| Index: openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
|
| diff --git a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
|
| deleted file mode 100644
|
| index 352aa374343b930eab79549ea35922350654c946..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
|
| --- a/openssl/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
|
| +++ /dev/null
|
| @@ -1,343 +0,0 @@
|
| -/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
|
| -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
|
| - * All rights reserved.
|
| - *
|
| - * This package is an SSL implementation written
|
| - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
|
| - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
|
| - *
|
| - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
|
| - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
|
| - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
|
| - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
|
| - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
|
| - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
| - *
|
| - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
|
| - * the code are not to be removed.
|
| - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
|
| - * as the author of the parts of the library used.
|
| - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
|
| - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
|
| - *
|
| - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
| - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
| - * are met:
|
| - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
|
| - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
| - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
| - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
| - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
| - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
|
| - * must display the following acknowledgement:
|
| - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
|
| - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
|
| - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
|
| - * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
|
| - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
|
| - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
|
| - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
|
| - *
|
| - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
|
| - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
| - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
| - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
| - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
| - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
| - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
| - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
| - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
| - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
| - * SUCH DAMAGE.
|
| - *
|
| - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
|
| - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
|
| - * copied and put under another distribution licence
|
| - * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| -#include <stdio.h>
|
| -#include <ctype.h>
|
| -#include "cryptlib.h"
|
| -#include <openssl/asn1.h>
|
| -#include <openssl/objects.h>
|
| -#include <openssl/x509.h>
|
| -#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
|
| -
|
| -int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
|
| - {
|
| - int i;
|
| - X509_CINF *ai,*bi;
|
| -
|
| - ai=a->cert_info;
|
| - bi=b->cert_info;
|
| - i=M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber,bi->serialNumber);
|
| - if (i) return(i);
|
| - return(X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer,bi->issuer));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
|
| -unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned long ret=0;
|
| - EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
|
| - unsigned char md[16];
|
| - char *f;
|
| -
|
| - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
|
| - f=X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer,NULL,0);
|
| - if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
|
| - goto err;
|
| - if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)f,strlen(f)))
|
| - goto err;
|
| - OPENSSL_free(f);
|
| - if(!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
|
| - (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
|
| - goto err;
|
| - if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,&(md[0]),NULL))
|
| - goto err;
|
| - ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
|
| - ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
|
| - )&0xffffffffL;
|
| - err:
|
| - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
|
| - return(ret);
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
|
| - {
|
| - return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer,b->cert_info->issuer));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
|
| - {
|
| - return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject,b->cert_info->subject));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
|
| - {
|
| - return(X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer,b->crl->issuer));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
|
| -int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
|
| - {
|
| - return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
|
| - {
|
| - return(a->cert_info->issuer);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
|
| - {
|
| - return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
|
| -unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
|
| - {
|
| - return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
|
| - {
|
| - return(a->cert_info->subject);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
|
| - {
|
| - return(a->cert_info->serialNumber);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
|
| - {
|
| - return(X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
|
| -unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
|
| - {
|
| - return(X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
|
| -/* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for
|
| - * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally
|
| - * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in
|
| - * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may
|
| - * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
|
| - * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point
|
| - * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt
|
| - * with an evil cast.
|
| - */
|
| -int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
|
| -{
|
| - /* ensure hash is valid */
|
| - X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
|
| - X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
|
| -
|
| - return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
|
| -}
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
|
| - {
|
| - int ret;
|
| -
|
| - /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
|
| -
|
| - if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified)
|
| - {
|
| - ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
|
| - if (ret < 0)
|
| - return -2;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified)
|
| - {
|
| - ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
|
| - if (ret < 0)
|
| - return -2;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
|
| -
|
| - if (ret)
|
| - return ret;
|
| -
|
| - return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
|
| -
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned long ret=0;
|
| - unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
|
| -
|
| - /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
|
| - i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
|
| - if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
|
| - NULL))
|
| - return 0;
|
| -
|
| - ret=( ((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
|
| - ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
|
| - )&0xffffffffL;
|
| - return(ret);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
|
| -/* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
|
| - * this is reasonably efficient. */
|
| -
|
| -unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
|
| - {
|
| - EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
|
| - unsigned long ret=0;
|
| - unsigned char md[16];
|
| -
|
| - /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
|
| - i2d_X509_NAME(x,NULL);
|
| - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
|
| - EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
|
| - if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
|
| - && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
|
| - && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,md,NULL))
|
| - ret=(((unsigned long)md[0] )|((unsigned long)md[1]<<8L)|
|
| - ((unsigned long)md[2]<<16L)|((unsigned long)md[3]<<24L)
|
| - )&0xffffffffL;
|
| - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
|
| -
|
| - return(ret);
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
|
| -X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
|
| - ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
|
| - {
|
| - int i;
|
| - X509_CINF cinf;
|
| - X509 x,*x509=NULL;
|
| -
|
| - if(!sk) return NULL;
|
| -
|
| - x.cert_info= &cinf;
|
| - cinf.serialNumber=serial;
|
| - cinf.issuer=name;
|
| -
|
| - for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
|
| - {
|
| - x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i);
|
| - if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509,&x) == 0)
|
| - return(x509);
|
| - }
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
|
| - {
|
| - X509 *x509;
|
| - int i;
|
| -
|
| - for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
|
| - {
|
| - x509=sk_X509_value(sk,i);
|
| - if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509),name) == 0)
|
| - return(x509);
|
| - }
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
|
| - {
|
| - if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - return(X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
|
| - {
|
| - if(!x) return NULL;
|
| - return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
|
| - {
|
| - EVP_PKEY *xk;
|
| - int ret;
|
| -
|
| - xk=X509_get_pubkey(x);
|
| -
|
| - if (xk)
|
| - ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
|
| - else
|
| - ret = -2;
|
| -
|
| - switch (ret)
|
| - {
|
| - case 1:
|
| - break;
|
| - case 0:
|
| - X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
|
| - break;
|
| - case -1:
|
| - X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
|
| - break;
|
| - case -2:
|
| - X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
|
| - }
|
| - if (xk)
|
| - EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
|
| - if (ret > 0)
|
| - return 1;
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
|
|