Delete bundled copy of OpenSSL and replace with README.

openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c

Index: openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
diff --git a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 88ee2cb557f0130e3031734d6e5855dc964560dd..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,915 +0,0 @@
-/* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- * 
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- * 
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- * 
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- * 
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- * 
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- *    distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- *    acknowledgment:
- *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-
-#ifndef RSA_NULL
-
-static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-		unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-		unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-		unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-		unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
-static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
-static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
-static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
-	"Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
-	RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
-	RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
-	RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
-	RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
-	RSA_eay_mod_exp,
-	BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if  e == 3 */
-	RSA_eay_init,
-	RSA_eay_finish,
-	0, /* flags */
-	NULL,
-	0, /* rsa_sign */
-	0, /* rsa_verify */
-	NULL /* rsa_keygen */
-	};
-
-const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
-	{
-	return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
-	}
-
-static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-	{
-	BIGNUM *f,*ret;
-	int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
-	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
-	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
-
-	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
-	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
-		{
-		if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
-			{
-			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		}
-	
-	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
-	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-	f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-	if (!f || !ret || !buf)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	switch (padding)
-		{
-	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-		i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
-		break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-	case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
-	        i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
-		break;
-#endif
-	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-		i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
-		break;
-	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-		i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
-		break;
-	default:
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	if (i <= 0) goto err;
-
-	if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
-	
-	if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
-		{
-		/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-		if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
-			goto err;
-
-	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
-		rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
-
-	/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
-	 * length of the modulus */
-	j=BN_num_bytes(ret);
-	i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j]));
-	for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
-		to[k]=0;
-
-	r=num;
-err:
-	if (ctx != NULL)
-		{
-		BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-		BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-		}
-	if (buf != NULL) 
-		{
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
-		OPENSSL_free(buf);
-		}
-	return(r);
-	}
-
-static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-	BN_BLINDING *ret;
-	int got_write_lock = 0;
-	CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
-
-	CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-
-	if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
-		{
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-		got_write_lock = 1;
-
-		if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
-			rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
-		}
-
-	ret = rsa->blinding;
-	if (ret == NULL)
-		goto err;
-
-	CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
-	if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret)))
-		{
-		/* rsa->blinding is ours! */
-
-		*local = 1;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		/* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
-
-		*local = 0; /* instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert()
-		             * that the BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses
-		             * require locks, and that the blinding factor must be
-		             * stored outside the BN_BLINDING
-		             */
-
-		if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
-			{
-			if (!got_write_lock)
-				{
-				CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-				CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-				got_write_lock = 1;
-				}
-			
-			if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
-				rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
-			}
-		ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
-		}
-
- err:
-	if (got_write_lock)
-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-	else
-		CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
-	BN_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	if (unblind == NULL)
-		/* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor
-		 * in BN_BLINDING. */
-		return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
-	else
-		{
-		/* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor
-		 * outside BN_BLINDING. */
-		int ret;
-		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
-		ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
-		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
-		return ret;
-		}
-	}
-
-static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
-	BN_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	/* For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
-	 * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING.
-	 * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
-	 * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor,
-	 * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING.
-	 * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock.
-	 */
-	return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
-	}
-
-/* signing */
-static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-	{
-	BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
-	int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
-	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
-	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
-	int local_blinding = 0;
-	/* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
-	 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
-	 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
-	BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
-	BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
-
-	if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
-	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-	f   = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-	if(!f || !ret || !buf)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	switch (padding)
-		{
-	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-		i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
-		break;
-	case RSA_X931_PADDING:
-		i=RSA_padding_add_X931(buf,num,from,flen);
-		break;
-	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-		i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
-		break;
-	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-	default:
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	if (i <= 0) goto err;
-
-	if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
-	
-	if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
-		{	
-		/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
-		{
-		blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
-		if (blinding == NULL)
-			{
-			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-	
-	if (blinding != NULL)
-		{
-		if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
-			{
-			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
-			goto err;
-		}
-
-	if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
-		((rsa->p != NULL) &&
-		(rsa->q != NULL) &&
-		(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
-		(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
-		(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
-		{ 
-		if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		BIGNUM local_d;
-		BIGNUM *d = NULL;
-		
-		if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-			{
-			BN_init(&local_d);
-			d = &local_d;
-			BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-			}
-		else
-			d= rsa->d;
-
-		if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-			if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
-				goto err;
-
-		if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
-				rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (blinding)
-		if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
-			goto err;
-
-	if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
-		{
-		BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
-		if (BN_cmp(ret, f))
-			res = f;
-		else
-			res = ret;
-		}
-	else
-		res = ret;
-
-	/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
-	 * length of the modulus */
-	j=BN_num_bytes(res);
-	i=BN_bn2bin(res,&(to[num-j]));
-	for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
-		to[k]=0;
-
-	r=num;
-err:
-	if (ctx != NULL)
-		{
-		BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-		BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-		}
-	if (buf != NULL)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
-		OPENSSL_free(buf);
-		}
-	return(r);
-	}
-
-static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-	{
-	BIGNUM *f, *ret;
-	int j,num=0,r= -1;
-	unsigned char *p;
-	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
-	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
-	int local_blinding = 0;
-	/* Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
-	 * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
-	 * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. */
-	BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
-	BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
-
-	if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
-	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-	f   = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-	if(!f || !ret || !buf)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	/* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
-	 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
-	if (flen > num)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	/* make data into a big number */
-	if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
-
-	if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
-		{
-		blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
-		if (blinding == NULL)
-			{
-			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		}
-	
-	if (blinding != NULL)
-		{
-		if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL))
-			{
-			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			goto err;
-			}
-		if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
-			goto err;
-		}
-
-	/* do the decrypt */
-	if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
-		((rsa->p != NULL) &&
-		(rsa->q != NULL) &&
-		(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
-		(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
-		(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
-		{
-		if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		BIGNUM local_d;
-		BIGNUM *d = NULL;
-		
-		if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-			{
-			d = &local_d;
-			BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-			}
-		else
-			d = rsa->d;
-
-		if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-			if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
-				goto err;
-		if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
-				rsa->_method_mod_n))
-		  goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (blinding)
-		if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
-			goto err;
-
-	p=buf;
-	j=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
-
-	switch (padding)
-		{
-	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-		r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
-		break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-        case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
-	        r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
-                break;
-#endif
- 	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-		r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
-		break;
-	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-		r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
-		break;
-	default:
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	if (r < 0)
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-
-err:
-	if (ctx != NULL)
-		{
-		BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-		BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-		}
-	if (buf != NULL)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
-		OPENSSL_free(buf);
-		}
-	return(r);
-	}
-
-/* signature verification */
-static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-	     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-	{
-	BIGNUM *f,*ret;
-	int i,num=0,r= -1;
-	unsigned char *p;
-	unsigned char *buf=NULL;
-	BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
-
-	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
-		return -1;
-		}
-
-	/* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
-	if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
-		{
-		if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
-			{
-			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		}
-	
-	if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
-	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-	f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-	buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-	if(!f || !ret || !buf)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	/* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
-	 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
-	if (flen > num)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
-
-	if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
-		{
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-		goto err;
-		}
-
-	if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-		if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
-			goto err;
-
-	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
-		rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
-
-	if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12))
-		if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) goto err;
-
-	p=buf;
-	i=BN_bn2bin(ret,p);
-
-	switch (padding)
-		{
-	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-		r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
-		break;
-	case RSA_X931_PADDING:
-		r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
-		break;
-	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-		r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
-		break;
-	default:
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-		goto err;
-		}
-	if (r < 0)
-		RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-
-err:
-	if (ctx != NULL)
-		{
-		BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-		BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-		}
-	if (buf != NULL)
-		{
-		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
-		OPENSSL_free(buf);
-		}
-	return(r);
-	}
-
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
-	{
-	BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
-	BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
-	BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
-	int ret=0;
-
-	BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-	r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-	vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-
-	{
-		BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
-		BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
-
-		/* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
-		 * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
-		 */
-		if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-			{
-			BN_init(&local_p);
-			p = &local_p;
-			BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
-			BN_init(&local_q);
-			q = &local_q;
-			BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-			}
-		else
-			{
-			p = rsa->p;
-			q = rsa->q;
-			}
-
-		if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
-			{
-			if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
-				goto err;
-			if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
-				goto err;
-			}
-	}
-
-	if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-		if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
-			goto err;
-
-	/* compute I mod q */
-	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-		{
-		c = &local_c;
-		BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-		if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
-		}
-
-	/* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
-	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-		{
-		dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
-		BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-		}
-	else
-		dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
-	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
-		rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
-
-	/* compute I mod p */
-	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-		{
-		c = &local_c;
-		BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-		if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
-		}
-	else
-		{
-		if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
-		}
-
-	/* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
-	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-		{
-		dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
-		BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-		}
-	else
-		dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
-	if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
-		rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
-
-	if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err;
-	/* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
-	 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
-	if (BN_is_negative(r0))
-		if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
-
-	if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
-
-	/* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
-	if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-		{
-		pr1 = &local_r1;
-		BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-		}
-	else
-		pr1 = r1;
-	if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
-
-	/* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
-	 * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
-	 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
-	 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
-	 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
-	 * they ensure p > q [steve]
-	 */
-	if (BN_is_negative(r0))
-		if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
-	if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
-	if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;
-
-	if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
-		{
-		if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
-		/* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
-		 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
-		 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
-		 * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
-		if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err;
-		if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
-		if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
-			if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
-		if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy))
-			{
-			/* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
-			 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
-			 * mod_exp and return that instead. */
-
-			BIGNUM local_d;
-			BIGNUM *d = NULL;
-		
-			if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
-				{
-				d = &local_d;
-				BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-				}
-			else
-				d = rsa->d;
-			if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx,
-						   rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
-			}
-		}
-	ret=1;
-err:
-	BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-	return(ret);
-	}
-
-static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
-	{
-	rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
-	{
-	if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
-		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
-	if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
-		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
-	if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
-		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
-	return(1);
-	}
-
-#endif