlo |
- lghi $cnt,14 |
- ngr $nhi,$tmp |
- |
- lg $Zlo,8($nlo,$Htbl) |
- lg $Zhi,0($nlo,$Htbl) |
- |
- sllg $nlo,$xi,4 |
- sllg $rem0,$Zlo,3 |
- ngr $nlo,$tmp |
- ngr $rem0,$x78 |
- ngr $xi,$tmp |
- |
- sllg $tmp,$Zhi,60 |
- srlg $Zlo,$Zlo,4 |
- srlg $Zhi,$Zhi,4 |
- xg $Zlo,8($nhi,$Htbl) |
- xg $Zhi,0($nhi,$Htbl) |
- lgr $nhi,$xi |
- sllg $rem1,$Zlo,3 |
- xgr $Zlo,$tmp |
- ngr $rem1,$x78 |
- j .Lghash_inner |
-.align 16 |
-.Lghash_inner: |
- srlg $Zlo,$Zlo,4 |
- sllg $tmp,$Zhi,60 |
- xg $Zlo,8($nlo,$Htbl) |
- srlg $Zhi,$Zhi,4 |
- llgc $xi,0($cnt,$Xi) |
- xg $Zhi,0($nlo,$Htbl) |
- sllg $nlo,$xi,4 |
- xg $Zhi,0($rem0,$rem_4bit) |
- nill $nlo,0xf0 |
- sllg $rem0,$Zlo,3 |
- xgr $Zlo,$tmp |
- ngr $rem0,$x78 |
- nill $xi,0xf0 |
- |
- sllg $tmp,$Zhi,60 |
- srlg $Zlo,$Zlo,4 |
- srlg $Zhi,$Zhi,4 |
- xg $Zlo,8($nhi,$Htbl) |
- xg $Zhi,0($nhi,$Htbl) |
- lgr $nhi,$xi |
- xg $Zhi,0($rem1,$rem_4bit) |
- sllg $rem1,$Zlo,3 |
- xgr $Zlo,$tmp |
- ngr $rem1,$x78 |
- brct $cnt,.Lghash_inner |
- |
- sllg $tmp,$Zhi,60 |
- srlg $Zlo,$Zlo,4 |
- srlg $Zhi,$Zhi,4 |
- xg $Zlo,8($nlo,$Htbl) |
- xg $Zhi,0($nlo,$Htbl) |
- sllg $xi,$Zlo,3 |
- xg $Zhi,0($rem0,$rem_4bit) |
- xgr $Zlo,$tmp |
- ngr $xi,$x78 |
- |
- sllg $tmp,$Zhi,60 |
- srlg $Zlo,$Zlo,4 |
- srlg $Zhi,$Zhi,4 |
- xg $Zlo,8($nhi,$Htbl) |
- xg $Zhi,0($nhi,$Htbl) |
- xgr $Zlo,$tmp |
- xg $Zhi,0($rem1,$rem_4bit) |
- |
- lg $tmp,0($xi,$rem_4bit) |
- la $inp,16($inp) |
- sllg $tmp,$tmp,4 # correct last rem_4bit[rem] |
- brctg $len,.Louter |
- |
- xgr $Zhi,$tmp |
- stg $Zlo,8+1($Xi) |
- stg $Zhi,0+1($Xi) |
- lm${g} %r6,%r14,6*$SIZE_T($sp) |
- br %r14 |
-.type gcm_ghash_4bit,\@function |
-.size gcm_ghash_4bit,(.-gcm_ghash_4bit) |
- |
-.align 64 |
-rem_4bit: |
- .long `0x0000<<12`,0,`0x1C20<<12`,0,`0x3840<<12`,0,`0x2460<<12`,0 |
- .long `0x7080<<12`,0,`0x6CA0<<12`,0,`0x48C0<<12`,0,`0x54E0<<12`,0 |
- .long `0xE100<<12`,0,`0xFD20<<12`,0,`0xD940<<12`,0,`0xC560<<12`,0 |
- .long `0x9180<<12`,0,`0x8DA0<<12`,0,`0xA9C0<<12`,0,`0xB5E0<<12`,0 |
-.type rem_4bit,\@object |
-.size rem_4bit,(.-rem_4bit) |
-.string "GHASH for s390x, CRYPTOGAMS by <appro\@openssl.org>" |
-___ |
- |
-$code =~ s/\`([^\`]*)\`/eval $1/gem; |
-print $code; |
-close STDOUT; |