| Index: openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
|
| diff --git a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
|
| deleted file mode 100644
|
| index d75b9f7eb6776115f5702645c6d37450f95c5b57..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
|
| --- a/openssl/ssl/ssl_lib.c
|
| +++ /dev/null
|
| @@ -1,3378 +0,0 @@
|
| -/*! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c
|
| - * \brief Version independent SSL functions.
|
| - */
|
| -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
|
| - * All rights reserved.
|
| - *
|
| - * This package is an SSL implementation written
|
| - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
|
| - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
|
| - *
|
| - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
|
| - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
|
| - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
|
| - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
|
| - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
|
| - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
| - *
|
| - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
|
| - * the code are not to be removed.
|
| - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
|
| - * as the author of the parts of the library used.
|
| - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
|
| - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
|
| - *
|
| - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
| - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
| - * are met:
|
| - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
|
| - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
| - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
| - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
| - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
| - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
|
| - * must display the following acknowledgement:
|
| - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
|
| - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
|
| - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
|
| - * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
|
| - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
|
| - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
|
| - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
|
| - *
|
| - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
|
| - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
| - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
| - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
| - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
| - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
| - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
| - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
| - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
| - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
| - * SUCH DAMAGE.
|
| - *
|
| - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
|
| - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
|
| - * copied and put under another distribution licence
|
| - * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
|
| - */
|
| -/* ====================================================================
|
| - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
|
| - *
|
| - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
| - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
| - * are met:
|
| - *
|
| - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
| - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
| - *
|
| - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
| - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
|
| - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
|
| - * distribution.
|
| - *
|
| - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
|
| - * software must display the following acknowledgment:
|
| - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
| - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
|
| - *
|
| - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
|
| - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
|
| - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
|
| - * openssl-core@openssl.org.
|
| - *
|
| - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
|
| - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
|
| - * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
|
| - *
|
| - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
|
| - * acknowledgment:
|
| - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
|
| - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
|
| - *
|
| - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
|
| - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
| - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
|
| - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
|
| - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
|
| - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
|
| - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
|
| - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
| - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
| - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
|
| - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
|
| - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
| - * ====================================================================
|
| - *
|
| - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
|
| - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
|
| - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
|
| - *
|
| - */
|
| -/* ====================================================================
|
| - * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
|
| - * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
|
| - * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
|
| - */
|
| -/* ====================================================================
|
| - * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
|
| - *
|
| - * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
|
| - * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
|
| - * license.
|
| - *
|
| - * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
|
| - * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
|
| - * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
|
| - *
|
| - * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
|
| - * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
|
| - * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
|
| - *
|
| - * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
|
| - * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
|
| - * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
|
| - * to make use of the Contribution.
|
| - *
|
| - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
|
| - * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
|
| - * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
|
| - * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
|
| - * OTHERWISE.
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| -#ifdef REF_CHECK
|
| -# include <assert.h>
|
| -#endif
|
| -#include <stdio.h>
|
| -#include "ssl_locl.h"
|
| -#include "kssl_lcl.h"
|
| -#include <openssl/objects.h>
|
| -#include <openssl/lhash.h>
|
| -#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
|
| -#include <openssl/rand.h>
|
| -#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
| -#include <openssl/dh.h>
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
| -#include <openssl/engine.h>
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -const char *SSL_version_str=OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT;
|
| -
|
| -SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={
|
| - /* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */
|
| - (int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function,
|
| - (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
|
| - ssl_undefined_function,
|
| - (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function,
|
| - (int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function,
|
| - (int (*)(SSL *, const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
|
| - 0, /* finish_mac_length */
|
| - (int (*)(SSL *, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function,
|
| - NULL, /* client_finished_label */
|
| - 0, /* client_finished_label_len */
|
| - NULL, /* server_finished_label */
|
| - 0, /* server_finished_label_len */
|
| - (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function,
|
| - (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *,
|
| - size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t,
|
| - int use_context)) ssl_undefined_function,
|
| - };
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_clear(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| -
|
| - if (s->method == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED);
|
| - return(0);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s))
|
| - {
|
| - SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
| - s->session=NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - s->error=0;
|
| - s->hit=0;
|
| - s->shutdown=0;
|
| -
|
| -#if 0 /* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not
|
| - * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */
|
| - /* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep
|
| - * the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */
|
| - if (s->renegotiate) return(1);
|
| -#else
|
| - if (s->renegotiate)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - s->type=0;
|
| -
|
| - s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT);
|
| -
|
| - s->version=s->method->version;
|
| - s->client_version=s->version;
|
| - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
| - s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
|
| -#if 0
|
| - s->read_ahead=s->ctx->read_ahead;
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - if (s->init_buf != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
|
| - s->init_buf=NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
|
| - ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
|
| - ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
|
| -
|
| - s->first_packet=0;
|
| -
|
| -#if 1
|
| - /* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if
|
| - * so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */
|
| - if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method))
|
| - {
|
| - s->method->ssl_free(s);
|
| - s->method=s->ctx->method;
|
| - if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
|
| - return(0);
|
| - }
|
| - else
|
| -#endif
|
| - s->method->ssl_clear(s);
|
| - return(1);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */
|
| -int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,const SSL_METHOD *meth)
|
| - {
|
| - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
| -
|
| - ctx->method=meth;
|
| -
|
| - sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&(ctx->cipher_list),
|
| - &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
|
| - meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
|
| - if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0))
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
|
| - return(0);
|
| - }
|
| - return(1);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
| - {
|
| - SSL *s;
|
| -
|
| - if (ctx == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX);
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| - if (ctx->method == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION);
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - s=(SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL));
|
| - if (s == NULL) goto err;
|
| - memset(s,0,sizeof(SSL));
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
| - s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
|
| -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
| -
|
| - s->options=ctx->options;
|
| - s->mode=ctx->mode;
|
| - s->max_cert_list=ctx->max_cert_list;
|
| -
|
| - if (ctx->cert != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - /* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to
|
| - * the CERT, not its contents; only when setting new
|
| - * parameters for the per-SSL copy, ssl_cert_new would be
|
| - * called (and the direct reference to the per-SSL_CTX
|
| - * settings would be lost, but those still were indirectly
|
| - * accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they
|
| - * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert).
|
| - * Now we don't look at the SSL_CTX's CERT after having
|
| - * duplicated it once. */
|
| -
|
| - s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
|
| - if (s->cert == NULL)
|
| - goto err;
|
| - }
|
| - else
|
| - s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */
|
| -
|
| - s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead;
|
| - s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback;
|
| - s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg;
|
| - s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode;
|
| -#if 0
|
| - s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth;
|
| -#endif
|
| - s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length;
|
| - OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx);
|
| - memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx));
|
| - s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback;
|
| - s->session_creation_enabled=1;
|
| - s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id;
|
| -
|
| - s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
|
| - if (!s->param)
|
| - goto err;
|
| - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param);
|
| -#if 0
|
| - s->purpose = ctx->purpose;
|
| - s->trust = ctx->trust;
|
| -#endif
|
| - s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown;
|
| - s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment;
|
| -
|
| - CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
| - s->ctx=ctx;
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| - s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0;
|
| - s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL;
|
| - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
|
| - s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
|
| - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
|
| - s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
|
| - s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL;
|
| - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
|
| - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
|
| - CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
| - s->initial_ctx=ctx;
|
| -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
| - s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
|
| -# endif
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - s->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
|
| -
|
| - s->method=ctx->method;
|
| -
|
| - if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
|
| - goto err;
|
| -
|
| - s->references=1;
|
| - s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1;
|
| -
|
| - SSL_clear(s);
|
| -
|
| - CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
| - s->psk_client_callback=ctx->psk_client_callback;
|
| - s->psk_server_callback=ctx->psk_server_callback;
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - return(s);
|
| -err:
|
| - if (s != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->cert != NULL)
|
| - ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
|
| - if (s->ctx != NULL)
|
| - SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
|
| - OPENSSL_free(s);
|
| - }
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
|
| - unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
|
| - {
|
| - if(sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - ctx->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
|
| - memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);
|
| -
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx,
|
| - unsigned int sid_ctx_len)
|
| - {
|
| - if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG);
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - ssl->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len;
|
| - memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len);
|
| -
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
|
| - {
|
| - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
| - ctx->generate_session_id = cb;
|
| - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb)
|
| - {
|
| - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
|
| - ssl->generate_session_id = cb;
|
| - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id,
|
| - unsigned int id_len)
|
| - {
|
| - /* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how
|
| - * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to
|
| - * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with
|
| - * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in
|
| - * use by this SSL. */
|
| - SSL_SESSION r, *p;
|
| -
|
| - if(id_len > sizeof r.session_id)
|
| - return 0;
|
| -
|
| - r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
|
| - r.session_id_length = id_len;
|
| - memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
|
| - /* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a
|
| - * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it
|
| - * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be
|
| - * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */
|
| - if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) &&
|
| - (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
|
| - {
|
| - memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0,
|
| - SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len);
|
| - r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
| - p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
|
| - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
| - return (p != NULL);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose)
|
| - {
|
| - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose)
|
| - {
|
| - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust)
|
| - {
|
| - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust)
|
| - {
|
| - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
|
| - {
|
| - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
|
| - {
|
| - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_free(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - int i;
|
| -
|
| - if(s == NULL)
|
| - return;
|
| -
|
| - i=CRYPTO_add(&s->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);
|
| -#ifdef REF_PRINT
|
| - REF_PRINT("SSL",s);
|
| -#endif
|
| - if (i > 0) return;
|
| -#ifdef REF_CHECK
|
| - if (i < 0)
|
| - {
|
| - fprintf(stderr,"SSL_free, bad reference count\n");
|
| - abort(); /* ok */
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - if (s->param)
|
| - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param);
|
| -
|
| - CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data);
|
| -
|
| - if (s->bbio != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */
|
| - if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
|
| - {
|
| - s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
|
| - }
|
| - BIO_free(s->bbio);
|
| - s->bbio=NULL;
|
| - }
|
| - if (s->rbio != NULL)
|
| - BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
|
| - if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio))
|
| - BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
|
| -
|
| - if (s->init_buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
|
| -
|
| - /* add extra stuff */
|
| - if (s->cipher_list != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
|
| - if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
|
| -
|
| - /* Make the next call work :-) */
|
| - if (s->session != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - ssl_clear_bad_session(s);
|
| - SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
|
| - ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
|
| - ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
|
| -
|
| - if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
|
| - /* Free up if allocated */
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| - if (s->tlsext_hostname)
|
| - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname);
|
| - if (s->initial_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx);
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
|
| -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
|
| - if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input);
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
|
| - sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
|
| - X509_EXTENSION_free);
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids)
|
| - sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
|
| - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
|
| - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
|
| - if (s->tlsext_channel_id_private)
|
| - EVP_PKEY_free(s->tlsext_channel_id_private);
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - if (s->client_CA != NULL)
|
| - sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
|
| -
|
| - if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s);
|
| -
|
| - if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx);
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
| - if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL)
|
| - kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx);
|
| -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
| -
|
| -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
| - if (s->next_proto_negotiated)
|
| - OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
|
| - if (s->srtp_profiles)
|
| - sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles);
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - OPENSSL_free(s);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s,BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio)
|
| - {
|
| - /* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it
|
| - */
|
| - if (s->bbio != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->wbio == s->bbio)
|
| - {
|
| - s->wbio=s->wbio->next_bio;
|
| - s->bbio->next_bio=NULL;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio))
|
| - BIO_free_all(s->rbio);
|
| - if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio))
|
| - BIO_free_all(s->wbio);
|
| - s->rbio=rbio;
|
| - s->wbio=wbio;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s)
|
| - { return(s->rbio); }
|
| -
|
| -BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s)
|
| - { return(s->wbio); }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - return(SSL_get_rfd(s));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - int ret= -1;
|
| - BIO *b,*r;
|
| -
|
| - b=SSL_get_rbio(s);
|
| - r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
|
| - if (r != NULL)
|
| - BIO_get_fd(r,&ret);
|
| - return(ret);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - int ret= -1;
|
| - BIO *b,*r;
|
| -
|
| - b=SSL_get_wbio(s);
|
| - r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR);
|
| - if (r != NULL)
|
| - BIO_get_fd(r,&ret);
|
| - return(ret);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK
|
| -int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s,int fd)
|
| - {
|
| - int ret=0;
|
| - BIO *bio=NULL;
|
| -
|
| - bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
|
| -
|
| - if (bio == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
| - goto err;
|
| - }
|
| - BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
|
| - SSL_set_bio(s,bio,bio);
|
| - ret=1;
|
| -err:
|
| - return(ret);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s,int fd)
|
| - {
|
| - int ret=0;
|
| - BIO *bio=NULL;
|
| -
|
| - if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
|
| - || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio,NULL) != fd))
|
| - {
|
| - bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
|
| -
|
| - if (bio == NULL)
|
| - { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; }
|
| - BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
|
| - SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),bio);
|
| - }
|
| - else
|
| - SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),SSL_get_rbio(s));
|
| - ret=1;
|
| -err:
|
| - return(ret);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s,int fd)
|
| - {
|
| - int ret=0;
|
| - BIO *bio=NULL;
|
| -
|
| - if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET)
|
| - || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio,NULL) != fd))
|
| - {
|
| - bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket());
|
| -
|
| - if (bio == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
| - goto err;
|
| - }
|
| - BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE);
|
| - SSL_set_bio(s,bio,SSL_get_wbio(s));
|
| - }
|
| - else
|
| - SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_wbio(s),SSL_get_wbio(s));
|
| - ret=1;
|
| -err:
|
| - return(ret);
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -/* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */
|
| -size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
|
| - {
|
| - size_t ret = 0;
|
| -
|
| - if (s->s3 != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len;
|
| - if (count > ret)
|
| - count = ret;
|
| - memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count);
|
| - }
|
| - return ret;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */
|
| -size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count)
|
| - {
|
| - size_t ret = 0;
|
| -
|
| - if (s->s3 != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
|
| - if (count > ret)
|
| - count = ret;
|
| - memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count);
|
| - }
|
| - return ret;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - return(s->verify_mode);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
|
| - {
|
| - return(s->verify_callback);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
| - {
|
| - return(ctx->verify_mode);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
| - {
|
| - return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *)
|
| - {
|
| - return(ctx->default_verify_callback);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s,int mode,
|
| - int (*callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))
|
| - {
|
| - s->verify_mode=mode;
|
| - if (callback != NULL)
|
| - s->verify_callback=callback;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s,int depth)
|
| - {
|
| - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s,int yes)
|
| - {
|
| - s->read_ahead=yes;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - return(s->read_ahead);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_pending(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - /* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled
|
| - * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)),
|
| - * and it is impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report
|
| - * errors that may be observed while scanning the new data.
|
| - * (Note that SSL_pending() is often used as a boolean value,
|
| - * so we'd better not return -1.)
|
| - */
|
| - return(s->method->ssl_pending(s));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - X509 *r;
|
| -
|
| - if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL))
|
| - r=NULL;
|
| - else
|
| - r=s->session->peer;
|
| -
|
| - if (r == NULL) return(r);
|
| -
|
| - CRYPTO_add(&r->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
|
| -
|
| - return(r);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - STACK_OF(X509) *r;
|
| -
|
| - if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL))
|
| - r=NULL;
|
| - else
|
| - r=s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain;
|
| -
|
| - /* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own
|
| - * certificate; if we are a server, it does not. */
|
| -
|
| - return(r);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to
|
| - * modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled */
|
| -void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t,const SSL *f)
|
| - {
|
| - CERT *tmp;
|
| -
|
| - /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */
|
| - SSL_set_session(t,SSL_get_session(f));
|
| -
|
| - /* what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or
|
| - * vice-versa */
|
| - if (t->method != f->method)
|
| - {
|
| - t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */
|
| - t->method=f->method; /* change method */
|
| - t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - tmp=t->cert;
|
| - if (f->cert != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
|
| - t->cert=f->cert;
|
| - }
|
| - else
|
| - t->cert=NULL;
|
| - if (tmp != NULL) ssl_cert_free(tmp);
|
| - SSL_set_session_id_context(t,f->sid_ctx,f->sid_ctx_length);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */
|
| -int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
| - {
|
| - if ( (ctx == NULL) ||
|
| - (ctx->cert == NULL) ||
|
| - (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL))
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
|
| - return(0);
|
| - }
|
| - if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
|
| - return(0);
|
| - }
|
| - return(X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
|
| -int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl)
|
| - {
|
| - if (ssl == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
|
| - return(0);
|
| - }
|
| - if (ssl->cert == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED);
|
| - return(0);
|
| - }
|
| - if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED);
|
| - return(0);
|
| - }
|
| - return(X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509,
|
| - ssl->cert->key->privatekey));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_accept(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->handshake_func == 0)
|
| - /* Not properly initialized yet */
|
| - SSL_set_accept_state(s);
|
| -
|
| - return(s->method->ssl_accept(s));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_connect(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->handshake_func == 0)
|
| - /* Not properly initialized yet */
|
| - SSL_set_connect_state(s);
|
| -
|
| - return(s->method->ssl_connect(s));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - return(s->method->get_timeout());
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_read(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->handshake_func == 0)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
|
| - {
|
| - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
| - return(0);
|
| - }
|
| - return(s->method->ssl_read(s,buf,num));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_peek(SSL *s,void *buf,int num)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->handshake_func == 0)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
|
| - {
|
| - return(0);
|
| - }
|
| - return(s->method->ssl_peek(s,buf,num));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_write(SSL *s,const void *buf,int num)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->handshake_func == 0)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)
|
| - {
|
| - s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE,SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN);
|
| - return(-1);
|
| - }
|
| - return(s->method->ssl_write(s,buf,num));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - /* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might
|
| - * expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet),
|
| - * 1 for success; but calling it once is usually not enough,
|
| - * even if blocking I/O is used (see ssl3_shutdown).
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| - if (s->handshake_func == 0)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED);
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s))
|
| - return(s->method->ssl_shutdown(s));
|
| - else
|
| - return(1);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->renegotiate == 0)
|
| - s->renegotiate=1;
|
| -
|
| - s->new_session=1;
|
| -
|
| - return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->renegotiate == 0)
|
| - s->renegotiate=1;
|
| -
|
| - s->new_session=0;
|
| -
|
| - return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - /* becomes true when negotiation is requested;
|
| - * false again once a handshake has finished */
|
| - return (s->renegotiate != 0);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
|
| - {
|
| - long l;
|
| -
|
| - switch (cmd)
|
| - {
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
|
| - return(s->read_ahead);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
|
| - l=s->read_ahead;
|
| - s->read_ahead=larg;
|
| - return(l);
|
| -
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
|
| - s->msg_callback_arg = parg;
|
| - return 1;
|
| -
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
|
| - return(s->options|=larg);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
|
| - return(s->options&=~larg);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
|
| - return(s->mode|=larg);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
|
| - return(s->mode &=~larg);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
|
| - return(s->max_cert_list);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
|
| - l=s->max_cert_list;
|
| - s->max_cert_list=larg;
|
| - return(l);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
|
| - if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu())
|
| - return 0;
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION ||
|
| - SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
|
| - {
|
| - s->d1->mtu = larg;
|
| - return larg;
|
| - }
|
| - return 0;
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
|
| - if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
|
| - return 0;
|
| - s->max_send_fragment = larg;
|
| - return 1;
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT:
|
| - if (s->s3)
|
| - return s->s3->send_connection_binding;
|
| - else return 0;
|
| - default:
|
| - return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg));
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
|
| - {
|
| - switch(cmd)
|
| - {
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
|
| - s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
|
| - return 1;
|
| -
|
| - default:
|
| - return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp));
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
| - {
|
| - return ctx->sessions;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg)
|
| - {
|
| - long l;
|
| -
|
| - switch (cmd)
|
| - {
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD:
|
| - return(ctx->read_ahead);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD:
|
| - l=ctx->read_ahead;
|
| - ctx->read_ahead=larg;
|
| - return(l);
|
| -
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG:
|
| - ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg;
|
| - return 1;
|
| -
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
|
| - return(ctx->max_cert_list);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST:
|
| - l=ctx->max_cert_list;
|
| - ctx->max_cert_list=larg;
|
| - return(l);
|
| -
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
|
| - l=ctx->session_cache_size;
|
| - ctx->session_cache_size=larg;
|
| - return(l);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE:
|
| - return(ctx->session_cache_size);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
|
| - l=ctx->session_cache_mode;
|
| - ctx->session_cache_mode=larg;
|
| - return(l);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE:
|
| - return(ctx->session_cache_mode);
|
| -
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER:
|
| - return(lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions));
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT:
|
| - return(ctx->stats.sess_connect);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD:
|
| - return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE:
|
| - return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT:
|
| - return(ctx->stats.sess_accept);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD:
|
| - return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE:
|
| - return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT:
|
| - return(ctx->stats.sess_hit);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT:
|
| - return(ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES:
|
| - return(ctx->stats.sess_miss);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS:
|
| - return(ctx->stats.sess_timeout);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL:
|
| - return(ctx->stats.sess_cache_full);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS:
|
| - return(ctx->options|=larg);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS:
|
| - return(ctx->options&=~larg);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_MODE:
|
| - return(ctx->mode|=larg);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE:
|
| - return(ctx->mode&=~larg);
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
|
| - if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
|
| - return 0;
|
| - ctx->max_send_fragment = larg;
|
| - return 1;
|
| - default:
|
| - return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg));
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void))
|
| - {
|
| - switch(cmd)
|
| - {
|
| - case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK:
|
| - ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp);
|
| - return 1;
|
| -
|
| - default:
|
| - return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,cmd,fp));
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b)
|
| - {
|
| - long l;
|
| -
|
| - l=a->id-b->id;
|
| - if (l == 0L)
|
| - return(0);
|
| - else
|
| - return((l > 0)?1:-1);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER * const *ap,
|
| - const SSL_CIPHER * const *bp)
|
| - {
|
| - long l;
|
| -
|
| - l=(*ap)->id-(*bp)->id;
|
| - if (l == 0L)
|
| - return(0);
|
| - else
|
| - return((l > 0)?1:-1);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
|
| - * preference */
|
| -STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - return(s->cipher_list);
|
| - }
|
| - else if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
|
| - (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL))
|
| - {
|
| - return(s->ctx->cipher_list);
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of
|
| - * algorithm id */
|
| -STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - return(s->cipher_list_by_id);
|
| - }
|
| - else if ((s->ctx != NULL) &&
|
| - (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL))
|
| - {
|
| - return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id);
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */
|
| -const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s,int n)
|
| - {
|
| - SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
| - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
| -
|
| - if (s == NULL) return(NULL);
|
| - sk=SSL_get_ciphers(s);
|
| - if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n))
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,n);
|
| - if (c == NULL) return(NULL);
|
| - return(c->name);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */
|
| -int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
|
| - {
|
| - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
| -
|
| - sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list,
|
| - &ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str);
|
| - /* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it
|
| - * was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string
|
| - * (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which
|
| - * has been disabled). This is not an error as far as
|
| - * ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence
|
| - * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been
|
| - * updated. */
|
| - if (sk == NULL)
|
| - return 0;
|
| - else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
|
| -int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str)
|
| - {
|
| - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
| -
|
| - sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list,
|
| - &s->cipher_list_by_id,str);
|
| - /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */
|
| - if (sk == NULL)
|
| - return 0;
|
| - else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */
|
| -int SSL_set_cipher_lists(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk)
|
| - {
|
| - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list;
|
| -
|
| - if (sk == NULL)
|
| - return 0;
|
| -
|
| - /* Based on end of ssl_create_cipher_list */
|
| - tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(sk);
|
| - if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
|
| - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
|
| - s->cipher_list = sk;
|
| - if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
|
| - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
|
| - s->cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list;
|
| - (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(s->cipher_list_by_id,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
|
| -
|
| - sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(s->cipher_list_by_id);
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */
|
| -char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len)
|
| - {
|
| - char *p;
|
| - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
| - SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
| - int i;
|
| -
|
| - if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) ||
|
| - (len < 2))
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| -
|
| - p=buf;
|
| - sk=s->session->ciphers;
|
| - for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
|
| - {
|
| - int n;
|
| -
|
| - c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
|
| - n=strlen(c->name);
|
| - if (n+1 > len)
|
| - {
|
| - if (p != buf)
|
| - --p;
|
| - *p='\0';
|
| - return buf;
|
| - }
|
| - strcpy(p,c->name);
|
| - p+=n;
|
| - *(p++)=':';
|
| - len-=n+1;
|
| - }
|
| - p[-1]='\0';
|
| - return(buf);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p,
|
| - int (*put_cb)(const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *))
|
| - {
|
| - int i,j=0;
|
| - SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
| - unsigned char *q;
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
| - int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx);
|
| -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
| -
|
| - if (sk == NULL) return(0);
|
| - q=p;
|
| -
|
| - for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
|
| - {
|
| - c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
|
| - /* Skip TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites if lower than v1.2 */
|
| - if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
|
| - (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION))
|
| - continue;
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
| - if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)) &&
|
| - nokrb5)
|
| - continue;
|
| -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
| - /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
|
| - if (((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK) || (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) &&
|
| - s->psk_client_callback == NULL)
|
| - continue;
|
| -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
|
| - j = put_cb ? put_cb(c,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,c,p);
|
| - p+=j;
|
| - }
|
| - /* If p == q, no ciphers and caller indicates an error. Otherwise
|
| - * add SCSV if not renegotiating.
|
| - */
|
| - if (p != q && !s->renegotiate)
|
| - {
|
| - static SSL_CIPHER scsv =
|
| - {
|
| - 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
|
| - };
|
| - j = put_cb ? put_cb(&scsv,p) : ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,&scsv,p);
|
| - p+=j;
|
| -#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
|
| - fprintf(stderr, "SCSV sent by client\n");
|
| -#endif
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return(p-q);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num,
|
| - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp)
|
| - {
|
| - const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
| - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
|
| - int i,n;
|
| - if (s->s3)
|
| - s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
|
| -
|
| - n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL);
|
| - if ((num%n) != 0)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| - if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
|
| - sk=sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
|
| - else
|
| - {
|
| - sk= *skp;
|
| - sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - for (i=0; i<num; i+=n)
|
| - {
|
| - /* Check for SCSV */
|
| - if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
|
| - (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
|
| - (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff)))
|
| - {
|
| - /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
|
| - if (s->renegotiate)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
|
| - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
|
| - goto err;
|
| - }
|
| - s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
|
| - p += n;
|
| -#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
|
| - fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
|
| -#endif
|
| - continue;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p);
|
| - p+=n;
|
| - if (c != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk,c))
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| - goto err;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (skp != NULL)
|
| - *skp=sk;
|
| - return(sk);
|
| -err:
|
| - if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
|
| - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| -/** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL.
|
| - * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546).
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| -const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type)
|
| - {
|
| - if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
|
| - return NULL;
|
| -
|
| - return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ?
|
| - s->session->tlsext_hostname :
|
| - s->tlsext_hostname;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname))
|
| - return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
|
| - return -1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
| -/* SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is
|
| - * expected that this function is called from the callback set by
|
| - * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb.
|
| - *
|
| - * The protocol data is assumed to be a vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte
|
| - * strings. The length byte itself is not included in the length. A byte
|
| - * string of length 0 is invalid. No byte string may be truncated.
|
| - *
|
| - * The current, but experimental algorithm for selecting the protocol is:
|
| - *
|
| - * 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this is indicated to the
|
| - * callback. In this case, the client application has to abort the connection
|
| - * or have a default application level protocol.
|
| - *
|
| - * 2) If the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the
|
| - * client selects the first protcol in its list, but indicates via the
|
| - * API that this fallback case was enacted.
|
| - *
|
| - * 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first protocol in the server's list
|
| - * that it supports and selects this protocol. This is because it's
|
| - * assumed that the server has better information about which protocol
|
| - * a client should use.
|
| - *
|
| - * 4) If the client doesn't support any of the server's advertised
|
| - * protocols, then this is treated the same as case 2.
|
| - *
|
| - * It returns either
|
| - * OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was found, or
|
| - * OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached.
|
| - */
|
| -int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned int i, j;
|
| - const unsigned char *result;
|
| - int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED;
|
| -
|
| - /* For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */
|
| - for (i = 0; i < server_len; )
|
| - {
|
| - for (j = 0; j < client_len; )
|
| - {
|
| - if (server[i] == client[j] &&
|
| - memcmp(&server[i+1], &client[j+1], server[i]) == 0)
|
| - {
|
| - /* We found a match */
|
| - result = &server[i];
|
| - status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED;
|
| - goto found;
|
| - }
|
| - j += client[j];
|
| - j++;
|
| - }
|
| - i += server[i];
|
| - i++;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */
|
| - result = client;
|
| - status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP;
|
| -
|
| - found:
|
| - *out = (unsigned char *) result + 1;
|
| - *outlen = result[0];
|
| - return status;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the client's
|
| - * requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the client didn't
|
| - * request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL.
|
| - *
|
| - * Note that the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned
|
| - * from this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols
|
| - * provided by the callback.
|
| - */
|
| -void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len)
|
| - {
|
| - *data = s->next_proto_negotiated;
|
| - if (!*data) {
|
| - *len = 0;
|
| - } else {
|
| - *len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
|
| - }
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -/* SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when a
|
| - * TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol
|
| - * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is returned
|
| - * by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This memory will
|
| - * not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a reference to
|
| - * it.
|
| - *
|
| - * The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no
|
| - * such extension will be included in the ServerHello. */
|
| -void SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **out, unsigned int *outlen, void *arg), void *arg)
|
| - {
|
| - ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb = cb;
|
| - ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg = arg;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a
|
| - * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out|
|
| - * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|).
|
| - * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The server's
|
| - * advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The callback can
|
| - * assume that |in| is syntactically valid.
|
| - *
|
| - * The client must select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this
|
| - * callback returns a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK.
|
| - */
|
| -void SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg), void *arg)
|
| - {
|
| - ctx->next_proto_select_cb = cb;
|
| - ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg = arg;
|
| - }
|
| -# endif
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
|
| - const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen,
|
| - int use_context)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION)
|
| - return -1;
|
| -
|
| - return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label,
|
| - llen, p, plen,
|
| - use_context);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned long l;
|
| -
|
| - l=(unsigned long)
|
| - ((unsigned int) a->session_id[0] )|
|
| - ((unsigned int) a->session_id[1]<< 8L)|
|
| - ((unsigned long)a->session_id[2]<<16L)|
|
| - ((unsigned long)a->session_id[3]<<24L);
|
| - return(l);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of
|
| - * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure
|
| - * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being
|
| - * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session
|
| - * with a matching session ID. */
|
| -static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b)
|
| - {
|
| - if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
|
| - return(1);
|
| - if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
|
| - return(1);
|
| - return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring
|
| - * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each
|
| - * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed via
|
| - * ssl.h. */
|
| -static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
|
| -static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(ssl_session, SSL_SESSION)
|
| -
|
| -SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
|
| - {
|
| - SSL_CTX *ret=NULL;
|
| -
|
| - if (meth == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED);
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
|
| - if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION))
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS);
|
| - goto err;
|
| - }
|
| - ret=(SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX));
|
| - if (ret == NULL)
|
| - goto err;
|
| -
|
| - memset(ret,0,sizeof(SSL_CTX));
|
| -
|
| - ret->method=meth;
|
| -
|
| - ret->cert_store=NULL;
|
| - ret->session_cache_mode=SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER;
|
| - ret->session_cache_size=SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT;
|
| - ret->session_cache_head=NULL;
|
| - ret->session_cache_tail=NULL;
|
| -
|
| - /* We take the system default */
|
| - ret->session_timeout=meth->get_timeout();
|
| -
|
| - ret->new_session_cb=0;
|
| - ret->remove_session_cb=0;
|
| - ret->get_session_cb=0;
|
| - ret->generate_session_id=0;
|
| -
|
| - memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats));
|
| -
|
| - ret->references=1;
|
| - ret->quiet_shutdown=0;
|
| -
|
| -/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/
|
| -/* ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
|
| - ret->master_key=NULL;
|
| - ret->key_arg=NULL;
|
| - ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
|
| -
|
| - ret->info_callback=NULL;
|
| -
|
| - ret->app_verify_callback=0;
|
| - ret->app_verify_arg=NULL;
|
| -
|
| - ret->max_cert_list=SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT;
|
| - ret->read_ahead=0;
|
| - ret->msg_callback=0;
|
| - ret->msg_callback_arg=NULL;
|
| - ret->verify_mode=SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
|
| -#if 0
|
| - ret->verify_depth=-1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */
|
| -#endif
|
| - ret->sid_ctx_length=0;
|
| - ret->default_verify_callback=NULL;
|
| - if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL)
|
| - goto err;
|
| -
|
| - ret->default_passwd_callback=0;
|
| - ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL;
|
| - ret->client_cert_cb=0;
|
| - ret->app_gen_cookie_cb=0;
|
| - ret->app_verify_cookie_cb=0;
|
| -
|
| - ret->sessions=lh_SSL_SESSION_new();
|
| - if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err;
|
| - ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new();
|
| - if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err;
|
| -
|
| - ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
|
| - &ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id,
|
| - meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST);
|
| - if (ret->cipher_list == NULL
|
| - || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
|
| - goto err2;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
|
| - if (!ret->param)
|
| - goto err;
|
| -
|
| - if ((ret->rsa_md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES);
|
| - goto err2;
|
| - }
|
| - if ((ret->md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES);
|
| - goto err2;
|
| - }
|
| - if ((ret->sha1=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES);
|
| - goto err2;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)
|
| - goto err;
|
| -
|
| - CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data);
|
| -
|
| - ret->extra_certs=NULL;
|
| - ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
|
| -
|
| - ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| - ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0;
|
| - ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL;
|
| - /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */
|
| - if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0)
|
| - || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0)
|
| - || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0))
|
| - ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
|
| -
|
| - ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0;
|
| - ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL;
|
| -
|
| -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
| - ret->next_protos_advertised_cb = 0;
|
| - ret->next_proto_select_cb = 0;
|
| -# endif
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
| - ret->psk_identity_hint=NULL;
|
| - ret->psk_client_callback=NULL;
|
| - ret->psk_server_callback=NULL;
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
| - SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret);
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
|
| - ret->freelist_max_len = SSL_MAX_BUF_FREELIST_LEN_DEFAULT;
|
| - ret->rbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
|
| - if (!ret->rbuf_freelist)
|
| - goto err;
|
| - ret->rbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
|
| - ret->rbuf_freelist->len = 0;
|
| - ret->rbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
|
| - ret->wbuf_freelist = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST));
|
| - if (!ret->wbuf_freelist)
|
| - {
|
| - OPENSSL_free(ret->rbuf_freelist);
|
| - goto err;
|
| - }
|
| - ret->wbuf_freelist->chunklen = 0;
|
| - ret->wbuf_freelist->len = 0;
|
| - ret->wbuf_freelist->head = NULL;
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
| - ret->client_cert_engine = NULL;
|
| -#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO
|
| -#define eng_strx(x) #x
|
| -#define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x)
|
| - /* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */
|
| - {
|
| - ENGINE *eng;
|
| - eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
|
| - if (!eng)
|
| - {
|
| - ERR_clear_error();
|
| - ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
|
| - eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO));
|
| - }
|
| - if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng))
|
| - ERR_clear_error();
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -#endif
|
| - /* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely
|
| - * deployed might change this.
|
| - */
|
| - ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT;
|
| -
|
| - return(ret);
|
| -err:
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
| -err2:
|
| - if (ret != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ret);
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#if 0
|
| -static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp)
|
| - { OPENSSL_free(comp); }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
|
| -static void
|
| -ssl_buf_freelist_free(SSL3_BUF_FREELIST *list)
|
| - {
|
| - SSL3_BUF_FREELIST_ENTRY *ent, *next;
|
| - for (ent = list->head; ent; ent = next)
|
| - {
|
| - next = ent->next;
|
| - OPENSSL_free(ent);
|
| - }
|
| - OPENSSL_free(list);
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a)
|
| - {
|
| - int i;
|
| -
|
| - if (a == NULL) return;
|
| -
|
| - i=CRYPTO_add(&a->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
| -#ifdef REF_PRINT
|
| - REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX",a);
|
| -#endif
|
| - if (i > 0) return;
|
| -#ifdef REF_CHECK
|
| - if (i < 0)
|
| - {
|
| - fprintf(stderr,"SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n");
|
| - abort(); /* ok */
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - if (a->param)
|
| - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param);
|
| -
|
| - /*
|
| - * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference
|
| - * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed
|
| - * after the sessions were flushed.
|
| - * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache,
|
| - * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then
|
| - * free ex_data, then finally free the cache.
|
| - * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].)
|
| - */
|
| - if (a->sessions != NULL)
|
| - SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a,0);
|
| -
|
| - CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data);
|
| -
|
| - if (a->sessions != NULL)
|
| - lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions);
|
| -
|
| - if (a->cert_store != NULL)
|
| - X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store);
|
| - if (a->cipher_list != NULL)
|
| - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list);
|
| - if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
|
| - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id);
|
| - if (a->cert != NULL)
|
| - ssl_cert_free(a->cert);
|
| - if (a->client_CA != NULL)
|
| - sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA,X509_NAME_free);
|
| - if (a->extra_certs != NULL)
|
| - sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs,X509_free);
|
| -#if 0 /* This should never be done, since it removes a global database */
|
| - if (a->comp_methods != NULL)
|
| - sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods,SSL_COMP_free);
|
| -#else
|
| - a->comp_methods = NULL;
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
|
| - if (a->srtp_profiles)
|
| - sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles);
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
| - if (a->psk_identity_hint)
|
| - OPENSSL_free(a->psk_identity_hint);
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
|
| - SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a);
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
| - if (a->client_cert_engine)
|
| - ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine);
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUF_FREELISTS
|
| - if (a->wbuf_freelist)
|
| - ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->wbuf_freelist);
|
| - if (a->rbuf_freelist)
|
| - ssl_buf_freelist_free(a->rbuf_freelist);
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| - if (a->tlsext_channel_id_private)
|
| - EVP_PKEY_free(a->tlsext_channel_id_private);
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - OPENSSL_free(a);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb)
|
| - {
|
| - ctx->default_passwd_callback=cb;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx,void *u)
|
| - {
|
| - ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata=u;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg)
|
| - {
|
| - ctx->app_verify_callback=cb;
|
| - ctx->app_verify_arg=arg;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
|
| - {
|
| - ctx->verify_mode=mode;
|
| - ctx->default_verify_callback=cb;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth)
|
| - {
|
| - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher)
|
| - {
|
| - CERT_PKEY *cpk;
|
| - int rsa_enc,rsa_tmp,rsa_sign,dh_tmp,dh_rsa,dh_dsa,dsa_sign;
|
| - int rsa_enc_export,dh_rsa_export,dh_dsa_export;
|
| - int rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp_export,kl;
|
| - unsigned long mask_k,mask_a,emask_k,emask_a;
|
| - int have_ecc_cert, ecdh_ok, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size;
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| - int have_ecdh_tmp;
|
| -#endif
|
| - X509 *x = NULL;
|
| - EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL;
|
| - int signature_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0, md_nid = 0;
|
| -
|
| - if (c == NULL) return;
|
| -
|
| - kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher);
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| - rsa_tmp=(c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL);
|
| - rsa_tmp_export=(c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL ||
|
| - (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp)*8 <= kl));
|
| -#else
|
| - rsa_tmp=rsa_tmp_export=0;
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
| - dh_tmp=(c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL);
|
| - dh_tmp_export=(c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL ||
|
| - (dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp)*8 <= kl));
|
| -#else
|
| - dh_tmp=dh_tmp_export=0;
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| - have_ecdh_tmp=(c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL);
|
| -#endif
|
| - cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]);
|
| - rsa_enc= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
|
| - rsa_enc_export=(rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
|
| - cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]);
|
| - rsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
|
| - cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]);
|
| - dsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
|
| - cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]);
|
| - dh_rsa= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
|
| - dh_rsa_export=(dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
|
| - cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]);
|
| -/* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */
|
| - dh_dsa= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
|
| - dh_dsa_export=(dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl);
|
| - cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]);
|
| - have_ecc_cert= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL);
|
| - mask_k=0;
|
| - mask_a=0;
|
| - emask_k=0;
|
| - emask_a=0;
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -
|
| -#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
|
| - printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
|
| - rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,have_ecdh_tmp,
|
| - rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa);
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]);
|
| - if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
|
| - mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
|
| - mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01;
|
| - }
|
| - cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94]);
|
| - if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey !=NULL) {
|
| - mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
|
| - mask_a |= SSL_aGOST94;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign))
|
| - mask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
|
| - if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc)))
|
| - emask_k|=SSL_kRSA;
|
| -
|
| -#if 0
|
| - /* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */
|
| - if ( (dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) &&
|
| - (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
|
| - mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
|
| - if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) &&
|
| - (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign))
|
| - emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - if (dh_tmp_export)
|
| - emask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
|
| -
|
| - if (dh_tmp)
|
| - mask_k|=SSL_kEDH;
|
| -
|
| - if (dh_rsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHr;
|
| - if (dh_rsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHr;
|
| -
|
| - if (dh_dsa) mask_k|=SSL_kDHd;
|
| - if (dh_dsa_export) emask_k|=SSL_kDHd;
|
| -
|
| - if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign)
|
| - {
|
| - mask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
|
| - emask_a|=SSL_aRSA;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (dsa_sign)
|
| - {
|
| - mask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
|
| - emask_a|=SSL_aDSS;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - mask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
|
| - emask_a|=SSL_aNULL;
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
|
| - mask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
|
| - mask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
|
| - emask_k|=SSL_kKRB5;
|
| - emask_a|=SSL_aKRB5;
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or
|
| - * ECDSA cipher suites depending on the key usage extension.
|
| - */
|
| - if (have_ecc_cert)
|
| - {
|
| - /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
|
| - x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509;
|
| - X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
|
| - ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
|
| - (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1;
|
| - ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
|
| - (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
|
| - ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
|
| - ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ?
|
| - EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0;
|
| - EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey);
|
| - if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
|
| - {
|
| - signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
|
| - OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
|
| - }
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| - if (ecdh_ok)
|
| - {
|
| -
|
| - if (pk_nid == NID_rsaEncryption || pk_nid == NID_rsa)
|
| - {
|
| - mask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
|
| - mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
|
| - if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
|
| - {
|
| - emask_k|=SSL_kECDHr;
|
| - emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (pk_nid == NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
|
| - {
|
| - mask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
|
| - mask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
|
| - if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163)
|
| - {
|
| - emask_k|=SSL_kECDHe;
|
| - emask_a|=SSL_aECDH;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
|
| - if (ecdsa_ok)
|
| - {
|
| - mask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
|
| - emask_a|=SSL_aECDSA;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| - if (have_ecdh_tmp)
|
| - {
|
| - mask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
|
| - emask_k|=SSL_kEECDH;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
| - mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
|
| - mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
|
| - emask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
|
| - emask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - c->mask_k=mask_k;
|
| - c->mask_a=mask_a;
|
| - c->export_mask_k=emask_k;
|
| - c->export_mask_a=emask_a;
|
| - c->valid=1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */
|
| -#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
|
| - (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
|
| -
|
| -int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
|
| - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
| - int keysize = 0;
|
| - int signature_nid = 0, md_nid = 0, pk_nid = 0;
|
| - const SSL_CIPHER *cs = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
|
| -
|
| - alg_k = cs->algorithm_mkey;
|
| - alg_a = cs->algorithm_auth;
|
| -
|
| - if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs))
|
| - {
|
| - /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */
|
| - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
|
| - if (pkey == NULL) return 0;
|
| - keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
|
| - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
| - if (keysize > 163) return 0;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
|
| - X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
|
| - if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm))
|
| - {
|
| - signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm);
|
| - OBJ_find_sigid_algs(signature_nid, &md_nid, &pk_nid);
|
| - }
|
| - if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHe || alg_k & SSL_kECDHr)
|
| - {
|
| - /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */
|
| - if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT))
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_KEY_AGREEMENT);
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHe) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
|
| - {
|
| - /* signature alg must be ECDSA */
|
| - if (pk_nid != NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_SHA1_SIGNATURE);
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHr) && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
|
| - {
|
| - /* signature alg must be RSA */
|
| -
|
| - if (pk_nid != NID_rsaEncryption && pk_nid != NID_rsa)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_SHOULD_HAVE_RSA_SIGNATURE);
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
|
| - {
|
| - /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */
|
| - if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return 1; /* all checks are ok */
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -/* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */
|
| -CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned long alg_k,alg_a;
|
| - CERT *c;
|
| - int i;
|
| -
|
| - c=s->cert;
|
| - ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
|
| -
|
| - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
|
| - alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
| -
|
| - if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
|
| - {
|
| - /* we don't need to look at SSL_kEECDH
|
| - * since no certificate is needed for
|
| - * anon ECDH and for authenticated
|
| - * EECDH, the check for the auth
|
| - * algorithm will set i correctly
|
| - * NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC
|
| - * not an RSA cert but for EECDH-RSA
|
| - * we need an RSA cert. Placing the
|
| - * checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA
|
| - * checks ensures the correct cert is chosen.
|
| - */
|
| - i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
|
| - }
|
| - else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
|
| - {
|
| - i=SSL_PKEY_ECC;
|
| - }
|
| - else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
|
| - i=SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
|
| - else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
|
| - i=SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
|
| - else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
|
| - i=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
|
| - else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
|
| - {
|
| - if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL)
|
| - i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
|
| - else
|
| - i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
|
| - }
|
| - else if (alg_a & SSL_aKRB5)
|
| - {
|
| - /* VRS something else here? */
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| - else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
|
| - i=SSL_PKEY_GOST94;
|
| - else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
|
| - i=SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
|
| - else /* if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL) */
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return c->pkeys + i;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - CERT_PKEY *cpk;
|
| - cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
|
| - if (!cpk)
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - return cpk->x509;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD **pmd)
|
| - {
|
| - unsigned long alg_a;
|
| - CERT *c;
|
| - int idx = -1;
|
| -
|
| - alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
|
| - c=s->cert;
|
| -
|
| - if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) &&
|
| - (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
|
| - idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
|
| - else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
|
| - {
|
| - if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
|
| - idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
|
| - else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
|
| - idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
|
| - }
|
| - else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
|
| - (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
|
| - idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
|
| - if (idx == -1)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| - if (pmd)
|
| - *pmd = c->pkeys[idx].digest;
|
| - return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode)
|
| - {
|
| - int i;
|
| -
|
| - /* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it,
|
| - * and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */
|
| - if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return;
|
| -
|
| - i=s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
|
| - if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit)
|
| - && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)
|
| - || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx,s->session))
|
| - && (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL))
|
| - {
|
| - CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
|
| - if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session))
|
| - SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - /* auto flush every 255 connections */
|
| - if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) &&
|
| - ((i & mode) == mode))
|
| - {
|
| - if ( (((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT)
|
| - ?s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good
|
| - :s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff)
|
| - {
|
| - SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx,(unsigned long)time(NULL));
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - return(s->method);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
|
| - {
|
| - int conn= -1;
|
| - int ret=1;
|
| -
|
| - if (s->method != meth)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->handshake_func != NULL)
|
| - conn=(s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect);
|
| -
|
| - if (s->method->version == meth->version)
|
| - s->method=meth;
|
| - else
|
| - {
|
| - s->method->ssl_free(s);
|
| - s->method=meth;
|
| - ret=s->method->ssl_new(s);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (conn == 1)
|
| - s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_connect;
|
| - else if (conn == 0)
|
| - s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_accept;
|
| - }
|
| - return(ret);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int i)
|
| - {
|
| - int reason;
|
| - unsigned long l;
|
| - BIO *bio;
|
| -
|
| - if (i > 0) return(SSL_ERROR_NONE);
|
| -
|
| - /* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake
|
| - * etc, where we do encode the error */
|
| - if ((l=ERR_peek_error()) != 0)
|
| - {
|
| - if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS)
|
| - return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
|
| - else
|
| - return(SSL_ERROR_SSL);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s))
|
| - {
|
| - bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
|
| - if (BIO_should_read(bio))
|
| - return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
|
| - else if (BIO_should_write(bio))
|
| - /* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try
|
| - * to write to the rbio, and an application program where
|
| - * rbio and wbio are separate couldn't even know what it
|
| - * should wait for.
|
| - * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly
|
| - * (so that we have SSL_want_read(s) instead of
|
| - * SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same,
|
| - * this test works around that bug; so it might be safer
|
| - * to keep it. */
|
| - return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
|
| - else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio))
|
| - {
|
| - reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
|
| - if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
|
| - return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
|
| - else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
|
| - return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
|
| - else
|
| - return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s))
|
| - {
|
| - bio=SSL_get_wbio(s);
|
| - if (BIO_should_write(bio))
|
| - return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE);
|
| - else if (BIO_should_read(bio))
|
| - /* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */
|
| - return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ);
|
| - else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio))
|
| - {
|
| - reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio);
|
| - if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT)
|
| - return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT);
|
| - else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT)
|
| - return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT);
|
| - else
|
| - return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s))
|
| - {
|
| - return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP);
|
| - }
|
| - if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_channel_id_lookup(s))
|
| - {
|
| - return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (i == 0)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
|
| - {
|
| - /* assume it is the socket being closed */
|
| - return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
|
| - }
|
| - else
|
| - {
|
| - if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) &&
|
| - (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY))
|
| - return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - int ret=1;
|
| -
|
| - if (s->handshake_func == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE,SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET);
|
| - return(-1);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s);
|
| -
|
| - if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
|
| - {
|
| - ret=s->handshake_func(s);
|
| - }
|
| - return(ret);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so
|
| - * one of these calls will reset it */
|
| -void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - s->server=1;
|
| - s->shutdown=0;
|
| - s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
|
| - s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
|
| - /* clear the current cipher */
|
| - ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
|
| - ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
|
| - ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - s->server=0;
|
| - s->shutdown=0;
|
| - s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_BEFORE;
|
| - s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect;
|
| - /* clear the current cipher */
|
| - ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s);
|
| - ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash);
|
| - ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
|
| - return(0);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int ssl_undefined_void_function(void)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
|
| - return(0);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
|
| - return(0);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -static const char *ssl_get_version(int version)
|
| - {
|
| - if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
|
| - return("TLSv1.2");
|
| - else if (version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
|
| - return("TLSv1.1");
|
| - else if (version == TLS1_VERSION)
|
| - return("TLSv1");
|
| - else if (version == SSL3_VERSION)
|
| - return("SSLv3");
|
| - else if (version == SSL2_VERSION)
|
| - return("SSLv2");
|
| - else
|
| - return("unknown");
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - return ssl_get_version(s->version);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -const char *SSL_SESSION_get_version(const SSL_SESSION *s)
|
| - {
|
| - return ssl_get_version(s->ssl_version);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -const char* SSL_authentication_method(const SSL* ssl)
|
| - {
|
| - if (ssl->cert != NULL && ssl->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)
|
| - return SSL_TXT_RSA "_" SSL_TXT_EXPORT;
|
| - switch (ssl->version)
|
| - {
|
| - case SSL2_VERSION:
|
| - return SSL_TXT_RSA;
|
| - default:
|
| - return SSL_CIPHER_authentication_method(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk;
|
| - X509_NAME *xn;
|
| - SSL *ret;
|
| - int i;
|
| -
|
| - if ((ret=SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL)
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| -
|
| - ret->version = s->version;
|
| - ret->type = s->type;
|
| - ret->method = s->method;
|
| -
|
| - if (s->session != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */
|
| - SSL_copy_session_id(ret,s);
|
| - }
|
| - else
|
| - {
|
| - /* No session has been established yet, so we have to expect
|
| - * that s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later --
|
| - * they should not both point to the same object,
|
| - * and thus we can't use SSL_copy_session_id. */
|
| -
|
| - ret->method->ssl_free(ret);
|
| - ret->method = s->method;
|
| - ret->method->ssl_new(ret);
|
| -
|
| - if (s->cert != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - if (ret->cert != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - ssl_cert_free(ret->cert);
|
| - }
|
| - ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert);
|
| - if (ret->cert == NULL)
|
| - goto err;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - SSL_set_session_id_context(ret,
|
| - s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - ret->options=s->options;
|
| - ret->mode=s->mode;
|
| - SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret,SSL_get_max_cert_list(s));
|
| - SSL_set_read_ahead(ret,SSL_get_read_ahead(s));
|
| - ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback;
|
| - ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg;
|
| - SSL_set_verify(ret,SSL_get_verify_mode(s),
|
| - SSL_get_verify_callback(s));
|
| - SSL_set_verify_depth(ret,SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
|
| - ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id;
|
| -
|
| - SSL_set_info_callback(ret,SSL_get_info_callback(s));
|
| -
|
| - ret->debug=s->debug;
|
| -
|
| - /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */
|
| - if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data))
|
| - goto err;
|
| -
|
| - /* setup rbio, and wbio */
|
| - if (s->rbio != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio,(char *)&ret->rbio))
|
| - goto err;
|
| - }
|
| - if (s->wbio != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->wbio != s->rbio)
|
| - {
|
| - if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio,(char *)&ret->wbio))
|
| - goto err;
|
| - }
|
| - else
|
| - ret->wbio=ret->rbio;
|
| - }
|
| - ret->rwstate = s->rwstate;
|
| - ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake;
|
| - ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func;
|
| - ret->server = s->server;
|
| - ret->renegotiate = s->renegotiate;
|
| - ret->new_session = s->new_session;
|
| - ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown;
|
| - ret->shutdown=s->shutdown;
|
| - ret->state=s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, though */
|
| - ret->rstate=s->rstate;
|
| - ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf, ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, ret->init_off */
|
| - ret->hit=s->hit;
|
| -
|
| - X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param);
|
| -
|
| - /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */
|
| - if (s->cipher_list != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - if ((ret->cipher_list=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL)
|
| - goto err;
|
| - }
|
| - if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)
|
| - if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id))
|
| - == NULL)
|
| - goto err;
|
| -
|
| - /* Dup the client_CA list */
|
| - if (s->client_CA != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - if ((sk=sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL) goto err;
|
| - ret->client_CA=sk;
|
| - for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
|
| - {
|
| - xn=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
|
| - if (sk_X509_NAME_set(sk,i,X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - X509_NAME_free(xn);
|
| - goto err;
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - if (0)
|
| - {
|
| -err:
|
| - if (ret != NULL) SSL_free(ret);
|
| - ret=NULL;
|
| - }
|
| - return(ret);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx);
|
| - OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx);
|
| - s->enc_read_ctx=NULL;
|
| - }
|
| - if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx);
|
| - OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
|
| - s->enc_write_ctx=NULL;
|
| - }
|
| - if (s->aead_read_ctx != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&s->aead_read_ctx->ctx);
|
| - OPENSSL_free(s->aead_read_ctx);
|
| - s->aead_read_ctx = NULL;
|
| - }
|
| - if (s->aead_write_ctx != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&s->aead_write_ctx->ctx);
|
| - OPENSSL_free(s->aead_write_ctx);
|
| - s->aead_write_ctx = NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
| - if (s->expand != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
|
| - s->expand=NULL;
|
| - }
|
| - if (s->compress != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
|
| - s->compress=NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
|
| -X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->server)
|
| - return(ssl_get_server_send_cert(s));
|
| - else if (s->cert != NULL)
|
| - return(s->cert->key->x509);
|
| - else
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */
|
| -EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->cert != NULL)
|
| - return(s->cert->key->privatekey);
|
| - else
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
|
| - return(s->session->cipher);
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
|
| -const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -#else
|
| -
|
| -const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->compress != NULL)
|
| - return(s->compress->meth);
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->expand != NULL)
|
| - return(s->expand->meth);
|
| - return(NULL);
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push)
|
| - {
|
| - BIO *bbio;
|
| -
|
| - if (s->bbio == NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - bbio=BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer());
|
| - if (bbio == NULL) return(0);
|
| - s->bbio=bbio;
|
| - }
|
| - else
|
| - {
|
| - bbio=s->bbio;
|
| - if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
|
| - s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
|
| - }
|
| - (void)BIO_reset(bbio);
|
| -/* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */
|
| - if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio,1))
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
| - return(0);
|
| - }
|
| - if (push)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->wbio != bbio)
|
| - s->wbio=BIO_push(bbio,s->wbio);
|
| - }
|
| - else
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->wbio == bbio)
|
| - s->wbio=BIO_pop(bbio);
|
| - }
|
| - return(1);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s->bbio == NULL) return;
|
| -
|
| - if (s->bbio == s->wbio)
|
| - {
|
| - /* remove buffering */
|
| - s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio);
|
| -#ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids adding one more preprocessor symbol */
|
| - assert(s->wbio != NULL);
|
| -#endif
|
| - }
|
| - BIO_free(s->bbio);
|
| - s->bbio=NULL;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode)
|
| - {
|
| - ctx->quiet_shutdown=mode;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
| - {
|
| - return(ctx->quiet_shutdown);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode)
|
| - {
|
| - s->quiet_shutdown=mode;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - return(s->quiet_shutdown);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode)
|
| - {
|
| - s->shutdown=mode;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - return(s->shutdown);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_version(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - return(s->version);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl)
|
| - {
|
| - return(ssl->ctx);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx)
|
| - {
|
| - if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
|
| - return ssl->ctx;
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
|
| - if (ctx == NULL)
|
| - ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
|
| -#endif
|
| - if (ssl->cert != NULL)
|
| - ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
|
| - ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
|
| - CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
|
| - if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
|
| - SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
|
| - ssl->ctx = ctx;
|
| - return(ssl->ctx);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
|
| -int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
| - {
|
| - return(X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile,
|
| - const char *CApath)
|
| - {
|
| - return(X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store,CAfile,CApath));
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl,
|
| - void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val))
|
| - {
|
| - ssl->info_callback=cb;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned
|
| - function pointer. */
|
| -void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/)
|
| - {
|
| - return ssl->info_callback;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl)
|
| - {
|
| - return(ssl->state);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_set_state(SSL *ssl, int state)
|
| - {
|
| - ssl->state = state;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long arg)
|
| - {
|
| - ssl->verify_result=arg;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl)
|
| - {
|
| - return(ssl->verify_result);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
|
| - CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
|
| - {
|
| - return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp,
|
| - new_func, dup_func, free_func);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg)
|
| - {
|
| - return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s,int idx)
|
| - {
|
| - return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
|
| - CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
|
| - {
|
| - return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp,
|
| - new_func, dup_func, free_func);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg)
|
| - {
|
| - return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s,int idx)
|
| - {
|
| - return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int ssl_ok(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - return(1);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
|
| - {
|
| - return(ctx->cert_store);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509_STORE *store)
|
| - {
|
| - if (ctx->cert_store != NULL)
|
| - X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store);
|
| - ctx->cert_store=store;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_want(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - return(s->rwstate);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/*!
|
| - * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys.
|
| - * \param ctx the SSL context.
|
| - * \param cb the callback
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
|
| -void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
|
| - int is_export,
|
| - int keylength))
|
| - {
|
| - SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,
|
| - int is_export,
|
| - int keylength))
|
| - {
|
| - SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb);
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifdef DOXYGEN
|
| -/*!
|
| - * \brief The RSA temporary key callback function.
|
| - * \param ssl the SSL session.
|
| - * \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite.
|
| - * \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size
|
| - * of the required key in bits.
|
| - * \return the temporary RSA key.
|
| - * \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| -RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keylength)
|
| - {}
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -/*!
|
| - * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys.
|
| - * \param ctx the SSL context.
|
| - * \param dh the callback
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
|
| -void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
|
| - int keylength))
|
| - {
|
| - SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
|
| - int keylength))
|
| - {
|
| - SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh);
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
|
| -void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
|
| - int keylength))
|
| - {
|
| - SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export,
|
| - int keylength))
|
| - {
|
| - SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh);
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|
| -int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint)
|
| - {
|
| - if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - if (ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
|
| - OPENSSL_free(ctx->psk_identity_hint);
|
| - if (identity_hint != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
|
| - if (ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - else
|
| - ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s == NULL)
|
| - return 0;
|
| -
|
| - if (s->session == NULL)
|
| - return 1; /* session not created yet, ignored */
|
| -
|
| - if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
|
| - {
|
| - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
|
| - OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
|
| - if (identity_hint != NULL)
|
| - {
|
| - s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(identity_hint);
|
| - if (s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| - else
|
| - s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - return(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL)
|
| - return NULL;
|
| - return(s->session->psk_identity);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s,
|
| - unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
|
| - char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
|
| - unsigned int max_psk_len))
|
| - {
|
| - s->psk_client_callback = cb;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
| - unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *hint,
|
| - char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk,
|
| - unsigned int max_psk_len))
|
| - {
|
| - ctx->psk_client_callback = cb;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s,
|
| - unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
|
| - unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
|
| - {
|
| - s->psk_server_callback = cb;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
| - unsigned int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, const char *identity,
|
| - unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len))
|
| - {
|
| - ctx->psk_server_callback = cb;
|
| - }
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
|
| - {
|
| - SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
|
| - }
|
| -void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))
|
| - {
|
| - SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb);
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_cutthrough_complete(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - return (!s->server && /* cutthrough only applies to clients */
|
| - !s->hit && /* full-handshake */
|
| - s->version >= SSL3_VERSION &&
|
| - s->s3->in_read_app_data == 0 && /* cutthrough only applies to write() */
|
| - (SSL_get_mode((SSL*)s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) && /* cutthrough enabled */
|
| - ssl3_can_cutthrough(s) && /* cutthrough allowed */
|
| - s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 && /* not a renegotiation handshake */
|
| - (s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A || /* ready to write app-data*/
|
| - s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A));
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int ssl3_can_cutthrough(const SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - const SSL_CIPHER *c;
|
| -
|
| - /* require a strong enough cipher */
|
| - if (SSL_get_cipher_bits(s, NULL) < 128)
|
| - return 0;
|
| -
|
| - /* require NPN extension */
|
| -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
|
| - if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
|
| - return 0;
|
| -#else
|
| - return 0;
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| - /* require a forward-secret cipher */
|
| - c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s);
|
| - if (!c || (c->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kEDH &&
|
| - c->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kEECDH))
|
| - {
|
| - return 0;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| - return 1;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -/* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
|
| - * vairable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if
|
| - * any. If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md
|
| - * Returns newly allocated ctx;
|
| - */
|
| -
|
| -EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash,const EVP_MD *md)
|
| -{
|
| - ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash);
|
| - *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
|
| - if (md) EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash,md,NULL);
|
| - return *hash;
|
| -}
|
| -void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash)
|
| -{
|
| -
|
| - if (*hash) EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(*hash);
|
| - *hash=NULL;
|
| -}
|
| -
|
| -void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug)
|
| - {
|
| - s->debug = debug;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -int SSL_cache_hit(SSL *s)
|
| - {
|
| - return s->hit;
|
| - }
|
| -
|
| -#if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16)
|
| -#include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c"
|
| -#endif
|
| -
|
| -IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER)
|
| -IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
|
| -IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER,
|
| - ssl_cipher_id);
|
|
|
Chromium Code Reviews
Issue 2072073002:
Delete bundled copy of OpenSSL and replace with README. (Closed)
Base URL: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/deps/openssl@master