Index: openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c |
diff --git a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c |
deleted file mode 100644 |
index 028d48bb46e7843e79327b8b767eeff6af2d1375..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 |
--- a/openssl/ssl/d1_pkt.c |
+++ /dev/null |
@@ -1,1893 +0,0 @@ |
-/* ssl/d1_pkt.c */ |
-/* |
- * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu |
- * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. |
- */ |
-/* ==================================================================== |
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
- * |
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
- * are met: |
- * |
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
- * |
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
- * distribution. |
- * |
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
- * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
- * |
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
- * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
- * |
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
- * |
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
- * acknowledgment: |
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
- * |
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
- * ==================================================================== |
- * |
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
- * |
- */ |
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
- * All rights reserved. |
- * |
- * This package is an SSL implementation written |
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
- * |
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
- * |
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
- * the code are not to be removed. |
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
- * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
- * |
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
- * are met: |
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
- * must display the following acknowledgement: |
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
- * |
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
- * SUCH DAMAGE. |
- * |
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
- * copied and put under another distribution licence |
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
- */ |
- |
-#include <stdio.h> |
-#include <errno.h> |
-#define USE_SOCKETS |
-#include "ssl_locl.h" |
-#include <openssl/evp.h> |
-#include <openssl/buffer.h> |
-#include <openssl/pqueue.h> |
-#include <openssl/rand.h> |
- |
-/* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */ |
-static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2) |
-{ int ret,sat,brw,i; |
- |
- if (sizeof(long) == 8) do |
- { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1}; |
- long l; |
- |
- if (is_endian.little) break; |
- /* not reached on little-endians */ |
- /* following test is redundant, because input is |
- * always aligned, but I take no chances... */ |
- if (((size_t)v1|(size_t)v2)&0x7) break; |
- |
- l = *((long *)v1); |
- l -= *((long *)v2); |
- if (l>128) return 128; |
- else if (l<-128) return -128; |
- else return (int)l; |
- } while (0); |
- |
- ret = (int)v1[7]-(int)v2[7]; |
- sat = 0; |
- brw = ret>>8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */ |
- if (ret & 0x80) |
- { for (i=6;i>=0;i--) |
- { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i]; |
- sat |= ~brw; |
- brw >>= 8; |
- } |
- } |
- else |
- { for (i=6;i>=0;i--) |
- { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i]; |
- sat |= brw; |
- brw >>= 8; |
- } |
- } |
- brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */ |
- |
- if (sat&0xff) return brw | 0x80; |
- else return brw + (ret&0xFF); |
-} |
- |
-static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, |
- int len, int peek); |
-static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); |
-static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); |
-static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, |
- unsigned int *is_next_epoch); |
-#if 0 |
-static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, |
- unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset); |
-#endif |
-static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q, |
- unsigned char *priority); |
-static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s); |
- |
-/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */ |
-static int |
-dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item) |
- { |
- DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; |
- |
- rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; |
- |
- if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) |
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); |
- |
- s->packet = rdata->packet; |
- s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length; |
- memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); |
- memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); |
- |
- /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */ |
- memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6); |
- |
- return(1); |
- } |
- |
- |
-static int |
-dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority) |
- { |
- DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; |
- pitem *item; |
- |
- /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */ |
- if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100) |
- return 0; |
- |
- rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA)); |
- item = pitem_new(priority, rdata); |
- if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) |
- { |
- if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata); |
- if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item); |
- |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- return(0); |
- } |
- |
- rdata->packet = s->packet; |
- rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length; |
- memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); |
- memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); |
- |
- item->data = rdata; |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
- /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ |
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && |
- (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) { |
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
- s->packet = NULL; |
- s->packet_length = 0; |
- memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); |
- memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); |
- |
- if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- OPENSSL_free(rdata); |
- pitem_free(item); |
- return(0); |
- } |
- |
- /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */ |
- if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) |
- { |
- OPENSSL_free(rdata); |
- pitem_free(item); |
- return(0); |
- } |
- |
- return(1); |
- } |
- |
- |
-static int |
-dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue) |
- { |
- pitem *item; |
- |
- item = pqueue_pop(queue->q); |
- if (item) |
- { |
- dtls1_copy_record(s, item); |
- |
- OPENSSL_free(item->data); |
- pitem_free(item); |
- |
- return(1); |
- } |
- |
- return(0); |
- } |
- |
- |
-/* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed |
- * yet */ |
-#define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \ |
- dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ |
- &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds)) |
- |
-/* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */ |
-#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \ |
- dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ |
- &((s)->d1->processed_rcds)) |
- |
-static int |
-dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s) |
- { |
- pitem *item; |
- |
- item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q); |
- if (item) |
- { |
- /* Check if epoch is current. */ |
- if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) |
- return(1); /* Nothing to do. */ |
- |
- /* Process all the records. */ |
- while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) |
- { |
- dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s); |
- if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s)) |
- return(0); |
- dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds), |
- s->s3->rrec.seq_num); |
- } |
- } |
- |
- /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records |
- * have been processed */ |
- s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch; |
- s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1; |
- |
- return(1); |
- } |
- |
- |
-#if 0 |
- |
-static int |
-dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s) |
- { |
- pitem *item; |
- PQ_64BIT priority = |
- (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) | |
- ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off); |
- |
- if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating, |
- nothing buffered */ |
- return 0; |
- |
- |
- item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records); |
- if (item && item->priority == priority) |
- { |
- /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be |
- * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without |
- * buffering */ |
- DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; |
- item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records); |
- rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; |
- |
- if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) |
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); |
- |
- s->packet = rdata->packet; |
- s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length; |
- memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); |
- memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); |
- |
- OPENSSL_free(item->data); |
- pitem_free(item); |
- |
- /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */ |
- return(1); |
- } |
- |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
-#endif |
- |
-static int |
-dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) |
-{ |
- int i,al; |
- int enc_err; |
- SSL_SESSION *sess; |
- SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
- unsigned int mac_size, orig_len; |
- unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
- |
- rr= &(s->s3->rrec); |
- sess = s->session; |
- |
- /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, |
- * and we have that many bytes in s->packet |
- */ |
- rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
- |
- /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' |
- * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which |
- * need to be copied into rr->data by either |
- * the decryption or by the decompression |
- * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer, |
- * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ |
- |
- /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] |
- * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ |
- |
- /* check is not needed I believe */ |
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ |
- rr->data=rr->input; |
- |
- enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); |
- /* enc_err is: |
- * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. |
- * 1: if the padding is valid |
- * -1: if the padding is invalid */ |
- if (enc_err == 0) |
- { |
- /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */ |
- rr->length = 0; |
- s->packet_length = 0; |
- goto err; |
- } |
- |
-#ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
-printf("dec %d\n",rr->length); |
-{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } |
-printf("\n"); |
-#endif |
- |
- /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ |
- if ((sess != NULL) && |
- (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && |
- (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) |
- { |
- /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ |
- unsigned char *mac = NULL; |
- unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
- mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); |
- OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
- |
- /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */ |
- orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8); |
- |
- /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was |
- * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, |
- * therefore we can safely process the record in a different |
- * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. |
- */ |
- if (orig_len < mac_size || |
- /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ |
- (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && |
- orig_len < mac_size+1)) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
- { |
- /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes |
- * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract |
- * the MAC in constant time from within the record, |
- * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes. |
- * */ |
- mac = mac_tmp; |
- ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); |
- rr->length -= mac_size; |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| |
- * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's |
- * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */ |
- rr->length -= mac_size; |
- mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; |
- } |
- |
- i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */); |
- if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) |
- enc_err = -1; |
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size) |
- enc_err = -1; |
- } |
- |
- if (enc_err < 0) |
- { |
- /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ |
- rr->length = 0; |
- s->packet_length = 0; |
- goto err; |
- } |
- |
- /* r->length is now just compressed */ |
- if (s->expand != NULL) |
- { |
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- rr->off=0; |
- /* So at this point the following is true |
- * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record |
- * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record |
- * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte |
- * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment |
- * after use :-). |
- */ |
- |
- /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ |
- s->packet_length=0; |
- dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */ |
- return(1); |
- |
-f_err: |
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
-err: |
- return(0); |
-} |
- |
- |
-/* Call this to get a new input record. |
- * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error |
- * or non-blocking IO. |
- * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in |
- * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record |
- * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data |
- * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes |
- */ |
-/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */ |
-int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) |
- { |
- int ssl_major,ssl_minor; |
- int i,n; |
- SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
- unsigned char *p = NULL; |
- unsigned short version; |
- DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; |
- unsigned int is_next_epoch; |
- |
- rr= &(s->s3->rrec); |
- |
- /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the |
- * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */ |
- dtls1_process_buffered_records(s); |
- |
- /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */ |
- if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s)) |
- return 1; |
- |
- /* get something from the wire */ |
-again: |
- /* check if we have the header */ |
- if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || |
- (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) |
- { |
- n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); |
- /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */ |
- if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */ |
- |
- /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ |
- if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) |
- { |
- s->packet_length = 0; |
- goto again; |
- } |
- |
- s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY; |
- |
- p=s->packet; |
- |
- /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */ |
- rr->type= *(p++); |
- ssl_major= *(p++); |
- ssl_minor= *(p++); |
- version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor; |
- |
- /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ |
- n2s(p,rr->epoch); |
- |
- memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6); |
- p+=6; |
- |
- n2s(p,rr->length); |
- |
- /* Lets check version */ |
- if (!s->first_packet) |
- { |
- if (version != s->version) |
- { |
- /* unexpected version, silently discard */ |
- rr->length = 0; |
- s->packet_length = 0; |
- goto again; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) |
- { |
- /* wrong version, silently discard record */ |
- rr->length = 0; |
- s->packet_length = 0; |
- goto again; |
- } |
- |
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) |
- { |
- /* record too long, silently discard it */ |
- rr->length = 0; |
- s->packet_length = 0; |
- goto again; |
- } |
- |
- /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ |
- } |
- |
- /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ |
- |
- if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) |
- { |
- /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ |
- i=rr->length; |
- n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1); |
- if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */ |
- |
- /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ |
- if ( n != i) |
- { |
- rr->length = 0; |
- s->packet_length = 0; |
- goto again; |
- } |
- |
- /* now n == rr->length, |
- * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */ |
- } |
- s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ |
- |
- /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */ |
- bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); |
- if ( bitmap == NULL) |
- { |
- rr->length = 0; |
- s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ |
- goto again; /* get another record */ |
- } |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
- /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */ |
- if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) |
- { |
-#endif |
- /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. |
- * Don't check if we're listening and this message is |
- * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed, |
- * since they arrive from different connections and |
- * would be dropped unnecessarily. |
- */ |
- if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && |
- *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && |
- !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) |
- { |
- rr->length = 0; |
- s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */ |
- goto again; /* get another record */ |
- } |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
- /* just read a 0 length packet */ |
- if (rr->length == 0) goto again; |
- |
- /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), |
- * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it |
- * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer |
- * anything while listening. |
- */ |
- if (is_next_epoch) |
- { |
- if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) |
- { |
- dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num); |
- } |
- rr->length = 0; |
- s->packet_length = 0; |
- goto again; |
- } |
- |
- if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) |
- { |
- rr->length = 0; |
- s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ |
- goto again; /* get another record */ |
- } |
- |
- return(1); |
- |
- } |
- |
-/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. |
- * 'type' is one of the following: |
- * |
- * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) |
- * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) |
- * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) |
- * |
- * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first |
- * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). |
- * |
- * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as |
- * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really |
- * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. |
- * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store |
- * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol |
- * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): |
- * Change cipher spec protocol |
- * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored |
- * Alert protocol |
- * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) |
- * Handshake protocol |
- * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have |
- * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages |
- * here, anything else is handled by higher layers |
- * Application data protocol |
- * none of our business |
- */ |
-int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) |
- { |
- int al,i,j,ret; |
- unsigned int n; |
- SSL3_RECORD *rr; |
- void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL; |
- |
- if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ |
- if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) |
- return(-1); |
- |
- /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */ |
- if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && |
- (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) || |
- (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- |
- /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */ |
- if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek))) |
- return ret; |
- |
- /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
- /* Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read |
- * app data with SCTP. |
- */ |
- if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) || |
- (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && |
- (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK) && |
- s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2)) |
-#else |
- if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) |
-#endif |
- { |
- /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ |
- i=s->handshake_func(s); |
- if (i < 0) return(i); |
- if (i == 0) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
- return(-1); |
- } |
- } |
- |
-start: |
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
- |
- /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record |
- * s->s3->rrec.data, - data |
- * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read |
- * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ |
- rr = &(s->s3->rrec); |
- |
- /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet, |
- * so process data buffered during the last handshake |
- * in advance, if any. |
- */ |
- if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0) |
- { |
- pitem *item; |
- item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q); |
- if (item) |
- { |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
- /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ |
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) |
- { |
- DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data; |
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
- dtls1_copy_record(s, item); |
- |
- OPENSSL_free(item->data); |
- pitem_free(item); |
- } |
- } |
- |
- /* Check for timeout */ |
- if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0) |
- goto start; |
- |
- /* get new packet if necessary */ |
- if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) |
- { |
- ret=dtls1_get_record(s); |
- if (ret <= 0) |
- { |
- ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret); |
- /* anything other than a timeout is an error */ |
- if (ret <= 0) |
- return(ret); |
- else |
- goto start; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ |
- |
- if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, |
- * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ |
- && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) |
- { |
- /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished. |
- * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so |
- * buffer the application data for later processing rather |
- * than dropping the connection. |
- */ |
- dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num); |
- rr->length = 0; |
- goto start; |
- } |
- |
- /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away |
- * (even in 'peek' mode) */ |
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) |
- { |
- rr->length=0; |
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
- return(0); |
- } |
- |
- |
- if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ |
- { |
- /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we |
- * are doing a handshake for the first time */ |
- if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && |
- (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- if (len <= 0) return(len); |
- |
- if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) |
- n = rr->length; |
- else |
- n = (unsigned int)len; |
- |
- memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n); |
- if (!peek) |
- { |
- rr->length-=n; |
- rr->off+=n; |
- if (rr->length == 0) |
- { |
- s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; |
- rr->off=0; |
- } |
- } |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
- /* We were about to renegotiate but had to read |
- * belated application data first, so retry. |
- */ |
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && |
- rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && |
- (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)) |
- { |
- s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
- } |
- |
- /* We might had to delay a close_notify alert because |
- * of reordered app data. If there was an alert and there |
- * is no message to read anymore, finally set shutdown. |
- */ |
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && |
- s->d1->shutdown_received && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) |
- { |
- s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
- return(0); |
- } |
-#endif |
- return(n); |
- } |
- |
- |
- /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake |
- * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ |
- |
- /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, |
- * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. |
- */ |
- { |
- unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0; |
- unsigned char *dest = NULL; |
- unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; |
- |
- if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
- { |
- dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment; |
- dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment; |
- dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; |
- } |
- else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) |
- { |
- dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment); |
- dest = s->d1->alert_fragment; |
- dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len; |
- } |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
- else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) |
- { |
- dtls1_process_heartbeat(s); |
- |
- /* Exit and notify application to read again */ |
- rr->length = 0; |
- s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
- return(-1); |
- } |
-#endif |
- /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */ |
- else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) |
- { |
- /* Application data while renegotiating |
- * is allowed. Try again reading. |
- */ |
- if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) |
- { |
- BIO *bio; |
- s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; |
- bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); |
- s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); |
- BIO_set_retry_read(bio); |
- return(-1); |
- } |
- |
- /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */ |
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- if (dest_maxlen > 0) |
- { |
- /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello |
- * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */ |
- if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen) |
- { |
-#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE |
- /* |
- * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while |
- * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this |
- * non-existing alert... |
- */ |
- FIX ME |
-#endif |
- s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; |
- rr->length = 0; |
- goto start; |
- } |
- |
- /* now move 'n' bytes: */ |
- for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) |
- { |
- dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++]; |
- rr->length--; |
- } |
- *dest_len = dest_maxlen; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; |
- * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. |
- * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ |
- |
- /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ |
- if ((!s->server) && |
- (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && |
- (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && |
- (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) |
- { |
- s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0; |
- |
- if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || |
- (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || |
- (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); |
- goto err; |
- } |
- |
- /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */ |
- |
- if (s->msg_callback) |
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, |
- s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
- |
- if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && |
- !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && |
- !s->s3->renegotiate) |
- { |
- s->new_session = 1; |
- ssl3_renegotiate(s); |
- if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) |
- { |
- i=s->handshake_func(s); |
- if (i < 0) return(i); |
- if (i == 0) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
- return(-1); |
- } |
- |
- if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) |
- { |
- if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ |
- { |
- BIO *bio; |
- /* In the case where we try to read application data, |
- * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with |
- * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may |
- * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ |
- s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
- bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); |
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); |
- BIO_set_retry_read(bio); |
- return(-1); |
- } |
- } |
- } |
- } |
- /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, |
- * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ |
- goto start; |
- } |
- |
- if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) |
- { |
- int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0]; |
- int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1]; |
- |
- s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0; |
- |
- if (s->msg_callback) |
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, |
- s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
- |
- if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
- cb=s->info_callback; |
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
- cb=s->ctx->info_callback; |
- |
- if (cb != NULL) |
- { |
- j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; |
- cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); |
- } |
- |
- if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */ |
- { |
- s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; |
- if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) |
- { |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
- /* With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data |
- * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this |
- * first so that nothing gets discarded. |
- */ |
- if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && |
- BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) |
- { |
- s->d1->shutdown_received = 1; |
- s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
- BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
- return -1; |
- } |
-#endif |
- s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
- return(0); |
- } |
-#if 0 |
- /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */ |
- /* now check if it's a missing record */ |
- if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) |
- { |
- unsigned short seq; |
- unsigned int frag_off; |
- unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]); |
- |
- n2s(p, seq); |
- n2l3(p, frag_off); |
- |
- dtls1_retransmit_message(s, |
- dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0), |
- frag_off, &found); |
- if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s)) |
- { |
- /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */ |
- /* requested a message not yet sent, |
- send an alert ourselves */ |
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, |
- DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); |
- } |
- } |
-#endif |
- } |
- else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */ |
- { |
- char tmp[16]; |
- |
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
- s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); |
- BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr); |
- ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp); |
- s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; |
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); |
- return(0); |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- |
- goto start; |
- } |
- |
- if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */ |
- { |
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
- rr->length=0; |
- return(0); |
- } |
- |
- if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) |
- { |
- struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr; |
- unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- |
- dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr); |
- |
- if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
- ccs_hdr_len = 3; |
- |
- /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know |
- * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ |
- /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */ |
- if ( (rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) || |
- (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) |
- { |
- i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
- goto err; |
- } |
- |
- rr->length=0; |
- |
- if (s->msg_callback) |
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, |
- rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
- |
- /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake |
- * messages are still missing, so just drop it. |
- */ |
- if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok) |
- { |
- goto start; |
- } |
- |
- s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0; |
- |
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1; |
- if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) |
- goto err; |
- |
- /* do this whenever CCS is processed */ |
- dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); |
- |
- if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
- s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
- /* Remember that a CCS has been received, |
- * so that an old key of SCTP-Auth can be |
- * deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored |
- * if no SCTP is used |
- */ |
- BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); |
-#endif |
- |
- goto start; |
- } |
- |
- /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ |
- if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && |
- !s->in_handshake) |
- { |
- struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; |
- |
- /* this may just be a stale retransmit */ |
- dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr); |
- if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) |
- { |
- rr->length = 0; |
- goto start; |
- } |
- |
- /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the |
- * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED. |
- */ |
- if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) |
- { |
- if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0) |
- return -1; |
- |
- dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s); |
- rr->length = 0; |
- goto start; |
- } |
- |
- if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && |
- !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) |
- { |
-#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and |
- * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting |
- * protocol violations): */ |
- s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server) |
- ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT |
- :SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
-#else |
- s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
-#endif |
- s->renegotiate=1; |
- s->new_session=1; |
- } |
- i=s->handshake_func(s); |
- if (i < 0) return(i); |
- if (i == 0) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
- return(-1); |
- } |
- |
- if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) |
- { |
- if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ |
- { |
- BIO *bio; |
- /* In the case where we try to read application data, |
- * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with |
- * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may |
- * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ |
- s->rwstate=SSL_READING; |
- bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); |
- BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); |
- BIO_set_retry_read(bio); |
- return(-1); |
- } |
- } |
- goto start; |
- } |
- |
- switch (rr->type) |
- { |
- default: |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS |
- /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */ |
- if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) |
- { |
- rr->length = 0; |
- goto start; |
- } |
-#endif |
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
- goto f_err; |
- case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: |
- case SSL3_RT_ALERT: |
- case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: |
- /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception |
- * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that |
- * should not happen when type != rr->type */ |
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- goto f_err; |
- case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: |
- /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, |
- * but have application data. If the library was |
- * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data |
- * is set) and it makes sense to read application data |
- * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started), |
- * we will indulge it. |
- */ |
- if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && |
- (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && |
- (( |
- (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && |
- (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && |
- (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) |
- ) || ( |
- (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && |
- (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && |
- (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) |
- ) |
- )) |
- { |
- s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; |
- return(-1); |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); |
- goto f_err; |
- } |
- } |
- /* not reached */ |
- |
-f_err: |
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
-err: |
- return(-1); |
- } |
- |
-int |
-dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) |
- { |
- int i; |
- |
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
- /* Check if we have to continue an interrupted handshake |
- * for reading belated app data with SCTP. |
- */ |
- if ((SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) || |
- (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) && |
- (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK))) |
-#else |
- if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) |
-#endif |
- { |
- i=s->handshake_func(s); |
- if (i < 0) return(i); |
- if (i == 0) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG); |
- return -1; |
- } |
- |
- i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len); |
- return i; |
- } |
- |
- |
- /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake |
- * is started. */ |
-static int |
-have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, |
- int len, int peek) |
- { |
- |
- if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) |
- /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ |
- { |
- unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment; |
- unsigned char *dst = buf; |
- unsigned int k,n; |
- |
- /* peek == 0 */ |
- n = 0; |
- while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) |
- { |
- *dst++ = *src++; |
- len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--; |
- n++; |
- } |
- /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ |
- for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++) |
- s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; |
- return n; |
- } |
- |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
- |
- |
- |
-/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' |
- * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. |
- */ |
-int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len) |
- { |
- int i; |
- |
- OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); |
- s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
- i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0); |
- return i; |
- } |
- |
-int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) |
- { |
- unsigned char *p,*pseq; |
- int i,mac_size,clear=0; |
- int prefix_len = 0; |
- SSL3_RECORD *wr; |
- SSL3_BUFFER *wb; |
- SSL_SESSION *sess; |
- int bs; |
- |
- /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written |
- * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ |
- if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) |
- { |
- OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */ |
- return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len)); |
- } |
- |
- /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ |
- if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) |
- { |
- i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); |
- if (i <= 0) |
- return(i); |
- /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ |
- } |
- |
- if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) |
- return 0; |
- |
- wr= &(s->s3->wrec); |
- wb= &(s->s3->wbuf); |
- sess=s->session; |
- |
- if ( (sess == NULL) || |
- (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || |
- (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) |
- clear=1; |
- |
- if (clear) |
- mac_size=0; |
- else |
- { |
- mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); |
- if (mac_size < 0) |
- goto err; |
- } |
- |
- /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */ |
-#if 0 |
- /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */ |
- if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done |
- && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
- { |
- /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites |
- * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) |
- */ |
- |
- if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) |
- { |
- /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; |
- * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment |
- * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later |
- * together with the actual payload) */ |
- prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); |
- if (prefix_len <= 0) |
- goto err; |
- |
- if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) |
- { |
- /* insufficient space */ |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
- goto err; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; |
- } |
-#endif |
- p = wb->buf + prefix_len; |
- |
- /* write the header */ |
- |
- *(p++)=type&0xff; |
- wr->type=type; |
- |
- *(p++)=(s->version>>8); |
- *(p++)=s->version&0xff; |
- |
- /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */ |
- pseq=p; |
- p+=10; |
- |
- /* lets setup the record stuff. */ |
- |
- /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC. |
- * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck). |
- */ |
- if ( s->enc_write_ctx && |
- (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)) |
- bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher); |
- else |
- bs = 0; |
- |
- wr->data=p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */ |
- wr->length=(int)len; |
- wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf; |
- |
- /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into |
- * wr->data */ |
- |
- /* first we compress */ |
- if (s->compress != NULL) |
- { |
- if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) |
- { |
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); |
- goto err; |
- } |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length); |
- wr->input=wr->data; |
- } |
- |
- /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input |
- * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length. |
- * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */ |
- |
- if (mac_size != 0) |
- { |
- if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1) < 0) |
- goto err; |
- wr->length+=mac_size; |
- } |
- |
- /* this is true regardless of mac size */ |
- wr->input=p; |
- wr->data=p; |
- |
- |
- /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ |
- if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */ |
- { |
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs); |
- /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for |
- * the rest of randomness */ |
- wr->length += bs; |
- } |
- |
- s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1); |
- |
- /* record length after mac and block padding */ |
-/* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || |
- (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */ |
- |
- /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */ |
- |
- s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq); |
- |
- /* XDTLS: ?? */ |
-/* else |
- s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */ |
- |
- memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6); |
- pseq+=6; |
- s2n(wr->length,pseq); |
- |
- /* we should now have |
- * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is |
- * wr->length long */ |
- wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ |
- wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; |
- |
-#if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */ |
- /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */ |
- if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) |
- dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length, |
- *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]))); |
-#endif |
- |
- ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])); |
- |
- if (create_empty_fragment) |
- { |
- /* we are in a recursive call; |
- * just return the length, don't write out anything here |
- */ |
- return wr->length; |
- } |
- |
- /* now let's set up wb */ |
- wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; |
- wb->offset = 0; |
- |
- /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */ |
- s->s3->wpend_tot=len; |
- s->s3->wpend_buf=buf; |
- s->s3->wpend_type=type; |
- s->s3->wpend_ret=len; |
- |
- /* we now just need to write the buffer */ |
- return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len); |
-err: |
- return -1; |
- } |
- |
- |
- |
-static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) |
- { |
- int cmp; |
- unsigned int shift; |
- const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence; |
- |
- cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num); |
- if (cmp > 0) |
- { |
- memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8); |
- return 1; /* this record in new */ |
- } |
- shift = -cmp; |
- if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8) |
- return 0; /* stale, outside the window */ |
- else if (bitmap->map & (1UL<<shift)) |
- return 0; /* record previously received */ |
- |
- memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8); |
- return 1; |
- } |
- |
- |
-static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) |
- { |
- int cmp; |
- unsigned int shift; |
- const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence; |
- |
- cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num); |
- if (cmp > 0) |
- { |
- shift = cmp; |
- if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8) |
- bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL; |
- else |
- bitmap->map = 1UL; |
- memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num,seq,8); |
- } |
- else { |
- shift = -cmp; |
- if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8) |
- bitmap->map |= 1UL<<shift; |
- } |
- } |
- |
- |
-int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) |
- { |
- int i,j; |
- void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; |
- unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH]; |
- unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0]; |
- |
- s->s3->alert_dispatch=0; |
- |
- memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf)); |
- *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0]; |
- *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1]; |
- |
-#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE |
- if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) |
- { |
- s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr); |
-#if 0 |
- if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg */ |
- |
- else |
- s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */ |
-#endif |
- |
-#if 0 |
- fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq); |
-#endif |
- l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr); |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
- i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0); |
- if (i <= 0) |
- { |
- s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; |
- /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */ |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL |
-#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE |
- || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE |
-#endif |
- ) |
- (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); |
- |
- if (s->msg_callback) |
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, |
- 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
- |
- if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
- cb=s->info_callback; |
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
- cb=s->ctx->info_callback; |
- |
- if (cb != NULL) |
- { |
- j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1]; |
- cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j); |
- } |
- } |
- return(i); |
- } |
- |
- |
-static DTLS1_BITMAP * |
-dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch) |
- { |
- |
- *is_next_epoch = 0; |
- |
- /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */ |
- if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch) |
- return &s->d1->bitmap; |
- |
- /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */ |
- else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) && |
- (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || |
- rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) |
- { |
- *is_next_epoch = 1; |
- return &s->d1->next_bitmap; |
- } |
- |
- return NULL; |
- } |
- |
-#if 0 |
-static int |
-dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority, |
- unsigned long *offset) |
- { |
- |
- /* alerts are passed up immediately */ |
- if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || |
- rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) |
- return 0; |
- |
- /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway. |
- * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up |
- * immediately) */ |
- if ( SSL_in_init(s)) |
- { |
- unsigned char *data = rr->data; |
- /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */ |
- if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || |
- rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) |
- { |
- unsigned short seq_num; |
- struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; |
- struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr; |
- |
- if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) |
- { |
- dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr); |
- seq_num = msg_hdr.seq; |
- *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off; |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr); |
- seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq; |
- *offset = 0; |
- } |
- |
- /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a |
- * retransmit of something we happened to previously |
- * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */ |
- if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq) |
- return 0; |
- if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && |
- seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq && |
- msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off) |
- return 0; |
- else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq && |
- (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC || |
- msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)) |
- return 0; |
- else |
- { |
- *priority = seq_num; |
- return 1; |
- } |
- } |
- else /* unknown record type */ |
- return 0; |
- } |
- |
- return 0; |
- } |
-#endif |
- |
-void |
-dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw) |
- { |
- unsigned char *seq; |
- unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence); |
- |
- if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ) |
- { |
- seq = s->s3->read_sequence; |
- s->d1->r_epoch++; |
- memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP)); |
- memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP)); |
- } |
- else |
- { |
- seq = s->s3->write_sequence; |
- memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); |
- s->d1->w_epoch++; |
- } |
- |
- memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes); |
- } |