Index: openssl/ssl/d1_both.c |
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c |
deleted file mode 100644 |
index 9a250fdab2162b77ffb6bada5836888d5b9d7cc8..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 |
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c |
+++ /dev/null |
@@ -1,1600 +0,0 @@ |
-/* ssl/d1_both.c */ |
-/* |
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu |
- * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. |
- */ |
-/* ==================================================================== |
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
- * |
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
- * are met: |
- * |
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
- * |
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
- * distribution. |
- * |
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
- * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
- * |
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
- * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
- * |
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
- * |
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
- * acknowledgment: |
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
- * |
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
- * ==================================================================== |
- * |
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
- * |
- */ |
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
- * All rights reserved. |
- * |
- * This package is an SSL implementation written |
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
- * |
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
- * |
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
- * the code are not to be removed. |
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
- * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
- * |
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
- * are met: |
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
- * must display the following acknowledgement: |
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
- * |
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
- * SUCH DAMAGE. |
- * |
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
- * copied and put under another distribution licence |
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
- */ |
- |
-#include <limits.h> |
-#include <string.h> |
-#include <stdio.h> |
-#include "ssl_locl.h" |
-#include <openssl/buffer.h> |
-#include <openssl/rand.h> |
-#include <openssl/objects.h> |
-#include <openssl/evp.h> |
-#include <openssl/x509.h> |
- |
-#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(msg_len) (((msg_len) + 7) / 8) |
- |
-#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(bitmask, start, end) { \ |
- if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \ |
- long ii; \ |
- for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \ |
- } else { \ |
- long ii; \ |
- bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \ |
- for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \ |
- bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \ |
- } } |
- |
-#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \ |
- long ii; \ |
- OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \ |
- is_complete = 1; \ |
- if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \ |
- if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \ |
- if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } } |
- |
-#if 0 |
-#define RSMBLY_BITMASK_PRINT(bitmask, msg_len) { \ |
- long ii; \ |
- printf("bitmask: "); for (ii = 0; ii < (msg_len); ii++) \ |
- printf("%d ", (bitmask[ii >> 3] & (1 << (ii & 7))) >> (ii & 7)); \ |
- printf("\n"); } |
-#endif |
- |
-static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] = {0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80}; |
-static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f}; |
- |
-/* XDTLS: figure out the right values */ |
-static unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500 - 28, 512 - 28, 256 - 28}; |
- |
-static unsigned int dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu); |
-static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, |
- unsigned long frag_len); |
-static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, |
- unsigned char *p); |
-static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, |
- unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off, |
- unsigned long frag_len); |
-static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, |
- long max, int *ok); |
- |
-static hm_fragment * |
-dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly) |
- { |
- hm_fragment *frag = NULL; |
- unsigned char *buf = NULL; |
- unsigned char *bitmask = NULL; |
- |
- frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment)); |
- if ( frag == NULL) |
- return NULL; |
- |
- if (frag_len) |
- { |
- buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len); |
- if ( buf == NULL) |
- { |
- OPENSSL_free(frag); |
- return NULL; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */ |
- frag->fragment = buf; |
- |
- /* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */ |
- if (reassembly) |
- { |
- bitmask = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len)); |
- if (bitmask == NULL) |
- { |
- if (buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buf); |
- OPENSSL_free(frag); |
- return NULL; |
- } |
- memset(bitmask, 0, RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len)); |
- } |
- |
- frag->reassembly = bitmask; |
- |
- return frag; |
- } |
- |
-static void |
-dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag) |
- { |
- if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment); |
- if (frag->reassembly) OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly); |
- OPENSSL_free(frag); |
- } |
- |
-/* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */ |
-int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) |
- { |
- int ret; |
- int curr_mtu; |
- unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize; |
- |
- /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */ |
- if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) |
- { |
- s->d1->mtu = |
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL); |
- |
- /* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know |
- * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */ |
- if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu()) |
- { |
- s->d1->mtu = 0; |
- s->d1->mtu = dtls1_guess_mtu(s->d1->mtu); |
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU, |
- s->d1->mtu, NULL); |
- } |
- } |
-#if 0 |
- mtu = s->d1->mtu; |
- |
- fprintf(stderr, "using MTU = %d\n", mtu); |
- |
- mtu -= (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); |
- |
- curr_mtu = mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)); |
- |
- if ( curr_mtu > 0) |
- mtu = curr_mtu; |
- else if ( ( ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0) |
- return ret; |
- |
- if ( BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu) |
- { |
- ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s)); |
- if ( ret <= 0) |
- return ret; |
- mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH); |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
- OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()); /* should have something reasonable now */ |
- |
- if ( s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == |
- (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); |
- |
- if (s->write_hash) |
- mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); |
- else |
- mac_size = 0; |
- |
- if (s->enc_write_ctx && |
- (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)) |
- blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher); |
- else |
- blocksize = 0; |
- |
- frag_off = 0; |
- while( s->init_num) |
- { |
- curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) - |
- DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - mac_size - blocksize; |
- |
- if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) |
- { |
- /* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */ |
- ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s)); |
- if ( ret <= 0) |
- return ret; |
- curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - |
- mac_size - blocksize; |
- } |
- |
- if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu) |
- len = curr_mtu; |
- else |
- len = s->init_num; |
- |
- |
- /* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part */ |
- if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
- { |
- if ( s->init_off != 0) |
- { |
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); |
- s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- |
- /* write atleast DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes */ |
- if ( len <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) |
- len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- } |
- |
- dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, |
- len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); |
- |
- dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]); |
- |
- OPENSSL_assert(len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); |
- } |
- |
- ret=dtls1_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], |
- len); |
- if (ret < 0) |
- { |
- /* might need to update MTU here, but we don't know |
- * which previous packet caused the failure -- so can't |
- * really retransmit anything. continue as if everything |
- * is fine and wait for an alert to handle the |
- * retransmit |
- */ |
- if ( BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), |
- BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0 ) |
- s->d1->mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), |
- BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL); |
- else |
- return(-1); |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- |
- /* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake |
- * message got sent. but why would this happen? */ |
- OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret); |
- |
- if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting) |
- { |
- /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case |
- * we'll ignore the result anyway */ |
- unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]; |
- const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; |
- int xlen; |
- |
- if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
- { |
- /* reconstruct message header is if it |
- * is being sent in single fragment */ |
- *p++ = msg_hdr->type; |
- l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p); |
- s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p); |
- l2n3(0,p); |
- l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p); |
- p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- xlen = ret; |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- } |
- |
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen); |
- } |
- |
- if (ret == s->init_num) |
- { |
- if (s->msg_callback) |
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, |
- (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, |
- s->msg_callback_arg); |
- |
- s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */ |
- s->init_num = 0; |
- |
- return(1); |
- } |
- s->init_off+=ret; |
- s->init_num-=ret; |
- frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); |
- } |
- } |
- return(0); |
- } |
- |
- |
-/* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1), |
- * maximum acceptable body length 'max'. |
- * Read an entire handshake message. Handshake messages arrive in |
- * fragments. |
- */ |
-long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok) |
- { |
- int i, al; |
- struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr; |
- unsigned char *p; |
- unsigned long msg_len; |
- |
- /* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused |
- * by the absence of an optional handshake message */ |
- if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) |
- { |
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0; |
- if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt)) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- *ok=1; |
- s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size; |
- return s->init_num; |
- } |
- |
- msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr; |
- memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); |
- |
-again: |
- i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok); |
- if ( i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT || |
- i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) /* bad fragment received */ |
- goto again; |
- else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok) |
- return i; |
- |
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
- msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len; |
- |
- /* reconstruct message header */ |
- *(p++) = msg_hdr->type; |
- l2n3(msg_len,p); |
- s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p); |
- l2n3(0,p); |
- l2n3(msg_len,p); |
- if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { |
- p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- } |
- |
- ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len); |
- if (s->msg_callback) |
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, |
- p, msg_len, |
- s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
- |
- memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); |
- |
- /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */ |
- if (!s->d1->listen) |
- s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; |
- |
- s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- return s->init_num; |
- |
-f_err: |
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
- *ok = 0; |
- return -1; |
- } |
- |
- |
-static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s,struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,int max) |
- { |
- size_t frag_off,frag_len,msg_len; |
- |
- msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len; |
- frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off; |
- frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; |
- |
- /* sanity checking */ |
- if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > msg_len) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); |
- return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
- } |
- |
- if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > (unsigned long)max) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); |
- return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
- } |
- |
- if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */ |
- { |
- /* msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked |
- * against max above */ |
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
- return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
- } |
- |
- s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len; |
- s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len; |
- s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type; |
- s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type; |
- s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq; |
- } |
- else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len) |
- { |
- /* They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce |
- * upper limit would open possibility for buffer overrun. */ |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); |
- return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
- } |
- |
- return 0; /* no error */ |
- } |
- |
- |
-static int |
-dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok) |
- { |
- /* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available |
- * if so: |
- * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[] |
- * (2) update s->init_num |
- */ |
- pitem *item; |
- hm_fragment *frag; |
- int al; |
- |
- *ok = 0; |
- item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages); |
- if ( item == NULL) |
- return 0; |
- |
- frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; |
- |
- /* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */ |
- if (frag->reassembly != NULL) |
- return 0; |
- |
- if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq) |
- { |
- unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len; |
- pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages); |
- |
- al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&frag->msg_header,max); |
- |
- if (al==0) /* no alert */ |
- { |
- unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off], |
- frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len); |
- } |
- |
- dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); |
- pitem_free(item); |
- |
- if (al==0) |
- { |
- *ok = 1; |
- return frag_len; |
- } |
- |
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
- s->init_num = 0; |
- *ok = 0; |
- return -1; |
- } |
- else |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
- |
-static int |
-dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) |
- { |
- hm_fragment *frag = NULL; |
- pitem *item = NULL; |
- int i = -1, is_complete; |
- unsigned char seq64be[8]; |
- unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len; |
- |
- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len) |
- goto err; |
- |
- /* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set) |
- * maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum. |
- */ |
- if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list) |
- max_len = s->max_cert_list; |
- else |
- max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; |
- |
- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len) |
- goto err; |
- |
- /* Try to find item in queue */ |
- memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be)); |
- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8); |
- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq; |
- item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be); |
- |
- if (item == NULL) |
- { |
- frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1); |
- if ( frag == NULL) |
- goto err; |
- memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); |
- frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len; |
- frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0; |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data; |
- if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) |
- { |
- item = NULL; |
- frag = NULL; |
- goto err; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- |
- /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a |
- * retransmit and can be dropped. |
- */ |
- if (frag->reassembly == NULL) |
- { |
- unsigned char devnull [256]; |
- |
- while (frag_len) |
- { |
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, |
- devnull, |
- frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0); |
- if (i<=0) goto err; |
- frag_len -= i; |
- } |
- return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; |
- } |
- |
- /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ |
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, |
- frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0); |
- if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len) |
- goto err; |
- |
- RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off, |
- (long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len)); |
- |
- RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len, |
- is_complete); |
- |
- if (is_complete) |
- { |
- OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly); |
- frag->reassembly = NULL; |
- } |
- |
- if (item == NULL) |
- { |
- memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be)); |
- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8); |
- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq); |
- |
- item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag); |
- if (item == NULL) |
- { |
- goto err; |
- i = -1; |
- } |
- |
- pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); |
- } |
- |
- return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; |
- |
-err: |
- if (frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); |
- if (item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item); |
- *ok = 0; |
- return i; |
- } |
- |
- |
-static int |
-dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) |
-{ |
- int i=-1; |
- hm_fragment *frag = NULL; |
- pitem *item = NULL; |
- unsigned char seq64be[8]; |
- unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len; |
- |
- if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len) |
- goto err; |
- |
- /* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */ |
- memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be)); |
- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8); |
- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq; |
- item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be); |
- |
- /* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment, |
- * don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it. |
- */ |
- if (item != NULL && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len) |
- item = NULL; |
- |
- /* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is |
- * too far in the future, already in the queue or if we received |
- * a FINISHED before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale |
- * retransmit. |
- */ |
- if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq || |
- msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL || |
- (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) |
- { |
- unsigned char devnull [256]; |
- |
- while (frag_len) |
- { |
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, |
- devnull, |
- frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0); |
- if (i<=0) goto err; |
- frag_len -= i; |
- } |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len) |
- return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok); |
- |
- frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0); |
- if ( frag == NULL) |
- goto err; |
- |
- memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); |
- |
- if (frag_len) |
- { |
- /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */ |
- i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, |
- frag->fragment,frag_len,0); |
- if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len) |
- goto err; |
- } |
- |
- memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be)); |
- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8); |
- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq); |
- |
- item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag); |
- if ( item == NULL) |
- goto err; |
- |
- pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); |
- } |
- |
- return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY; |
- |
-err: |
- if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); |
- if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item); |
- *ok = 0; |
- return i; |
- } |
- |
- |
-static long |
-dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) |
- { |
- unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
- unsigned long len, frag_off, frag_len; |
- int i,al; |
- struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; |
- |
- redo: |
- /* see if we have the required fragment already */ |
- if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok) |
- { |
- if (*ok) s->init_num = frag_len; |
- return frag_len; |
- } |
- |
- /* read handshake message header */ |
- i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,wire, |
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0); |
- if (i <= 0) /* nbio, or an error */ |
- { |
- s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
- *ok = 0; |
- return i; |
- } |
- /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */ |
- if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- /* parse the message fragment header */ |
- dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr); |
- |
- /* |
- * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered |
- * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time |
- * While listening, we accept seq 1 (ClientHello with cookie) |
- * although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello) |
- */ |
- if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq && !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1)) |
- return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok); |
- |
- len = msg_hdr.msg_len; |
- frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off; |
- frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len; |
- |
- if (frag_len && frag_len < len) |
- return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok); |
- |
- if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 && |
- wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) |
- { |
- /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- |
- * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them |
- * if their format is correct. Does not count for |
- * 'Finished' MAC. */ |
- if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0) |
- { |
- if (s->msg_callback) |
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, |
- wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, |
- s->msg_callback_arg); |
- |
- s->init_num = 0; |
- goto redo; |
- } |
- else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */ |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- if ((al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&msg_hdr,max))) |
- goto f_err; |
- |
- /* XDTLS: ressurect this when restart is in place */ |
- s->state=stn; |
- |
- if ( frag_len > 0) |
- { |
- unsigned char *p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- |
- i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, |
- &p[frag_off],frag_len,0); |
- /* XDTLS: fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */ |
- if (i <= 0) |
- { |
- s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
- *ok = 0; |
- return i; |
- } |
- } |
- else |
- i = 0; |
- |
- /* XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the |
- * handshake to fail */ |
- if (i != (int)frag_len) |
- { |
- al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- *ok = 1; |
- |
- /* Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in |
- * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments' |
- * lengths: as soon as they sum up to handshake packet |
- * length, we assume we have got all the fragments. */ |
- s->init_num = frag_len; |
- return frag_len; |
- |
-f_err: |
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
- s->init_num = 0; |
- |
- *ok=0; |
- return(-1); |
- } |
- |
-int dtls1_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen) |
- { |
- unsigned char *p,*d; |
- int i; |
- unsigned long l; |
- |
- if (s->state == a) |
- { |
- d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
- p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
- |
- i=s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, |
- sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.finish_md); |
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i; |
- memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); |
- p+=i; |
- l=i; |
- |
- /* Copy the finished so we can use it for |
- * renegotiation checks |
- */ |
- if(s->type == SSL_ST_CONNECT) |
- { |
- OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
- memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, |
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); |
- s->s3->previous_client_finished_len=i; |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
- memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, |
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); |
- s->s3->previous_server_finished_len=i; |
- } |
- |
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16 |
- /* MSVC 1.5 does not clear the top bytes of the word unless |
- * I do this. |
- */ |
- l&=0xffff; |
-#endif |
- |
- d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l, 0, l); |
- s->init_num=(int)l+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- s->init_off=0; |
- |
- /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ |
- dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); |
- |
- s->state=b; |
- } |
- |
- /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */ |
- return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); |
- } |
- |
-/* for these 2 messages, we need to |
- * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init |
- * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero |
- * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init |
- * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign |
- * ssl->session->read_compression assign |
- * ssl->session->read_hash assign |
- */ |
-int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b) |
- { |
- unsigned char *p; |
- |
- if (s->state == a) |
- { |
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
- *p++=SSL3_MT_CCS; |
- s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; |
- s->init_num=DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- |
- if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { |
- s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++; |
- s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,p); |
- s->init_num+=2; |
- } |
- |
- s->init_off=0; |
- |
- dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0, |
- s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0); |
- |
- /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ |
- dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1); |
- |
- s->state=b; |
- } |
- |
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */ |
- return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)); |
- } |
- |
-static int dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(BUF_MEM *buf, unsigned long *l, X509 *x) |
- { |
- int n; |
- unsigned char *p; |
- |
- n=i2d_X509(x,NULL); |
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,(int)(n+(*l)+3))) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
- return 0; |
- } |
- p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[*l]); |
- l2n3(n,p); |
- i2d_X509(x,&p); |
- *l+=n+3; |
- |
- return 1; |
- } |
-unsigned long dtls1_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x) |
- { |
- unsigned char *p; |
- int i; |
- unsigned long l= 3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- BUF_MEM *buf; |
- |
- /* TLSv1 sends a chain with nothing in it, instead of an alert */ |
- buf=s->init_buf; |
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,10)) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
- return(0); |
- } |
- if (x != NULL) |
- { |
- X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx; |
- |
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,NULL)) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB); |
- return(0); |
- } |
- |
- X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx); |
- /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ |
- ERR_clear_error(); |
- for (i=0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) |
- { |
- x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i); |
- |
- if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x)) |
- { |
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); |
- return 0; |
- } |
- } |
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx); |
- } |
- /* Thawte special :-) */ |
- for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(s->ctx->extra_certs); i++) |
- { |
- x=sk_X509_value(s->ctx->extra_certs,i); |
- if (!dtls1_add_cert_to_buf(buf, &l, x)) |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
- l-= (3 + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); |
- |
- p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
- l2n3(l,p); |
- l+=3; |
- p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[0]); |
- p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l, 0, l); |
- |
- l+=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- return(l); |
- } |
- |
-int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code) |
- { |
- if ( code > 0) |
- { |
- fprintf( stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__); |
- return 1; |
- } |
- |
- if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) |
- { |
- /* not a timeout, none of our business, |
- let higher layers handle this. in fact it's probably an error */ |
- return code; |
- } |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) && !s->tlsext_hb_pending) /* done, no need to send a retransmit */ |
-#else |
- if (!SSL_in_init(s)) /* done, no need to send a retransmit */ |
-#endif |
- { |
- BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ); |
- return code; |
- } |
- |
-#if 0 /* for now, each alert contains only one record number */ |
- item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records); |
- if ( item ) |
- { |
- /* send an alert immediately for all the missing records */ |
- } |
- else |
-#endif |
- |
-#if 0 /* no more alert sending, just retransmit the last set of messages */ |
- if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts >= DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT) |
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, |
- DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); |
-#endif |
- |
- return dtls1_handle_timeout(s); |
- } |
- |
-int |
-dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs) |
- { |
- /* The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence number, |
- * since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake. However, the |
- * ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so using only the sequence |
- * will result in the CCS and Finished having the same index. To prevent this, |
- * the sequence number is multiplied by 2. In case of a CCS 1 is subtracted. |
- * This does not only differ CSS and Finished, it also maintains the order of the |
- * index (important for priority queues) and fits in the unsigned short variable. |
- */ |
- return seq * 2 - is_ccs; |
- } |
- |
-int |
-dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s) |
- { |
- pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages; |
- piterator iter; |
- pitem *item; |
- hm_fragment *frag; |
- int found = 0; |
- |
- iter = pqueue_iterator(sent); |
- |
- for ( item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter)) |
- { |
- frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; |
- if ( dtls1_retransmit_message(s, |
- (unsigned short)dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs), |
- 0, &found) <= 0 && found) |
- { |
- fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n"); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- return 1; |
- } |
- |
-int |
-dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs) |
- { |
- pitem *item; |
- hm_fragment *frag; |
- unsigned char seq64be[8]; |
- |
- /* this function is called immediately after a message has |
- * been serialized */ |
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0); |
- |
- frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0); |
- |
- memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num); |
- |
- if ( is_ccs) |
- { |
- OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + |
- ((s->version==DTLS1_VERSION)?DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH:3) == (unsigned int)s->init_num); |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + |
- DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num); |
- } |
- |
- frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len; |
- frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq; |
- frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type; |
- frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0; |
- frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len; |
- frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs; |
- |
- /* save current state*/ |
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx; |
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash; |
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress; |
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session; |
- frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch; |
- |
- memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be)); |
- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, |
- frag->msg_header.is_ccs)>>8); |
- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, |
- frag->msg_header.is_ccs)); |
- |
- item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag); |
- if ( item == NULL) |
- { |
- dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
-#if 0 |
- fprintf( stderr, "buffered messge: \ttype = %xx\n", msg_buf->type); |
- fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = %d\n", msg_buf->len); |
- fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tseq_num = %d\n", msg_buf->seq_num); |
-#endif |
- |
- pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item); |
- return 1; |
- } |
- |
-int |
-dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off, |
- int *found) |
- { |
- int ret; |
- /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */ |
- pitem *item; |
- hm_fragment *frag ; |
- unsigned long header_length; |
- unsigned char seq64be[8]; |
- struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state; |
- unsigned char save_write_sequence[8]; |
- |
- /* |
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0); |
- OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0); |
- */ |
- |
- /* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */ |
- memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be)); |
- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq>>8); |
- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)seq; |
- |
- item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be); |
- if ( item == NULL) |
- { |
- fprintf(stderr, "retransmit: message %d non-existant\n", seq); |
- *found = 0; |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
- *found = 1; |
- frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; |
- |
- if ( frag->msg_header.is_ccs) |
- header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- else |
- header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- |
- memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment, |
- frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length); |
- s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length; |
- |
- dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type, |
- frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, 0, |
- frag->msg_header.frag_len); |
- |
- /* save current state */ |
- saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx; |
- saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash; |
- saved_state.compress = s->compress; |
- saved_state.session = s->session; |
- saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch; |
- saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch; |
- |
- s->d1->retransmitting = 1; |
- |
- /* restore state in which the message was originally sent */ |
- s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx; |
- s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash; |
- s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress; |
- s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session; |
- s->d1->w_epoch = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch; |
- |
- if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1) |
- { |
- memcpy(save_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); |
- memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->d1->last_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); |
- } |
- |
- ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ? |
- SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); |
- |
- /* restore current state */ |
- s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx; |
- s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash; |
- s->compress = saved_state.compress; |
- s->session = saved_state.session; |
- s->d1->w_epoch = saved_state.epoch; |
- |
- if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1) |
- { |
- memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); |
- memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, save_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); |
- } |
- |
- s->d1->retransmitting = 0; |
- |
- (void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s)); |
- return ret; |
- } |
- |
-/* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */ |
-void |
-dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s) |
- { |
- pitem *item; |
- |
- for(item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages); |
- item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) |
- { |
- dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data); |
- pitem_free(item); |
- } |
- } |
- |
- |
-unsigned char * |
-dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt, |
- unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len) |
- { |
- /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */ |
- if (frag_off == 0 && !s->d1->listen) |
- { |
- s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; |
- s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++; |
- } |
- |
- dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq, |
- frag_off, frag_len); |
- |
- return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- } |
- |
- |
-/* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */ |
-static void |
-dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, |
- unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off, |
- unsigned long frag_len) |
- { |
- struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; |
- |
- msg_hdr->type = mt; |
- msg_hdr->msg_len = len; |
- msg_hdr->seq = seq_num; |
- msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off; |
- msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len; |
- } |
- |
-static void |
-dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, |
- unsigned long frag_len) |
- { |
- struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; |
- |
- msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off; |
- msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len; |
- } |
- |
-static unsigned char * |
-dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) |
- { |
- struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; |
- |
- *p++ = msg_hdr->type; |
- l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p); |
- |
- s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p); |
- l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p); |
- l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p); |
- |
- return p; |
- } |
- |
-unsigned int |
-dtls1_min_mtu(void) |
- { |
- return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) / |
- sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]); |
- } |
- |
-static unsigned int |
-dtls1_guess_mtu(unsigned int curr_mtu) |
- { |
- unsigned int i; |
- |
- if ( curr_mtu == 0 ) |
- return g_probable_mtu[0] ; |
- |
- for ( i = 0; i < sizeof(g_probable_mtu)/sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0]); i++) |
- if ( curr_mtu > g_probable_mtu[i]) |
- return g_probable_mtu[i]; |
- |
- return curr_mtu; |
- } |
- |
-void |
-dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) |
- { |
- memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); |
- msg_hdr->type = *(data++); |
- n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len); |
- |
- n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq); |
- n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off); |
- n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len); |
- } |
- |
-void |
-dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr) |
- { |
- memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st)); |
- |
- ccs_hdr->type = *(data++); |
- } |
- |
-int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s) |
- { |
- int ret; |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) && |
- !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) |
- { |
- ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s)); |
- if (ret < 0) return -1; |
- |
- if (ret == 0) |
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1, NULL); |
- } |
-#endif |
- ret = ssl3_shutdown(s); |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL); |
-#endif |
- return ret; |
- } |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
-int |
-dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) |
- { |
- unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; |
- unsigned short hbtype; |
- unsigned int payload; |
- unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ |
- |
- /* Read type and payload length first */ |
- hbtype = *p++; |
- n2s(p, payload); |
- pl = p; |
- |
- if (s->msg_callback) |
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, |
- &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, |
- s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
- |
- if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) |
- { |
- unsigned char *buffer, *bp; |
- int r; |
- |
- /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte |
- * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus |
- * payload, plus padding |
- */ |
- buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); |
- bp = buffer; |
- |
- /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ |
- *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; |
- s2n(payload, bp); |
- memcpy(bp, pl, payload); |
- bp += payload; |
- /* Random padding */ |
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding); |
- |
- r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding); |
- |
- if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) |
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, |
- buffer, 3 + payload + padding, |
- s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
- |
- OPENSSL_free(buffer); |
- |
- if (r < 0) |
- return r; |
- } |
- else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) |
- { |
- unsigned int seq; |
- |
- /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), |
- * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the |
- * sequence number */ |
- n2s(pl, seq); |
- |
- if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) |
- { |
- dtls1_stop_timer(s); |
- s->tlsext_hb_seq++; |
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
-int |
-dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) |
- { |
- unsigned char *buf, *p; |
- int ret; |
- unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ |
- unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ |
- |
- /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ |
- if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || |
- s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- |
- /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ |
- if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- |
- /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ |
- if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- |
- /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding |
- * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. |
- */ |
- OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); |
- |
- /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number |
- * as payload to distuingish different messages and add |
- * some random stuff. |
- * - Message Type, 1 byte |
- * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) |
- * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) |
- * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) |
- * - Padding |
- */ |
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); |
- p = buf; |
- /* Message Type */ |
- *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; |
- /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ |
- s2n(payload, p); |
- /* Sequence number */ |
- s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); |
- /* 16 random bytes */ |
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16); |
- p += 16; |
- /* Random padding */ |
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding); |
- |
- ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); |
- if (ret >= 0) |
- { |
- if (s->msg_callback) |
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, |
- buf, 3 + payload + padding, |
- s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
- |
- dtls1_start_timer(s); |
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; |
- } |
- |
- OPENSSL_free(buf); |
- |
- return ret; |
- } |
-#endif |